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Hoofdstuk 1
Een Nederlandstalige
samenvatting van dit
proefschrift
(A Dutch Summary of this
Dissertation)
If you can read English, please skip this chapter and proceed to p. 35.
Kun je geen Engels lezen, dan heb je het geluk om in dit hoofdstukin na-
volging van Artikel 102 van het FTW-reglement voor het doctoraatsexamen
in de toegepaste wetenschappeneen korte Nederlandstalige samenvatting
te vinden, die je in staat stelt om inzicht te krijgen in het volledige proef-
schrift en die voldoende gedetailleerd is om de essentie, de originaliteit, en
de wetenschappelijke waarde van dit proefschrift te kunnen begrijpen.
1.1 Inleiding
Het doel van dit proefschrift is tweevoudig. Ten eerste, willen we onder-
zoeken in hoeverre onderprevisies andere bekende onzekerheidsmodellen
verenigen en uitbreiden, en hoe ze tot een aanvaardbare notie van optimali-
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teit leiden. Ten tweede, willen we onderzoeken hoe een dynamisch systeem,
waarvan de onzekerheid beschreven wordt door zo'n geu¨niceerd model,
optimaal geregeld kan worden, en we willen eveneens onderzoeken of het
mogelijk is deze optimale regeling te vinden met behulp van een ecie¨nte
methode, namelijk, dynamisch programmeren.
We verwijzen naar Tabel 1.1 voor een vertaling van de technische termen.
1.2 Onderprevisies en optimaliteit
In deze paragraaf introduceren we de basisconcepten van de theorie van de
onderprevisies, die vooral ontwikkeld werd door Walley [86]. We demon-
streren eveneens het unicerend karakter van deze theorie, en we geven aan
hoe onderprevisies aanleiding geven tot een aantal welbekende noties van
optimaliteit.
1.2.1 Een gedragsgericht onzekerheidsmodel
Toevallige veranderlijken, gokken, en prijzen
Een toevallige veranderlijke is een, mogelijk onzekere, maar waarneembare
eigenschap van een systeem. Je kunt bijvoorbeeld denken aan de nog niet
gekende uitkomst van een experiment. De verzameling van waarden die een
toevallige veranderlijke X kan aannemen, noteren we met een kalligrasche
letter X, en een bepaalde waarde van X noemen we een realisatie van X en
wordt genoteerd door een kleine letter x. Observeren we dat de realisatie
van X gegeven is door x, dan schrijven we X = x.
We willen optimale regeling onder onzekerheid bestuderen. Specieker,
we willen onze kennis over de onzekere realisatie van de winst van een
systeem modelleren, en beslissingen nemenoptimale regeling reduceert
uiteindelijk tot het nemen van een beslissinggebaseerd op deze kennis. In
wat volgt zullen we een gedragsgericht onzekerheidsmodel suggereren. De-
ze modelleerkeuze is uitermate geschikt met het oog op optimale regeling,
gezien optimale regeling op zichzelf natuurlijk een vorm van gedrag is. Bij-
gevolg leidt elk voldoend gesostikeerd gedragsgericht kennismodel op een
natuurlijke wijze tot een notie van optimaliteit. Dit zullen we demonstreren
in paragraaf 1.2.4. Deze manier om naar kennis, en in het bijzonder, onze-
kerheid, te kijken, is natuurlijk niet nieuw: zie bijvoorbeeld Ramsey [65],
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Tabel 1.1: Vertaling van de technische termen
Engels Nederlands
behavioural gedragsgericht
random variable toevallige veranderlijke
realisation realisatie
gamble gok
random quantity ree¨elwaardige functie
event gebeurtenis
lower prevision onderprevisie
upper prevision bovenprevisie
prevision previsie
conjugate upper prevision toegevoegde bovenprevisie
self-conjugate zelftoegevoegd
avoiding sure loss zeker verlies vermijden
incuring sure loss zeker verlies oplopen
coherent coherent
vacuous niets-zeggend
probability charge waarschijnlijkheidslading
measure maat
set function verzamelingenfunctie
inner set function binnenverzamelingenfunctie
possibility measure possibiliteitsmaat
p-box p-doos
natural extension natuurlijke uitbreiding
linear extension lineaire uitbreiding
lower envelope onderomhullende
extended lower prevision veralgemeende onderprevisie
act-state (in)dependence actie-kennis(on)afhankelijkheid
Markov decision process markovbeslisproces
Markov chain markovketen
update herzien
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De Finetti [26], von Neumann en Morgenstern [83], Savage [69], Anscombe
en Aumann [2], Khaneman en Tversky [47], Walley [85], von Winterfeld en
Edwards [84], Seidenfeld, Schervish, en Kadane [72], en vele anderen.
We beginnen met een denitie: een gok f op een toevallige veranderlijke
X is een ree¨elwaardige winst, uitgedrukt in een eenheid van utiliteit die vast
verondersteld wordt, die begrensd is als functie van X. Wiskundig is een gok
f op X een begrensdeXR-afbeelding, en een gok wordt dus ge¨nterpreteerd
als een begrensde onzekere winst: als X = x, ontvangen we f (x). Wanneer
meerdere toevallige veranderlijken in het spel zijn, dan schrijven we soms
ook f (X) in plaats van f om te benadrukken dat f een gok is op de toeval-
lige veranderlijke X. De verzameling van alle gokken op X noteren we als
L(X). De beperking om alleen naar begrensde onzekere winsten te kijken is
tot op zekere hoogte een wiskundig gemak. We zullen verderop de theorie
grotendeels veralgemenen om ook over onbegrensde onzekere winsten iets
te kunnen zeggen. Een ree¨el getal a 2 R kan bijvoorbeeld ge¨denticeerd
worden met een constante gok a(x) := a voor alle x 2 X. Een andere speciale
klasse van gokken zijn deze die corresponderen tot zogenaamde gebeurtenis-
sen. Een gebeurtenis op X is een deelverzameling vanX. Met een gebeurtenis
A op X kunnen we een f0; 1g-waardige gok IA associe¨ren, die ons e´e´n eenheid
utiliteit geeft als de realisatie x van X tot A behoort, en anders niets. Deze
gok IA noemen we de indicator van A.
De onderprevisie P( f ) van een gok f is gedenieerd als de supremum
koopprijs voor f : P( f ) is de hoogste prijs s zodat voor elke t < s, we bereid
zijn t te betalen alvorens X te observeren, als we garantie krijgen f (x) te
ontvangen na observatie van X = x. Wiskundig is een onderprevisie op X
een ree¨elwaardige afbeelding gedenieerd op een deelverzameling dom P,
het domein van P, van L(X). Een onderprevisie hoeft niet op alle gokken
gedenieerd te zijn. Verderop zullen we beschrijven hoe een onderprevisie
kan uitgebreid worden tot de verzameling van alle gokken.
We kunnen een gok f natuurlijk ook interpreteren als een onzeker be-
grensd verlies. De bovenprevisie P( f ) van f is dan de inmum verkoopprijs
voor f : het is de laagste prijs s zodat voor elke t > s, we bereid zijn t te
ontvangen alvorens X te observeren, als we garantie krijgen f (x) te verliezen
na observatie van X = x. Gezien een winst r equivalent is met een verlies  r,
moet er gelden dat P( f ) =  P(  f ): voor elke onderprevisie P bestaat er een
zogenaamde toegevoegde bovenprevisie P op dom P =  dom P die hetzelfde
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gedrag modelleert. We kunnen ons daarom beperken tot de studie van on-
derprevisies, en we spreken af dat als P een onderprevisie voorstelt, P altijd
zijn toegevoegde voorstelt.
Het kan gebeuren dat P zelftoegevoegd is: dit gebeurt precies wanneer
dom P = dom P en P( f ) = P( f ) voor alle gokken f 2 dom P. In dat geval
schrijven we P in plaats van P of P, als het duidelijk is uit de context of we het
over aankoopprijzen of over verkoopprijzen hebben. Een zelftoegevoegde
onderprevisie noemen we ook gewoonweg een previsie, in navolging van De
Finetti [26], die previsies gebruikte om een gedragsgerichte interpretatie te
geven voor de klassieke waarschijnlijkheidsleer, gebaseerd op de notie van
verwachtingswaarde.
Het vermijden van zeker verlies, en coherentie
Onderprevisies impliceren dus een bereidheid bepaalde gokken te kopen
voor een bepaalde prijs. Indien het mogelijk is om een combinatie van gokken
in dom P te vinden, en aanvaardbare aankoopprijzen voor deze gokken (strikt
lager dan hun supremum aankoopprijs), zodanig dat we met zekerheid een
strikt positieve hoeveelheid utiliteit verliezen als we die gokken kopen voor
die aanvaardbare aankoopprijzen, dan zeggen we dat P zeker verlies oploopt.
Zo'n combinatie van gokken en aankoopprijzen wordt in het Engels ook wel
een `Dutch book' genoemd. In het andere geval zeggen we dat P zeker verlies
vermijdt. Uiteraard willen we dat onderprevisies zeker verlies vermijden; dit
idee werd voor het eerst geopperd door Ramsey [65, p. 182].
Het kan ook gebeuren dat we bereid zijn een gok f voor een hogere prijs
te kopen dan P( f ), na overweging van andere combinaties van gokken en
aanvaardbare aankoopprijzen. Is dit nimmer het geval, dan zeggen we dat P
coherent is; dit idee is afkomstig van Williams [92]. Coherente onderprevisies
voldoen aan een hele resem mooie eigenschappen; je kunt die vinden op
blz. 55 (Theorem 3.5). Indien het domein van P een lineaire ruimte is, dan is
P coherent als en slechts als ze de afbeelding inf (die een gok f afbeeldt op
zijn inmum) puntsgewijs domineert, positief homogeen is, en superadditief
is. Coherentie impliceert eveneens het vermijden van zeker verlies.
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Voorbeelden van coherente onderprevisies
Als belangrijkste voorbeelden van coherente onderprevisies, vermelden we
de volgende:
 waarschijnlijkheidsladingendit zijn eindig additieve waarschijnlijk-
heidsmaten, en waarschijnlijkheidsmaten zelf zijn hier dus een speciaal
geval van: zij  een waarschijnlijkheidslading, en denieer P(IA) :=
 P( IA) := (A) voor alle A in het domein van , dan is P een cohe-
rente previsie.
 2-monotone verzamelingenfunctieshierbij is een verzamelingenfunc-
tie een [0; 1]-waardige monotone afbeelding , gedenieerd op een
veld van gebeurtenissen op X, waarbij (;) = 0 en (X) = 1, en de-
ze wordt 2-monotoon genoemd als ze voldoet aan de ongelijkheid
(A [ B) + (A \ B)  (A) + (B) voor alle A en B in haar domein. Zij 
een 2-monotone verzamelingenfunctie en denie¨ren we P(IA) := (A)
voor alle A in het domein van , dan is P een coherente onderprevisie.
 possibiliteitsmatendit zijn gewoonweg supremumbehoudende ver-
zamelingenfuncties. Zij  een possibiliteitsmaat, en denie¨ren we
P(IA) := (A) voor alle A in het domein van , dan is P een cohe-
rente bovenprevisie.
Andere voorbeelden van coherente onderprevisies zijn:
 niets-zeggende onderprevisies ten opzichte van een niet-lege deelver-
zameling A van Xzij zijn gedenieerd door PA( f ) := infx2A f (x) voor
alle gokken f op X.
 geneste verzamelingenfunctiesdit zijn verzamelingenfuncties gede-
nieerd op een ketting van gebeurtenissen. Deze induceren coherente
previsies.
 minitieve en maxitieve verzamelingenfunctiesdit zijn minimum- en
maximumbehoudende verzamelingenfuncties. Minitieve induceren
coherente onderprevisies, en maxitieve induceren coherente bovenpre-
visies.
 cumulatieve distributiefuncties op een gesloten interval [a; b]zij F
een ree¨elwaardige functie op [a; b], en denie¨ren we PF(I[a;x]) := F(x)
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voor alle x in [a; b], dan is PF een coherente previsie als en slechts als
0  F(x)  F(b) = 1 voor alle x in [a; b], en F monotoon stijgend is.
 p-dozenzij F en F twee ree¨elwaardige functies op een gesloten in-
terval [a; b], en denie¨er P(F;F)(I[a;x]) := F(x) en  P(F;F)( I[a;x]) := F(x)
voor alle x in [a; b]. Dan is P(F;F) een coherente onderprevisie als en
slechts als 0  F(x)  F(x)  F(b) = F(b) = 1 voor alle x in [a; b], en
zowel F als F monotoon stijgend zijn.
1.2.2 Natuurlijke uitbreiding
Denitie en voorbeelden
De natuurlijke uitbreiding, ingevoerd door Walley [86], zegt hoe een onder-
previsie uitbreidt naar een groter domein, i.e., naar een grotere verzameling
gokken, en is essentieel om besluiten te trekken omtrent systemen waarvan
de onzekerheid beschreven wordt door onderprevisies, zoals optimaliteitsbe-
sluiten. Indien een onderprevisie zeker verlies vermijdt, dan is haar natuur-
lijke uitbreiding naar een verzameling gokken gedenieerd als haar meest
conservatieve coherente uitbreiding naar die verzameling; in geval ze zeker
verlies oploopt, heeft ze geen enkele coherente uitbreiding (zie ook Walley
[86]). Als het domein van een onderprevisie eindig is, dan kan haar natuurlij-
ke uitbreiding berekend worden aan de hand van een lineair programma (zie
vergelijking (4.1) op blz. 96 voor details). Dit programma komt in essentie
neer op het vinden van de hoogst mogelijke aanvaardbare aankoopprijs voor
een bepaalde gok, op basis van aanvaardbare aankoopprijzen voor gokken
in het domein van de onderprevisie.
Walley [86] beschouwt enkel natuurlijke uitbreiding tot de verzameling
van alle gokken. We kunnen echter gemakkelijk aantonen dat natuurlijke
uitbreiding tot een arbitraire verzameling van gokken (die het domein van
de onderprevisie bevat) alle oorspronkelijke eigenschappen van natuurlijke
uitbreiding behoudt. Dit is het gevolg van de transitiviteit van natuurlijke uit-
breiding: een natuurlijke uitbreiding van een natuurlijke uitbreiding van een
onderprevisie is opnieuw een natuurlijke uitbreiding van een onderprevisie
(zie Corollary 4.9 op blz. 98 voor details).
Vele uitbreidingsmethoden uit de literatuur zijn speciale gevallen van na-
tuurlijke uitbreiding. Denie¨ren we de lineaire uitbreiding van een onderpre-
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visie als haar natuurlijke uitbreiding tot het grootst mogelijke domein waar
deze uitbreiding zelftoegevoegd is, dan heeft deze lineaire uitbreiding alle
eigenschappen van een (additieve) integraal. Dit nodigt uit tot de volgende
denitie: noem een gok P-integreerbaar indien hij behoort tot het domein van
de lineaire uitbreiding van de onderprevisie P. Dan kunnen we de volgende
nieuwe resultaten bewijzen:
 Zij  een waarschijnlijkheidslading. Een gok is P-integreerbaar als en
slechts als ze Dunford-integreerbaar is ten opzichte van , in welk ge-
val de natuurlijke uitbreiding van P voor deze gok samenvalt met zijn
Dunford-integraal (de Dunford-integraal werd ingevoerd door Dun-
ford [31, p. 443, Sect. 3] en Dunford en Schwartz [30, Part I, Chapter III,
Denition 2.17, p. 112]). Merk echter op dat de Dunford-integraal niet
enkel gedenieerd is voor gokken, maar ook voor mogelijk onbegrens-
de ree¨elwaardige functies.
 Zij  een waarschijnlijkheidslading. De onder-S-integraal ten opzichte
van  valt samen met de natuurlijke uitbreiding van P (de S-integraal
werd ingevoerd, onder varie¨rende voorwaarden, door Moore en Smith
[57, Section 5, p. 114, ll. 1013], Kolmogoro [50, Zweites Kapitel, x2,
p. 663, Nr. 12], Hildebrandt [42, Sect. 1(f), p. 869], Gould [37, Deni-
tion 4.3, p. 201, en Denition 6.1& Theorem 6.2, p. 213], en Bhaskara
Rao en Bhaskara Rao [9, Section 4.5]; wij gebruiken enkel de boven- en
onder-S-integraal zoals gedenieerd door Bhaskara Rao en Bhaskara
Rao [9, Section 4.5]). Bijgevolg is een gok S-integreerbaar als en slechts
als hij Dunford-integreerbaar is, en vallen de twee integralen samen
op gokken (dit laatste feit was reeds bewezen op een compleet andere
manier door Bhaskara Rao en Bhaskara Rao [9, Section 4.5]).
 Riemann- en Riemann-Stieltjes-integratie zijn eveneens een bijzonder
geval van natuurlijke uitbreiding: de onder-Riemann-Stieltjes-integraal
ten opzichte van een coherente cumulatieve distributiefunctie F, ge-
denieerd analoog aan de manier waarop Darboux [14, Section II,
pp. 6471] de onder-Riemann-integraal denieert (zie Hildebrandt [43,
Chapter II, pp. 2732, in het bijzonder Denition 2.1, Denition 2.2,
Theorem 3.2 en Theorem 3.10] voor een discussie), valt samen met
de natuurlijke uitbreiding van de waarschijnlijkheidslading Fdie
gedenieerd is op het veld (niet het -veld) gegenereerd door alle in-
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tervallen waarvan de indicator Riemann-Stieltjes-integreerbaar is, en
die uniek bepaald is door de identiteit F([x; y]) = F(y)   F(x) voor
alle a  x  y  b zodat I[x;y] Riemann-Stieltjes-integreerbaar isals
en slechts als F in elk punt ofwel linkscontinu ofwel rechtscontinu is.
Noteer dat F de restrictie is van de zogenaamde Lebesgue-Stieltjes-
maat (zie Halmos [40, Section 15.9]) tot het veld gegenereerd door
alle `Riemann-Stieltjes-integreerbare intervallen'. Het is mogelijk om
alle waarschijnlijkheidsladingen te karakteriseren waarvan de natuur-
lijke uitbreiding samenvalt met een gegeven onder-Riemann-Stieltjes-
integraal: zie Theorem 4.52 op blz. 145 voor details. Als een bijzonder
geval hiervan vermelden we dat de onder-Riemann-integraal over het
eenheidsinterval [0; 1] samenvalt met de natuurlijke uitbreiding van
de restrictie van de Lebesgue-maat tot het veld gegenereerd door alle
intervallen in [0; 1].
 Als een gevolg van het voorgaande puntje, kunnen we eveneens ge-
makkelijk bewijzen dat de natuurlijke uitbreiding van een coheren-
te cumulatieve distributiefunctie F op [a; b] samenvalt met de onder-
Riemann-Stieltjes-integraal als en slechts als F(a) = 0 en F rechtscontinu
is in elk punt van het interval [a; b).
 Eveneens als gevolg van de karakterisatie van de Riemann-integraal
als speciaal geval van natuurlijke uitbreiding, vinden we twee nieuwe
uitdrukkingen voor de Choquet-integraal (een niet-additieve integraal
voor 2-monotone verzamelingenfuncties, zie Choquet [11, Section 48.1,
p. 265] voor een algemene denitie), in termen van een Dunford-
integraal, en in termen van een S-integraal.
We vermelden eveneens een aantal belangrijke reeds gekende resultaten uit
de literatuur, betreende 2-monotone verzamelingenfuncties en de Choquet-
integraal:
 De Choquet-integraal van een 2-monotone verzamelingenfunctie  valt
samen met de natuurlijke uitbreiding van P (Walley [85]).
 De binnenverzamelingenfunctie van een 2-monotone verzamelingen-
functie  is 2-monotoon, en valt samen met de natuurlijke uitbreiding
van P tot de klasse van alle gebeurtenissen (Walley [85] en Walley [86,
Corollary 3.1.9, p. 127]).
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Al deze resultaten geven enerzijds aan hoe natuurlijke uitbreiding onder
bepaalde voorwaarden kan berekend worden met behulp van traditionele
integratietechnieken, en anderzijds hoe de theorie van de onderprevisies, en
natuurlijke uitbreiding in het bijzonder, vele gekende onzekerheidstheorie-
en (en aanverwante wiskundige modellen, zoals integralen) omvat. Dit
ondersteunt de visie op de theorie van de onderprevisies als unicerend
model. Uiteraard zijn er ook onzekerheidsmodellen die niet omvat worden
door onderprevisies; we vermelden hierbij als belangrijk voorbeeld het model
gesuggereerd door Seidenfeld, Schervish, en Kadane [72].
Dualiteit
De natuurlijke uitbreiding van een onderprevisie valt samen met de onder-
omhullende van alle coherente previsies die haar domineren. Dit resultaat
werd bewezen door Walley [86, Sections 3.3.3&3.4.1, pp. 134136] in geval
van natuurlijke uitbreiding tot alle gokken. We kunnen dit resultaat veral-
gemenen voor natuurlijke uitbreiding tot een kleinere verzameling gokken.
Een bijzonder interessant gevolg van deze veralgemening, is dat indien alle
gokken in het domein van een onderprevisie meetbaar zijn ten opzichte van
een veld, we de natuurlijke uitbreiding tot alle gokken kunnen schrijven als
een onderomhullende van onder-S-integralen ten opzichte van alle waar-
schijnlijkheidsladingen op dit veld waarvan de S-integraal de onderprevisie
domineert; zie Corollary 4.88 op blz. 195 voor details. Dit resulteert in een
eenvoudigere duale uitdrukking voor natuurlijke uitbreiding.
1.2.3 Cauchy-uitbreiding
Er is e´e´n welbekende interessante uitbreidingstechniek, ontwikkeld door
Dunford [31] in integraaltheorie, die niet door natuurlijke uitbreiding ge-
dekt wordt. Deze uitbreidingstechniek verdient onze aandacht omdat hij
uitbreidt tot ree¨elwaardige functies die niet noodzakelijk begrensd zijn. Vele
problemen in regeltheorie vereisen de behandeling van onbegrensde ree¨le
veranderlijken: bijvoorbeeld, een kwadratische kostenfunctie is onbegrensd
als functie van de toestand en de regeling van het systeem. Daar wij optimale
regeling op het oog hebben, dringt een studie van onbegrensde veranderlij-
ken zich op. De uitbreiding van Dunford's idee (oorspronkelijk ontworpen
ter uitbreiding van integralen tot onbegrensde functies, en gebaseerd op
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Cauchy-rijen) tot onderprevisies laten we achterwege in deze samenvatting,
en we beperken ons tot een losse formulering van de belangrijkste resultaten
van deze studie:
 De theorie van de onderprevisies kan worden uitgebreid tot supremum
aankoopprijzen voor ree¨elwaardige functies die niet noodzakelijk be-
grensd zijn, als we ook  1 en +1 als mogelijke supremum aankoop-
prijs beschouwen ( 1 betekent nooit aankopen ongeacht de prijs, en
+1 betekent altijd aankopen ongeacht de prijs). Een afbeelding van
een verzameling ree¨elwaardige functies tot supremum aankoopprijzen
noemen we een veralgemeende onderprevisie. De begrippen `zeker
verlies vermijden', `coherentie', en `natuurlijke uitbreiding' veralgeme-
nen op een bijna voor de hand liggende wijze. Het dualiteitsresultaat,
i.e., natuurlijke uitbreiding als onderomhullende van veralgemeende
previsies, veralgemeent slechts in beperkte mate: technische beperkin-
gen op het domein van de veralgemeende onderprevisies zijn vereist.
 De natuurlijke uitbreiding van een onderprevisie tot een veralgemeen-
de onderprevisie neemt de waarde  1 aan op elke ree¨elwaardige func-
tie die onbegrensd is naar onder. Dat betekent dat de natuurlijke uit-
breiding heel erg conservatief is: op basis van natuurlijke uitbreiding
zijn we nooit bereid een ree¨elwaardige functie aan te kopen die onbe-
grensd is naar onder, ongeacht de prijs.
 De uitbreiding van een onderprevisie tot een veralgemeende onder-
previsie met behulp van Cauchy-rijen (en die we daarom de Cauchy-
uitbreiding noemen) is een ree¨elwaardige coherente veralgemeende on-
derprevisie, en is niet even conservatief als de natuurlijke uitbreiding.
 De Cauchy-uitbreiding valt samen met de Choquet-integraal voor on-
begrensde veranderlijken, in het geval we vertrekken van een 2-mono-
tone verzamelingenfunctie.
 In het algemeen geval, kan de Cauchy-uitbreiding geschreven wor-
den als een onderomhullende van Dunford-integralen (naar analogie
met de onderomhullende van onder-S-integralen in geval van gewone
natuurlijke uitbreiding).
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1.2.4 Optimaliteit
Beschouw een statisch systeem, waarop we een regeling a kunnen toepassen,
vrij te kiezen uit een verzameling A van beschikbare regelingen. Elke regeling
a in A induceert een ree¨elwaardige winst Ja. Vaak worden de winsten Ja be-
invloed door veranderlijken die niet goed gekend zijn. In de onderstelling dat
we deze veranderlijken kunnen modelleren door een toevallige veranderlijke
X, beschouwen we de winsten Ja dus als een ree¨elwaardige functie van X.
Een traditionele manier om optimaliteit te denie¨ren, in geval we onze-
ker zijn over de winst van een systeem, bestaat erin alle onzekerheden te
modelleren aan de hand van een waarschijnlijkheidsverdeling op X, en de
verwachte winst te maximaliseren. Deze aanpak leidt onder andere tot de
volgende problemen:
 Ongeacht de waarschijnlijkheidsverdeling, vinden we bijna altijd een
unieke optimale regeling, wat verwonderlijk is in geval we weinig
informatie hebben: maximaliseren van verwachte winst kan geen on-
beslistheid modelleren.
 Indien het niet duidelijk is hoe we een waarschijnlijkheidsverdeling
kunnen opstellen op basis van de gegevens, dan kan onze uiteindelijke
(en noodzakelijkerwijs arbitraire) keuze van deze verdeling een on-
identiceerbaar eect hebben op wat we optimaal noemen: het maxi-
maliseren van verwachte winst omvat geen robuustheid.
 Het maximaliseren van verwachte winst reecteert niet noodzakelij-
kerwijs de symmetrie van het oorspronkelijke probleem, tenzij we
ons beperken tot een waarschijnlijkheidsverdeling die deze symmetrie
heeft. Helaas is er vaak geen waarschijnlijkheidsverdeling die zowel
de symmetrie van het probleem als de gegeven informatie reecteert.
Beschouw bijvoorbeeld een muntstuk, waarvan we enkel weten dat het
kop of munt kan vallen. De gegeven informatie is symmetrisch wat be-
treft kop en munt, en de enige verdeling die deze symmetrie reecteert
is p(kop) = p(munt) = 12 . Deze verdeling weerspiegelt niet de gegeven
informatie, die niets zegt over de waarschijnlijkheid van kop en munt.
In deze paragraaf geven we een overzicht van de belangrijkste noties van
optimaliteit die we kunnen associe¨ren met onderprevisies, om alternatieven
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te vinden die aan bovenstaande argumenten weerstaan. Om deze verschil-
lende noties met elkaar te kunnen vergelijken, veronderstellen we dat P een
ree¨elwaardige coherente veralgemeende onderprevisie is, gedenieerd op
een lineaire tralie die op zijn minst de verzameling van alle constante gokken
en alle winsten Ja, a 2 A, bevat. Het domein van P voorzien we van de topo-
logie bepaald door het volgende convergentiecriterium: we zeggen dat een
rij fn in het domein van P convergeert naar een element f in het domein van
P, indien fn(x) naar f (x) convergeert voor alle mogelijke waarden x van X, en
P(j fn   f j) naar nul convergeert. Noteer dat deze topologie een combinatie
is van de zwakke topologie en de topologie ge¨nduceerd door de semi-norm
P(jj). De verzameling van alle veralgemeende previsies op het domein van P
die P puntsgewijs domineren noteren we doorM: uit voorgaande resultaten
volgt datM niet-leeg, convex, en compact is ten opzichte van de topologie
van puntsgewijze convergentie op leden van het domein van P, en bovendien
is P precies de onderomhullende vanM: P( f ) = minQ2MQ( f ) (het minimum
wordt bereikt precies wegens de compactheid van M ten opzichte van de
topologie van puntsgewijze convergentie op leden van het domein van P).
P-maximaliteit
Dit criterium, ingevoerd door Walley [86, Section 3.9.2, p. 161], is gebaseerd
op paarsgewijze keuze. Voor twee regelingen a en b in A zeggen we dat we a
strikt verkiezen boven b, en we schrijven a >P b, indien P(Ja   Jb) > 0, of indien
Ja  Jb en Ja , Jb. De eerste voorwaarde betekent dat we bereid zijn een strikt
positieve prijs te betalen om de winst Ja te krijgen en Jb te verliezen, wat
duidelijk wijst op een strikte voorkeur voor a ten opzichte van b. Anderzijds,
als Ja  Jb en Ja , Jb, dan resulteert a in een hogere winst dan b, en daarom
zullen we ook in dat geval a strikt verkiezen boven b.
De relatie >P is een strikte partie¨le ordening, en er is veelal geen grootste
element in A ten opzichte van >P. In plaats van op zoek te gaan naar een
grootste element, gaan we dus beter op zoek naar ongedomineerde elemen-
ten: we noemen een regeling a P-maximaal in A indien er geen regeling in
A is die we strikt verkiezen boven a: max>P (A) = fa 2 A : (8b 2 A)(aPb)g.
Het bestaan van P-maximale elementen is gegarandeerd indien fJa : a 2 Ag
compact is.
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M-maximaliteit
M-maximaliteit is een speciaal geval van wat Levi E-admissibiliteit noemt
[54, Section 4.8], en kan gezien worden als een robuuste versie van het maxi-
maliseren van verwachte winst: we noemen een regelingM-maximaal indien
ze Q-maximaal is voor minstens e´e´n Q inM.
Als we M interpreteren als een verzameling van mogelijke verwach-
tingsoperatorenmaar we weten niet precies welk model inM het correcte
isdan selecteertM-maximaliteit precies die regelingen die maximaal zijn
onder e´e´n van de mogelijke modellen Q inM.
Deze notie van optimaliteit valt samen met P-maximaliteit indien A niet
meer dan twee elementen bevat, of indien de verzameling van alle win-
sten fJa : a 2 Ag convex is. In het algemeen is de verzameling M-maximale
regelingen een deel van de verzameling P-maximale regelingen.
P-maximin en P-maximax
Nog een populaire veralgemening van het maximaliseren van verwachte
winst bestaat uit het ordenen van regelingen volgens de onderprevisie (of
bovenprevisie) van hun winsten: noem een regeling P-maximin in A als ze
maximaal is ten opzichte van de ordening AP gedenieerd door a AP b indien
P(Ja) > P(Jb), of indien Ja  Jb en Ja , Jb. We noemen een regeling P-maximax
in A als ze maximaal is ten opzichte van de ordening AP gedenieerd door
a AP b indien P(Ja) > P(Jb), of indien Ja  Jb en Ja , Jb.
Een axiomatische studie van P-maximin werd gegeven door Gilboa en
Schmeidler [34].
Het is welbekend dat P-maximin en P-maximax regelingen eveneens P-
maximaal zijn. P-maximin regelingen zijn niet noodzakelijk M-maximaal,
maar P-maximax regelingen wel.
Intervaldominantie en zwakke P-maximaliteit
Een laatste veralgemening die we vermelden bestaat uit het ordenen van
regelingen op de volgende manier: noem een regeling zwak P-maximaal in A
als ze maximaal is ten opzichte van de ordening P gedenieerd door a P b
indien P(Ja) > P(Jb), of indien Ja  Jb en Ja , Jb.
De ongelijkheid P(Ja) > P(Jb) wordt ook wel intervaldominantie genoemd:
ze zegt dat het interval [P(Ja);P(Ja)] volledig rechts van [P(Jb);P(Jb)] ligt. Zoals
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de naam reeds doet vermoeden is zwakke P-maximaliteit zwakker dan P-
maximaliteit: elke P-maximale regeling is eveneens zwak P-maximaal.
Verbanden en belangrijkste eigenschappen
 In het algemeen gelden de volgende implicaties:
P-maximax P-maximin
M-maximaal P-maximaal
zwak P-maximaal
?
HHHHHHj ?
-
HHHHHHj ?
 Als P zelftoegevoegd is, dan is M = fPg, en alle optimaliteitscriteria
vallen samen met het maximaliseren van de verwachte winst (als we P
als verwachtingsoperator beschouwen):
P-maximax P-maximin
M-maximaal P-maximaal
zwak P-maximaal
?
HHHHHHj ?
6
-
HHHHHHj
HH
HH
Y 6

?
6
HH
HH
Y
 Alle criteria afgeleid uit paarsgewijze voorkeur (i.e., P-maximaliteit,
zwakke P-maximaliteit, P-maximin, en P-maximax) voldoen aan de
volgende eigenschap: als fJa : a 2 Ag compact is, dan is er voor elke
niet-optimale regeling a een optimale regeling b zodat b strikt verkozen
wordt boven a. We zullen later zien dat deze eigenschap cruciaal is ter
veralgemening van dynamisch programmeren.
 Voor al deze criteria, behalve voor P-maximin en P-maximax, geldt: als
P puntsgewijs gedomineerd wordt door Q, dan impliceert optimaliteit
ten opzichte van Q eveneens optimaliteit ten opzichte van P. Dus,
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Figuur 1.1: Het optimaliteitsprincipe
hoe sterker onze disposities, i.e., hoe hoger onze aankoopprijzen, hoe
kleiner onze verzameling optimale regelingen, en dus, hoe e´e´nduidiger
onze optimale beslissingen bepaald zijn. P-maximin en P-maximax vol-
doen hier niet aan: ze impliceren een duidelijke, vaak zelfs e´e´nduidige
beslissing, zelfs als onze aankoopprijzen zeer laag zijn. Net zoals bij
het maximaliseren van verwachte winst, falen zij in het modelleren van
onbeslistheid.
1.3 Dynamisch programmeren
In deze paragraaf, beantwoorden we de tweede grote vraag van dit proef-
schrift: we onderzoeken in welke mate dynamisch programmeren kan toege-
past worden op dynamische discretetijdssystemen waarvan de onzekerheid
omtrent winst en dynamica beschreven wordt door onderprevisies.
1.3.1 Het deterministische geval met onzekere winst
In geval enkel de winst onzeker is, kunnen we, in het algemeen, dynamisch
programmeren enkel gebruiken om P-maximale en M-maximale paden te
vinden (zie De Cooman en Troaes [24, 23]). Eerst beschrijven we wat dyna-
misch programmeren precies inhoudt, en dan onderzoeken we onder welke
voorwaarden dit algoritme kan toegepast worden, en voor welke noties van
optimaliteit deze voorwaarden voldaan zijn.
Inleiding
Dynamisch programmeren is een ecie¨nte recursieve methode om optimale
paden van een systeem te bepalen, en werd ontworpen door Bellman [4]. De
werking van het algoritme is gebaseerd op het optimaliteitsprincipe. Laat ons
dit principe uitleggen aan de hand van Figuren 1.1 en 1.2. Figuur 1.1 schetst
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Figuur 1.2: Dynamisch programmeren
een systeem dat op drie manieren van toestand a naar toestand c, via toestand
b, kan evolueren: via de paden , , of . De winsten geassocieerd
met elk van deze paden noteren we door J, J, en J respectievelijk.
Onderstel dat  optimaal is: dus J > J en J > J. Dan volgt dat pad
 optimaal is om van b naar c te gaan. Inderdaad, daar J = J + J voor
 2 f; ; g (we onderstellen dat winsten additief zijn langs paden) kunnen
we uit bovenstaande ongelijkheden aeiden dat J > J en J > J. Deze
eenvoudige observatie, die Bellman het optimaliteitsprincipe noemde, vormt
de basis voor de recursieve techniek van dynamisch programmeren.
Om te zien hoe dit in zijn werk gaat, beschouw Figuur 1.2. Onderstel
dat we een optimale weg om van a naar e te gaan willen vinden. Na e´e´n
tijdstap, kunnen we de toestanden b, c, en d bereiken vanuit a, en de optimale
paden vanuit deze toestanden naar de nale toestand e zijn gekend: ,  en
, respectievelijk. Om nu de optimale paden van a naar e te vinden, moeten
we enkel de winsten J + J, J + J, en J + J van de optimale paden , ,
en  vergelijken, gezien het optimaliteitsprincipe zegt dat de paden , ,
en  niet optimaal kunnen zijn: waren ze dat toch, dan zouden ook , , en
 optimaal moeten zijn. Deze observatie, is wat in essentie gekend is als de
Bellman-vergelijking, en stelt ons in staat een regelprobleem behoorlijk eci-
ent op te lossen aan de hand van een recursieve procedure, door achterwaarts
de optimale paden te berekenen vanuit de nale toestand.
Uiteraard gebeurt het vaak dat de winst onzeker is. Het is gebruikelijk
deze onzekerheid te modelleren aan de hand van een waarschijnlijkheidsver-
deling, en de verwachte winst te maximaliseren. Dynamisch programmeren
blijft dan nog steeds mogelijk, ten gevolge van de lineariteit van de verwach-
tingsoperator. We hebben echter reeds betoogd dat deze weg in sommige
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situaties niet tot de gewenste resultaten leidt. De vraag rijst dus of dynamisch
programmeren ook kan toegepast worden als we de onzekerheid, en dus ook
optimaliteit, beschrijven aan de hand van onderprevisies, die, zoals we even-
eens reeds betoogd hebben, de klassieke aanpak veralgemenen tot situaties
waar we te weinig informatie hebben om een verdeling te identiceren.
Op dit punt merken we op dat ook andere auteurs, zoals Satia en Lave
[68], White en Eldeib [90], Givan, Leach, en Dean [36], en Harmanec [41],
dynamisch programmeren veralgemeend hebben tot systemen met onzeke-
re winst en/of onzekere dynamica, waar onzekerheid gemodelleerd wordt
door onderprevisies (of, wat min of meer equivalent is, verzamelingen van
waarschijnlijkheidsverdelingen). Maar geen van deze auteurs vraagt zich af
in welke zin hun veralgemeende methoden tot optimale paden leidt. Wij be-
naderen het probleem vanuit een ander perspectief: we denie¨ren eerst een
notie van optimaliteit, en pas dan onderzoeken we of dynamisch programme-
ren mogelijk is, in plaats van blindweg Bellman's algoritme te veralgemenen
zonder aan te tonen in welke zin de gevonden paden optimaal zijn.
Discretetijdssystemen
Dynamica Voor a en b inN, noteren we de verzameling van alle natuurlijke
getallen c die voldoen aan a  c  b als [a; b]. De vergelijking xk+1 = f (xk;uk; k)
beschrijft een discretetijdssysteem met k 2 N, xk 2 X, en uk 2 U. De ver-
zameling X is de toestandsruimte, en U is de regelruimte De afbeelding
f : XU N! X beschrijft de evolutie van de toestand in de tijd: gegeven
toestand xk 2 X en regeling uk 2 U op tijdstip k 2 N, geeft f (xk;uk; k) de
volgende toestand xk+1 van het systeem. We leggen een eindtijd N op: na
dit tijdstip zijn we niet meer ge¨nteresseerd in de dynamica van het systeem.
Het mag eveneens voorkomen dat niet alle toestanden en regelingen toege-
staan zijn op alle tijdstippen: we eisen dat xk behoort tot de verzameling van
toegestane toestanden Xk voor elk tijdstip k 2 [0;N], en dat uk behoort tot
de verzameling van toegestane regelingenUk voor elk tijdstip k 2 [0;N   1],
waar Xk  X enUk  U uiteraard gegeven zijn.
Paden Een pad is een triplet (x; k;u), waar x 2 X een toestand is, k 2 [0;N]
een tijdstip, en u : [k;N   1] ! U een rij van regelingen. Deze gegevens
bepalen een uniek toestandstraject x : [k;N] ! X, recursief gedenieerd
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door xk = x en x`+1 = f (x`;u`; `) voor elke ` 2 [k;N   1]. Een pad is toelaatbaar
als x` 2 X` voor elke ` 2 [k;N], en u` 2 U` voor elke ` 2 [k;N   1]. De unieke
afbeelding van de lege verzameling naar U noteren we als u;. Als k = N,
dan doet u niets, en is gelijk aan u;. Het unieke pad dat vertrekt en eindigt
in toestand x op tijdstip k = N kunnen we dan noteren als (x;N;u;).
De verzameling toelaatbare paden vanuit toestand x 2 X op tijdstip k 2
[0;N] noteren we als U(x; k). Bijvoorbeeld, U(x;N) = f(x;N;u;)g als x 2 XN,
enU(x;N) = ; in het andere geval.
We kunnen ook paden beschouwen met eindtijd M verschillend van N,
en we noteren die als (x; k;u)M (in de onderstelling dat k  M  N). We
kunnen (x; k;u)k identiceren met (x; k;u;)k: het unieke pad, lengte nul, dat
op tijdstip k start en eindigt in x. Zij 0  k  `  m. We kunnen twee paden
(x; k;u)` en (y; `; v)m aaneenschakelen als y = x`, en deze aaneenschakeling
noteren we als (x; k;u; `; v)m of als (x; k;u)`  (y; `; v)m.
De verzameling van alle toelaatbare paden die vanuit x vertrekken op
tijdstip k en eindigen op tijdstip ` 2 [k;N], noteren we alsU(x; k)`. Voor een
pad (x; k;u)` 2 U(x; k)` en een verzameling padenV  U(x`; `), noteren we
ook (x; k;u)` V = f(x; k;u)`  (x`; `; v) : (x`; `; v) 2 Vg.
Winstfuncties Het toepassen van regeling u 2 U op het systeem in toe-
stand x 2 X op tijdstip k 2 [0;N   1], resulteert in een ree¨elwaardige winst
g(x;u; k; !). Bereiken we de toestand x 2 X op het eindtijdstip N, dan krijgen
we eveneens een winst, gegeven door h(x; !). De parameter ! verzamelt alle
veranderlijken die de winst be¨nvloeden. Kenden we de exacte waarde van
!, dan zouden we eveneens de exacte waarde van de winsten kennen. De
waarde van! is echter onzeker, en dus beschouwen we! als de uitkomst van
een toevallige veranderlijke
 die waarden aanneemt in een verzameling
 .
De winsten zijn dus eveneens onzeker, en we beschouwen ze als ree¨elwaar-
dige functies van 
. Het is belangrijk op te merken dat 
 enkel de winsten
be¨nvloedt, en geen eect heeft op de systeemdynamica. We onderstellen
ook dat onze kennis over 
 niet be¨nvloed wordt door de begintoestand
van het systeem, of de regelingen die we erop uitoefenendit noemt men
actie-kennisonafhankelijkheid.
We zullen eveneens enkel het belangrijke geval beschouwen waar de
winstfuncties additief zijn langs paden van het systeem: aan het pad (x; k;u)
koppelen we een winstfunctie J(x; k;u; !) =
PN 1
i=k g(xi;ui; i; !) + h(xN; !),
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voor elke ! 2 
. Als M < N, dan denie¨ren we eveneens J(x; k;u; !)M =PM 1
i=k g(xi;ui; i; !). Aan de lege regeling koppelen we winst nul: we denie¨ren
J(x; k;u; !)k = 0, voor e´e´nder welk tijdstip k.
Gegeven een systeem in initie¨le toestand x 2 X op tijdstip k 2 [0;N],
kunnen we een regeling u : [k;N   1] ! U vinden, die resulteert in een
toelaatbaar pad (x; k;u), en zodat de winstfunctie J(x; k;u; !) optimaal is?
Is ! gekend, dan reduceert dit probleem zich tot een klassiek regelpro-
bleem, en kan opgelost worden met behulp van dynamisch programmeren.
We onderstellen hier dat de beschikbare kennis over 
 gemodelleerd wordt
aan de hand van een coherente veralgemeende onderprevisie P gedenie¨erd
op een voldoend grote verzameling dom P van ree¨elwaardige functies op
.
Noteer dat voor een gegeven pad (x; k;u), de winstfunctie J(x; k;u; !)
gezien kan worden als een ree¨elwaardige afbeelding op 
, die we noteren
als J(x; k;u). Er geldt dat J(x; k;u; `; v)m = J(x; k;u)` + J(x`; `; v)m voor k 
`  m  N, en J(x; k;u)k = 0. We denie¨ren eveneens de verzameling J(x; k)
van alle winstfuncties gekoppeld aan toelaatbare paden vanuit x 2 Xk op
tijdstip k 2 [0;N]: J(x; k) = fJ(x; k;u) : (x; k;u) 2 U(x; k)g. Dus onderstellen
we dat P een ree¨elwaardige coherente veralgemeende onderprevisie is, en
dat dom P een lineaire tralie is die op zijn minst alle constante gokken bevat,
en alle winstfuncties g(xk;uk; k) en h(xN), voor alle k 2 [0;N   1], alle xk in Xk,
alle uk in Uk, en alle xN in XN. Het domein dom P van P kunnen we dan
voorzien van de topologie beschreven in paragraaf 1.2.4.
Voorwaarden voor dynamisch programmeren onder een algemene notie
van optimaliteit
In paragraaf 1.2.4, hebben we vijf verschillende manieren beschreven waarop
we met een onderprevisie een optimaal padeen pad is een actie in de con-
text van dynamische systemenkunnen associe¨ren. We zoeken nu uit, voor
welke van deze verschillende types optimaliteit, we dynamisch programme-
ren mogen toepassen ter oplossing van het corresponderende regelprobleem.
Laat ons daartoe Bellman's analyse iets nauwkeuriger onderzoeken, en
uitvissen aan welke eigenschappen een generieke notie van optimaliteit moet
voldoen, om dynamisch programmeren mogelijk te maken. Beschouw een
eigenschap, genaamd -optimaliteit, die een pad in een gegeven verzame-
ling P van paden ofwel heeft, ofwel niet heeft. Indien een pad in P deze
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Figuur 1.3: Een algemenere vorm van dynamisch programmeren
eigenschap heeft, dan zeggen we dat het -optimaal is in P. We noteren de
verzameling van -optimale elementen van P door opt (P). Per denitie
geldt dat opt (P)  P. Verderop zullen we onze bevindingen toepassen op
de reeds beschreven concrete optimaleitsnoties.
Het optimaliteitsprincipe Beschouw Figuur 1.3. We willen de -optimale
paden van a naar e bepalen. Na e´e´n tijdstap kunnen we de toestanden
b, c, en d bereiken vanuit a. De -optimale paden vanuit deze toestanden
zijn , , en  en , respectievelijk. Opdat Bellman's algoritme zou wer-
ken, moeten de -optimale paden vanuit a naar e, a priori gegeven door
opt
 f; ; ; ; ; g, ook gegeven zijn door opt  f; ; ; g, i.e.,
de -optimale paden in de verzameling van aaneenschakelingen van , , en
met de respectieve -optimale paden , , en  en . We moeten dus uitslui-
ten dat de aaneenschakelingen  en  met de niet--optimale paden  en
 -optimaal kunnen zijn. Dit komt neer op de vereiste dat de operator opt
aan een veralgemening van Bellman's optimaliteitsprincipe moet voldoen,
en ons zodoende doet besluiten dat als  en  niet -optimaal zijn, dan  en
 eveneens niet -optimaal. Concreet zeggen we dat -optimaliteit voldoet
aan het optimaliteitsprincipe indien voor alle k 2 [0;N], x 2 Xk, ` 2 [k;N], en
(x; k;u) 2 U(x; k) de volgende implicatie geldt: als (x; k;u) -optimaal is
in U(x; k), dan is (x`; `;u) -optimaal in U(x`; `). Dit kan ook geschreven
worden als:
opt (U(x; k)) 
[
(x;k;u)`2U(x;k)`
(x; k;u)`  opt (U(x`; `)) :
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De Bellman-vergelijking zegt dat we gelijkheid krijgen als we de -op-
timaliteitsoperator laten inwerken op het rechterlid. Dit wordt normaal
geformuleerd met ` = k + 1. Echter, en dit misschien tot de grote verwonde-
ring voor lezers die vertrouwd zijn met de traditionele vorm van dynamisch
programmeren, hiertoe moet opt aan nog een eigenschap voldoen.
Ongevoeligheid voor het weglaten van niet-optimale paden Inderdaad,
het weglaten van de niet--optimale paden  en  uit de verzameling
van kandidaat -optimale paden mag geen eect hebben op de uiteindelijke
verzameling -optimale paden: er moet gelden dat
opt
 f; ; ; ; ; g = opt  f; ; ; g :
Dit is uiteraard voldaan voor de traditionele vorm van optimaliteitmaxi-
maliseren van verwachte winstmaar dit hoeft niet voldaan te zijn voor de
meer abstracte types optimaliteit die we zullen beschouwen. De gelijkheid
is gegarandeerd als opt ongevoelig is voor het weglaten van niet--optimale
elementen uit f; ; ; ; ; g, in de volgende zin: beschouw een niet-
lege verzameling S en een optimaliteitsoperator opt gedenieerd op de ver-
zameling }(S) van deelverzamelingen van S zodat opt (T)  T voor alle
T  S. Dan noemen we opt ongevoelig voor het weglaten van niet--optimale
elementen van S indien opt (S) = opt (T) voor alle T zodat opt (S)  T  S.
In geval -optimaliteit geassocieerd is met een (familie van) strikt partie¨le
ordening(en), dan is aan deze voorwaarde voldaan indien elk niet--optimaal
pad gedomineerd wordt door een optimaal pad. Concreet, zij S een niet-lege
verzameling voorzien van een familie strikte partie¨le ordeningen > j, j 2 J.
Denieer voor elke T  S de verzameling opt> j (T) :=
n
a 2 T : (8b 2 T)(b 6> j a)
o
als de verzameling van maximale elementen van T ten opzichte van > j, en
zij optJ (T) :=
S
j2J opt> j (T), en noem elementen van deze verzameling J-
optimaal in T. Dan zijn opt> j , j 2 J en optJ optimaliteitsoperatoren. Boven-
dien, als voor j 2 J
(8a 2 S n opt> j (S))(9b 2 opt> j (S))(b > j a); (1.1)
dan is opt> j ongevoelig voor het weglaten van niet-> j-maximale elemen-
ten van S. Als bovenstaande eigenschap geldt voor alle j 2 J, dan is opt J
ongevoelig voor het weglaten van niet-J-optimale elementen van S.
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De veralgemeende Bellman-vergelijking Zij k 2 [0;N] en x 2 Xk. Indien -
optimaliteit voldoet aan het optimaliteitsprincipe, en indien opt ongevoelig
is voor het weglaten van niet--optimale elementen vanU(x; k), dan kunnen
we aantonen dat voor alle ` 2 [k;N] geldt dat
opt (U(x; k)) = opt
0BBBBBB@
[
(x;k;u)`2U(x;k)`
(x; k;u)`  opt (U(x`; `))
1CCCCCCA ;
dus, in dat geval is een pad -optimaal als en slechts als ze een -optimale
aaneenschakeling is van een toelaatbaar pad (x; k;u)` en een -optimaal pad
inU(x`; `).
Laat ons nu deze algemene resultaten toepassen op de concrete types
optimaliteit die we reeds behandeld hebben. Voor alle vijf optimaliteitsope-
ratoren opt>P , optM, optAP , optAP , en optP , gaan we na of we de Bellman-
vergelijking kunnen gebruiken ter oplossing van het corresponderende re-
gelprobleem.
Onderzoek van de voorwaarden voor dynamisch programmeren bij een
aantal concrete vormen van optimaliteit
P-maximaliteit We beschouwen eerst de optimaliteitsoperator opt>P die uit
een verzameling paden, die paden selecteert, die maximaal zijn ten opzich-
te van de strikt partie¨le ordening >P. Merk eerst en vooral op dat >P een
vectorordening is op dom P: als f >P g, dan f + h >P g + h, voor eender
welke ree¨elwaardige functies f , g, en h in dom P. Uitgaande van deze ob-
servatie, is het is eenvoudig aan te tonen dat P-maximaliteit voldoet aan het
optimaliteitsprincipe.
In paragraaf 1.2.4 hebben we reeds vermeld dat alsJ(x; k) compact is, elk
niet-P-maximaal element inJ(x; k) gedomineerd wordt door een P-maximaal
element in J(x; k), of wat equivalent is, elk niet-P-maximaal pad in U(x; k)
gedomineerd wordt door een P-maximaal pad inU(x; k). Bijgevolg, wegens
een eigenschap die we eveneens reeds vermeld hebben bij de behandeling
van ongevoeligheid voor het weglaten van niet--optimale elementen, volgt
dat als J(x; k) compact is, dan is opt>P ongevoelig voor het weglaten van
niet-P-maximale paden vanU(x; k).
We besluiten: zij k 2 [0;N] en x 2 Xk, en onderstel dat J(x; k) compact is,
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dan geldt voor alle ` 2 [k;N] dat
opt>P (U(x; k)) = opt>P
0BBBBBB@
[
(x;k;u)`2U(x;k)`
(x; k;u)`  opt>P (U(x`; `))
1CCCCCCA :
Deze Bellman-vergelijking voor P-maximaliteit resulteert in een recur-
sieve methode om alle P-maximale paden te bepalen. Inderdaad, neem
opt>P (U(x;N)) = fu;g voor elke x 2 XN, en opt>P (U(x; k)) kan recursief be-
paald worden uit de Bellman-vergelijking. Noteer dat deze vergelijking ook
een methode geeft ter constructie van een P-maximale terugkoppelwet: voor
elke x 2 Xk, kies e´e´nder welke (x; k;u(x; k)) 2 opt>P (U(x; k)). Dan realiseert
(x; k) = uk(x; k) een P-maximale terugkoppelwet.
M-maximaliteit Gelijkaardige overwegingen leiden tot het volgende be-
sluit: de optimaliteitsoperator optM voldoet aan het optimaliteitsprincipe,
en als J(x; k) compact is, dan is optM ongevoelig voor het weglaten van
niet-M-maximale paden van U(x; k). Bijgevolg kunnen we ook voor M-
maximaliteit een Bellman-vergelijking neerschrijven.
P-maximin, P-maximax, en zwakke P-maximaliteit Als J(x; k) compact
is, dan is de optimaliteitsoperator optAP ongevoelig voor het weglaten van
niet-P-maximin paden vanU(x; k), en gelijkaardige observaties gelden voor
optAP en optP . Maar helaas, zoals met tegenvoorbeelden kan aangetoond
worden, geldt het optimaliteitsprincipe noch voor P-maximin, noch voor
P-maximax, noch voor zwakke P-maximaliteit. Bijgevolg vinden we geen
Bellman-vergelijking. In essentie, komt dit omdat de strikt partie¨le ordenin-
gen AP, AP, en P geen vectorordeningen zijnze zijn niet verenigbaar met
de additiviteit van winstfuncties langs paden.
Dit toont ook aan dat de Bellman-vergelijking voorgesteld door Harma-
nec [41], op basis van zwakke P-maximaliteit, niet noodzakelijk tot zwak-P-
maximale paden leidt.
Toepassing: het aligneren van genetische sequenties onder onzekere evo-
lutionaire afstand
Het aligneren van genetische sequenties is een veel gebruikte techniek (zie
bijvoorbeeld Mount [58]). Om maar een paar voorbeelden te geven, aan de
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hand van het aligneren van sequenties kunnen we de evolutionaire relatie
tussen soorten bepalen, en evolutionaire bomen reconstrueren. Een aligne-
ring kan ook functionele gebieden in genetische sequenties onthullen, wat op
zijn beurt kan leiden tot nieuwe geneesmiddelen, of kan helpen te beslissen
welke behandeling het meest geschikt is voor een bepaalde patie¨nt met een
wel bepaald genotype. Het aligneren van genetische sequenties wordt ook
gebruikt ter voorspelling van structurele en biochemische eigenschappen
van de sequenties zelf.
Het aligneringsprobleem wordt over het algemeen geformuleerd als een
optimalisatieprobleem: positieve scores worden toegekend aan goede over-
eenkomsten, en negatieve scores aan slechte overeenkomsten en gaten. Deze
scores worden samengevat in wat een scorematrix genoemd wordt. We willen
dan die alignering vinden met de grootste totale score. Deze aanpak heeft
twee voordelen: (i) het stelt ons in staat op een objectieve manier de beste
alignering te vinden uit alle mogelijke aligneringen, en (ii) de hoogste score,
die correspondeert met de beste alignering, geeft ons een objectieve kwali-
teitsmaat voor deze alignering. Needleman en Wunsch [60] ontwikkelden
een ecie¨nt dynamisch programmeeralgorithme ter alignering van paren
van genetische sequenties.
De alignering hangt natuurlijk sterk af van de keuze van de scorematrix:
hoe moeten we goede overeenkomsten belonen, en slechte overeenkomsten
en gaten straen? In de praktijk zijn er een hele resem scorematrices in
omloop, en de precieze keuze van de scorematrix hangt af van extra onder-
stellingen omtrent de bestudeerde genetische sequenties. Bijvoorbeeld, als
we PAM scorematrices gebruiken, die ge¨ntroduceerd werden door Dayho,
Schwartz, en Orcutt [15], en waartoe wij ons zullen beperken, dan maakt men
de volgendeop het eerste gezicht ongetwijfeld absurdeonderstellingen:
 de evolutionaire afstand van de sequenties tot hun dichtste gemeen-
schappelijke voorouder is gekend,
 evolutie is in evenwicht,
 in dit evenwichtspunt is er evolutionaire omkeerbaarheideender wel-
ke puntmutatie is even waarschijnlijk als haar inverse mutatie,
 puntmutaties op verschillende locaties in een sequentie zijn identiek en
onafhankelijk verdeeld, en
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 puntmutaties op verschillende tijdstippen zijn identiek en onafhanke-
lijk verdeeld.
Verschillende evolutionaire afstanden T induceren dan verschillende score-
matrices PAM(T). Uiteraard zijn bovenstaande onderstellingen niet courant:
veel onderzoek is gewijd aan het veralgemenen van deze onderstellingen.
Wij zullen ons concentreren op het veralgemenen van de eerste onderstel-
ling.
Inderdaad, het schatten van de evolutionaire afstand is een groot pro-
bleem, vooral wanneer men korte sequenties vergelijkt: `estimation bias
usually occurs when the sequence length is short so that stochastic eects
are strong'1 (Gu en Li [39, p. 5899, rechterkolom, ll. 2527]). En vaak kunnen
we enkel steunen op de sequenties zelf ter schatting van de evolutionaire
afstand.
E´e´n aanpak is de afstand te schatten op basis van de gelijkaardigheid van
de twee sequenties. Typisch kiest men PAM250 als de sequenties voor 20%
gelijk zijn, PAM120 als ze 40% gelijk zijn, PAM60 als ze 60% gelijk zijn, en-
zovoort. Het is echter niet helemaal duidelijk hoe het gelijkheidspercentage
kan afgeleid worden alvorens te aligneren, en zelfs dan nog riskeren we voor
korte sequenties een serieuze schattingsfout.
Een andere aanpak bestaat eruit het optimalisatieprobleem voor een ver-
zameling PAM-matrices op te lossen, of zelfs met andere methoden, en dan
die methode uit te kiezen die de hoogste score geeft. De prestatie van ver-
schillende aligneringsmethodes is reeds goed bestudeerd, en e´e´n van de
interessante resultaten uit deze studie is dat `for dierent pairs many die-
rent methods create the best alignments', en daarom, `if a method that could
select the best alignment method for each pair existed, a signicant improve-
ment of the alignment quality could be gained'2 (zie Elofsson [32]). Helaas
is het in de praktijk computationeel onmogelijk per sequentiepaar een groot
aantal methodes uit te proberen en alle parameters af te stemmen voor elk
van deze methodes.
In plaats daarvan, onderzoeken wij, met de dynamische programmeer-
methode ontwikkeld in dit proefschrift, of een fout in de schatting van evo-
1[. . . ] 'een schattingsfout komt gebruikelijk voor wanneer de sequenties kort zijn, waardoor
stochastische eecten sterk zijn'
2[. . . ] `voor verschillende paren, leiden verschillende methodes tot een beste alignering',
en daarom, `ware er een methode ter selectie van de beste methode, zouden we een serieuze
vooruitgang boeken in aligneringskwaliteit'.
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lutionaire afstand ook leidt tot een fout in de optimale alignering. In het
bijzonder, veralgemenen we het welbekende Needleman-Wunsch algoritme
(zie Needleman en Wunsch [60]) om te bepalen of een alignering, of delen er-
van, ongevoelig zijn voor variaties in evolutionaire afstand in een opgegeven
interval.
Het belangrijkste resultaat van deze veralgemening, na toepassing op een
aantal testgevallen, is dat de keuze van de PAM-matrix doorgaans irrelevant
is voor de alignering van de grootste delen van genetische sequenties. Met
andere woorden, vaak maakt het niet uit welke PAM-matrix je precies se-
lecteert, als je enkel in de alignering ge¨nteresseerd bent. Merk misschien
nog op dat, hoewel de alignering zelf doorgaans niet echt veel varieert, de
optimale score doorgaans wel sterk varieert.
1.3.2 Het niet-deterministische geval: optimaal sturen en te-
gelijk leren over de dynamica
We beschrijven nu hoe een systeem, met onzekere dynamica, optimaal ge-
stuurd kan worden terwijl we tegelijk leren over de dynamica, aan de hand
van conditionele onderprevisies, en een nieuwe notie van optimaliteit die
gedeeltelijke actie-kennisafhankelijkheid toelaat. De voorwaarden voor dy-
namisch programmeren zijn voldaan als we het leren voorstellen door een
imprecies Dirichlet-model.
Inleiding
E´e´n van de belangrijkste modellen voor niet-deterministische systemen zijn
markovbeslisprocessen; dit zijn geregelde markovketens (zie Markov [55]).
Markovbeslisprocessen modelleren onzekerheid omtrent dynamica via zo-
genaamde transitiewaarschijnlijkheden. Onderstellen we de winst voor elke
transitie onder elke regelactie gekend, dan bekomen we een optimale rege-
ling door de verwachte winst te maximaliseren. Dit maximalisatieprobleem
(en vele varianten ervan) kan ecie¨nt opgelost worden met dynamisch pro-
grammeren; zie bijvoorbeeld Bertsekas [8] voor een uitstekend overzicht.
Reeds vroeg in de ontwikkeling van markovbeslisprocessen, realiseerde
men zich dat de transitiewaarschijnlijkheden zelf vaak onzeker zijn, omdat
ze in de praktijk vaak moeilijk te meten zijn. Om aan dit probleem hoofd te
bieden, worden in de literatuur twee aanpakken gesuggereerd en bestudeerd:
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(i) lerenwe herzien onze kennis over de transitiewaarschijnlijkheden
naarmate we transities observeren; zie bijvoorbeeld Bellman [3], Martin
[56], en Satia en Lave [68].
(ii) verzamelingenwe onderstellen enkel dat de transitiewaarschijnlijk-
heden tot een bepaalde convexe verzameling behoren; zie bijvoorbeeld
Wolfe en Dantzig [93], Satia en Lave [68], White en Eldeib [90], Givan,
Leach, en Dean [36], Harmanec [41], en Kozine en Utkin [52].
Beide aanpakken hebben hun nadelen. De leeraanpak vergt a priori ken-
nis over de transitiewaarschijnlijkheden. Is deze kennis foutief, dan is de
optimale regelwet eveneens foutief in de initie¨le fase van het regelproces.
De verzamelingaanpak heeft als nadeel dat er niets geleerd wordt, en men
dus mogelijk interessante informatie over de dynamica negeert, die in vele
gevallen wel beschikbaar is. Bovendien heeft deze aanpak een ietwat proble-
matische relatie met optimaliteit: met een verzameling transitiewaarschijn-
lijkheden kunnen we enkel een interval voor de verwachte winst berekenen,
voor elke regelwet. Bijna alle auteurs beschouwen daarom enkel maximin of
maximax oplossingen. Ze ontwerpen algoritmes, gebaseerd op dynamisch
programmeren, die ofwel de minimaal verwachte winst maximaliseren (pes-
simistisch, maximin), ofwel de maximaal verwachte winst maximaliseren
(optimistisch, maximax), en dus alle tussenoplossingen negeren.
Een opmerkelijke uitzondering is Harmanec [41], die een dynamisch pro-
grammeeralgoritme voorstelt ter berekening van alle maximale regelwetten
ten opzichte van een partie¨le ordening, die wij hier intervaldominantie heb-
ben genoemd. Op die manier beperkt hij zich niet tot enkel extreme oplossin-
gen. Helaas stelde Harmanec [41] zich niet de vraag in welke zin zijn dyna-
misch programmeermethode tot optimale regelwetten leiddezoals reeds
vermeld, leidt zij zelfs niet eens tot maximale regelwetten ten opzichte van
de gegeven ordening. Dus, pakken we het probleem opnieuw aan vanuit
een ander perspectief: we denie¨ren eerst een notie van optimaliteit, en we
onderzoeken dan of er aan de voorwaarden voor dynamisch programmeren
voldaan is, zijnde (i) het optimaliteitsprincipe, en (ii) ongevoeligheid voor
het weglaten van niet-optimale elementen.
Voorheen hebben we reeds een partie¨le ordening gesuggereerd die aan
het optimaliteitsprincipe en aan de ongevoeligheidseigenschap voldeed (on-
der een compactheidsvoorwaarde). Zoals eveneens opgemerkt werd door
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Harmanec [41], veralgemeent deze partie¨le ordening niet zomaar tot niet-
deterministische dynamische systemen. Zoals we straks zullen aangeven, is
de reden dat er zogenaamde actie-kennisafhankelijkheid is in markovbeslis-
processen.
Ons doel is het combineren van de leeraanpak en de verzamelingaanpak
om de problemen te vermijden waaraan beide aanpakken elk lijden. We
willen de verzameling transitiewaarschijnlijkheden herzien op basis van ob-
servaties van voorgaande transities. Een markovbeslisproces kan beschouwd
worden als een verzameling onafhankelijke multinomiale samplemodellen
(zie Martin [56]), en we hebben een welbekende wiskundige methode om
zulke modellen te herzien: het imprecies Dirichlet-model, ontwikkeld door
Walley [87]. Hiertoe moeten we echter eerst de partie¨le preferentierelatie
veralgemenen tot het geval van actie-kennisafhankelijkheid.
We kunnen dan aantonen dat er behoorlijk algemene voorwaarden zijn
waaronder aan het optimaliteitsprincipe en aan de ongevoeligheidseigen-
schap voldaan is; echter, zoals in het klassieke geval, met gekende transi-
tiewaarschijnlijkheden, eveneens het geval is, moet de regelwet van de vol-
ledige toestandsgeschiedenis afhangen (zie Bertsekas [8]), en daarom blijft
een directe implementatie van de gesuggereerde techniek beperkt tot relatief
kleine systemen.
Een bijzonder geval: leren met het imprecies Dirichlet-model
In deze samenvatting beschouwen we enkel het geval waarin het leren ge-
modelleerd wordt aan de hand van het imprecies Dirichlet-model; alle ba-
sisideee¨n zijn hierin reeds aanwezig, en het laat ons eveneens toe de meeste
technische detailsin het bijzonder, marginale uitbreiding en optimalisatie
onder gedeeltelijke actie-kennisonafhankelijkheidgrofweg over te slaan.
Het enige wat we nog aanmerken wat betreft het algemene geval, is dat
het optimalisatieprincipe niet altijd geldt: het leermodel moet aan bepaal-
de structurele eigenschappen voldoen. Als bij wonder zijn deze voldaan in
geval we het imprecies Dirichlet-model gebruiken.
Regelwetten en winstgokken Zij X de eindige toestandsruimte, en U de
eindige regelruimte. De toevallige veranderlijke die de toestand voorstelt op
tijdstip k noteren we als Xk. Na tijdstip N zijn we niet meer ge¨nteresseerd
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in de dynamica van het systeem. Beschouw het systeem op tijdstip k. We
kunnen
 Xk = xk observeren,
 de regeling k(xk) 2 U toepassen en Xk+1 = xk+1 observeren,
 de regeling k+1(xkxk+1) 2 U toepassen en Xk+2 = xk+2 observeren,
 etc.,
 de regeling N 1(xkxk+1 : : : xN 1) 2 U toepassen en XN = xN observeren.
Deze operatie wordt gekarakteriseerd door een eindige rij van functies k =
(k; k+1; : : : ; N 1), waar ` : X` k+1 ! U. We noemen k een regelwet star-
tend op k. De verzameling van alle regelwetten startend op k noteren we als
k.
Met elke regelwet k 2 k associe¨ren we een winstgok vanaf tijdstip ` na
observatie van xk : : : x` 1 (met `  k; als ` = k dan is xk : : : x` 1 een lege rij, i.e.,
er is geen observatie, en we schrijven ook Jk (xk; : : : ; xN) in dat geval),
Jk(xk :::x` 1)(x`; : : : ; xN) =
N 1X
q=`
gq(xq; q(xk : : : xq); xq+1) + gN(xN)
Dit is een gok op (X`; : : : ;XN). Elke transitie leidt tot een winst: startend op
tijdstip q in toestand xq, en het toepassen van regeling uq 2 U waarbij we in
toestand xq+1 2 X terechtkomen, krijgen we een winst gq(xq;uq; xq+1). Komen
we toe in de eindtoestand xN op tijdstip N, dan krijgen we een extra winst
gN(xN). Noteer dat Jk(xk :::x` 1) enkel afhangt van k via `(xk : : : x` 1X`), . . . ,
N 1(xk : : : x` 1X` : : :XN 1). Deze rij, die overeenkomt met de regelwet k na
observatie van xk : : : x` 1, noteren we als k(xk : : : x` 1).
We willen die regelwet vinden die de winstgok maximaliseert.
Leren van de dynamica via het imprecies Dirichlet-model Een eenvoudi-
ge manier om de dynamica te leren, is het Dirichlet-model (zie Martin [56]).
In dit model is de verwachtingswaarde van een gok f op X`+1, na observatie
van xk : : : x` en onder regelwet k, gegeven door
Ek ( f jxk : : : x`s) =
X
x`+12X
f (x`+1)
s`(xk :::x`)x`x`+1 + n
`(xk :::x`)
x`x`+1 (xk : : : x`; k)
s +N`(xk :::x`)x` (xk : : : x`; k)
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Het symbool nuxy(xk : : : x`; k) stelt het aantal transities voor vanuit toestand
x naar y via regeling u, in de rij xk : : : x` onder regelwet k, en het symbool
Nux (xk : : : x`; k) stelt het aantal transities voor vanuit toestand x via regeling
u (ongeacht de eindtoestand):
nuxy(xk; k) = 0;
nuxy(xk : : : x`+1; k) = nuxy(xk : : : x`; k)
+
8>>><>>>:
1; if x` = x; x`+1 = y en `(xk : : : x`) = u
0; in het andere geval
en,
Nux (xk : : : x`; k) =
X
y2X
nuxy(xk : : : x`; k):
De hyperparameters van dit model zijn s en uxy, voor elke x en y 2 X en
elke u 2 U. De hyperparameter s > 0 bepaalt de leersnelheid (lagere s
betekent sneller leren), en de hyperparameters uxy,
P
y2X uxy = 1, modelleren
de initie¨le kennis over de transitiewaarschijnlijkheden; uxy is de verwachte
transitiewaarschijnlijkheid om van toestand x naar y te gaan via regeling u.
Na het toepassen van de regel van Bayes, vinden we
Ek ( f jxk : : : x`s) = Ek (jxk : : : x`s)  Ek (jxk : : : x`X`+1s)    
    Ek (jxk : : : x`X`+1 : : :XN 1s)( f )
als de verwachtingswaarde van een willekeurige gok f op (X`+1; : : : ;XN) (zie
ook Bertsekas [8]).
Het imprecies Dirichlet-model (Walley [87]) bestaat er nu uit de verzame-
ling van alle Dirichlet-modellen te beschouwen voor alle mogelijke waarden
van de hyperparameters uxy (de leerparameter s wordt constant veronder-
stelt). Om technische redenen zullen wij enkel waarden uxy   beschouwen,
voor een willekeurig kleine  > 0: dit betekent dat de initie¨le verwachte
transitiewaarschijnlijkheden minstens  zijn.
Optimaliteit Noteer dat de hyperparameters s en uxy, die dus initie¨le infor-
matie over de dynamica voorstellen, niet be¨nvloed worden door de regelwet
k: zij zijn actie-kennisonafhankelijk. Deze observatie is feitelijk de reden waar-
om dynamisch programmeren mogelijk blijkt onder een robuuste versie van
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dit klassieke model. Inderdaad, op basis van bovenstaande uitdrukking voor
de verwachtingswaarde, kunnen we regelwetten ordenen-uiteraard heeft
het enkel zin regelwetten te ordenen met dezelfde regelgeschiedenis. Noteer
dus k(xk : : : x`;uk : : : u` 1) als de verzameling van regelwetten k in k die
voldoen aan
k(xk) = uk; k(xkxk+1) = uk+1; : : : ; ` 1(xk : : : x` 1) = u` 1;
en laat ons k(xk) met k identiceren. Concreet, onderstel dat k en k 2
k(xk : : : x`;uk : : : u` 1). Dan verkiezen we k boven k na observatie van
xk : : : x` en toepassing van uk : : : u` 1, en we schrijvenk >xk :::x` ;uk :::u` 1 k, indien
inf
uxy
(Ek (Jk(xk :::x`)jxk : : : x`s)   Ek (Jk(xk :::x`)jxk : : : x`s)) > 0: (1.2)
Eens xk : : : x` en uk : : : u` 1 vastliggen, hangt de ordening enkel af van k en
k via k(xk : : : x`) en k(xk : : : x`).
We bekomen een optimaliteitsoperator door die regelwetten te selecteren
die optimaal zijn ten opzichte van de bovenstaande strikte partie¨le ordening.
Concreet, noemen we een regelwetk optimaal indien hij maximaal is ink(xk)
ten opzichte van >xk voor elke xk 2 X. We noemen k optimaal vanaf tijdstip `
indien ze een maximaal element is van k(xk : : : x`; k(xk) : : : ` 1(xk : : : x` 1))
ten opzichte van de partie¨le ordening >xk :::x` ;k(xk):::` 1(xk :::x` 1) voor elke xk : : : x`.
Deze denitie is zinvol: k is eindig, en het bestaan van maximale regel-
wetten ten opzichte van >xk :::x` ;k(xk):::` 1(xk :::x` 1) is dus gegarandeerd. Men kan
eveneens bewijzen dat er steeds regelwetten bestaan die simultaan maximaal
zijn ten opzichte van >xk:::x` ;k(xk):::` 1(xk :::x` 1) voor alle xk : : : x`.
Het optimaliteitsprincipe We kunnen nu het volgende bewijzen. Zij k < N
enk 2 k. Voor elke k  ` < N, geldt de volgende implicatie: alsk optimaal
is vanaf tijdstip ` dan is k eveneens optimaal vanaf tijdstip ` + 1.
Dynamisch programmeren We beschrijven kort hoe dit optimaliteitsprin-
cipe leidt tot een dynamisch programmeeralgoritme. Beschouw hiertoe het
beslisproces geschetst in Figuur 1.4. Op tijdstip k kunnen we kiezen tussen
twee regelacties: u en v. Beschouw de regelwet 0 die v toepast op tijdstip 0,
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k = 0 k = 1 k = 2
u, v u, v
x
x x
yy
Figuur 1.4: Een eenvoudig beslisproces
en u als x1 = x en v als x1 = y op tijdstip 1:
0(x) = v;
1(xx) = u;
1(xy) = v:
Het optimaliteitsprincipe dicteert: als 0 optimaal is vanaf tijdstip 0, dan is
0(x), die u toepast als x1 = x en v als x1 = y op tijdstip 1, optimaal vanaf
tijdstip 1.
Dit leidt tot een vereenvoudiging bij het berekenen van de optimale regel-
wetten vanaf tijdstip 0. Inderdaad, onderstel bijvoorbeeld dat 1, gegeven
door 1(x) = v en 1(y) = u, niet optimaal is vanaf tijdstip 1. Wegens het
optimaliteitsprincipe zullen 0 en 00, gegeven door
0(x) = u; 00(x) = v
1(xx) = 1(x) = v; 01(xx) = 1(x) = v;
1(xy) = 1(y) = u; 01(xy) = 1(y) = u;
ook niet optimaal zijn vanaf tijdstip 0, gezien 1 anders optimaal zou moe-
ten zijn vanaf tijdstip 0. Dus, als we de regelwetten kennen die optimaal
zijn vanaf tijdstip ` + 1, dan kunnen we deze informatie gebruiken om de
verzameling van regelwetten die mogelijk optimaal zijn vanaf tijdstip ` te
reduceren.
Natuurlijk kunnen we dit enkel doen als een reductie in de zoekruimte
de uiteindelijke verzameling van optimale elementen niet wijzigt: onze notie
van optimaliteit moet ongevoelig zijn voor het weglaten van niet-optimale
elementen. De verzameling van winstgokken is eindig, en dus compact. Bij-
gevolg voldoet onze notie van optimaliteit, die gebaseerd is op een ordening,
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aan de ongevoeligheidseigenschap.
Het aantal regelwetten groeit exponentieel met de lengte van de paden
die we beschouwen, maar wegens het optimaliteitsprincipe en de ongevoe-
ligheidseigenschap moeten we de meeste van deze paden niet beschouwen:
dynamisch programmeren, zoals hier ruwweg beschreven werd, leidt tot een
exponentie¨le versnelling in het zoeken naar de verzameling van alle optimale
regelwetten.
Chapter 2
Introduction
The aim of this dissertation is two-fold. First, we wish to investigate to
what extent lower previsions unify and extend various other well-known
uncertainty models, and how they lead to an acceptable notion of optimality.
Secondly, we wish to investigate how a dynamical system, whose uncertain-
ties are described by such a unied uncertainty model, can be controlled in
an optimal way, and we want to nd out whether it is possible to nd such a
control policy through an ecient method, namely, dynamic programming.
Uncertainty and Optimality
In Part I, we introduce the basic concepts of the theory of lower previsions
(which was developed mainly by Walley [86]), we demonstrate the unifying
role of theory of lower previsions in uncertainty modelling, and we explain
how lower previsions naturally lead to various well-known notions of op-
timality.
The rst four sections of Chapter 3, Sections 3.13.4, are concerned with
the precise denition of random variables, gambles, lower previsions, avoid-
ing sure loss, and coherence, which are essential for a good understanding of
the remaining chapters. The remainder of this chapter, Section 3.5, presents
an overview of the most important uncertainty models that fall within the
theory of lower previsions. From a practical point of view, the most import-
ant ones are probability charges, 2-monotone set functions, and possibility
measures.
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Chapter 4 is concerned solely with the technique of natural extension of
lower previsions: natural extension dictates whether and how a lower pre-
vision must extend to a larger domain, and is essential in making inferences
from lower previsions, such as optimality judgements. In Section 4.1 we
present a precise denition of natural extension, that generalises the notion
of natural extension given by Walley [86]. This section is essential for a good
understanding of the remaining chapters. In Section 4.2, we introduce a new
notion of integration based on natural extension, called linear extension.
Section 4.3 presents various examples of natural extension, and relates
them to other well-known extension procedures known from the literature.
Some of these results are new: in particular, we prove that the S-integral, the
Riemann integral, and the Riemann-Stieltjes integral (Darboux's type), are
instances of linear extension, and that the corresponding lower and upper in-
tegrals are instances of natural extension (Sections 4.3.5&4.3.6); we show that
the natural extension of a cumulative distribution function is, under fairly
general assumptions, given by the Riemann-Stieltjes integral (Section 4.3.7);
and nally, we recover two new expressions of the Choquet integral in terms
of the S-integral, and in terms of the Dunford integral (Section 4.3.10). The
most important known results collected in Section 4.3 are that the linear ex-
tension of a probability charge corresponds to the Dunford integral restricted
to gambles, or equivalently, the S-integral (Section 4.3.2), and that the nat-
ural extension of a 2-monotone set function is given by the Choquet integral
restricted to gambles (Section 4.3.10).
In Section 4.4 we generalise a number of well-known results about sets of
probability measures and lower previsions: in particular, we show that if all
gambles in the domain of a lower prevision P are measurable with respect to
a eld F , then that lower prevision P avoids sure loss if and only if there is
a probability charge on F whose S-integral dominates P, and that in such a
case, the natural extension of P to the set of all gambles is given by the lower
envelope of the lower S-integrals with respect to all probability charges on F
that dominate P; this new result yields a simpler representation of coherent
lower previsions, and a simpler expression for natural extension, in case all
gambles in the domain of P are measurable with respect to a non-trivial eld,
i.e., a eld smaller than the power set (Section 4.4.2).
There is one well-known extension procedure, due to Dunford [31], which
is not covered by natural extension, but which still deserves our attention,
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as it allows for an extension to random quantities that needn't be bounded.
Many problems in optimal control concern unbounded random quantities:
for instance, a cost function is often chosen to be a quadratic (and hence,
unbounded) function of the state and of the control. Since we aim to study
optimal control in what follows, we must rst extend the theory of lower
previsions, including natural extension, to random quantities that are not
necessarily bounded (Sections 5.15.2). The technical matter of porting Dun-
ford's idea (originally devised to extend integrals to unbounded functions) to
lower previsions is dealt with in Section 5.4, but rst we discuss a simpler and
less general method in Section 5.3, which at the same time introduces part
of the mathematical machinery required in Section 5.4. We provide a more
convenient characterisation of our extension in Section 5.5, we show that our
extension coincides with the Choquet integral for unbounded random quant-
ities, in case we start out with a 2-monotone set function (Section 5.5.4), and
we establish that our extension can always be written as a lower envelope
of Dunford integrals (Section 5.6). The main results of Chapter 5 have been
published by Troaes and De Cooman [78, 79, 80].
As the results of Chapters 35 clearly identify the unifying character of
lower previsions and natural extension, we shall only consider uncertainty
modelled by lower previsions in the remaining chapters.
Chapter 6 presents an overview of various notions of optimality that can
be derived from a lower prevision and studies their properties (Sections 6.3
6.6). An incentive for studying these generalisations of the classical maxim-
ising expected utility approach (which is briey presented in Section 6.1) is
given in Section 6.2.1. The most important new result in this chapter is a tech-
nical lemma about preorders in Section 6.2.3 (a slightly less general version
has already been published by De Cooman and Troaes [24]), which allows
us to prove a property, called insensitivity to omission of non-optimal ele-
ments, that turns out to be essential for the dynamic programming approach
to work.
Dynamic Programming
In Part II, we set out to answer the second question: we investigate the applic-
ability of dynamic programming to dynamical systems whose uncertainties,
in gain or dynamics, are described by lower previsions.
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Chapter 7 studies deterministic systems whose uncertain gain is described
by a lower prevision. In Section 7.2 we identify two conditions for the
dynamic programming approach to work: (i) the principle of optimality,
which is due to Bellman [4], and (ii) insensitivity to omission of non-optimal
elements, which is a new condition (in case the gain is not uncertain, this
condition is satised whenever an optimal solution exists). All notions of
optimality introduced in Chapter 6 satisfy the insensitivity property, but, as
we show in Section 7.2, only P-maximality and M-maximality satisfy the
principle of optimality. We present a simple example in Section 7.3, and
a more realistic example, robust sequence alignment, in Section 7.4, where
we nd that the exact choice of the PAM matrix in (amino-acid) sequence
alignment usually does not matter when aligning short sequences, contrary to
what is often claimed (as for instance by Mount [58]). The basic ideas behind
the dynamic programming method are due to De Cooman and Troaes [24,
23]. The robust sequence alignment example has also been published earlier
by Troaes [76].
In Chapter 8, we study systems whose dynamics is uncertain, and we de-
scribe a way to accomplish simultaneous optimal control and learning about
the dynamics, by means of conditional lower previsions (Section 8.2), and
a new notion of optimality, which allows for partial act-state dependence
(Section 8.3). In Section 8.4 we identify a fairly general class of dynamical
systems, whose uncertain dynamics is described by conditional lower previ-
sions; this allows us to model learning about the dynamics at the same time.
In Section 8.5 we state conditions for the principle of optimality to hold, and
we note that the insensitivity property is almost trivially satised for the
systems under study. As a result, we can construct a dynamic programming
algorithm: this is demonstrated in Section 8.7 through a numerical example,
where the learning is modelled through an imprecise Dirichlet model. The
results of this chapter, without proofs, were published earlier by Troaes [77].
The appendix contains results about the extended real number system,
that are probably not new, but certainly very hard to nd. We need these
results only in Chapter 5.
Part I
Uncertainty and Optimality
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Chapter 3
Lower and Upper Previsions
PROBABILITY DOES NOT EXIST.
Bruno de Finetti [27], Volume I, p. x
In this and the next chapter we introduce the main ideas behind the theory
of coherent lower and upper previsions. We refer to Walley [86] for a more
in depth discussion.
3.1 Random Variables
We call a random variable any, possibly uncertain, but observable property of
a system. One could think of a random variable as an experiment's outcome
that is not necessarily known to the modeller. For example, the amount of
rainfall R(d;w) during a particular day d, measured at a particular weather
station w, is a random variable; it takes values in the set fr : r 2 R; r  0g. But
also the statement tomorrow, it will rain in Ghent is a random variable,
with possible values true and false. The set of possible values of a
random variable X is denoted by a calligraphic letter X. A particular value
of X is called a realisation of X and it is denoted by a lower-case letter x. It
is convenient to denote the event of observing the realisation of X to be x as
X = x.
Let us now describe a few things one can do with random variables. At
the same time we x some notation that will be used extensively further on.
41
42 LOWER AND UPPER PREVISIONS
Any map f dened on the set of outcomes X of a random variable X
we can again consider as a random variable. We call such a mapping a
function of X, and it represents nothing but a relabelling (not necessarily one-
to-one) of the outcomes of X. If those outcomes are observable, so must be, in
principle, any relabelling of them, and hence, the function f again constitutes
a random variable. For instance, tomorrow, it will rain in Ghent could be
dened as Boolean function of the amount of rainfall R(d;w) for d tomorrow
and measured at Ghent's weather station w. If we consider more than one
random variable we may write f (X) in order to emphasise that f is a function
of X only. The realisation of f is uniquely determined by the realisation x of
X and is therefore denoted by f (x).
Obviously, the composition g f of mappings f and g is a random variable
if f is dened on the set of outcomes of a random variable. As (g  f )(x) is
dened as g( f (x)), we shall also write (g  f )(X) as g( f (X)).
Considering the combined outcomes of a collection of random variables
X1, X2, . . . , and Xn we again obtain a random variable which we denote
by (X1;X2; : : : ;Xn) and whose possible outcomes are (not necessarily all)
elements of X1  X2      Xn and are generically denoted by (x1; : : : ; xn).
From a function f (X1;X2; : : : ;Xn) we may obtain a new function of for instance
(X1; : : : ;X j) (with j < n) by xing the values of X j+1, . . . Xn at their respective
realisations x j+1, . . . , xn. This function is denoted by f (X1; : : : ;X j; x j+1; : : : ; xn).
3.2 Belief, Behaviour and Optimality
Our aim in this work is to study optimal control under uncertainty. More
particularly, we wish to model our beliefs about the uncertain realisation of
the gain of a system and make decisionsoptimal control eventually reduces
to decision makingbased on these beliefs. In the following we shall propose
a behavioural belief model. Before going into a detailed description of this
model, we rst discuss very briey a few important how's, why's, pro's and
con's of behavioural belief models: why are behavioural belief models well
suited for studying optimal control under uncertainty, and what are the limits
of behavioural belief models?
Beliefs about X can be modelled through behaviour. For instance, if we
strongly believe that the outcome of the random variable tomorrow, it will
rain in Ghent will be true then probably we will take an umbrella with us
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for tomorrow's city-trip to Ghent (even though we might not be 100% certain
of rain). Thus, clearly our behaviour is a reection of our beliefs (possibly
involving uncertainty). This has lead some people, such as Ramsey [65], De
Finetti [26], von Neumann and Morgenstern [83], Savage [69], Anscombe
and Aumann [2], Khaneman and Tversky [47], Walley [85], von Winterfeld
and Edwards [84], Seidenfeld, Schervish and Kadane [72], and many others,
to the idea of taking behaviourin whatever formas the primitive notion
when modelling belief, de facto taking some form of behaviour as a denition
of belief. It is also the course we shall pursue.
Optimal control in itself is actually a form of behaviour, and hence, any
suciently sophisticated behavioural belief model naturally leads to a notion
of optimality induced by belief. In optimal control we are presented with a
set of controls, for instance
U = ftake umbrella;don't take umbrellag;
and we are faced with the problem of identifying the subset of best controls
opt (U)  U. Observe that this identication clearly reects our beliefs: if
we strongly believe that the value of the random variable tomorrow, it will
rain in Ghent will be true then clearly
opt (U) = ftake umbrellag;
provided we prefer not to get wet. Thus, we might in fact take optim-
ality, or more precisely, the optimality operator, also called choice function,
opt : }(U) ! }(U) that selects the best options from a set, as the primitive
notion when modelling belief. We shall however consider a simpler way
of modelling behaviour and derive optimality from it. It turns out that the
simple behavioural belief model we shall use still encompasses quite a large
number of uncertainty models and optimality operators that exist in the
literature.
A simple but fairly general way to model our beliefs about the ran-
dom variable X consists of considering our dispositions towards transactions
whose value depends on the outcome of X; such transactions occur typically
in optimal control problems: often, we want to optimise a gain whose value
is a function of a random variable X. Again, to see how such dispositions
relate to belief, assume for instance that we have strong belief that we shall
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observe X = x. We should then be inclined to accept, prior to observation of
X, any transaction that incurs a positive gain if X = x. On the other hand,
if we strongly believe that X = x will not be observed, we should not care
too much, prior to observation of X, about the gains or losses connected with
X = x. Hence, beliefs about X naturally translate into behavioural dispos-
itions towards transactions whose value depends on the outcome of X. In
the theory of lower previsions we shall consider a very particular type of
transactions: buying gains that are a bounded function of X.
Any behavioural belief model can be made operational since measuring
belief is simply obtained by measuring behaviour. We refer to von Winterfeld
and Edwards [84] for an extensive discussion.
On the other hand, not all beliefs are reected by behaviour, and cer-
tainly not by the restricted types of behaviour we shall study. Despite its
unifying character, this is a hard limit on the applicability of the theory used
in this work. This limit is at least three-fold. Firstly, we shall only express
belief regarding random variables. Secondly, it turns out that only using
transactions in describing optimality operators forces us to restrict to a very
particular type of optimality operators. Finally, we shall be concerned only
with transactions expressed in terms of a linear utility scale.
Indeed, not all our beliefs concern random variables. For instance, I
believe that most of my beliefs are not concerned at all with dispositions
towards transactions whose value depends on the outcome of a random
variable (although I usually have a lot of fun in trying to express my beliefs
by such transactions). This belief I cannot express as dispositions towards
transactions whose value depends on the outcome of a random variable.
More seriously, any belief concerning an entity whose value is not observable
falls beyond the scope of the behavioural belief models that are based on
random variables. For instance, what about a transaction whose outcome
depends on the fact whether or not the electron is a fundamental particle? Or,
what about Pascal's [63] wager, who considers a transaction whose outcome
depends on the fact whether God exists or not? As Pascal puts it:
[...]  Examinons donc ce point, et disons:  Dieu est, ou il n'est
pas.  Mais de quel cote´ pencherons-nous? La raison n'y peut rien
de´terminer: il y a un chaos inni qui nous se´pare. Il se joue un jeu,
a l'extre´mite´ de cette distance innie, o u il arrivera croix ou pile. Que
gagerez-vous? Par raison, vous ne pouvez de´fendre nul des deux. Ne
blamez donc pas de faussete´ ceux qui ont pris un choix; car vous n'en
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savez rien.   Non; mais je les blamerai d'avoir fait, non ce choix,
mais un choix; car, encore que celui qui prend croix et l'autre soient en
paraille faute, ils sont tous deux en faute: le juste est de ne point parier [our
emphasis].   Oui; mais il faut parier. [...]
Blaise Pascal [63, Vol. 1, Sect. 233-418, pp. 101102]
Unless we have an experiment that determines an objective (or at least inter-
subjective) answer to such questions, transactions whose outcome depends
on these answers cannot be executed. Therefore, they fall beyond the scope
of behavioural belief models.
A second reason why not all beliefs are reected by the restricted types of
behaviour we shall study, is that the optimality operator induced by trans-
actions is uniquely determined by its restriction to pairs of controls only.
That is, our best options within pairs of controls uniquely determine our best
options within any set of controls. There are reasonable optimality operat-
ors that do not satisfy this property; see for instance Schervish, Seidenfeld,
Kadane and Levi [71], and Chapter 6 of this work.
Finally, we shall only be concerned with transactions expressed in a xed
and unique linear utility scale: this means roughly that twice executing a
transaction doubles its value. This is taken for granted if transactions only
involve a suciently small amount of money (see De Finetti [27, Volume I,
Section 3.2]) or an exchange of lottery tickets (see Walley [86, Section 2.2]).
However, they often fail when the results of transactions involve drinking
beer, eating gnocci, sunbathing, or making love. So, there are behavioural dis-
positions, reecting beliefs, which cannot be completely expressed in terms
of a linear utility scale. They fall beyond the scope of the behavioural belief
models we shall study.
3.3 Gambles and Prices
3.3.1 Denitions
A gamble f on a random variable X is a real-valued gain (expressed in units of
a linear utility scale which is assumed to be xed) that is a bounded function
of X. In particular, it is a real-valued random variable. Mathematically, it is
a bounded XR-mapping, and it is thus interpreted as a bounded uncertain
gain: if x turns out to be the realisation of X, then we receive an amount
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f (x) of utility. As before, when we consider gambles on dierent random
variables, we may write f (X) in order to emphasise that f is a gamble on X.
Restricting to bounded uncertain gains is to some extent a mathematical
convenience. We shall propose a way to generalise large parts of the theory
to the unbounded case further on.
The set of all gambles on X is denoted by L(X). It is a linear lattice
an ordered linear space such that every two vectors have a supremum and
an inmumwith respect to the point-wise addition, the point-wise scalar
multiplication and the point-wise ordering, which are dened as
( f + g)(x) := f (x) + g(x); and
( f )(x) :=  f (x)
for any pair of gambles f and g on X, any real  and all x 2 X, and
f  g if for all x 2 X : f (x)  g(x):
The supremum f _ g of two gambles f and g on X is given by their point-wise
maximum, and their inmum f ^ g is given by their point-wise minimum:
for all x 2 X,
( f _ g)(x) = maxf f (x); g(x)g; and
( f ^ g)(x) = minf f (x); g(x)g:
These operators should not be confused with the supremum sup f and
inmum inf f of a gamble f on X, which are dened as
sup f := minfa 2 R : a  f g; and
inf f := maxfa 2 R : a  f g:
We also dene the absolute value
 f  of a gamble f as  f  (x) :=  f (x) for all
x 2 X, and the negation   f of f as (  f )(x) :=  ( f (x)) for all x 2 X. As usual,
f + ( g) is abbreviated to f   g.
It is convenient to identify a real number a 2 R with the constant gamble
a(x) := a for all x 2 X. For instance, the expression a  f , where f is a gamble
on X and a is a real number, means a  f (x) for all x 2 X; we already used
this in our denition of supremum. The set of constant gambles on X will be
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denoted by R(X).
Another special class of gambles are those that correspond to so-called
events. An event on X simply is a subset of X. With an event A on X we
can associate a f0; 1g-valued gamble IA that gives us one unit of utility if the
realisation x of X belongs to A, and nothing otherwise:
IA(x) =
8>>><>>>:
1; if x 2 A;
0; otherwise:
This gamble IA is called the indicator of A. For a collectionA of events on X,
we dene
IA := fIA : A 2 Ag:
The lower prevision P( f ) of a gamble f is dened as the supremum buying
price for f ; P( f ) is the highest price s such that for any t < s, we are willing
to pay t prior to observation of X, if we are guaranteed to receive f (x) when
observing X = x. Mathematically, we dene a lower prevision on X as a
real-valued mapping dened on some subset dom P, the domain of P, of
L(X). Indeed, we do not require a lower prevision to be dened on the set of
all gambles. Further on, we shall describe methods for extending any lower
prevision to the set of all gambles.
We can also interpret f as an uncertain bounded loss: if x turns out to
be the true value of X, we lose an amount f (x) of linear utility. The upper
prevision P( f ) of the gamble f is then the inmum selling price for f ; it is
the lowest price s such that for any t > s, we are willing to receive t prior to
observation of X, if we are guaranteed to lose f (x) when observing X = x.
Since a gain r is equivalent to a loss  r it should hold that P( f ) =  P(  f ):
from any lower prevision P we can infer a so-called conjugate upper prevision
P on dom P =  dom P which represents the same behavioural dispositions.
We can therefore restrict our attention to the study of lower previsions only,
without loss of generality. Also, if we use the notation P for a lower prevision,
P always denotes its conjugate.
It may happen that P is self-conjugate, that is, dom P = dom P and P( f ) =
P( f ) for all gambles f 2 dom P. In such a case, we may simply write P instead
of P or P whenever it is clear from the context whether we are considering
either buying or selling prices (or both). We call a self-conjugate lower
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prevision P simply a prevision, and P( f ) represents a so-called fair price for
the gamble f : we are willing to buy f for any price s < P( f ), and we are
willing to sell f for any price s > P( f ). Previsions, interpreted as fair prices,
were introduced by De Finetti [26], who used them to provide a behavioural
foundation for probability theory based on expectation.
It is convenient to identify indicator gambles with their corresponding
events. In particular, we shall denote the lower prevision of an indicator
gamble P(IA) simply as P(A). We call P(A) the lower probability of the event
A, and if the domain of P only contains indicator gambles, we simply call P
a lower probability. Similarly, we denote P(IA) as P(A) and call it the upper
probability of A. If the domain of P only contains indicator gambles it is
called an upper probability. If P is a (self-conjugate lower) prevision then P(A)
is called the probability of A. If the domain of a prevision P only contains
indicator gambles along with their negations then P is called a probability .
3.3.2 Lower and Upper Previsions by Chance
As a simple example of lower and upper previsions, we illustrate how chance
(aleatory probability) can be related to lower and upper previsions of f0; 1g-
valued gambles, or, lower and upper probabilities.
Let's for instance assume that X corresponds to the colour of a marble
randomly drawn from a bag of N marbles. For simplicity, assume that each
marble can be either red or blue, so X = fred; blueg. Let A be the event of
drawing a red marble, and suppose we learn somehow that at least n of the
marbles are red. Now consider the gamble IA. If we assume that each marble
of the bag is equally likely to be drawn, then we gain one unit of utility
in at least n of the N equiprobable cases; we could say that the statistical
chance of drawing red is at least nN . In an innite sequence of independent
trials of the marble experiment, the relative frequency by which we draw
red will converge almost surely to the chance of drawing red by the strong
law of large numbers. Therefore, repeatedly buying IA for any price strictly
less than nN will result almost surely in a net gain in such a sequence. This
suggests P(A) = nN as a supremum buying price. In this example, the lower
probability of A is nothing but a lower bound for the chance of A.
Alternatively, suppose we learn that at most n of the marbles are red and
consider the gamble  IA. We expect to lose one unit of utility in at most n of
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the N equiprobable cases. In an innite sequence of independent trials of the
marble experiment, again we should be disposed to buying  IA for any price
strictly less than   nN . This suggests P( IA) =   n

N , or equivalently, P(A) =
n
N .
The upper probability of A is nothing but an upper bound for the chance of
A.
We've shown how our belief about the chance of particular events trans-
lates naturally into lower and upper previsions. This is sometimes called the
principle of direct inference; see Walley [86, Section 7.2.4] for a more detailed
discussion and a dierent approach not relying on sequences of independent
trials. If the chance of an event A is exactly known, the fair price for IA is
exactly equal to this chance. Of course, lower and upper previsions can be
used as models for beliefs in far more general situations.
3.3.3 Inference Rules
Some behavioural dispositions are evident: for instance, an indicator gamble
does not take a negative value, and therefore, we should be disposed to buy it
(at least) for any strictly negative price. Also, some behavioural dispositions
imply other behavioural dispositions. To give a simple example, if we are
disposed to buy a gamble for a price, then we should also be disposed to
buy it for any lower price (we already used this implicitly in accepting the
supremum buying price as a summary of all our buying prices). We shall
accept the following axioms of rationality governing dispositions towards
buying and selling gambles.
Axiom 3.1 (Axioms of Rationality). For arbitrary gambles f and g on X and
arbitrary real numbers s and t the following should hold.
(i) We are disposed to buy f for any price strictly less than inf f (accepting
a sure gain).
(ii) We are disposed not to buy f for any price strictly larger than sup f
(avoiding a sure loss).
(iii) If we are disposed to buy f for s then we should be disposed to buy  f
for s, for any strictly positive  2 R (scale independence).
(iv) If we are disposed to buy f for s and g for t then we should be disposed
to buy f + g for s + t (accepting combined transactions).
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(v) If we are disposed to buy f for s and g  f then we should be disposed
to buy g for s (monotonicity).
The above axioms can easily be motivated through the linearity of the
utility scale in which gambles and prices are expressed; see for instance
Walley [86, Section 2.4.4] for a justication using probability currency as a
linear utility scale. Also see De Finetti [27, Volume I, Section 3.2.5] for a
simple solution in case gambles and prices are expressed in a precise but
non-linear utility scale.
3.4 Criteria of Rationality
3.4.1 Avoiding Sure Loss
Buying f (X) for a price strictly higher than sup f makes no sense: with cer-
tainty, such transaction incurs a strictly positive loss. For example, suppose
that for some non-empty subset A of X our lower prevision for IA is equal to
1:2; P(IA) = 1:2. This means that we are disposed to buy the uncertain gain
IA for a price 1:1 since 1:1 is strictly less than 1:2. But, the reward of IA is 1 at
most, so this behavioural disposition incurs a sure loss of at least 1:1 1 = 0:1.
This is irrational behaviour, so our lower prevision P(IA) should not be equal
to 1:2; in fact, it should not be strictly higher than 1.
More generally, a combined buy of a nite collection of gambles is not
acceptable if this transaction leads to a sure loss. For example, suppose we
have that P(IA) = 0:7 and P(IB) = 0:7, with A and B non-empty and disjoint
subsets of X. This means that we are disposed to buy both IA and IB for
0:6. Therefore, we are disposed to buy IA + IB = IA[B for 0:6 + 0:6 = 1:2.
But again, the reward for IA[B is 1 at most, so these behavioural dispositions
lead to a loss of at least 1:2   1 = 0:2. Again, this behaviour is irrational:
P(IA)+ P(IB) should not be equal to 1:2; it should not be higher than 1 in fact.
These examples call for the following denition, which apparently goes back
to Ramsey [65, p. 182].
Denition 3.2. Let P be a lower prevision on X. Then the following condi-
tions are equivalent; if any (hence all) of them are satised, then P is said to
avoid sure loss.
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(A) For any n 2N n f0g, and f1, . . . , fn in dom P, it holds that
nX
i=1
P( fi)  sup
2666664
nX
i=1
fi
3777775 : (3.1)
(B) For any n 2Nnf0g, non-negative 1, . . . , n inR, and f1, . . . , fn in dom P,
it holds that
nX
i=1
iP( fi)  sup
2666664i
nX
i=1
fi
3777775 : (3.2)
Explanation. The equivalence of (A) and (B) is proved in Walley's book [86,
Lemma 2.4.4]. Let's explain (A).
Suppose that Eq. (3.1) does not hold for some n 2N n f0g and f1, . . . , fn in
dom P. Dene the strictly positive number
 :=
nX
i=1
P( fi)   sup
2666664
nX
i=1
fi
3777775 > 0:
Let  := n+1 . Since  > 0, we are disposed to buy each fi for P( fi)   . Hence,
by the axioms of rationality, Axiom 3.1(iv) in particular, we are disposed to
buy
Pn
i=1 fi for
Pn
i=1 P( fi)   n. But, this transaction always leads to a strictly
positive loss since
nX
i=1
P( fi)   n >
nX
i=1
P( fi)    = sup
2666664
nX
i=1
fi
3777775
by the denition of . This violates Axiom 3.1(ii). 
3.4.2 Coherence
It might occur that we are disposed to buy a gamble f for a higher price
than the one implied by P( f ) after consideration of buying prices of other
gambles. For example, consider the lower prevision P dened by P(IA) = 0:3,
P(IB) = 0:4 and P(IC) = 0:5, where A, B and C are non-empty subsets of X
with A \ B = ; and A [ B  C. This means for instance that we are disposed
to buy IA + IB = IA[B for 0:25 + 0:35 = 0:6. But observe that IA[B  IC since
A[B  C: IC gives us a reward at least as high as IA[B. Therefore, we should
also be disposed to buy IC for 0:6; the supremum buying price P(IC) = 0:5 is
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too low. These observations are formalised and generalised in the following
denition, which apparently goes back to Williams [92].
Denition 3.3. Let P be a lower prevision on X. Then the following condi-
tions are equivalent; if any (hence all) of them are satised, then P is called
coherent:
(A) For any m 2N, n 2N, and gambles f0, f1, . . . , fm in dom P, it holds that
nX
i=1
P( fi)  mP( f0)  sup
2666664
nX
i=1
fi  m f0
3777775 : (3.3)
(B) For any n 2N, non-negative 0, 1, . . . , n in R, and gambles f0, f1, . . . ,
fn in dom P, it holds that
nX
i=1
iP( fi)   0P( f0)  sup
2666664
nX
i=1
i fi   0 f0
3777775 : (3.4)
Explanation. The equivalence of (A) and (B) is mentioned, but not proved,
in Walley [86, Lemma 2.5.4]. Let's rst explain (A), and then prove that
(A) =) (B); the converse implication is immediate.
Suppose (3.3) is violated for some n 2 N, m 2 N, and gambles f0, f1, . . . ,
fn in dom P. The case m = 0 means that P does not avoid sure loss. We
already demonstrated that this is irrational (see Section 3.4.1). So suppose
m , 0. Let
 := sup
2666664
nX
i=1
fi  m f0
3777775 ;  :=
nX
i=1
P( fi)  mP( f0)    > 0;
and  := n+1 . Since  > 0, we are disposed to buy each fi for P( fi)   .
Hence, by Axiom 3.1(iv), we are disposed to buy
Pn
i=1 fi for
Pn
i=1 P( fi)  n, or
equivalently, to buy
Pn
i=1 fi    for
Pn
i=1 P( fi)   n   . Now, observe that
nX
i=1
fi    =
nX
i=1
fi   sup
2666664
nX
i=1
fi  m f0
3777775  m f0;
and hence, by Axiom 3.1(v), we should also be disposed to buy the larger re-
ward m f0 for the same price
Pn
i=1 P( fi) n , and therefore, by Axiom 3.1(iii),
3.4 CRITERIA OF RATIONALITY 53
also to buy f0 for 1m
Pn
i=1 P( fi)   n   

. But
1
m
0BBBBB@
nX
i=1
P( fi)   n   
1CCCCCA > 1m
0BBBBB@
nX
i=1
P( fi)      
1CCCCCA = P( f0);
by the choice of , which means that P( f0) is too low.
(A) =) (B) Assume that (A) holds:
nX
i=1
P( fi)  mP( f0)  sup
2666664
nX
i=1
fi  m f0
3777775 ;
for any n 2 N, m 2 N, and gambles f0, f1, . . . , fn in dom P; and suppose ex
absurdo that
nX
i=1
iP( fi)   0P( f0) > sup
2666664
nX
i=1
i fi   0 f0
3777775 ;
for a particular choice of n 2N, non-negative0, 1, . . . , n inR, and gambles
f0, f1, . . . , fn in dom P. Dene
 :=
nX
i=1
iP( fi)   0P( f0)   sup
2666664
nX
i=1
i fi   0 f0
3777775 > 0
 := sup
hPn
i=0j f jj
i
+
Pn
i=0jP( f j)j  0 and,  := 2+1 > 0. Since Q is dense in R,
there are non-negative rational numbers i 2 Q such that i  i  i +  for
every i 2 f0; : : : ;ng. By Lemma 3.4 we nd that
i fi  i fi + j fij;
 0 f0   0 f0 + j f0j;
 iP( fi)   iP( fi) + 
P( fi)
0P( f0)  0P( f0) + 
P( f0)
for every j 2 f1; : : : ;ng. Let k 2N be a common denominator of 0; : : : ; n and
let mi = ki 2N for every j 2 f0; : : : ;ng. We nd that
sup
2666664
nX
i=1
i fi   0 f0
3777775  
0BBBBB@
nX
i=1
iP( fi)   0P( f0)
1CCCCCA
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 sup
2666664
nX
i=1
i fi   0 f0 +
nX
i=0
j fij
3777775
 
0BBBBB@
nX
i=1
iP( fi)   0P( f0)
1CCCCCA +
nX
i=0

P( fi)
 sup
2666664
nX
i=1
i fi   0 f0
3777775  
nX
i=1
iP( fi) + 0P( f0)
+ 
0BBBBB@sup
2666664
nX
i=0
j fij
3777775 +
nX
i=0
P( fi)
1CCCCCA
=   +  <  =2:
We conclude that
sup
2666664
nX
i=1
mi fi  m0 f0
3777775  
0BBBBB@
nX
i=1
miP( fi)  m0P( f0)
1CCCCCA <  k=2 < 0:
We have reached a contradiction. 
Lemma 3.4. Let a, b and  be real numbers and assume that   0. If a  b  a+ 
then for every real number c we have that ac    jcj  bc  ac +  jcj.
Proof. If c  0 then we have that ac  bc  (a + )c which implies that
ac    jcj  ac  bc  (a + )c  ac +  jcj :
On the other hand, if c < 0 then we have that ac  bc  (a+ )c which implies
that
ac +  jcj  ac  bc  (a + )c  ac    jcj :
In both cases we nd that ac    jcj  bc  ac +  jcj. 
Coherence is the minimal requirement we shall impose on lower previ-
sions. Clearly, avoiding sure loss is weaker than coherence. So, why did
we introduce avoiding sure loss, separately from coherence? Because it is
sucient for a lower prevision to avoid sure loss: in Theorem 4.3 on p. 96,
we shall see that, any lower prevision that avoids sure loss, can be corrected
to a behaviourally equivalent coherent lower prevision. This statement will
be made precise in Section 4.1.
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For previsionsself-conjugate lower previsionsavoiding sure loss and
coherence are equivalent. De Finetti actually denes coherence for previsions
as avoiding sure loss; see De Finetti [27, Vol. I, p. 87, Sect. 3.3.5]. Regarding
terminology, Walley [86, Section 2.8.1, p. 86] calls a coherent prevision a linear
previsionbut his denition is slightly more general: it extends to lower
previsions that are not self-conjugate. We shall say that a lower prevision is
linear if it is coherent and self-conjugate. Denote the set of all linear previsions
with domain K  L(X) by PK (X). The set PL(X)(X) is simply denoted by
P(X).
Coherence has the following implications; we refer to Walley [86, The-
orem 2.6.1] for a proof.
Theorem 3.5. Let P be a coherent lower prevision. Let f and g be gambles on X.
Let a be a constant gamble. Let  and  be reals with   0 and 0    1. Let f
be a net of gambles. Then the following statements hold whenever every term is well
dened.
(i) inf f  P( f )  P( f )  sup f
(ii) P(a) = P(a) = a
(iii) P( f + a) = P( f ) + a; P( f + a) = P( f ) + a
(iv) f  g + a =) P( f )  P(g) + a and P( f )  P(g) + a
(v) P( f ) + P(g)  P( f + g)  P( f ) + P(g)  P( f + g)  P( f ) + P(g)
(vi) P( f ) = P( f ); P( f ) = P( f )
(vii) P( f )+ (1  )P(g)  P( f + (1  )g)  P( f )+ (1  )P(g)  P( f + (1 
)g)  P( f ) + (1   )P(g)
(viii) P  j f j  P( f ); P  j f j  P( f )
(ix)
P( f )   P(g)  P  j f   gj ; P( f )   P(g)  P  j f   gj
(x) P  j f + gj  P  j f j + P  jgj ; P  j f + gj  P  j f j + P  jgj
(xi) P( f _ g) + P( f ^ g)  P( f ) + P(g)  P( f _ g) + P( f ^ g),
P( f ) + P(g)  P( f _ g) + P( f ^ g)  P( f ) + P(g), and
P( f ) + P(g)  P( f _ g) + P( f ^ g)  P( f ) + P(g).
(xii) lim P
 j f   f j = 0 =) lim P( f) = P( f ) and lim P( f) = P( f ).
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(xiii) P and P are uniformly continuous with respect to the topology of uniform
convergence on their respective domains: for any  > 0 and any f and g in
dom P, if supj f   gj < , then jP( f )   P(g)j < .
If the domain of a lower prevision is a linear space, then we can character-
ise coherence in a simpler way. Again, we refer to Walley [86, Theorem 2.5.5,
p. 75] for a proof.
Theorem 3.6. Let P be a lower prevision on X, and assume that dom P is a linear
subspace of L(X). Then P is coherent if and only if for any gambles f and g in
dom P and any strictly positive real number  the following conditions are met.
(i) P( f )  inf f
(ii) P( f ) = P( f )
(iii) P( f + g)  P( f ) + P(g)
For previsions, the characterisation is even simpler; see De Finetti [27,
Sect. 3.5.1, p. 74] or Walley [86, Theorem 2.8.4, p. 88] for a proof.
Theorem 3.7. Let P be a prevision on X, and assume that dom P is a linear subspace
ofL(X). Then P is a linear prevision (i.e., P is coherent) if and only if for any gambles
f and g 2 dom P the following conditions are met.
(i) P( f )  inf f
(ii) P( f + g) = P( f ) + P(g)
Because the conditions on linear subspaces are much easier to check, a
very common method for proving coherence of lower previsions (or linearity
of previsions) dened on arbitrary subsets of L(X) consists in proving that
it is the restriction of a coherent lower prevision (or linear prevision) on a
linear subspace of L(X). This simple observation is suciently important to
call it a lemma.
Denition 3.8. Let P and Q be lower previsions on X. Then P is said to be a
restriction of Q, and Q is said to be an extension of P, whenever dom P  dom Q
and P( f ) = Q( f ) for all f 2 dom P.
Lemma 3.9. The following statements hold.
(i) The restriction of a lower prevision avoiding sure loss also avoids sure loss.
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(ii) The restriction of a coherent lower prevision is also coherent.
(iii) The restriction of a linear prevision to a prevision is also linear.
Proof. Immediately from Denition 3.2 and Denition 3.3. 
Lemma 3.9 will be useful in particular for proving the coherence of
(lower and upper) probabilities, that is, lower previsions dened on indicator
gambles. Typically, a lower probability is extended to a lower prevision on a
linear space by means of an integral.
Another way to prove coherence of a lower prevision is to express it
as a convex combination, a lower envelope, or a point-wise limit of lower
previsions that are already known to be coherent.
Lemma 3.10. Suppose   = fP1;P2; : : : ;Png is a nite collection of lower previsions
dened on a common domain K . Let Q be a convex combination of  :
Q( f ) :=
nX
i=1
iPi( f ); for all f 2 K ;
for some 1, . . . , n  0 and
Pn
i=1 i = 1. Then the following statements hold.
(i) If all lower previsions in   avoid sure loss, then Q avoids sure loss.
(ii) If all lower previsions in   are coherent, then Q is coherent.
(iii) If all lower previsions in   are linear previsions, then Q is a linear prevision.
Proof. See Walley [86, Theorem 2.6.4, p. 79] for a proof of (i) and (ii). To prove
(iii) it suces to check self-conjugacy of Q:
Q(  f ) =
nX
i=1
iPi(  f ) =  
nX
i=1
iPi( f ) =  Q( f ):

Lemma 3.11. Suppose   is a collection of lower previsions dened on a common
domain K . Let Q be the lower envelope of  :
Q( f ) := inf
P2 
P( f ); for any f 2 K :
Then the following statements hold.
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(i) If all lower previsions in   avoid sure loss, then Q avoids sure loss.
(ii) If all lower previsions in   are coherent, then Q is coherent.
(iii) If all lower previsions in   are linear, then Q is coherent but not linear, unless
  is a singleton.
Proof. See Walley [86, Theorem 2.6.3] for a proof of (i) and (ii). To prove (iii) it
suces to check that Q is not self-conjugate whenever   contains more than
one element. Choose two distinct linear previsions P1 and P2 in  . Since they
are distinct, there is a gamble f 2 K such that for instance P1( f ) < P2( f ). This
means that
Q( f )  P1( f ) < P2( f )  Q( f );
therefore Q is not self-conjugate, which establishes the proof. 
Lemma 3.12. Suppose P is a net of lower previsions dened on a common domain
K . Suppose that P converges point-wise to a lower prevision Q dened onK . Then
the following statements hold.
(i) If all P avoid sure loss then Q avoids sure loss.
(ii) If all P are coherent then Q is coherent.
(iii) If all P are linear then Q is linear.
Proof. See Walley [86, Theorem 2.6.5, p. 79] for a proof of (i) and (ii). To prove
(iii) it suces to check self-conjugacy of Q:
Q( f ) = lim

P( f ) = lim  P(  f ) =   lim P(  f ) =  Q(  f ) = Q( f ):
This establishes the lemma. 
Finally, continuity may also help in proving that a lower prevision is
coherent. This establishes a partial converse of Lemma 3.9.
Lemma 3.13. Suppose P is continuous on its domain with respect to the topology
of uniform convergence, and coherent on a dense subset K of dom P. Then P is
coherent.
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Proof. Let  > 0. Since K is dense in dom P, we have that for any gamble
f 2 dom P there is an f 2 K such that sup
 f   f  < . Therefore, for any
m 2N, n 2N n f0g and f0, f1, . . . , fn in dom P it holds that
nX
i=1
P( fi)  mP( f0)  (n +m) +
nX
i=1
P( f i )  mP( f 0 )
 (n +m) + sup
2666664
nX
i=1
f i  m f 0
3777775
 2(n +m) + sup
2666664
nX
i=1
fi  m f0
3777775 :
Since this holds for any  > 0, it must also hold for  = 0. Coherence
follows. 
The following is a variation on the same theme.
Lemma 3.14. Let P be a coherent lower prevision. Then P has a unique extension
to a coherent lower prevision dened on the uniform closure of dom P. Moreover, if
P is self-conjugate, then also this unique extension is self-conjugate.
Proof. In Chapter 4, Section 4.1, Theorem 4.3, on p. 96, it will be proved that
any coherent lower prevision P has a coherent extension to an arbitrary (but
larger) domain. Since the proof is so much shorter using this result, we shall
cheat, and use it; of course, Theorem 4.3 does not rely on this lemma. So,
there are coherent extensions Q of P to the uniform closure of dom P.
Let Q
1
and Q
2
be two coherent lower previsions dened on the uniform
closure of dom P, and suppose that Q
1
( f ) = Q
2
( f ) = P( f ) for all f in dom P.
We must show that Q
1
(g) = Q
2
(g) for all g in dom Q
1
= dom Q
2
. For every
such g, there is a sequence fn in dom P that converges uniformly to g. Since
Q
1
and Q
2
are coherent, it follows from Theorem 3.5(xii) that
Q
1
(g) = lim
n2N
Q
1
( fn) = limn2NP( fn) = limn2NQ2( fn) = Q2(g);
and hence, Q
1
(g) = Q
2
(g) for any gamble g in their domain (incidentally,
note that the limit is independent of the choice of the sequence fn converging
uniformly to g). This proves uniqueness.
If P is self-conjugate, then, again take for every g in dom Q a sequence fn
in dom P that converges uniformly to g. Since Q is coherent, it follows from
60 LOWER AND UPPER PREVISIONS
Theorem 3.5(xii) that
Q(g) = lim
n2N
Q( fn) = limn2NP( fn) = limn2NP( fn) = limn2NQ( fn) = Q(g):

3.5 Examples of Coherent Lower Previsions
3.5.1 Vacuous Lower Previsions
We may know nothing at all about the realisation of X. We express this by
stating that we are only disposed to buy a gamble f on X for a price that is a
lower bound of it:
PX( f ) = inf f :
This lower prevision, dened on the set of all gambles L(X), is called the
vacuous lower prevision on X. It is coherent (check the conditions of The-
orem 3.6).
More generally, we might only be sure that the realisation of X belongs to
a non-empty subset A of X. We then should only be willing to buy a gamble
f on X for a price than is a lower bound of f (X) restricted to A:
PA( f ) = infx2A f (x) = maxfa 2 R : 8x 2 A; a  f (x)g: (3.5)
Again this lower prevision is dened on the set of all gambles L(X) and is
coherent. We call it the vacuous lower prevision on X relative to A. Its conjugate
is given by
PA( f ) = sup
x2A
f (x) = minfa 2 R : 8x 2 A; a  f (x)g:
Within the class of vacuous lower previsions, only the ones relative to
singletons are linear. They model exact knowledge of the value of X. Lower
envelopes of vacuous lower previsions are again vacuous, but convex com-
binations usually are not. In Section 4.3.12 we shall show that convex com-
binations of vacuous lower previsions correspond to the natural extension of
so-called belief functions.
3.5 EXAMPLES OF COHERENT LOWER PREVISIONS 61
3.5.2 Probability Charges
Probability charges, also called nitely additive probability measures, are
a very common way of representing uncertainty about a random variable.
They are slightly more general than so-called probability measures, used in
the classical theory of probability. In Section 4.4, we shall establish that avoid-
ing sure loss, coherence, and natural extension (see Section 4.1 further on),
can be expressed using probability charges only, whence their importance in
the theory of lower previsions.
First, we identify a suciently large collection of events of interest. Con-
veniently, we assume that this collection has the structure of a eld.
Denition 3.15. A eldF onX is a collection of subsets ofX that contains the
empty set and is closed under nite unions and complementation. A -eld
F on X is a eld on X that is also closed under countable unions. An ample
eld on X is a eld on X that is also closed under arbitrary unions.
For example, if X is a topological space, the smallest -eld that contains
all open sets is called the Borel -eld on X and is denoted by B(X). The
members of this eld are called Borel sets. For instance, B(R) corresponds to
the smallest -eld that contains all open intervals (a; b) (where a, b 2 R and
a < b). In measure theory, this is the standard way to equip R with a -eld.
A simpler example is the smallest eld that contains all closed intervals
of a compact interval [a; b]. We denote this eld by F[]([a; b]). It contains all
nite unions of intervals in [a; b], and turns out to be a handy tool in the study
of Riemann-Stieltjes integrals.
Examples of ample elds on X are the set f;;Xg, and the set of all subsets
of X, also called the power set of X:
}(X) := fA : A  Xg:
Any nite eld is also an ample eld. It is well-known that there is a cor-
respondence between ample elds and partitions; see Wang [89], and The-
orem 3.51 on p. 88.
Obviously, any ample eld is a -eld, and any -eld is a eld. If X
is nite, then any eld on X is also a -eld and an ample eld. If X is
countable, then any -eld on X is also an ample eld.
Next, to each event A in a eld F we attach a real number (A) that
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measures our belief in A; typically, it represents a chance, a betting rate, or
a price. To be a probability charge,  should satisfy a number of additional
properties.
Denition 3.16. Let F be a eld on X. A charge  on F , also called nitely
additive measure, nitely additive set function, or additive set function, is an R-
valued mapping on F that assumes at most one of the values +1 and  1,
and satises
(i) (;) = 0, and
(ii) (A [ B) = (A) + (B) whenever A, B 2 F and A \ B = ;.
A charge  on F is called a probability charge if additionally
(iii) (X) = 1, and
(iv) (A)  0 for any A 2 F .
The set of probability charges on F is denoted by P(F ). Finally, a charge 
is said to be -additive if additionally F is a -eld and
(v) for any sequence An of pairwise disjoint sets in F , the limit
lim
n!+1
nX
i=1
(Ai)
exists in R and is equal to   Sn2N An (and hence, the limit is inde-
pendent of the order of the sequence).
A -additive charge is simply called a measure and a -additive probability
charge is simply called a probability measure.
Note that in the literature, there are more general denitions of a measure:
for instance, Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara Rao [9, Denition 2.3.1, p. 47] allow
a measure to be dened on a eld that is not a -eld, Halmos [40, Section 7,
p. 30] allows a measure to be dened on a ring (i.e., a collection of sets closed
under union and dierence), and also Ko¨nig [51, Chapter I, Section 2, p. 14]
has a dierent denition of a measure, allowing it to be dened on what he
calls a -oval. However, usually, measures are assumed to be dened on a
-eld, see for instance Kallenberg [48, Chapter 1, p. 8] and Schechter [70,
Section 11.37, p. 288], and this is also the assumption we make. Observe
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that probability charges do not assume the values +1 or  1; they are [0; 1]-
valued.
Perhaps the most commonly used charge is the Lebesgue measure  on
B(R), which is dened as the unique -additive measure on B(R) such that
((a; b)) = ([a; b)) = ((a; b]) = ([a; b]) = b   a for any a, b 2 R (a  b): it
measures the length of intervals of R. Vitali [82] proved that there is no -
additive measure on all of}(R) that has this propertyif we accept the axiom
of choice; also see for instance Schechter [70, Section 21.22, p. 558]. This is also
one of the reasons why we need to introduce the Borel -eld. Sometimes
the Lebesgue measure is dened on larger -elds, see for instance Halmos
[40, Section 15]. We have found at least three dierent Lebesgue measures.1
However, we prefer to take the simplest denition and always assume the
Lebesgue measure to be dened only on the Borel -eld of R.
As another example, consider the total variation
 of a charge  on a eld
F , which is dened as
 (A) = sup nX
i=1
(Ai)
for any A 2 F , where the supremum is taken over all nite partitions
fA1; : : : ;Ang  F of A. It is easy to check that
 is a charge. When 
is positive (that is, (A)  0 for all A 2 F , which holds for instance for
probability charges and also for the Lebesgue measure),
 is equal to .
Identifying events with indicator gambles, observe that any real-valued
mappingonF can be identied with a lower probability, an upper probabil-
ity, or a probability. In doing this,F need not even be a eld. Let's emphasise
the dierence between what we call probabilities, and probability charges.
Probabilities, dened in the last paragraph of Section 3.3.1, are previsions
whose domain only contains indicator gambles along with their negations
without any further restrictions. Probability charges, on the other hand, are
additive, positive, and normed real-valued mappings dened on a eld. So,
as mathematical objects, they are quite dierent from probabilities. Through
1The Lebesgue measure dened on the Borel -eld is sometimes also called the Borel-
Lebesgue measure; see Schechter [70, Section 21.19]. The completion of the Borel-Lebesgue
measure is usually also called the Lebesgue measure; see Halmos [40]. Finally, the Carathe´odory
extension of the Borel-Lebesgue measure to the -eld of-measurable setsagain, see Halmos
[40]might as well be called the Lebesgue measure. The Carathe´odory extension also agrees
with the linear extension, as described in Section 4.3.4 on p. 116 .
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the identication below, we shall establish a link between probabilities and
probability charges in Theorem 3.21.
Denition 3.17. Let  be any real-valued mapping dened on a class of sub-
sets of X. The lower probability induced by  is dened as the lower prevision
P that maps all gambles IA for A 2 dom to(A), the upper probability induced
by  the upper prevision P that maps all gambles IA for all A 2 dom to
(A), and the probability induced by  the prevision P that maps all gambles
IA for A 2 F to (A) and all gambles  IA for A 2 F to  (A):
P(IA) := (A)
P(IA) := (A)
P(IA) =  P( IA) := (A)
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
for all A 2 dom:
A natural question is: are these (lower/upper) probabilities coherent? If
not, do they at least avoid sure loss? In general, this question is hard to
answer. In case the domain of  is a eld, we shall establish in Theorem 3.21
that P is a coherent probability if and only if is a probability charge. Hence,
by Lemma 3.9, in such a case also P is a coherent lower probability and P is a
coherent upper probability. The proof invokes an extension of P to the linear
span of fIA : A 2 F g, called the Dunford integral. This integral was introduced
as an integral of vector-valued functions with respect to measures by Dunford
[31, p. 443, Sect. 3], and extended to an integral of vector-valued functions
with respect to charges by Dunford and Schwartz [30, Part I, Chapter III,
Denition 2.17, p. 112]; also see Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara Rao [9, Chapter 4]
for a detailed study of the Dunford integral on scalar-valued functions. For
establishing the coherence of probability charges in Theorem 3.21, we only
need the Dunford integral dened on F -simple (see Denition 3.18 below)
gambles; see Dunford and Schwartz [30, Part I, Chapter III, Denition 2.13,
p. 108]. As discussed by Dunford and Schwartz [30, Part I, Chapter III,
Section 2, pp. 101119], the Dunford integral is rst dened on F -simple
gamblesthis is the main reason why we call the integral dened below
the Dunford integraland then extended to more general functions through
Cauchy sequences; this method is due to Dunford [31, Lemma 6, p. 444],
and will be discussed in Section 4.3.8 on p. 161 ., as it also forms a possible
basis to extend coherent lower previsions to functions of X that are possibly
unbounded; this is the subject of Chapter 5. Note that, onF -simple gambles,
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the Dunford integral coincides with the S-integral introduced by Hildebrandt
[42, Sect. 1(f), p. 869] as an integral associated with charges. We shall discuss
the S-integral in Section 4.3.5. As Hildebrandt [42, Sect. 1(f), p. 869] notes,
`it is possible to dene the Lebesgue integral [with respect to a charge] by
the Lebesgue process' and for F -simple gambles (or more generally, F -
measurable gambles), `obviously [the Lebesgue integral] exists', and the `[S-
integral] exists also in this case and agrees with the [Lebesgue integral]'.
Concluding, the integral of Denition 3.19 coincides with just about any
integral found in the literature for charges and F -simple gambles. Other
extensions of probability charges will be discussed in Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.4.
So, what are F -simple gambles?
Denition 3.18. Let F be a eld on X. A gamble f on X is called F -simple if
it belongs to the linear span of IF , that is, if
f =
nX
i=1
aiIAi ;
for some n 2 N, a1, . . . , an in R and A1, . . . , An in F . The sum
Pn
i=1 aiIAi
is called a representation of f . The set of F -simple gambles is denoted by
span(F ).
Note that span(F ) is a simplied notation for span(IF ), the linear span of
all indicators of elements of F .
Denition 3.19. Let F be a eld on X and let  be a charge on F . An
F -simple gamble f is called Dunford integrable with respect to  if it has a
representation f =
Pn
i=1 aiIAi such that
 (Ai) < +1 for all i 2 f1; : : : ;ng. The
Dunford integral of f with respect to  is then dened as
D
Z
f d :=
nX
i=1
ai(Ai): (3.6)
Proof of unambiguity. Consider the linear space of gambles spanned by
K := fIA : A 2 F ;
 (A) < +1g:
Note that span(K ) is exactly the set of Dunford integrableF -simple gambles.
Dene the mapping  (IA) := (A) on K . Now note that  satises the
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condition
nX
i=1
iIAi = 0 =)
nX
i=1
i (IAi ) = 0 (3.7)
for every 1, . . . , n 2 R and IA1 , . . . , IAn 2 K . Indeed, suppose
Pn
i=1 iIAi = 0.
Let B  F be a nite partition of X such that for every i 2 f1; : : : ;ng it holds
that Ai is a union of elements of B. Then,
0 =
nX
i=1
iIAi =
nX
i=1
i
X
B2B
BAi
IB =
X
B2B
0BBBBBBBBBB@
X
i2f1;:::;ng
BAi
i
1CCCCCCCCCCA IB
and since fIB : B 2 Bg is linearly independent this means that
X
i2f1;:::;ng
BAi
i = 0
for every B 2 B. In particular,
nX
i=1
i (IAi ) =
nX
i=1
i 
0BBBBBBBBBB@
X
B2B
BAi
IB
1CCCCCCCCCCA =
nX
i=1
i
X
B2B
BAi
 (IB)
=
X
B2B
0BBBBBBBBBB@
X
i2f1;:::;ng
BAi
i
1CCCCCCCCCCA (IB) = 0;
where we used additivity of . Hence, Eq. (3.7) holds.
By a linear extension theorem (Schechter [70, Proposition 11.10]) it follows
from Eq. (3.7) that  has a unique linear extension	 to span(K ) given by
	
0BBBBB@
nX
i=1
iIAi
1CCCCCA =
nX
i=1
i (IAi ): (3.8)
But this means that 	 is the Dunford integral. In other words, the Dunford
integral is uniquely determined by (3.6). 
For A 2 F , we say that an F -simple gamble f is Dunford integrable over
A with respect to  whenever IA f is Dunford integrable with respect to . In
such a case, we call D
R
IA f d the Dunford integral of f over A with respect
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to , and we also write
D
Z
A
f d := D
Z
IA f d: (3.9)
Lemma 3.20. Let F be a eld on X and let  be a probability charge on F . Then
all F -simple gambles are Dunford integrable with respect to , and the mapping
Espan(F ) dened by
Espan(F ) ( f ) := D
Z
f d (3.10)
for any F -simple gamble f , denes a linear prevision on span(F ).
Proof. Dunford integrability of allF -simple gambles follows from
 =  for
probability charges . Note that Espan(F ) is self-conjugate, this easily follows
from its denition, and hence, Espan(F ) is a prevision. Now, simply check the
conditions of Theorem 3.7. 
We now arrive at the main result of this section: probability charges are
coherent probabilities. Obviously, by Lemma 3.9, this implies that they are
also coherent either as lower probabilities or upper probabilities.
Theorem 3.21. Let F be a eld. Let  be any real-valued function dened on F .
Then P is coherent if and only if  is a probability charge.
Proof. Let  be a probability charge dened on a eld F . Observe that
the probability  is the restriction of Espan(F ) which is a linear prevision by
Lemma 3.20. Now apply Lemma 3.9 to arrive at the desired result.
Conversely, let P be coherent. Observe that P is a linear probability
on IF [  IF . From (A) = P(A) for all A 2 F , it is very easy to show
that  satises the properties of a probability charge simply by applying the
linearity of P. 
Equivalently, it holds that P avoids sure loss if and only if  is a probab-
ility charge.
We have already shown that the linear prevision Espan(F ) is the unique
linear extension of the probability P to the set of F -simple gambles. We
shall prove further on that Espan(F ) is actually the only coherent extension of
P to span(F ) (this will follow from a stronger result; see Proposition 4.28 on
p. 112). In fact, it is also the only coherent extension of the lower probability
P, and the only coherent extension of the upper probability P, to span(F ).
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In this sense, additivity implies self-conjugacy (see Corollary 4.33). In order
to come up with event-based models, (lower or upper) probabilities, that are
not self-conjugate, we need to weaken additivity. A few ways of doing this
are described in Sections 3.5.4, 3.5.5, 3.5.7, 3.5.8, 3.5.9, and 3.5.10. But rst,
we x the minimal properties a set function should satisfy, to be interpreted
as a coherent (lower/upper) probability.
3.5.3 Set Functions
Denition
Let, for now,  be an arbitrary set function, i.e., an arbitrary real-valued
mapping dened on an arbitrary collectionA of subsets ofX, which we shall
interpret either as a lower probability, an upper probability, or a probability;
for simplicity, also assume that ; 2 A and X 2 A. Then, independently of
how we interpret , it follows from Theorem 3.5 that, if either P, P, or P is
coherent, then (;) = 0, (X) = 1, and (A)  (B) for all A and B inA such
that A  B. Explicitly:
 if P is coherent, then P(I;) = 0, P(IX) = 1, and A  B =) P(IA) 
P(IB), for all A and B inA,
 if P is coherent, then P(I;) = 0, P(IX) = 1, and A  B =) P(IA) 
P(IB), for all A and B inA, and
 if P is coherent, then P(I;) = 0, P(IX) = 1, and A  B =) P(IA) 
P(IB), for all A and B inA.
Since we are only interested in set functions that induce either coherent lower
probabilities, coherent upper probabilities, or coherent probabilities, it is
consistent to include the above conditions into our denition of a set function.
Why exactly takeonlythese conditions? Indeed, they are necessary, but
not sucient for  to induce a coherent lower probability, a coherent upper
probability, or a coherent probability. Nevertheless,
 they are simple,
 they are independent of whether we interpret  as a coherent lower
probability, as a coherent upper probability, or as a coherent probability,
and
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 for all the specialised types of set functions we shall study further on,
it suces to impose only one additional propertysuch as nesting, 2-
monotonicity, minimum preservation, etc.for  to induce a coherent
lower probability, a coherent upper probability, or a coherent probabil-
ity.
Denition 3.22. A set function is a real-valued mapping , dened on a
collectionA of subsets of X, such that
(i) ; 2 A and X 2 A,
(ii) (;) = 0 and (X) = 1, and
(iii) A  B =) (A)  (B) for any A and B inA.
The setA is called the domain of  and is denoted by dom.
So, from now on, all set functions are assumed to satisfy the conditions
of the above denition. This deviates from the terminology used in the
literature: usually, set functions are only assumed to be non-negative, and
zero on the empty set. But, for the purpose of studying the coherence of
event-based models, Denition 3.22 simplies our study a lot. Note that
probability charges are set functions: since they induce coherent probabilities,
they satisfy the above conditions; however, we shall not call all charges set
functions: for instance, we shall not call the Lebesgue measure a set function,
because (R) = +1. In this work, this will not form any obstacle whatsoever.
Dual Set Functions
Dening lower and upper previsions in Section 3.3.1, we have seen that
from any lower prevision P we can infer a conjugate upper prevision P on
dom P =  dom P which represents the same behavioural dispositions.
Let  be a real-valued set function, and assume that we interpret it as
a lower probability: we consider the lower probability P := P induced by
note that we will usually denote by  any set function that is meant to
be interpreted as a lower probability. The conjugate upper prevision P of P
can be dened by P( IA) :=  (A) for all A 2 dom , and unfortunately, P
is not dened on a set of indicator gambles: P is not an upper probability
induced by a set function we shall usually denote by  any set function
that is meant to be interpreted as an upper probability. Hence, there seems to
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be no correspondence between lower and upper probabilities similar to the
correspondence between lower and upper previsions.
However, through a simple transformation, we can infer, through coher-
ence, an upper probability from P: by Theorem 3.5, it should hold that
P(I{A) = P(1   IA) = 1   P(IA)
whenever P is coherent. This suggests the following denition.
Denition 3.23. Let  be a real-valued set function. The dual of  is the
real-valued set function  dened on
n
{A : A 2 dom 
o
by
({A) := 1   (A);
for any A 2 dom . If dom  is closed under complementation and ({A) =
1   (A) for all A 2 dom , then  is called self-dual.
There is a close relationship between conjugate upper previsions and
dual set functions, as we shall see in Proposition 3.24 and Proposition 4.10.
Note that elds are closed under complementation. We have already seen
an example of self-dual set functions on a eld: in case  is a probability
charge, its dual  is equal to , whence, probability charges are self-dual set
functions.
The following proposition says that avoiding sure loss and coherence are
preserved for the dual set function. In Proposition 4.10 on p. 99, we shall
establish a stronger result: models the same behavioural dispositions as its
dual .
Proposition 3.24. Let  be a real-valued set function, and let  be its dual. Then
P avoids sure loss if and only if P avoids sure loss, and P is coherent if and only
if P is coherent. If  is self-dual, then P is coherent if and only if P is coherent, if
and only if P is coherent.
Proof. Immediate from the denitions of avoiding sure loss and coherence.
except for proving that, whenever  is self-dual, coherence of P is equivalent
to coherence of P. Since the proof is so much shorter using very simple
result proved in Section 4.1, we shall cheat, and use that result.
By Lemma 3.9, if P is coherent, then P is coherent too. Conversely,
assume that P is coherent. The easiest way to proceed, is to assume that P
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has a coherent extension P to IA [  IA; this will be established in Section 4.1.
If we can prove that this coherent extension P is equal to Pand hence,
that it is uniquethen we have also established the coherence of P. Since
P is an extension of P, it holds that P(IA) = P(IA) = (A) = P(IA). Since,
additionally,  is self-dual, it holds that P( IA) = P(1  IA)  1 = P(I{A)  1 =
({A)   1 =  (A) = P( IA). 
3.5.4 Nested Set Functions
A common way to model uncertainty about a random variable, is to identify
a nested collection of sets, and to attach, to each event A in this collection,
a real number (A) that measures our belief in A; we shall identify  with a
lower probability P, an upper probability P, or a probability P. These set
functions, which are far simpler than probability charges, have no specic
name in the literature. I call them nested set functions, because they are
dened on a collection of nested sets.
As lower probabilities, or upper probabilities, they arise naturally when
modelling linguistic uncertainty; see Walley and De Cooman [88]. As prob-
abilities, they arise as cumulative distribution functions; see Section 3.5.10.
In Theorem 3.27 below, we prove that a nested set function  always in-
duces a coherent probability P, and hence, also a coherent lower probability
P and a coherent upper probability P.
Denition 3.25. A collectionA of subsets of X is called nested whenever for
any two elements A and B ofA either A  B or B  A.
Denition 3.26. A set function is called nested if its domain is a nested
collection of sets.
Recall from Denition 3.22 that we assume set functions  to be dened
on at least ; and X: this will simplify the condition for coherence and the
expression for natural extension, and it guarantees that dom is a bounded
chain with respect toa chain is bounded if it has a minimal and a maximal
element; such nested set functions have been studied in the literature in the
context of non-additive set functions, see for instance De Cooman and Aeyels
[21] and Denneberg [28].
Also recall that we assume set functions to be monotone: (A)  (B)
whenever A  B, with minimum value (;) = 0 and maximum value (X) =
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1; otherwise, they induce neither coherent lower probabilities, nor coherent
upper probabilities, nor coherent probabilities. Hence, a nested set function
is an order preserving mapping from a chain of subsets of X to the unit
interval [0; 1].
The following theorem follows from Denneberg [28, Proposition 2.10]; we
give an alternative proof below.
Theorem 3.27. Let  be a nested set function. Then P, P and P are coherent.
Proof. Indeed, by Lemma 3.9, it suces to show that P is coherent. Den-
neberg [28, Proposition 2.10] showed that  is the restriction of a probability
charge. Hence, by Theorem 3.21 and Lemma 3.9, P is coherent.
Alternatively, dene the set of gambles K := fIA : A 2 domg. Consider
the set of gambles span(K ) spanned by K , this is a linear subspace of L(X).
It is easy to show thatK constitutes a basis for the linear space span(K ). By a
linear extension theorem (Schechter [70, Proposition 11.10]) we can uniquely
dene a linear mapping P on span(K ) such that
P(IA) = (A)
for all A 2 dom. P is an extension of the probability P: to establish
coherence, it suces to show that P is a linear prevision. We check the
conditions of Theorem 3.7. Clearly P( f +g) = P( f )+P(g) for all f , g 2 span(K )
since it is a linear mapping. We only need to show that P( f )  inf f for any
f 2 span(K ). Indeed, for any n in N, 1, . . . , n in R, and S1  S2     
Sn = X in dom, we easily see that
inf
x2X
2666664
nX
i=1
iISi (x)
3777775 =
n
min
i=1
26666664
0BBBBBB@
nX
j=i
 j
1CCCCCCA
37777775
which is dominated by the following convex mixturewhere we use (S1)+Pn
i=2[(Si)   (Si 1)] = (Sn) = (X) = 1, (S1)  0, (Si)   (Si 1)  0,

0BBBBBB@
nX
j=1
 j
1CCCCCCA(S1) +
nX
i=2
0BBBBBB@
nX
j=i
 j
1CCCCCCA [(Si)   (Si 1)]
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by (S1) = P(IS1 ), (Si)   (Si 1) = P(ISinSi 1 ), and the linearity of P,
= P
0BBBBBB@
0BBBBBB@
nX
j=1
 j
1CCCCCCA IS1 +
nX
i=2
0BBBBBB@
nX
j=i
 j
1CCCCCCA ISinSi 1
1CCCCCCA
= P
0BBBBB@
nX
i=1
iISi
1CCCCCA :

3.5.5 2-Monotone and 2-Alternating Set Functions
The denition of 2-monotone and 2-alternating set functions below can be
found for instance in Choquet [11, p. 131, and Chapter II, Section 8, p. 155].
Denition 3.28. A set function  dened on a eld F is called 2-monotone if
for any A and B in F ,
(A [ B) + (A \ B)  (A) + (B):
A set function  dened on F is called 2-alternating if its dual is 2-monotone,
or equivalently, if for any A and B in F ,
(A [ B) + (A \ B)  (A) + (B):
The property (A [ B) + (A \ B)  (A) + (B) is sometimes also called
strong sub-additivity; see for instance Choquet [11, p. 132].
As Walley [85, Section 6, pp. 5152] notes, there are no clear behavioural
arguments, similar to the behavioural arguments in favour of coherence,
explaining 2-monotonicity. Certainly, not all coherent lower probabilities
correspond to a 2-monotone set function. Nevertheless, 2-monotone set func-
tions are mathematically very convenient, as we shall see in Section 4.3.10,
and arise naturally in a number of important cases, as we shall see Sec-
tion 4.3.4: these are the main reasons for studying 2-monotonicity.
In case A \ B = ; it holds that (A [ B)  (A) + (B) if  is 2-monotone,
and (A [ B)  (A) + (B) if  is 2-alternating. This indicates that 2-
monotone set functions are to be identied with lower probabilities and 2-
alternating set functions, which are duals of 2-monotone set functions, with
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upper probabilities; see Theorem 3.5(v) and Proposition 3.24. When are these
lower and upper probabilities coherent?
The lower probability P induced by a 2-monotone set function  has
an extension, known as the Choquet integral. This integral was introduced
by Choquet [11, Section 48.1, p. 265] with respect to so-called capacities; we
shall not study capacities in their full generality. Let it suce to note that
2-monotone set functions are 2-monotone capacities when we equip X with
any topology such that all elements of dom  are open: our denition of
2-monotone set function is then a special case of Choquet's [11, Chapter III,
Section 15.2, p. 174] denition of 2-monotone capacities. Below we give a
denition of the Choquet integral with respect to 2-monotone set functions,
forF -simple gambles. Our denition relies on the Dunford integral forB(R)-
simple gambles, which we introduced beforerecall that B(R) is the Borel
eld on R. Usually, the Choquet integral is dened through the Riemann
integral, see for instance Janssen [45, Section 1.5.4.1], or the Riemann-Stieltjes
integral, see for instance Walley [85, Section 6]although some authors prefer
to use other types of integration in their denition of the Choquet integral, as
is the case for instance in Denneberg [28, Chapter 5]. In all cases investigated,
the denition for F -simple gambles, given below in terms of the Dunford
integral, coincides with other denitions found in the literature.
Denition 3.29. Let F be a eld onX and let  be a 2-monotone set function
on F . Let f be any F -simple gamble. Then the lower decreasing distribution
function of f with respect to  is dened by
G; f (a) := (fx 2 X : f (x) > ag)
for any a 2 R. The Choquet integral of f with respect to  is dened as
C
Z
f d := inf f +D
Z
[inf f ;sup f ]
G; f d
where the Dunford integral is taken with respect to the Lebesgue measure 
on B(R).
Proof of Dunford integrability of G; f . First observe that fx 2 X : f (x) > ag is in
F for any a 2 R since f is F -simple. Also f only takes a nite number of
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values, say a1 <    < an. We can write
G; f = I( 1;a1) +
n 1X
i=1
G; f (ai)I[ai;ai+1) (3.11)
hence, G; f is B(R)-simple. From the above expression, it is easy to see that
G; f is Dunford integrable over [inf f ; sup f ] = [a1; an] with respect to the
Lebesgue measure. 
It is convenient to write the Dunford integral in the above denition of
the Choquet integral as a sum. We can always write an F -simple function
as f =
Pn
i=1 aiIAi such that a1 <    < an and such that A1,. . . , An constitutes a
partition of F . We can write, using (3.11),
C
Z
f d = a1 +
n 1X
i=1
(ai+1   ai)G; f (ai)
= a1
h
1   G; f (a1)
i
+
n 1X
i=2
ai
h
G; f (ai 1)   G; f (ai)
i
+ anG; f (an 1)
=
nX
i=1
ai
h
([nj=iA j)   ([nj=i+1A j)
i
:
The last two expressions are especially interesting because they show how
the Choquet integral of f is a convex combination of the values of f , with
coecients that depend in a non-trivial way on the shape of f . If we write
the gamble f as b0+
Pn
i=1 biIBi with b0 inR, b1, . . . , bn inR and strictly positive,
and X % B1 % B2 %    % Bn % ;, then we can also write the above equality as
C
Z
f d = b0 +
nX
i=1
biG; f
0BBBBBB@
i 1X
j=0
b j
1CCCCCCA
= b0 +
nX
i=1
bi(Bi); (3.12)
which is a well-known identity (see for instance, Janssen [45]). The following
result is due to Walley [85, Corollary 6.2, p. 55].
Lemma 3.30. Let F be a eld on X and let  be a 2-monotone set function on F .
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Dene the lower prevision Espan(F ) by
Espan(F ) ( f ) := C
Z
f d (3.13)
for anyF -simple gamble f . Then Espan(F ) is a coherent lower prevision on span(F ).
Proof. Simply check the conditions of Theorem 3.6. Conditions (i) and (ii)
are easy to check. Condition (iii) is more dicult to prove; see for instance
Choquet [11, p. 287], Walley [85, Lemma 6.3, p. 54], or Denneberg [28, The-
orem 6.3, p. 75] for proofs. 
We now arrive at the main result: 2-monotone set functions induce co-
herent lower probabilities. It was proved by Walley [85, Corollary 6.3, p. 55].
Theorem 3.31. Any 2-monotone set function induces a coherent lower probability.
Proof. Let  be a 2-monotone set function dened on a eld F . Observe
that, for instance by Eq. (3.12), P is the restriction of E
span(F )
 to the set
IF of indicators of elements of F . But Espan(F ) is a coherent prevision by
Lemma 3.30. Now apply Lemma 3.9 to arrive at the desired result. 
3.5.6 2-Monotone Lower Previsions
Let's briey generalise the notion of 2-monotonicity to lower previsions; this
will turn out to be useful later on. The denition below is an instance of a
general denition given by Choquet [11, Chapter III, Denition 13.1, p. 170,
and Section 14.1, p. 171]
Denition 3.32. A lower prevision P dened on a lattice of gambles on X is
called 2-monotone if for all gambles f and g in dom P it holds that
(i) f  g =) P( f )  P(g), and
(ii) P( f _ g) + P( f ^ g)  P( f ) + P(g).
Proposition 3.33. Let S be any non-empty subset ofX. The vacuous lower prevision
with respect to S, i.e., PS, is a 2-monotone coherent lower prevision.
Proof. The proposition can be proved easily by direct verication of Den-
ition 3.32: let f and g be gambles in dom P. Clearly, by the coherence of
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PS (Theorem 3.5(iv)) it holds that PS( f )  PS(g) whenever f  g, and since
f _ g  f and f _ g  g, also PS( f _ g)  maxfPS( f );PS(g)g. Moreover,
PS( f ^ g) = infx2S minf f (x); g(x)g = min

inf
x2S
f (x); inf
x2S
g(x)

= minfPS( f );PS(g)g:
So, we can also conclude that
PS( f _ g) + PS( f ^ g)  maxfPS( f );PS(g)g +minfPS( f );PS(g)g
= PS( f ) + PS(g);
which establishes the proposition. 
Proposition 3.34. Any convex combination of 2-monotone lower previsions dened
on a common domain, is 2-monotone.
Proof. Let P1, . . . , Pn be a nite family of 2-monotone lower previsions dened
on a common domain K , and let 1, . . . , n be non-negative reals such thatPn
i=1 i = 1. For any f and g inK , it holds that
nX
i=1
iPi( f _ g) +
nX
i=1
iPi( f ^ g) =
nX
i=1
i
h
Pi( f _ g) + Pi( f ^ g)
i

nX
i=1
i
h
Pi( f ) + Pi(g)
i
=
nX
i=1
iPi( f ) +
nX
i=1
iPi(g);
and, whenever f  g, it obviously follows that Pni=1 iPi( f )  Pni=1 iPi(g); soPn
i=1 iPi is 2-monotone as well. 
Proposition 3.35. Let P be a net of 2-monotone lower previsions dened on a
common domain K  L(X). If P( f ) := lim P( f ) exists and is real for all f in K ,
then this point-wise limit P is a 2-monotone lower prevision onK .
Proof. For any f and g inK , it holds that
lim

P( f _ g) + lim P( f ^ g) = lim
h
P( f _ g) + P( f ^ g)
i
 lim

h
P( f ) + P(g)
i
= lim

P( f ) + lim P(g);
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since all limits exist and are real. Clearly, whenever f  g, it also follows
that lim P( f )  lim P(g) So, lim P is a 2-monotone lower prevision on
K . 
3.5.7 Completely Monotone Set Functions and Belief Func-
tions
Belief functions were introduced by Shafer [74, 75]. They are a special case
of so-called completely monotone set functions. Note that jJj denotes the
cardinality of the nite set J, that is, the number of elements in J. The
denition below can be found in Choquet [11, Chapter III, Denition 13.1,
p. 170, and Section 14.1, p. 171]; Choquet's denition is actually far more
general, and extends to mappings from any commutative semi-group to any
commutative group, i.e., not only mappings from a eld to R. Also note
that n-monotone set functions are n-monotone capacities when we equip X
with any topology such that all elements of dom  are open: our denition of
n-monotone set functions is then a special case of Choquet's [11, Chapter III,
Section 15.2, p. 174] denition of n-monotone capacities. (Note that, by our
denition of a set function , it already holds that (A)  (B) whenever
A  B, this is why this condition is not included in the denition below.)
Denition 3.36. Let F be a eld on X, and let  be a set function dened on
F . Let n 2N, n  2. Then  is called monotone of order n, or n-monotone, if for
any A1, . . . , An 2 F , it holds that

0BBBBB@
n[
i=1
Ai
1CCCCCA 
X
;,Jf1;2;:::;ng
( 1)jJj+1
0BBBBBB@
\
i2J
Ai
1CCCCCCA : (3.14)
If  is n-monotone for all n  2, then  is called completely monotone, monotone
of order innity, or 1-monotone. If, additionally, X is a nite set and F is the
power set of X, then  is called a belief function. A set function  on F is
called n-alternating if its dual is n-monotone, or equivalently, if for any A1,
. . . , An 2 F , it holds that

0BBBBB@
n\
i=1
Ai
1CCCCCA 
X
;,Jf1;2;:::;ng
( 1)jJj+1
0BBBBBB@
[
i2J
Ai
1CCCCCCA : (3.15)
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If  is n-alternating for all n  2, or equivalently, if the dual of  is completely
monotone, then  is called completely alternating. The dual of a belief function
is called a plausibility function.
It is easily veried that 2-monotonicity as dened in Denition 3.36 is
equivalent to the 2-monotonicity as dened in Denition 3.28.
Shafer [75, Section 1, pp. 827828] calls completely monotone set functions
also belief functions, and calls completely alternating set functions also upper
probability functions; in his denition, the domain of belief functions and
upper probability functions does not even need to be a eld. However, in
the literature, belief and plausibility functions are usually understood to be
dened on the power set of a nite set, following Shafer's [74, Chapter 2,
Section 2, p. 38] original denition.
It is instructive to compare the denition of completely monotone set
functions with the denition of probability charges, and to observe that
complete monotonicity generalises a well-known combinatorial identity: for
a probability charge  on F it holds that

0BBBBB@
n[
i=1
Ai
1CCCCCA =
X
;,Jf1;2;:::;ng
( 1)jJj+1
0BBBBBB@
\
i2J
Ai
1CCCCCCA ; (3.16)
for any n 2 N, n  2 and A1, . . . , An 2 F ; for instance, see De Finetti [27,
Vol. I, Sect. 3.8.3, p. 101]. This equality is also known as the sieve formula
or the inclusion-exclusion principle; see for instance Aigner [1, 4.24(i), p. 158].
Hence, probability charges are also completely monotone set functions, but
not every completely monotone set function corresponds to a probability
charge. For example, as we shall see in Proposition 3.42 below, the vacuous
lower prevision, restricted to I}(X), is a completely monotone set function that
is not a probability charge. Choquet [11, Section 14.5, p. 173174] notes that
probability charges are the only set functions, dened on a eld, which are
both 2-monotone and 2-alternating, and proves that consequently, they must
be n-monotone and n-alternating for any n 2 N, n  2; he does not rely on
the sieve formula to prove this.
Let's sum up a few obvious facts. Denote byN the setN [ f1g.
Proposition 3.37. Let n 2 N, n  2. If a set function  is n-monotone, then for
any m 2N, n  m  2,  is also m-monotone.
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Proof. Immediate from Denition 3.36. 
Proposition 3.38. Let n 2 N, n  2. Any n-monotone set function  induces a
coherent lower probability P.
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 3.37 and Theorem 3.31. 
The following proposition says that n-monotonicity is preserved under
convex combinations and limits.
Proposition 3.39. Let n 2N, n  2. The following statements hold.
(i) Any convex combination of n-monotone set functions, dened on a common
eld, is n-monotone.
(ii) If the point-wise limit of a net of n-monotone set functions dened on a common
eld exists, then this limit is n-monotone.
Proof. We prove the statements for n 2N, n  2. The proof for n = 1 is then
immediate.
(i). It is easily veried that the convex combination of set functions is
again a set function. We are left to check the condition for n-monotonicity.
Let 1, . . . , m be non-negative real numbers such that
Pm
j=1  j = 1, let 1, . . . ,
m be n-monotone set functions dened on a common eld F , and dene
(A) :=
Pm
j=1  j j(A) for every A 2 F . Then, for any A1, . . . , An 2 F , it holds
that

0BBBBB@
n[
i=1
Ai
1CCCCCA =
nX
j=1
 j j
0BBBBB@
n[
i=1
Ai
1CCCCCA

nX
j=1
 j
X
;,Jf1;2;:::;ng
( 1)jJj+1 j
0BBBBBB@
\
i2J
Ai
1CCCCCCA :
=
nX
j=1
X
;,Jf1;2;:::;ng
( 1)jJj+1 j j
0BBBBBB@
\
i2J
Ai
1CCCCCCA :
=
X
;,Jf1;2;:::;ng
( 1)jJj+1
nX
j=1
 j j
0BBBBBB@
\
i2J
Ai
1CCCCCCA :
=
X
;,Jf1;2;:::;ng
( 1)jJj+1
0BBBBBB@
\
i2J
Ai
1CCCCCCA ;
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hence,  is n-monotone.
(ii). It is easily veried that the point-wise limit of a net of set functions,
if this limit exists, is again a set function. It remains to check the condition
for n-monotonicity. Let  be a net of n-monotone set functions. Then
lim


0BBBBB@
n[
i=1
Ai
1CCCCCA  lim
X
;,Jf1;2;:::;ng
( 1)jJj+1
0BBBBBB@
\
i2J
Ai
1CCCCCCA
=
X
;,Jf1;2;:::;ng
( 1)jJj+1 lim


0BBBBBB@
\
i2J
Ai
1CCCCCCA ;
hence, also lim  is an n-monotone set function. 
There's another way to construct n-monotone set functions, due to Cho-
quet [11, Chapter V, Section 24.3, p. 198]. We shall use it a few times.
Denition 3.40. Let F be a eld on X and G a eld on Y. A mapping
r : F ! G is called a meet-homomorphism or a \-homomorphism from F to G if
(i) r(;) = ; and r(X) = Y, and
(ii) r(A \ B) = r(A) \ r(B) for every A and B in F .
Note that every \-homomorphism is monotone, i.e., if C  D for C and D
in F , then r(C)  r(D), since r(C) = r(C \D) = r(C) \ r(D).
Lemma 3.41. Let n 2 N, n  2. Let F be a eld on X, let G be a eld on Y, let r
be a \-homomorphism from F to G, and let  be an n-monotone set function on G.
Then  :=   r is an n-monotone set function on F .
Proof. Choquet's [11, Chapter V, Section 23.2, p. 197, and Section 24.3, p. 198]
proof is rather short; it's essentially only a remark of two lines. For the sake
of completeness, let's work out the details. We shall prove the statement for
nite n; the case n = 1 is then immediate.
It is easily shown that (;) = 0, and (X) = 1, and that  is monotone, i.e.,
(A)  (B) whenever A  B for A and B in F (use the monotonicity of r and
).
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Now, for any A1, . . . , An 2 F , it holds that
X
;,Jf1;2;:::;ng
( 1)jJj+1
0BBBBBB@
\
i2J
Ai
1CCCCCCA =
X
;,Jf1;2;:::;ng
( 1)jJj+1
0BBBBBB@r
0BBBBBB@
\
i2J
Ai
1CCCCCCA
1CCCCCCA
=
X
;,Jf1;2;:::;ng
( 1)jJj+1
0BBBBBB@
\
i2J
r(Ai)
1CCCCCCA
and since  is n-monotone,
 
0BBBBB@
n[
i=1
r(Ai)
1CCCCCA
and, since a \-homomorphism is monotone, it holds that r(A j)  r(
Sn
i=1 Ai)
for all j 2 f1; : : : ;ng, and hence, Sni=1 r(Ai)  r(Sni=1 Ai). So, since also  is
monotone,
 
0BBBBB@r
0BBBBB@
n[
i=1
Ai
1CCCCCA
1CCCCCA = 
0BBBBB@
n[
i=1
Ai
1CCCCCA :
This establishes the lemma. 
We can now easily prove the following proposition, which is strongly
related to a very similar result by Choquet [11, Chapter V, Section 26.2, p. 205],
which gives a particular example of a completely monotone set function; we
shall need this when introducing S-integrals and Riemann-Stieltjes integrals.
Proposition 3.42. Let S be any non-empty subset of X. The set function  dened
by (A) := PS(IA) is a completely monotone set function.
Proof. Immediately from Choquet [11, Chapter V, Section 24.3, p. 198], Shafer
[75, Section 2, p. 830, ll. 14], or Lemma 3.41, once observed that  =   r,
with a probability charge (i.e., a completely monotone set function) on f;;Xg
dened by (;) := 0 and (X) := 1, and r a \-homomorphism from }(X) to
f;;Xg, dened by
r(A) :=
8>>><>>>:
X; if S  A;
;; otherwise:
for every A  X. Indeed, r is a \-homomorphism, since r(;) = ;, r(X) = X,
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and
r(A \ B) =
8>>><>>>:
X; if S  A \ B
;; otherwise
=
8>>><>>>:
X; if S  A and S  B
;; otherwise
= r(A) \ r(B);
and also,
(  r)(A) = (r(A)) =
8>>><>>>:
1; if S  A;
0; otherwise;
which is equal to (A). This establishes the lemma. 
What makes belief functions so special is that they can be uniquely char-
acterised through convex combinations of vacuous lower previsions, i.e.,
convex combinations of completely monotone set functions of the type of Pro-
position 3.42. This was proved by Shafer [74, Theorem 2.1 and Theorem 2.2]
using simple combinatorics (the sieve formula and Mo¨bius inversion); Cho-
quet [11, Section 45.1, pp. 258259] established a more general result, i.e., for
a more general class of completely monotone set functions, using geometry;
also see Shafer [75, p. 830, ll. 14 and Theorem 2.1] for a straightforward
extension of Choquet's result.
Theorem 3.43. Assume that X is nite. Let  be any real-valued mapping dened
on the power set ofX. Then  is a belief function if and only if there exists a mapping
m : }(X)! [0; 1] that satises m(;) = 0, PAXm(A) = 1, and
(A) =
X
;,BX
m(B)PB(IA): (3.17)
A mapping m satisfying the conditions described in Theorem 3.43 is called
a basic probability assignment. It is well-known that the correspondence
between basic probability assignments and belief functions is onto and one-
to-one; see Shafer [74, Section 3, p. 39]. Transforming a belief function into
its basic probability assignment is sometimes also called Mo¨bius inversion or
the inverse Mo¨bius transform:
m(A) :=
X
BA
( 1)jAnBj(B); (3.18)
see Shafer [74, Theorem 2.2, p. 39].
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Eq. (3.17) suggests the following coherent extension of P:
E( f ) :=
X
;,BX
m(B)PB( f ); for any gamble f on X: (3.19)
This coherent lower prevision agrees with the Choquet integral with respect
to , dened on p. 74 for F -simple gamblesin this case X is a nite set
and F is the power set of X, all gambles are F -simple. Thus, for belief
functions, Eq. (3.19) can be used to calculate the Choquet integral. This result
is apparently due to Walley [86, Note 2 of Section 3.2, p. 502].
Theorem 3.44. Assume that X is nite, and let  be a belief function on }(X)
corresponding to a basic probability assignment m. For any gamble f on X it holds
that
C
Z
f d =
X
;,BX
m(B)PB( f ):
3.5.8 Minimum and Maximum Preserving Set Functions
Minimum and maximum preserving set functions are a nice example of com-
pletely monotone and completely alternating set functions. On the power
set of a nite set, they are belief functions. More generally, on nite elds,
they are equivalent to (normed) necessity and possibility measures, dened
further on in Section 3.5.9. For modelling so-called linguistic uncertainty
through nested set functions, they are actually more reasonable than neces-
sity and possibility measures; see Theorem 4.36(ii) on p. 117; also see Walley
and De Cooman [88, p. 19].
Denition 3.45. Let F be a eld. A set function  dened on F is called
minimum preserving if, for any A and B in F ,
(A \ B) = (A) ^ (B):
A set function  dened on F is called maximum preserving if its dual is
minimum preserving, or equivalently, if for any A and B in F ,
(A [ B) = (A) _ (B):
As with 2-monotonicity, minimum preservation does not have a clear
behavioural interpretation. Actually, minimum preservation, as a rationality
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constraint, is clearly too strong in general: from De Cooman and Aeyels [21,
Proposition 15&16], we infer that if X is nite, then the only coherent min-
imum preserving lower previsions dened on all gambles on X are vacuous
lower previsions.
Using results from Section 3.5.5 about 2-monotone set functions, it is
easy to prove that minimum preserving set functions induce coherent lower
probabilities. As the proof is short, it is given below.
Theorem 3.46. Any minimum preserving set function is 2-monotone, and hence,
induces a coherent lower probability. Similarly, any maximum preserving set func-
tion is 2-alternating, and hence, induces a coherent upper probability.
Proof. Let  be a 2-monotone set function, and let A, B 2 dom . Since  is
a set function, it is monotone, and hence, (A [ B)  (A) and (A [ B) 
(B). Therefore, (A [ B)  (A) _ (B). Since, additionally,  is minimum
preserving,
(A [ B) + (A \ B)  (A) _ (B) + (A) ^ (B) = (A) + (B):
Now apply Theorem 3.31 and Proposition 3.24. 
Nguyen [62, Theorem 1, pp. 363364] proved that minimum preserving
set functions are completely monotone. So, when they are dened on the
power set of a nite set, we can invoke Eq. (3.18) and Theorem 3.44 to calculate
their Choquet integral.
Proposition 3.47. Any minimum preserving set function is completely monotone.
Corollary 3.48. Any minimum preserving set function dened on the power set of
a nite set is a belief function.
3.5.9 Necessity and Possibility Measures
Zadeh [95] introduced possibility measures, aimed at modelling linguistic
uncertainty, for instance, inferring from tomorrow, it will rain a lot in
Ghent something about the amount it will rain tomorrow in Ghent. Dubois
and Prade [29] introduced necessity measures, which are dual possibility
measures. De Cooman [17, 18, 19] generalised possibility and necessity
measures to complete latticeslinguistic variables typically assume values
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in a complete latticeand discussed the formal analogies between possibility
theory and probability theory. Because of their interpretation as upper and
lower probabilities, I shall only consider real-valued possibility and necessity
measures.
Walley and De Cooman [88] modelled statements of the type subject is
predicate as lower previsions, and obtained possibility measures (or more
general, maximum preserving upper probabilities) only when the predicate
is `monotonic' in the random variable of interest. This means the predicate
must be attached to a numerical scale onX (Walley and De Cooman [88, p. 13,
ll. 1921]):
[...] monotonic predicates are the predicates q for which there is an
underlying numerical scale which measures the degree of q-ness of [the
possible outcomes x of X,]
or, more generally, that the predicate is attached to a complete preorder (a
complete, transitive, and reexive relation) on X (Walley and De Cooman
[88, p. 14, Assumption 1]):
[we assume that] there are degrees of q-ness, and every pair of elements
in the possibility space [X] can be compared according to how well they
satisfy the property q, i.e. according to their degrees of q-ness.
For example (Walley and De Cooman [88, p. 13, ll. 210]),
[...] suppose that we are trying to identify the man who committed a
particular crime from a group of suspects, who make up the possibility
space [X]. An eyewitness describes the criminal as `tall'. How should we
model the resulting uncertainty about which suspect is the criminal? [...]
there is a natural ordering of [X] according to the height of the suspects,
and `tall' is increasing for an uncertain state which represents the height
of the criminal.
So, as a behavioural uncertainty model, it appears that possibility measures
can only model a very particularbut commontype of linguistic uncer-
tainty.
Perhaps the easiest way to introduce necessity and possibility measures,
is to take a look at Denition 3.45 on p. 84, and to note that

0BBBBB@
\
A2A
A
1CCCCCA = minA2A (A) and 
0BBBBB@
[
A2A
A
1CCCCCA = maxA2A (A)
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for any non-empty nite subsetA of F . This suggests a stronger version of
Denition 3.45 if  and  are dened on an ample elda eld closed under
arbitrary intersection and arbitrary union.
Denition 3.49. Let F be an ample eld. A set function N dened on F is
said to be an inmum preserving set function, or a necessity measure, if for any
non-emptyA  F ,
N
0BBBBB@
\
A2A
A
1CCCCCA = infA2AN(A):
A set function dened on F is said to be a supremum preserving set function,
or a possibility measure, if its dual is inmum preserving, or equivalently, if
for any non-emptyA  F ,

0BBBBB@
[
A2A
A
1CCCCCA = supA2A(A):
Note that, since possibility measures , as dened above, are set func-
tions, it holds that (X) = 1. In the literature, possibility measures for
which (X) = 1 are called normed possibility measures. Similarly, necessity
measures, as dened above, are called normed necessity measures in the lit-
erature. We shall only consider normed possibility and necessity measures,
and simply call them possibility and necessity measures.
Before, we have denoted set functions by lower case letters, such as  for
set functions that induce coherent probabilities,  for set functions that induce
coherent lower probabilities, and  for set functions that induce coherent
upper probabilities. In the literature, necessity and possibility measures are
denoted by upper case letters and N, and the lower case letters  and  are
reserved for the necessity distribution and the possibility distribution; we
follow this convention.
One important advantage of supremum preserving set functions, not
shared by maximum preserving set functions in general, is their represent-
ability as a real-valued mapping on X. This relies on a special property of
ample elds, not shared by elds or -elds in general. First, we need to
dene atoms; see for instance Wang [89].
Denition 3.50. Let F be a eld on X, and let x 2 X. Then a set A in F is
called an atom of F if
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(i) A , ;, and
(ii) if B 2 F and B  A then either B = ; or B = A.
The set of atoms of F will be denoted byA(F ).
The following theorem is a concise summary of results by Wang [89]. As
the proof is short, it is given below, for the sake of completeness.
Theorem 3.51. A eld F on X is an ample eld if and only if there is a partition B
of X such that every element of F is an arbitrary union of elements of B:
F =
8>><>>:
[
A2A
A : A  B
9>>=>>; : (3.20)
If so, this partition B is unique, and is the setA(F ) of atoms of F .
Proof. First, we show that, for any eld F , the atoms of F are pair-wise
disjoint. Suppose A and B are atoms of F . Clearly, A\B 2 F , A\B  A, and
A \ B  B. So, by the denition of atom, either A \ B = ; or A \ B = A, and
either A\B = ; or A\B = B. Hence, indeed, either A\B = ; or A\B = A = B.
if. If F is generated by a partition B through arbitrary union, then F
is closed under arbitrary union, and hence, F is an ample eld. Let's show
that B = A(F ). Let B 2 B. Suppose that A 2 F and A  B. Since A 2 F ,
there is a subsetA of B such that A = [C2AC. Since B is a partition,A  B,
and A  B, it must hold that A  fBg. Hence, either A = ;, in which case
A = ;, or A = fBg, in which case A = B. So, indeed, B 2 A(F ). We proved
that B  A(F ). But, all elements of A(F ) are pair-wise disjoint, so, it must
hold that B = A(F ).
only if. Suppose F is an ample eld. We must prove that A(F ) is
the only partition of X for which Eq. (3.20) is satised. First, we show that
A(F ) is a partition ofX. Since F is an ample eld, this implies that Eq. (3.20)
is satised for the partition A(F ). Then, by the if-part, A(F ) is the only
partition of X such that Eq. (3.20) is satised.
So, is A(F ) a partition of X? Above, we showed that all atoms of F are
pair-wise disjoint. It remains to prove that
S
A2A(F ) A = X. Dene for any
x 2 X the set
[x]F :=
\
A2F ; x2A
A:
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Then, [x]F is an atom of F . Indeed, since x 2 [x]F , it is non-empty, and since
F is closed under arbitrary intersectionsince it is an ample eldalso
[x]F 2 F . If B 2 F and B  [x]F , then we have the following cases.
(a) x 2 B. Then [x]F \ B = [x]F by denition of [x]F , and hence, B  [x]F .
Together with B  [x]F , it follows that B = [x]F .
(b) x < B. Then ({[x]F ) [ B = {[x]F , and hence, B  {[x]F . Together with
B  [x]F , it follows that B = ;.
So, [x]F is indeed an atom of F . Since x 2 [x]F for all x 2 X, we nd that
X 
[
A2A(F )
A 
[
x2X
[x]F  X;
which establishes the desired equality. 
So, ifF is an ample eld, the setA(F ) of atoms ofF is the nest partition
ofXwhose elements belong toF , and any element ofF is an arbitrary union
of elements of this partition. Conversely, if F is generated through arbitrary
union of elements of a partition, then F is an ample eld whose atoms are
given by the generating partition. This establishes an isomorphism between
partitions and ample elds. For example, the ample eld }(X) corresponds
to the partition ffxg : x 2 Xg of all singletons of X. The ample eld f;;Xg
corresponds to the partition fXg.
An important consequence of Theorem 3.51 is that, if F is an ample eld,
then every singleton of X is contained in an atom of F . As in the proof, we
shall denote this atom by [x]F .
What happens if we restrict a possibility measure dened on an ample
eld F to the corresponding partition A(F )? As we shall prove shortly, a
possibility measure is uniquely determined by its restriction to atoms, and a
necessity measure by its restriction to complements of atoms.
Denition 3.52. Let F be an ample eld. Let  be a possibility measure on
F . The gamble
(x) := ([x]F ); for all x 2 X;
is called the possibility distribution induced by. For a necessity measure N on
F , the gamble
(x) := N({[x]F ); for all x 2 X;
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is called the necessity distribution induced by N.
The next theorem and corollary is a summary of results by De Cooman
[17]. Again, since the proofs are short, they are given here for the sake of
completeness. The notion ofF -measurability will be dened in Section 4.3.2;
see Denition 4.25 on p. 109. The only thing we need to know now, is that
in case F is an ample eld, a gamble f is F -measurable if and only if it is
constant on the atoms of F ; see Proposition 4.27 on p. 111.
Theorem 3.53. LetF be an ample eld. A set function N dened onF is a necessity
measure if and only if there is an F -measurable gamble  on X such that inf  = 0,
sup   1 and
N(A) = inf
x2{A
(x); (3.21)
for any A in F n fXg, and N(X) = 1. If so, then  is the necessity distribution
induced by N. Similarly, a set function  dened on F is a possibility measure if
and only if there is an F -measurable gamble  onX such that inf  0, sup = 1,
and
(A) = sup
x2A
(x); (3.22)
for any A in F n f;g, and (;) = 0. If so, then  is the possibility distribution
induced by .
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 3.51. Let's ll in the details. First of all,
it suces to prove only the rst part of the theorem, concerning necessity
measures. The part about possibility measures follows then from their dual
necessity measures.
if. Let be anF -measurable mapping onX such that inf  = 0, sup   1
and suppose that Eq. (3.21) holds. The properties N(;) = 0, N(X) = 1 and
N(A)  N(B) for all A and B in F such that A  B, are immediate. LetA be a
subset of F n fXg. Then
N
0BBBBB@
\
A2A
A
1CCCCCA = inf
8>><>>:(x) : x 2 {
0BBBBB@
\
A2A
A
1CCCCCA
9>>=>>;
= inf
8>><>>:(x) : x 2
[
A2A
{A
9>>=>>;
= inf
n
(x) : 9A 2 A : x 2 {A
o
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= inf
0BBBBB@
[
A2A
n
(x) : x 2 {A
o1CCCCCA
= inf
n
inf
n
(x) : x 2 {A
o
: A 2 A
o
= inf
A2A
N(A);
and hence, N is an inmum preserving set function; it is a necessity measure.
From the equality Eq. (3.21) it also easily follows that, for any x 2 X,
N({[x]F ) = inf
y2{{[x]F
(y) = inf
y2[x]F
(y) = (x);
since  is F -measurable, and using Proposition 4.27. Hence,  coincides with
the necessity distribution induced by N.
only if. Suppose that N is a necessity measure onF . Then the necessity
distribution  induced by N, satises Eq. (3.21). Indeed, since N is inmum
preserving, and A =
T
B2A(F );B\{A,;{B by Theorem 3.51 applied on {A, it
follows that
N(A) = inf
B2A(F )
B\{A,;
N({B) = inf
x2{A
N({[x]F ) = inf
x2{A
(x)
for any A 2 F n fXg. From this equality, it also follows that sup  =
supx2XN({[x]F )  1, and
inf
x2X
(x) = inf
B2A(F )
N({B) = N
0BBBBBB@
\
B2A(F )
{B
1CCCCCCA = N
0BBBBBB@{
[
B2A(F )
B
1CCCCCCA = N({X) = 0;
applying Theorem 3.51 to get
S
B2A(F ) B = X. 
The following corollary is similar to a well-known result in probability
theory, namely, that there is an onto and one-to-one correspondence between
(suciently regular) probability density functions on [a; b], and (suciently
regular) probability measures on [a; b]; see De Cooman [17].
Denition 3.54. A necessity distribution  on X is a gamble on X such that
0 = inf   sup   1. A possibility distribution  on X is a gamble on X such
that 0  inf  sup = 1.
Corollary 3.55. LetF be an ample eld. There is an onto and one-to-one correspond-
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ence between necessity measures on F and F -measurable necessity distributions,
and an onto and one-to-one correspondence between possibility measures on F and
F -measurable possibility distributions.
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 3.53, and the fact that, through Eq. (3.21),
a necessity measure N on F uniquely determines an F -measurable neces-
sity distributionnamely, its induced necessity distributionand any F -
measurable necessity distribution  uniquely determines a necessity meas-
ure N on F : indeed, suppose N(A) , M(A) for some A 2 F , where M is a
necessity measure that also satises Eq. (3.21) with necessity distribution .
Then
inf
x2{A
(x) = N(A) ,M(A) = inf
x2{A
(x)
We have arrived at a contradiction. Hence, N is unique.
The proof for possibility measures now follows from their dual necessity
measures. 
3.5.10 Cumulative Distribution Functions and P-Boxes
A probability box, or p-box, models uncertainty about a real-valued random
variable X through bounds on the cumulative distribution function of X; we
refer to Ferson, Kreinovich, Ginzburg, Myers, and Sentz [33] for an in depth
discussion of this model. Within our framework, we shall view a p-box as
a lower prevision dened on a particular set of indicator gambles and their
negations.
We shall be mostly concerned with p-boxes modelling uncertainty about
bounded random variables, i.e., gambles. Therefore, we restrict our study to
p-boxes dened on compact intervals only.
Denition 3.56. Let X = [a; b] be a compact interval in R. An ordered pair
(F;F) of real-valued mappings on X is called a p-box on X, and the lower
prevision P(F;F) dened by
P(F;F)(I[a;x]) = F(x) and P(F;F)( I[a;x]) =  F(x) for all x 2 X; (3.23)
is called the lower prevision induced by (F;F).
The identication of p-boxes (F;F) with P(F;F) means that we interpret
F(x) as a lower probability and F(x) as an upper probability for the event
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[a; x]. So, p-boxes are nothing but a specication of a lower and an upper
cumulative distribution function.
Through the above identications, we may also translate our lower pre-
vision behavioural concepts to p-boxes. We say that a p-box avoids sure loss
if its corresponding lower prevision avoids sure loss, etc. It is easy to show
exactly when a p-box is coherent. Let's rst consider the simpler case F = F.
Denition 3.57. Let X = [a; b] be a compact interval in R. A cumulative
distribution function on X is a self-conjugate p-box (F;F) on X.
A cumulative distribution function F (we shall write simply F instead of
(F;F) for cumulative distribution functions) induces a probability dened by
PF := P(F;F). It satises PF(I[a;x]) =  PF( I[a;x]) = F(x). When is PF coherent?
Lemma 3.58. Let X = [a; b] be a compact interval in R and let F be cumulative
distribution function F on X. Then PF is coherent if and only if
(i) x  y =) F(x)  F(y) for all x, y 2 X, and
(ii) 0  F(a)  F(b) = 1.
Proof. if. Immediate from Theorem 3.27.
only if. Immediate from the properties of coherence, Theorem 3.5. 
Theorem 3.59. LetX = [a; b] be a compact interval inR, and let (F;F) be a p-box
on X. Then P(F;F) is coherent if and only if both PF and PF are coherent, and
additionally F(x)  F(x) for all x 2 X:
(i) x  y =) F(x)  F(y) and F(x)  F(y), for all x, y 2 X
(ii) 0  F(x)  F(x)  1 = F(b) = F(b), for all x 2 X
Proof. only if. The conditions for coherence of PF and PF (described in
Lemma 3.58) and the condition F(x)  F(x) for all x 2 X are easily derived
from the coherence of P(F;F).
if. If both PF and PF are coherent, then, by Lemma 3.11, so must be
their lower envelope
P(I[a;x]) = minfPF(I[a;x]);PF (I[a;x])g = minfF(x);F(x)g = F(x); and
P( I[a;x]) = minfPF( I[a;x]);PF ( I[a;x])g = minf F(x); F(x)g =  F(x);
where we used F(x)  F(x). But P is exactly equal to P(F;F). Hence, P(F;F) is
coherent. 
Chapter 4
Inference
We now turn to the following simple inference problem. Suppose we have
a lower prevision P, dened on a subset of the set of all gambles on X. Can
we infer from P something about the lower prevision of a gamble that is not
in the domain of P? More generally, can we extend P to a coherent lower
prevision dened on a larger domain? Walley [86] proved that this is possible
if P avoids sure loss, in which case he proved there is point-wise smallest
coherent lower prevision in the set of all coherent extensions of P. This is
only one of the many ways to dene natural extension; we refer to Walley
[86] on this subject.
Walley [86] also demonstrated how natural extension encompasses many
other extension methods known from the literature: the Lebesgue integral
on the closed unit interval, the Choquet integral with respect to 2-monotone
set functions, inner and outer measures, Bayes's rule, etc. We shall discuss
these results, and generalise some of them.
4.1 Natural Extension
Let P be any lower prevision, and let K be a set of gambles that includes
dom P. Let's carefully sum up the properties which our extension EKP of P
to K should satisfy. Note that Walley only discusses the case K = L(X); as
we shall see in Corollary 4.4, all other cases follow from K = L(X). We shall
denote EL(X)P by EP.
First of all, any behavioural disposition expressed by P should also be
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expressed by EKP . Hence, any transaction implied by P, such as buying a
gamble f for a price s, should also be implied by EKP . In such a case, we say
that EKP is a behavioural extension of P:
Denition 4.1. We say that a lower prevision Q is a behavioural extension
of a lower prevision P if dom P  dom Q and P( f )  Q( f ) for any gamble
f 2 dom P.
Thus, dom P  K and EKP ( f )  P( f ) for all f in dom P. Secondly, EKP must
be coherent, as argued in Section 3.4.2. Last but not least, we want the buying
prices EKP to be as low as possible: any coherent behavioural extension of P
to K must also be a behavioural extension of EKP . This can only be the case
when EKP is the point-wise smallest coherent behavioural extension of P to
K . Because of this property, EKP is sometimes also called the least committal
extension of P; see for instance Walley [85, p. 28].
Denition 4.2. Let P be a lower prevision, and let dom P  K  L(X). The
point-wise smallest coherent behavioural extension of P to K , if it exists, is
called the natural extension of P to K , and it is denoted by EKP . The natural
extension of P toL(X) is simply called the natural extension of P, and is denoted
by EP.
The main contribution of the following theorem, again due to Walley [86,
Chapter 3], is that avoiding sure loss of P is necessary and sucient for the
existence of its natural extension EKP . It also gives an explicit expression for
EKP , and a number of criteria for checking avoiding sure loss.
Theorem 4.3. Let P be a lower prevision, and let dom P  K  L(X). Dene the
L(X)R map E by
E( f ) := sup
(
 +
nX
i=1
iP( fi) :
 2 R; n 2N; 1; : : : ; n  0; f1; : : : ; fn 2 dom P;
(8x 2 X)

 +
nX
i=1
i fi(x)  f (x)
)
(4.1)
for any gamble f 2 L(X). The following conditions are equivalent.
(i) E( f ) < +1 for some gamble f 2 L(X).
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(ii) E( f ) < +1 for all gambles f 2 L(X).
(iii) E is a coherent lower prevision.
(iv) The natural extension of P toK exists and is equal to E restricted toK .
(v) P has at least one coherent behavioural extension.
(vi) P has at least one behavioural extension that avoids sure loss.
(vii) P avoids sure loss.
The following corollary, whose proof is immediate from the above the-
orem, tells us that EP uniquely determines the natural extension E
K
P of P to
any domain K that includes dom P.
Corollary 4.4. Let P be a lower prevision, and let dom P  K  L(X). Then EKP
exists if and only if EP exists, and in such a case
EKP ( f ) = EP( f ) for all f 2 K :
So, from now on, in proofs, we can focus our attention on the natural
extension EP of P to the set of all gambles on X. An alternative, and simpler
expression for natural extension is obtained when P is dened on a linear
space and is coherent. This theorem is also due to Walley [86, Denition 3.1.1
and Theorem 3.1.2, pp. 122124]; the proof is very short, we provide it for the
sake of completeness.
Theorem 4.5. Let P be any coherent lower prevision dened on a linear space, and
let dom P  K  L(X). Then the natural extension of P to K exists, and for any
gamble f 2 K ,
EKP ( f ) := supfa + P(g) : a 2 R; g 2 dom P; a + g  f g: (4.2)
for any gamble f 2 K .
Proof. Look at Eq. (4.1) and note that
nX
i=1
iP( fi)  P
0BBBBB@
nX
i=1
i fi
1CCCCCA : (4.3)
Since we are looking for the supremum, we can replace
Pn
i=1 iP( fi) by P(g)
with g =
Pn
i=1 i fi. 
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EKP coincides with P on dom P if P is coherent; this follows directly from
the denition of natural extension in case dom P = K . We refer to Walley [86,
Theorem 3.1.2(d)] for a proof.
Proposition 4.6. Let P be a lower prevision, and let dom P  K  L(X). If P is
coherent then P and EKP coincide on dom P.
Let's end with few nice results about natural extension, not due to Walley.
Proposition 4.7. Let P and Q be lower previsions on X that avoid sure loss. If
Q is a behavioural extension of P, then EQ is a behavioural extension of EP too:
EQ( f )  EP( f ) for every gamble f on X.
Proof. If Q is a behavioural extension of P, then any coherent behavioural
extension of Q is also a coherent behavioural extension of P; now apply
the denition of natural extension: it is the point-wise smallest coherent
behavioural extension to the set of all gambles on X. 
Proposition 4.8. Let P be a lower prevision that avoids sure loss. Let Q be any
coherent behavioural extension of P. Then P is equivalent to Q (that is, EP = EQ) if
and only if Q and EP coincide on dom Q.
Proof. Note that since P avoids sure loss and Q is coherent, both EP and EQ
exist.
if. Since Q is a behavioural extension of P, any behavioural extension
of Q is also a behavioural extension of P. Hence, EQ  EP. To prove the
converse inequality, let R be any coherent behavioural extension of P to the
set of all gambles on X. The claim is established if we can show that R is
also a behavioural extension of Q. Indeed, R  EP by denition of natural
extension. Since Q = EP on dom Q it follows that also R  Q on dom Q,
which means that R is a behavioural extension of Q.
only if. Suppose EP = EQ. Since Q is coherent, it follows from Proposi-
tion 4.6 that Q and EQ coincide on dom Q, and hence, EP and Q coincide on
dom Q. 
Corollary 4.9. Let P be a lower prevision that avoids sure loss, and let dom P 
J  K  L(X). Then
EK
EJP
( f ) = EKP ( f ); for all f 2 K ; and EJP ( f ) = EKP ( f ); for all f 2 J :
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Proof. By Corollary 4.4, EJP coincides with EP onJ . Hence, by Proposition 4.8,
EEJP is equal to EP. Therefore, also E
K
EJP
is equal to EKP , again by Corollary 4.4.
The other equality is immediate from Corollary 4.4. 
The rst equality of Corollary 4.9 could be called transitivity of natural
extension: let P, Q, and R be three coherent lower previsions on X, and
assume that dom P  dom Q  dom R; if Q is the natural extension of P to
dom Q, and R is the natural extension of Q to dom R, then R is the natural
extension of P to dom R.
The following proposition generalises Proposition 3.24 on p. 70. Recall
that the dual of a set function  is dened as ({A) := 1   (A) for any
A 2 dom .
Proposition 4.10. Let  be a set function dened on a collectionA of subsets of X,
and let  be its dual. Then P and P are equivalent: P avoids sure loss if and only
if P avoids sure loss, and in such a case, EP = EP .
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 4.3. 
4.2 Linear Extension and Integration
In the following sections we shall study how integration with respect to
probability charges and other event-based uncertainty structures can be ob-
tained through natural extension, and vice versa. Let's start with some general
considerations about integration. Many of the integrals we know are linear
functionals that can be written as (a linear combination of)1 linear previsions
dened on a linear space of gambles. So, it seems natural to me to dene
integration as a kind of linear natural extension for lower previsions. The
idea of dening integrability and integrals through natural extension is new,
and we shall explore its relation with some of the more common integrals
further on.
Denition 4.11. Let P be a lower prevision that avoids sure loss. Then the
linear extension EP of P is dened as the natural extension EP restricted to the
1For instance, by the Jordan decomposition theorem, any bounded charge is a linear com-
bination of two probability charges; see Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara Rao [9, Theorem 2.5.3].
Therefore, as long as integrals are linear, we can reduce integration with respect to bounded
charges to integration with respect to probability charges. For bounded positive charges this
comes down to renormalisation. Renormalisation will be extensively used further on.
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domain where it is self-conjugate, that is, to f f 2 L(X) : EP( f ) = EP( f )g. We
say that f is P-integrable if f 2 dom EP, and we shall call EP( f ) the integral of
f with respect to P, or simply the P-integral.
Since EP is a restriction of a coherent lower prevision, namely EP , and since
EP is self-conjugate by its denition, it follows that it is a linear prevision.
Proposition 4.12. EP is a linear prevision.
We emphasise again that the P-integral introduced here is a linear integ-
ral. Not all integrals are linear. The most important non-linear integral is
probably the Choquet integral; this integral is usually not a P-integral. The
Choquet integral is the only non-linear integral used in this work.
The linear extension is in a sense the unique coherent behavioural exten-
sion, as explained in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.13. Let P be a lower prevision that avoids sure loss. Then for
any coherent behavioural extension Q of P, it holds that EP( f ) = Q( f ) whenever
f 2 dom EP \ dom Q.
Proof. Let f 2 dom EP \ dom Q. Simply note that the linear extension coin-
cides with the natural extension on its domain, and the natural extension is
the point-wise smallest coherent behavioural extension of P. In particular,
EP( f ) = EP( f )  EQ( f )   EQ(  f )   EP(  f ) =  EP(  f ) = EP( f );
hence, EP( f ) = EQ( f ). Now, by coherence of Q and Proposition 4.6 we have
that Q( f ) = EQ( f ). Hence, EP( f ) = Q( f ). 
For previsions we don't only have uniqueness, but we can even establish
equivalence of P and EP. Below, we prove an even more general statement;
compare with Proposition 4.8.
Proposition 4.14. Let P be a linear prevision. Then for any coherent behavioural
extension Q of P such that dom Q  dom EP it holds that EQ = EP, that is, Q is
equivalent to P.
Proof. Since any behavioural extension of Q must also be a behavioural ex-
tension of P, it clearly holds that EQ  EP. The converse is established if we
can show that any behavioural extension R of P, dened on L(X), is also a
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behavioural extension of Q. Indeed, by Proposition 4.13 we easily nd that
EP = R on dom EP, and EP = Q on dom Q. Hence, Q = R on dom Q. But this
means that R is a behavioural extension of Q. 
The following is an immediate consequence of Proposition 4.7 on p. 98.
Proposition 4.15. Let P and Q be lower previsions on X that avoid sure loss. If
Q is a behavioural extension of P, then EQ is an extension of EP: it holds that
dom EP  dom EQ and EP( f ) = EQ( f ) for every f in dom EP.
Proof. By Proposition 4.7 on p. 98, we already have that EQ is a behavioural
extension of EP. Consequently, for any gamble f in dom EP it holds that
EP( f ) = EP( f )  EQ( f )  EQ( f )  EP( f ) = EP( f );
so f belongs to dom EQ and EQ( f ) = EP( f ). 
The P-integrable gambles interact in additive way with other gambles.
Proposition 4.16. Let P be a lower prevision on X that avoids sure loss. For any
pair of gambles f and g on X of which at least one is P-integrable it holds that
EP( f + g) = EP( f ) + EP(g) and EP( f + g) = EP( f ) + EP(g):
Proof. Suppose for instance f is P-integrable, that is, EP( f ) = EP( f ). Then the
rst equality follows from
EP( f ) + EP(g)  EP( f + g)  EP( f ) + EP(g) = EP( f ) + EP(g);
where we used the coherence of EP and Theorem 3.5(v). For upper previsions
the proof is similar. 
The linear extension is a natural generalisation to gambles of the Jordan
extension (see Denneberg [28, p. 29]) in measure theory; the Jordan exten-
sion will be dened in Section 4.3.4. Indeed, restricting the self-conjugacy
condition to indicators, we recover the condition for Jordan measurability.
The following corollary tells us that linear extension is also very similar to
the construction of the Carathe´odory extension (see Denneberg [28, p. 24])
in measure theory; the Carathe´odory extension will also be dened in Sec-
tion 4.3.4. However, the condition below, restricted to indicators, is not
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similar to the condition for Carathe´odory measurabilitythe equivalence is
true, but it is not immediate.
Corollary 4.17. Let P be a lower prevision that avoids sure loss. A gamble f on X
is P-integrable if and only if
EP( f + g) = EP( f ) + EP(g); for all g 2 L(X):
Proof. only if. Immediate from Proposition 4.16.
if. Take g =   f . Then 0 = EP(0) = EP( f ) + EP(  f ) = EP( f )   EP( f ). 
The following proposition gives a lower bound on the domain of the linear
extension. Recall that R(X) denotes the set of constant gambles on X. The
relation P( f ) = sup f in the proposition below is related to so-called null-sets
and null-gambles. With respect to a probability measure , a subset A ofX is
called a null-set if its outer measure (A) is zero; we shall see in Section 4.3.4
that the outer measure corresponds to a coherent upper prevision. Hence,
(A) translates into P(IA) = 0, or equivalently, P( IA) = sup[ IA]. The
proposition below says that null-sets belong to the domain of the linear
extensionit is not hard to imagine how this also extends to null-gambles
f , which satisfy P(j f j) = 0. Null-sets and null-gambles will be introduced in
Section 5.3.1 on p. 225 . and Section 5.3.2 on p. 230 .
Recall the denition of 2-monotonicity for lower previsions; see Deni-
tion 3.32 on p. 76.
Proposition 4.18. Let P be a lower prevision that avoids sure loss. The following
statements hold.
(i) If both f and   f are in dom P, and P( f ) =  P(  f ), then f 2 dom EP and
P( f ) = EP( f ).
(ii) If f 2 dom P and P( f ) = sup f , then f 2 dom EP and P( f ) = EP( f ).
(iii) If j f j 2 dom P and P(j f j) = 0, then any gamble g such that jgj  j f j, belongs
to dom EP, and EP(g) = 0. In particular, EP( f ) = EP(j f j) = EP( j f j) = 0.
(iv) R(X)  dom EP.
(v) dom EP is a uniformly closed linear space.
(vi) If EP is 2-monotone then dom EP is a uniformly closed linear lattice.
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Proof. (i). If both f and   f are in dom P and P( f ) =  P(  f ) then, by the
denition of natural extension as the point-wise smallest coherent behavi-
oural extension of P,
P( f ) = P( f )  EP( f )  EP( f )  P( f );
recall that  P(  f ) = P( f ) by denition. Hence, P( f ) = EP( f ) = EP( f ) = EP( f ).
(ii). If f 2 dom P and P( f ) = sup f , then
sup f = P( f )  EP( f )  EP( f )  sup f ;
and hence, also P( f ) = EP( f ) = EP( f ) = EP( f ).
(iii). If P(j f j) = 0, then, since P(j f j)  infj f j  0, it follows that infj f j = 0,
or equivalently, sup j f j = P( j f j). Now, apply (ii) to nd that  j f j belongs
to dom EP, and EP( j f j) = 0, and hence, EP(j f j) =  EP( j f j) = 0 too. For any
gamble g on X such that jgj  j f j, we nd that
0 = EP( j f j)  EP( jgj)  EP(g)  EP(g)  EP(jgj)  EP(j f j) = 0:
Therefore, EP(g) = EP(g) = 0, so g belongs to dom EP, and EP(g) = 0.
(iv). EP is coherent, so EP(a) = EP(a) = EP(a) = a for any a 2 R(X).
(v). Let 1, . . . , n, 01, . . . , 
0
m be non-negative reals, and h1, . . . , hn, h01,
. . . , h0m gambles in dom EP. By the coherence of the natural extension, and the
self-conjugacy of the linear extension, it follows from Theorem 3.5(vi)&(v)
on p. 55 that
EP
0BBBBB@
nX
i=1
ihi  
nX
i=1
0i h0i
1CCCCCA 
nX
i=1
iEP(hi) +
mX
i=1
0i EP( h0i )
and since EP(hi) = EP(hi), and also EP( h0i ) = EP( h0i ) =  EP(h0i ) =  EP(h0i ) =
EP( h0i ),
=
nX
i=1
iEP(hi) +
mX
i=1
0i EP( h0i )  EP
0BBBBB@
nX
i=1
ihi  
mX
i=1
0i h0i
1CCCCCA
Now use EP  EP. So, dom EP is a linear space. It is uniformly closed, because
of Lemma 3.14 on p. 59.
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(vi). It suces to show that j f j belongs to dom EP whenever f belongs to
dom EPindeed, f _ g = ( f + g+ j f   gj)=2 and f ^ g = ( f + g  j f   gj)=2, and
by (v) we already have that dom EP is a uniformly closed linear space.
Observe that, by the 2-monotonicity of EP,
EP( f _   f ) + EP( f ^   f )  EP( f ) + EP(  f );
or equivalently, since f _   f = j f j and f ^   f =  j f j, and EP( ) =  EP(),
EP( f )   EP( f )  EP(j f j)   EP(j f j):
So, if f belongs to dom EP, then the left hand side is zero. By the coherence
of EP, the right hand side is non-negative, and hence, the inequality implies
that the right hand side must be zero too. But this means that j f j belongs to
dom EP. 
Note that for just about any notion of integrability in the literature, the
set of integrable bounded functions is at least uniformly closed: for instance,
Darboux [14, The´oreme V (second one), p. 82] proves this result for Riemann
integrability.
We now give some conditions under which P-integrals of two gambles
are equal.
Proposition 4.19. Let P be a lower prevision on X that avoids sure loss, let f and
g be gambles on X, and dene N := fx 2 X : f (x) , g(x)g. The following statements
hold.
(i) If f is P-integrable, and EP(IN) = 0, then g is P-integrable and EP( f ) = EP(g).
(ii) If f and g are P-integrable, EP(IN) = 0, and EP is 2-monotone, then EP( f ) =
EP(g).
Proof. Dene  := supj f   gj  0, and note that j f   gj  IN.
(i). By the coherence of EP, Theorem 3.5(iv)&(vi) on p. 55:
0  EP(j f   gj)  EP(IN) = 0:
Applying Theorem 3.5(ix), it follows that EP(g) = EP( f ) = EP(g).
(ii). If EP is 2-monotone, then by Proposition 4.18(vi), dom EP is a linear
lattice. Therefore, if f and g are P-integrable, then also j f   gj is P-integrable,
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and hence, by the coherence of EP, Theorem 3.5(iv)&(vi) on p. 55:
0  EP(j f   gj) = EP(j f   gj)  EP(IN) = 0:
Again applying Theorem 3.5(ix), it follows that EP(g) = EP( f ). 
Let's end with a few obvious, but important, results.
Corollary 4.20. Let P be a linear prevision. Then EP is an extension of P.
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 4.18(i). 
If dom P  K  dom EP, then we denote EKP also by EKP to emphasise that
it is a linear prevision.
Corollary 4.21. Let P be a linear prevision, and let dom P  J  K  dom EP.
Then
EK
EJP
( f ) = EKP ( f ) for all f 2 K ; and EJP ( f ) = EKP ( f ) for all f 2 J :
Proof. Immediate from Corollary 4.9, once observed that EKP = E
K
P , E
J
P = E
J
P ,
and EK
EJP
= EK
EJP
, by Corollary 4.4. 
4.3 Examples of Natural and Linear Extension
4.3.1 Uncertainty Models and Equivalence
We have already seen many examples where mathematical constructs for
modelling uncertaintybriey, uncertainty modelsare identied with lo-
wer previsions: a probability charge  is identied with its induced probabil-
ity P; a nested set function  is identied with its induced lower probability
P, its induced upper probability P, or its induced probability P; a 2-
monotone set function  is identied with its induced lower probability P ,
as are minimum preserving set functions and necessity measures; a cumu-
lative distribution function F is identied with its induced probability PF;
and a p-box (F;F) with its induced lower prevision P(F;F). Through this
identication it was proved under what conditions these models are coher-
ent: see Theorem 3.21 on p. 67, Proposition 3.24 on p. 70, Theorem 3.27 on
p. 72, Theorem 3.31 on p. 76, Proposition 3.38 on p. 80, Theorem 3.46 on p. 85,
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Lemma 3.58 on p. 93, and Theorem 3.59 on p. 93. In this section we formalise
the idea of identifying mathematical constructs with lower previsions. This
provides us with a unifying language for studying their relations.
Again, only because all these uncertainty models can be interpreted as
lower previsions, it seems logical to describe all relations between them
through the language of lower previsions. So, the denition below is not
the most general one we can think ofwithout doubt there are uncertainty
models not interpretable as lower previsionsbut it is general enough for
the purpose of this work (see for instance De Cooman [20] for a very general
approach).
Denition 4.22. An uncertainty structure is a pair (S; s), where S is a non-
empty set, and smaps each element ofS to a lower prevision on X. Elements
s of S are called uncertainty models. An uncertainty model s is said to avoid
sure loss whenever s(s) avoids sure loss; the set of uncertainty models that
avoid sure loss is denoted by asl(S). If s avoids sure loss, then E
s(s) exists, is
called the natural extension of s, and is also denoted by Es whenever s is clear
from the context. Similarly, Es(s) is called the linear extension of s and is simply
denoted by Es. A gamble f is called s-integrable whenever it is Es-integrable
and in such a case we call Es( f ) the s-integral of f . An uncertainty model s is
said to be coherent whenever s(s) is coherent, that is, whenever s(s) = Es on
dom s(s); the set of coherent models inS is denoted by coh(S). An uncertainty
structure must satisfy the following conditions which guarantee that the idea
of natural extension pulls back to S in a very simple way.
(i) Every coherent uncertainty model s 2 S is uniquely determined by the
natural extension of s(s). That is, for every coherent s, s0 2 S it holds
that
Es = Es0 () s = s0: (4.4)
So, smust be one-to-one between coh(S) and fEs : s 2 coh(S)g.
(ii) For every uncertainty model s 2 S that avoids sure loss there is a
coherent uncertainty model s 2 coh(S) such that Es = Es . So, fEs : s 2
asl(S)g = fEs : s 2 coh(S)g
For every s 2 asl(S) there is a unique s 2 coh(S) such that Es = Es and this
uncertainty model s is called the natural extension in S of s.
Let's give a few examples of uncertainty structures.
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 Let K  L(X). Any set of lower previsions dened on a common
domainK is an uncertainty structure when equipped with the identity
map.
 Let F be a eld. The set P(F ) of probability charges on F equipped
with P is an uncertainty structure; see Denition 3.17 on p. 64: P
is the induced probability of a probability charge . Indeed, all of its
elements are coherent:
coh(P(F )) = asl(P(F )) = P(F ): (4.5)
Hence, condition (ii) is satised. Condition (i) is also satised. The
natural extension E coincides with E
span(F )
 on span(F ). This will
follow from the fact that every F -simple gamble f is -integrable with
-integral given by Espan(F ) ( f ) (see for instance Proposition 4.28 on
p. 112).
 Let A be a nested collection of subsets of X, and suppose that ; 2 A
and X 2 A. The set of nested set functions onA equipped with either
P, P, or P, are three dierent uncertainty structures.
 The set of 2-monotone set functions on a eld F is an uncertainty
structure when equipped with P; once more see Denition 3.17 on
p. 64: P is the induced lower probability of a 2-monotone set function
. Again, all of its elements are coherent so condition (ii) is trivially
satised, as well as condition (i). The natural extension E coincides
with Espan(F ) on span(F ), as we shall prove further on. In case  is a
probability charge, it holds that EP = EP .
 Let F be an ample eld. The set of necessity measures on F is an
uncertainty structure when equipped with P. The set of possibility
measures on F is an uncertainty structure when equipped with P.
 P-boxes and cumulative distribution functions are uncertainty struc-
tures too when equipped with P(;).
Let's now use uncertainty structures in order to identify various relations
between dierent uncertainty models.
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Denition 4.23. Let (S; s) and (T ; t) be two uncertainty structures, and let
s 2 S and t 2 T . We say that s is equivalent to t, and we write s  t, whenever
(i) both s and t incur sure loss, or
(ii) their natural extensions coincide: Es = Et.
Let (S; s) and (T ; t) be two uncertainty structures. Then S is said to be
weaker than T and we write S 4 T whenever for every s 2 coh(S) there is a
t 2 coh(T ) such that s  t. Finally, S and T are said to be equivalent and we
write S  T if each is weaker than the other one, that is, whenever S 4 T
and T 4 S.
Clearly,  is the equivalence relation that corresponds to the partial semi-
ordering 4 on the set of uncertainty structures. This partial semi-ordering
has a unique maximal element (up to equivalence), namely, the set of all
coherent lower previsions on L(X) equipped with the identity map. Every
other uncertainty structure is equivalent to some subset of this set, and the
partial semi-ordering corresponds to set inclusion.
Sometimes, we want to express the relation between uncertainty models
restricting to only a subset of all gambles.
Denition 4.24. Let K  L(X). Let (S; s) and (T ; t) be two uncertainty
structures, and let s 2 S and t 2 T . We say that s is equivalent to t on K , and
we write s K t, whenever
(i) both s and t incur sure loss, or
(ii) their natural extensions coincide on K : Es( f ) = Et( f ) for all gambles f
inK .
S is said to be weaker than T on K , and we write S 4K T , whenever for
every s 2 coh(S) there is a t 2 coh(T ) such that s K t. Finally, S and T are
said to be equivalent onK and we writeS K T if both are weaker onK than
the other one, that is, whenever S 4K T and T 4K S.
For example, by denition, any two uncertainty structures (S; s) and (T ; t)
are at least equivalent on the set R(X) of constant gambles on X.
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4.3.2 Integration of Probability Charges
Let's now consider s-integrals for some special uncertainty structures. First
of all, we take a look at the set of probability charges dened on a eld F
equipped with P. For a probability charge , the set of all P-integrable
gambles, the domain of EP , is denoted by L(X). Using the notation in-
troduced in Section 4.3.1, the set of all -integrable gambles, which is the
domain of E, is denoted by L(X).
What can we say about L(X)? Applying Proposition 4.18(i)&(v) with
P equal to P, it follows that L(X) contains at least the uniform closure of
span(F ). Gambles in this uniform closure will be called F -measurable, and
the set of F -measurable gambles is denoted by
LF (X) := cl(span(F )): (4.6)
This characterisation is equivalent to many other characterisations of meas-
urability known in the literature; see for instance Greco [38], Bhaskara Rao
and Bhaskara Rao [9], Walley [86], Denneberg [28], and Janssen [45]. Bhas-
kara Rao and Bhaskara Rao [9] called it F -continuity. In Hildebrandt [42,
Sect. 1(f), p. 869] and Walley [86, Section 3.2.1, p. 129], the denition of F -
measurability is stronger than our denition ofF -measurability given below,
unless F is a -eld. However, if F is a eld, but not a -eld, Hildebrandt's
[42] and Walley's [86] set ofF -measurable gambles is not even a linear space;
therefore, I prefer the more general denition. In case F is a -eld, our
denition reduces to the classical denition of F -measurability, also called
Borel-measurability, for gambles.
The characterisation (A) in the denition below is due to Greco [38],
and the characterisation (B) is due to Janssen [45], who also established
equivalence with Greco's denition. Below, we give a shorter proof.
Denition 4.25. Let F be a eld on X and let f be a gamble on X. Then the
following conditions are equivalent; if any (hence all) of them are satised,
we say that f is F -measurable.
(A) For any a 2 R and any  > 0 there is an A 2 F such that
fx 2 X : f (x)  ag  A  fx 2 X : f (x)  a + g:
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(B) There is a sequence fn of F -simple gambles that converges uniformly to
f , that is, limn!1 sup
 f   fn = 0.
The set of all F -measurable gambles is denoted by LF (X).
Proof of equivalence. (A) =) (B). Assume that condition (A) is satised. Let
 > 0. Then (B) is established if we can nd an F -simple gamble g such that
sup
 f   g  .
Let a0, . . . , an be a nite sequence of real numbers such that a0 < inf f , 0 <
ai+1   ai < 3 for i 2 f0; : : : ;n  1g and sup f < an. Dene Ai = fx 2 X : f (x)  aig
for i 2 f0; : : : ;ng. By (A) there is a sequence B0, . . . , Bn 1 of members of F
such that
A0  B0  A1  B1     An 1  Bn 1  An:
With a 1 := 0, dene the F -simple gamble
g :=
n 1X
i=0
(ai   ai 1)IBi :
We show that g has the desired property:
 f (x)   g(x) <  for any x 2 X.
Indeed, let x 2 X. First observe that by construction of a0, . . . , an there is a
unique j 2 f1; : : : ;ng such that a j 1  f (x) < a j. By the construction of the
sequence B0, . . . , Bn 1 it holds that IBi (x) = 1 for i < j and IBi (x) = 0 for i > j
(for i = j both values are possible). We can conclude that
 f (x)   g(x) =
 f (x)  
n 1X
i=0
(ai   ai 1)IBi


 f (x)  
j 1X
i=0
(ai   ai 1)
 +
a j   a j 1
=
 f (x)   a j 1 + a j   a j 1

 f (x)   a j + 2 a j   a j 1
< ;
which establishes the rst part of the proof.
(B) =) (A). Conversely, let a 2 R and  > 0, and suppose there is a
sequence of F -simple gambles such that sup
 f   fn converges to zero. Then
4.3 EXAMPLES OF NATURAL AND LINEAR EXTENSION 111
there is an n 2N such that sup
 f   fn  < 2 . We nd that
fx 2 X : f (x)  ag  fx 2 X : fn(x)  a + 2 g  fx 2 X : f (x)  a + g:
Now simply observe that fx 2 X : fn (x)  a + 2 g belongs to F , since fn is
F -simple. 
We note that for a -eld F , F -measurability is equivalent to the well-
known notion of Borel-measurability, as we prove now; see for instance
Kallenberg [48, Lemma 1.11, p. 7]. As the proof is short, it is given below.
Proposition 4.26. Let F be a -eld on X. A gamble f on X is F -measurable if
and only if for any a 2 R the set fx 2 X : f (x) > ag belongs to F , or equivalently, if
and only if for any a 2 R the set fx 2 X : f (x)  ag belongs to F .
Proof. if. Simply take A := fx 2 X : f (x) > ag or A := fx 2 X : f (x)  ag in
Denition 4.25(A).
only if. Suppose f is F -measurable. By Denition 4.25(A) there is a
sequence An in F such that
fx 2 X : f (x)  a + 1n+1 g  An  fx 2 X : f (x)  a + 2n+1 g
Taking the countable union over n 2N, we nd that
fx 2 X : f (x) > ag  [n2NAn  fx 2 X : f (x) > ag;
which means that fx 2 X : f (x) > ag = [n2NAn. Since F is a -eld, it is closed
under countable union, and hence, [n2NAn belongs to F . This establishes
the proposition.
For the other part, construct the sequence An in F such that
fx 2 X : f (x)  a   2n+1 g  An  fx 2 X : f (x)  a   1n+1 g;
and take countable intersection to arrive at the desired result. 
For ample eldselds closed under arbitrary unionwe have the fol-
lowing necessary and sucient condition.
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Proposition 4.27. Let F be an ample eld on X. A gamble f on X is F -measurable
if and only if for any a 2 R the set fx 2 X : f (x) = ag belongs to F , or equivalently,
if and only if f is constant on the atoms of F .
Proof. The two conditions are equivalent, since fx 2 X : f (x) = ag belongs to
F if and only if fx 2 X : f (x) = ag is a union of atoms of F , by Theorem 3.51.
if. Suppose that for any a 2 R the set fx 2 X : f (x) = ag belongs to F .
Since
fx 2 X : f (x)  bg =
[
ab
fx 2 X : f (x) = ag
for any b 2 R, and F is closed under arbitrary union, it follows that fx 2
X : f (x)  bg belongs to F for any b 2 R. Now apply Proposition 4.26.
only if. If f is F -measurable, then, by Proposition 4.26, for any a 2 R,
both fx 2 X : f  ag and fx 2 X : f > ag belong to F . But, F is a eld, and
hence, it is closed under complementation and intersection. We nd that also
fx 2 X : f  ag \{fx 2 X : f > ag = fx 2 X : f = ag
belongs to F . 
Proposition 4.28. Let F be a eld on X and let  be a probability charge on F .
Then any F -measurable gamble is -integrable, that is,
span(F )  LF (X)  L(X): (4.7)
Proof. The inclusion span(F )  LF (X) follows easily from the denition of
F -measurability, Denition 4.25(B) on p. 109.
By Proposition 4.18(i) all gambles in span(F ) are -integrable. By Propos-
ition 4.18(v) all gambles in the uniform closure of this set are also-integrable.
But, by Denition 4.25 these are exactly the F -measurable gambles. 
4.3.3 Linear Previsions and Probability Charges
Through F -measurability, we shall now establish a fairly general corres-
pondence between linear previsions and probability charges; similar results
were proved by for instance, Hildebrandt [42], Dunford and Schwartz [30,
Chapter VI, p. 492 .], and Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara Rao [9, Theorem 4.7.4,
p. 135]. This will also be a rst example of equivalent uncertainty structures.
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Its impact is that, in Section 4.4, it will allow us to obtain the natural extension
by lower and upper integrals, introduced further on in Section 4.3.5.
Denition 4.29. We can dene a map from the set of linear previsions to the
set of probability charges. Let P be a linear prevision, and let F be a eld
such that IF  dom P. The restriction of P to IF corresponds to a probability
charge on F :
FP (A) := P(IA) for any A 2 F : (4.8)
Conversely, we can also dene a map from the set of probability charges
to the set of linear previsions. Let  be a probability charge dened on the
eld F , and let K be any set of -integrable gambles: K  L(X). Then the
mapping EK dened by
EK ( f ) := E( f ) for any f 2 K ; (4.9)
is a linear prevision.
Proof that these maps are well-dened. Let P be a linear prevision, and let F be
a eld such that IF  dom P. To see that FP is a probability charge, observe
that the conditions of Denition 3.16 follow from the linearity of P.
Let  be a probability charge on F , and letK  L(X). To see that EK is a
linear prevision, observe that by its denition, it is a restriction of the linear
extension E, which is obviously a linear prevision. Therefore, by Lemma 3.9
also EK is a linear prevision. 
By Proposition 4.18(iv) (R(X)  dom EP) and Proposition 4.13, any linear
prevision P has a unique coherent behavioural extension to a linear prevision
on dom P [ R(X), through P(a) := a for all a 2 R(X). So, we can always
assume that there is a eld F such that IF  dom P.
Recall that E is a short notation for EP : the linear extension of the
probability P induced by . Hence, EK is the linear extension of P restricted
toK . If dom P  K , then EK is equal to EKP , dened on p. 105.
Also note that for K = span(F ), the linear prevision Espan(F ) , as dened
in Denition 4.29 above by Eq. (4.9), coincides with the linear prevision
Espan(F ) := D
R
d, as dened in Lemma 3.20 on p. 67 by Eq. (3.10). Indeed,
by Lemma 3.20, D
R
d, dened on the set span(F ) of F -simple gambles,
is a coherent behavioural extension of P. But, by Proposition 4.28, any
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F -simple gamble is -integrable: span(F )  L(X) = dom EP . Hence, by
Proposition 4.13, D
R
d and EP coincide on span(F ). Thus, D
R
d =
Espan(F )P = E
span(F )
 : this shows that our notation is consistent.
We can actually extend the Dunford integral to a much larger set of
gambles, and in Theorem 4.62 we shall prove that D
R
d = E for this
extension.
The two maps given above constitute equivalences between particular
sets of probability charges and sets of linear previsions; a more general ver-
sion of the theorem below can be found in Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara Rao
[9, Theorem 4.7.4, p. 135].
Theorem 4.30. Let F be a eld. Then F and ELF (X) are onto and one-to-one
between the set of linear previsions on LF (X) and the set of probability charges on
F .
Proof. Let P be any linear prevision on LF (X), and let  be any probability
charge on F .
In order to establish that the maps are onto and one-to-one, it suces to
show that
F
ELF (X)
=  and ELF (X)
FP
= P:
For any A 2 F , ELF (X) (IA) = EP (IA), and applying Corollary 4.20, EP (IA) =
P(A) = (A); hence, the rst equality holds. To see that the second equality
also holds, let f be any F -measurable gamble. By Denition 4.25 f can be
uniformly approximated by a sequence fn of F -simple gambles. For any
such F -simple gamble fn =
Pmn
j=1 an; jIAn; j , it holds that
ELF (X)
FP
( fn) = Espan(F )
FP
( fn) = D
Z
fn dFP
=
mnX
j=1
an; jFP (An; j) =
mnX
j=1
an; jP(IAn; j ) = P( fn):
Let's explain each equality. The rst equality follows from Proposition 4.28,
by which dom P  span(F )  LF (X)  L(X), and Corollary 4.21, which
gives the desired equality. The next equality is simply an application of the
denition of Espan(F )
FP
given in Lemma 3.20, which agrees with Denition 4.29
as we explained before. The next equality is a direct application of the
denition of the Dunford integral for F -simple gambles; see Denition 3.19
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on p. 65. Next, we apply the denition of FP ; see Denition 4.29. Finally, we
invoke the linearity of P.
Since both ELF (X)
FP
and P are coherent previsions, they are continuous with
respect to the topology of uniform convergence, so
ELF (X)
FP
( f ) = lim
n!+1E
LF (X)
FP
( fn) = limn!+1P( fn) = P( f ):
This establishes the claim. 
Corollary 4.31. For a given eld F , the set of probability charges on F (equipped
with P) is equivalent to the set of linear previsions on LF (X) (equipped with the
identity map).
Proof. Using Theorem 4.30 it is easy to check the conditions of Denition 4.23.

Corollary 4.32. }(X) and EL(X) are onto and one-to-one maps between probability
charges on }(X) and linear previsions on L(X). Hence, the set P(}(X)) of all
probability charges on }(X) is equivalent to the set P(X) of all linear previsions on
L(X).
Proof. See Theorem 4.30 and observe that L}(X)(X) = L(X) whenever  is
dened on }(X). 
Finally, we obtain the following new characterisation of self-conjugacy,
which I nd quite surprising.
Corollary 4.33. Let F be a eld on X and P be a coherent lower prevision dened
on a symmetric domain (dom P =  dom P) such that
IF  dom P  LF (X): (4.10)
Then P is self-conjugate if and only if its restriction to IF corresponds to a probability
charge on F , that is, if and only if FP is a probability charge.
Proof. only if. If P is self-conjugate, it must be a coherent prevision, in
which case its restriction to IF corresponds to FP , which is a probability
charge by Denition 4.29.
if. Since P is coherent, it coincides with its natural extension EP on
dom P, by Proposition 4.6. The corollary is therefore established if we can
show that EP is self-conjugate on LF (X).
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First, note that since the restriction of P to IF corresponds to a probability
charge, for any A in F it holds in particular that P(IA) + P(I{A) = P(IX) = 1,
and hence, also EP(IA)+EP(I{A) = 1. But this means that, by Theorem 3.5(iii),
EP(IA) = 1   EP(I{A) = 1   EP(1   IA) =  EP( IA) = EP(IA): (4.11)
Thus, EP restricted to IF [ IF , say Q, is a linear prevision: it is the restriction
of a coherent lower prevision, and it is self-conjugate. By Theorem 3.21 on
p. 67, it follows that the set function , dened by (A) := Q(A) for all A 2 F ,
is a probability charge; note that P = Q. Its linear extension E = EQ is, by
its denition, a linear prevision dened on the set of all -integrable gambles
f . But, since EP is also a coherent behavioural extension of Q, it must hold
that EQ( f ) = EP( f ) for all -integrable gambles f , by Proposition 4.13. But,
by Proposition 4.28, F -measurability implies -integrability, and so we also
have that EQ( f ) = EP( f ) for all F -measurable gambles f . This means that EP
is self-conjugate on the set LF (X) of F -measurable gambles. 
4.3.4 Inner and Outer Set Function, Completion, and Other
Extensions
The following denition describes well-known extensions for probability
charges, 2-monotone set functions, and nested set functions that can be char-
acterised by means of natural extension.
Denition 4.34. Let  be a set function dened on a collectionA of subsets
of X. The inner set function and outer set function induced by  are the set
functions  and  dened for all B  X by
(B) := supf(A) : A 2 A; A  Bg;
(B) := inff(A) : A 2 A; A  Bg:
Proposition 4.35. Let  be a set function dened on a collectionA of subsets of X,
and let  be its dual. Then (A) = 1   ({A) and (A) = 1   ({A) for any
A 2 A.
Proof. Immediate from the denition of inner and outer set function. 
The next theorem summarises the most important properties of the inner
and outer set function. Properties (i), (ii) and (vi) are due to De Cooman
4.3 EXAMPLES OF NATURAL AND LINEAR EXTENSION 117
and Aeyels [21]; their results are proved by means of nested set functions
induced by a multi-valued map; for the sake of completeness, an alternative
proof without reference to multi-valued maps is given below. The continuity
condition below for necessity and possibility measures is sucient, but not
necessary; it is a special case of the (necessary and sucient) continuity condi-
tion given by De Cooman and Aeyels [21]; this follows immediately from De
Cooman and Aeyels [21, Section 6.2]. Property (iii) is due to Walley [86, Co-
rollary 3.1.9, p. 127], (iv) is due to Choquet [11, Chapter IV, Lemma 18.3&18.4,
pp. 185186], and (v) summarises (iii) and (iv) for probability charges.
Recall that by Theorem 3.27 on p. 72, lower probabilities, upper probabil-
ities, and probabilities induced by nested set functions are always coherent,
and by Theorem 3.31 on p. 76, lower probabilities induced by 2-monotone
set functions are always coherent.
Theorem 4.36. The following statements hold.
(i) Let  and  be nested set functions. Then P is coherent, and equal to EP on
indicators:
(A) = EP(IA); for all A  X:
Similarly, P is coherent and equal to EP on indicators:
(A) = EP (IA); for all A  X:
(ii) Let  and  be nested set functions. Then  is a minimum preserving set
function. If, additionally, dom  is closed under arbitrary intersection and 
is continuous from above, i.e.,

0BBBBB@
\
A2A
A
1CCCCCA = infA2A (A); for any non-emptyA  dom ;
then  is a necessity measure. Similarly,  is a maximum preserving set
function. If, additionally, dom is closed under arbitrary union and  is
continuous from below, i.e.,

0BBBBB@
[
A2A
A
1CCCCCA = supA2A (A); for any non-emptyA  dom;
then  is a possibility measure.
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(iii) Let  and  be set functions dened on a eld. If P is coherent, then P is also
coherent and equal to EP on indicators:
(A) = EP(IA); for all A  X:
Similarly, if P is coherent, then P is also coherent and equal to EP on
indicators:
(A) = EP (IA); for all A  X:
(iv) Let n 2 N, n  2. If  is an n-monotone set function, then  is also an
n-monotone set function. If  is an n-alternating set function, then  is also
an n-alternating set function.
(v) If  is a probability charge, then  is completely monotone,  is completely
alternating, and
(A) = E(IA); and 
(A) = E(IA); for all A  X: (4.12)
(vi) Let F be an ample eld, let N be a necessity measure on F with necessity
distribution , and let  be a possibility measure on F with possibility distri-
bution . Then N is a necessity measure with necessity distribution  and
is a possibility measure with possibility distribution : for any A  X, A , ;
and A , X, it holds that
N(A) = inf
x2{A
(x) and (A) = sup
x2A
(x):
Proof. (i). It suces to prove that (A) = EP(IA) for all A  X. Indeed, since
X 2 dom  and (X) = 1 by the coherence of P (Theorem 3.27), it follows
from Theorem 4.3 on p. 96 that
EP (A) = sup
( nX
i=1
i(Si) : n 2N; 1; : : : ; n  0; S1; : : : ;Sn 2 dom ;
nX
i=1
iISi  IA
)
:
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Choosing n = 1 and 1 = 1, it immediately follows that
EP (A)  supf(S) : S 2 dom ; S  Ag = (A):
To see that the converse inequality holds too, it suces to show that for any
n 2 N, 1, . . . , n  0, and S1, . . . , Sn 2 dom  such that
Pn
i=1 iISi  IA, there
is an S 2 dom  such that S  A and Pni=1 i(Si)  (S).
If
Pn
i=1 iISi = 0, choose S = ;, and use ; 2 dom  and (;) = 0 (which
hold by the coherence of P). Otherwise, without loss of generality, we can
assume that i > 0 and Si , ; for all i 2 f1; : : : ;ng. Dene the non-empty set
S :=
n[
i=1
Si:
Since dom  is a nested collection of sets, it follows that S 2 dom . If x 2 S,
then (since i > 0 for all i 2 f1; : : : ;ng and n  1)
0 <
nX
i=1
iISi (x)  IA(x);
this can only happen when also IA(x) = 1. Hence, S  A. Finally, take any
x 2 \ni=1Sithis set is non-empty since dom  is a nested collection, Si , ; for
all i 2 f1; : : : ;ng, and n  1. Observe that x 2 S, and therefore also x 2 A. We
nd that
1 = IA(x) 
nX
i=1
iISi (x) =
nX
i=1
i;
and hence,
(S) 
nX
i=1
i(S) 
nX
i=1
i(Si);
where we used (S)  (Si) for all i 2 f1; : : : ;ng: indeed, S  Si by denition
of S, and hence, (S)  (Si) by the coherence of P; see Theorem 3.27. This
establishes that (A) = EP (IA) for all A  X.
To prove that (A) = EP (IA) for all A  X, apply Proposition 4.35 and
Proposition 4.10 on p. 99.
(ii). From (i) and Theorem 3.5(iv): (A\B) = EP (A\B)  EP(A) = (A)
and (A\B) = EP (A\B)  EP(B) = (B), and hence, (A\B)  (A)^(B).
To establish the converse inequality, it suces to show that, for any C, D 2
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dom  such that C  A and D  B, there is an E 2 dom  such that E  A \ B
and (E)  (C) ^ (D). Indeed, take E = C \ D, and observe that E = C or
E = D since dom  is a nested collection. Hence,
(A \ B) = supf(E) : E 2 dom ; E  A \ Bg
 supf(C) ^ (D) : C;D 2 dom ; C  A; D  Bg
and since the conditions C  A and D  B are logically independent,
= supf(C) : C 2 dom ; C  Ag ^ supf(D) : D 2 dom ; D  Bg
= (A) ^ (B):
Suppose that dom  is closed under arbitrary intersection, and  is con-
tinuous from above. Let A be any collection of subsets of X. Again, the
inequality (
T
A2A A)  infA2A (A) follows from (i) and Theorem 3.5(iv).
To establish the converse inequality, it suces to show that, whenever for all
A 2 Awe have CA  dom  such that CA  A, there is an E 2 dom  such that
E  TA2A A and (E)  infA2A (CA). Indeed, take E = TA2A CA: E 2 dom 
for some A 2 A since dom  is a nested collection closed under arbitrary
intersection, and (E) = infA2A (CA) since  is continuous from above. Now,
proceed as above.
To prove that  is maximum preserving, or a possibility measure if  is
continuous from below, apply Proposition 4.35 and Proposition 4.10 on p. 99.
(iii). See Walley [86, Corollary 3.1.9, p. 127].
(iv). We prove the n-monotone case: the n-alternating case then follows
from Proposition 4.35 and Proposition 4.10 on p. 99.
Choquet [11, Chapter IV, Lemma 18.3, p. 186, ll. 69] gives a simple proof
note that Choquet's `interior capacity' does not depend on any topology on
X, and coincides with our inner set function, but Choquet's `exterior capacity'
does depend on the topology on X, and therefore has no relation with the
outer set function in general; see Choquet [11, Chapter V, Section 15.2, p. 174].
The 2-monotone case can also be found in for instance Walley [85, Lemma 6.1].
Choquet's proof is rather brief, so let's ll in the details for the sake of
completeness. We prove the case where n is nite; the case n = 1 is then
immediate.
Let B1, . . . , Bn be subsets of X. By the denition of the inner set function
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, for any non-empty J  f1; : : : ;ng, there is a set AJ in dom  such that
AJ 
T
i2J Bi and (
T
i2J Bi)  (AJ) + . For every i 2 f1; : : : ;ng, dene
Ai :=
S
J3i AJ. Since AJ 
T
i2J Bi for every non-empty J  f1; : : : ;ng, it follows
that
Ai =
[
J3i
AJ 
[
J3i
\
i02J
Bi0  Bi
for all i 2 f1; : : : ;ng: if there is a J 3 i (namely, J = fig), such that x 2 Bi0 for
every i0 2 J, then it must hold in particular that x 2 Bi (since i 2 J). Also,
\
i2J
Ai =
\
i2J
[
J03i
AJ0  AJ
for every non-empty J  f1; : : : ;ng: if x 2 AJ, then, obviously, for every i 2 J,
there is a J0 3 i (namely, J0 = J) such that x 2 AJ0 . Hence, for every  > 0, we
nd that

0BBBBB@
n[
i=1
Bi
1CCCCCA  
0BBBBB@
n[
i=1
Ai
1CCCCCA = 
0BBBBB@
n[
i=1
Ai
1CCCCCA
since Ai  Bi and Ai 2 dom  for all i 2 f1; : : : ;ng, and now using the n-
monotonicity of ,

X
;,Jf1;2;:::;ng
( 1)jJj+1
0BBBBBB@
\
i2J
Ai
1CCCCCCA :
and since (
T
i2J Ai)  (
T
i2J Bi)  (AJ)+  (
T
i2J Ai)+ for all non-empty
J  f1; : : : ;ng, we may conclude that
  (2n   1) +
X
;,Jf1;2;:::;ng
( 1)jJj+1
0BBBBBB@
\
i2J
Bi
1CCCCCCA :
Since this inequality holds for all  > 0, it follows that it must also hold for
 = 0, and hence,  is n-monotone.
(v). Immediate (iii) and (iv), once observed that a probability charge is a
completely monotone and completely alternating set function (see Choquet
[11, Section 14.5, pp. 173174]). An alternative proof follows from application
of Theorem 4.41 and Theorem 4.42, given further on.
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(vi). By (iii), N(A) = EPN (IA) for all A  X. De Cooman and Aeyels
[21, Theorem 6] proved that EPN (I{fxg) = (x). This establishes the claim.
Alternatively, for any A  X, A , X, it holds that
N(A) = supfN(B) : B 2 F ; B  Ag
= sup
(
inf
x2{B
(x) : B 2 F ; B  A
)
= sup

inf
x2B
(x) : B 2 F ; {A  B

and this supremum is reached for B 2 F as small as possible such that
{A  B, and by Theorem 3.51 on p. 88, this is B = [x2{A[x]F , hence,
= inf
x2{A
(x):
The proof for  is similar. 
The above proposition about inner and outer extension has a nice con-
sequence, which is again due to De Cooman and Aeyels [21, Section 7.1]; the
corollary below is a special case of their result. We give an alternative proof
below.
Corollary 4.37. Let N be a necessity measure, and let v be its induced necessity
distribution. Then PN is equivalent to the lower probability induced by the restriction
of N to the dual cut sets of v, i.e., the lower probability P induced by the nested set
function
(fx 2 X : v(x)  zg) := N(fx 2 X : v(x)  zg); for all z 2 R:
Similarly, let  be a possibility measure, and let p be its induced possibility distri-
bution. Then P is equivalent to the upper probability induced by the restriction of
 to the strict cut sets of p, i.e., the upper probability P induced by the nested set
function
(fx 2 X : p(x) > zg) := (fx 2 X : p(x) > zg); for all z 2 R;
Proof. As it follows from Theorem 3.46 that N is coherent, it suces to show
that N(A) = (A) for all A 2 dom N, by Theorem 4.6 and Theorem 4.8.
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Observe that  is a nested set function, and dom  is closed under arbitrary
intersection: for any Z  R, it holds that
\
z2Z
fx 2 X : N(x)  zg = fx 2 X : N(x)  inf Zg;
and  is continuous from above since N is a necessity measurehence,  is
necessity measure by Theorem 4.36(ii). Is it equal to N? Yes, by Theorem 3.53,
this holds if the necessity distribution v induced by  is equal to the necessity
distribution v induced by N. Indeed, for any x 2 X,
v(x) = ({fxg)
= supf(S) : S 2 dom ; x < Sg
= supfN(fy 2 X : v(y)  zg) : z 2 R; x < fy 2 X : v(y)  zgg
= supfN(fy 2 X : v(y)  zg) : z 2 R; v(x) > zgg
= supfinffv(y) : y 2 X; v(y) > zg : z 2 R; v(x) > zgg
and since inffv(y) : y 2 X; v(y) > zg is non-decreasing in z,
= lim
z <!v(x)
inffv(y) : y 2 X; v(y) > zg
Since inffv(y) : y 2 X; v(y) > zg  z, its limit for z to v(x) is greater or equal
than v(x). Also, since v(x) 2 fv(y) : y 2 X; v(y) > zg whenever z < v(x), it
follows that inffv(y) : y 2 X; v(y) > zg  v(x) whenever z < v(x). Hence, the
limit is less or equal than v(x). We conclude that v(x) = v(x). 
In the literature, we nd the following extensions of probability charges
(see for instance Denneberg [28, pp. 2429]). We shall investigate their rela-
tion to the linear extension we introduced before.
Denition 4.38. Let  be a probability charge dened a the eld F . The
completion of  is the probability charge  dened by (AN) := (A) for
any A 2 F and N  X, whenever there is an M 2 F such that N  M and
(M) = 0. The Carathe´odory eld of  is dened as
C := A  X : (B) = (B \ A) + (B n A) for all B  X	 ;
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and Jordan eld of  is dened as
J := A  X : (A) = (A)	 :
The Carathe´odory extension of a probability charge  is the unique extension
of  to a probability charge C dened on C, and the Jordan extension of a
probability charge  is the unique extension of  to a probability charge J
dened on J.
Through Theorem 4.36, we can easily show that the probability PJ in-
duced by the Jordan extension J is equal to the linear extension E of
P restricted to indicators. By Theorem 4.30, this establishes existence and
uniqueness of the Jordan extension. Note that, as a result, IJ = dom E\I}(X).
Proof of existence and uniqueness of the Carathe´odory extension for prob-
ability measures can be found in for instance Kallenberg [40, Theorem 2.1,
p. 24]. For probability charges, this follows from a result by Denneberg [28],
who showed that Jordan and Carathe´odory extensions coincide. Anyway,
the Carathe´odory extension of  satises the following interesting property:
(A [ B) + (A \ B) = C(A) + (B)
for any A 2 C and B  X; note that C(A) = (A) = (A). In case A\B = ;,
the above equation follows from Proposition 4.16 and Theorem 4.36 above.
A set A 2 C is also called -measurable (see Halmos [40, Section 11]) or
Carathe´odory measurable (see Denneberg [28, Chapter 2, p. 24]). Following
Hildebrandt [43, Chapter V, Theorem 2.8], Carathe´odory measurability has
also a connection with Riemann integrability. Similarly, a set in J is called
Jordan measurable.
Taking B = X in the denition of C makes clear that the Jordan eld
includes the Carathe´odory eld. Once observed that  is a 2-monotone
set function, it follows easily that the Jordan eld is actually equal to the
Carathe´odory eld; see Denneberg [28, Proposition 2.9]. Therefore, the
Jordan extension is equal to the Carathe´odory extension.
It is easy to show that the completion of a probability charge  is also a
probability charge that agrees with the linear extension of , but in general,
the domain of the completion is smaller than the domain of the Carathe´odory
or Jordan extension. Let's also mention that sets in the domain of the comple-
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tion of the Lebesgue measure are called Lebesgue measurable. So, measurability
is legion, and all want their personal soldier? Anyway, let's summarise:
Theorem 4.39. Let F be a eld on X and let  be a probability charge. Then, for
any A  X, A 2 dom implies IA 2 dom E, and
E(IA) = (A) for any A 2 dom;
The linear extension of  restricted to events, the Carathe´odory extension of , and
the Jordan extension of  coincide: for any A  X it holds that
IA 2 dom E () A 2 C () A 2 J
and, if A satises any of these equivalent conditions,
E(IA) = C(A) = J (A):
Proof. The completion  agrees on its domain with the linear extension of
. Indeed, let A 2 dom. We must show that (A) = (A) = (A). Since
(A)  (A), it suces to show that (A)  (A)  (A). Since A 2 dom,
there are B 2 F , M 2 F , and N  M, such that A = BN, (M) = 0, and
(A) = (B); see Denition 4.38. Hence,
(BN) 
(B)   (N) = (B) = (B) = (B) + (N)  (BN);
where we used (N)  (N)  (M) = (M) = 0, the coherence of the
natural extension E (Theorem 3.5), and Theorem 4.36(v)for the rst in-
equality, use IBN = jIB   IN j, and for the second inequality, use IB + IN  IBN.
Therefore, (A)  (A)  (A).
It follows from Eq. (4.12) that (A) = (A) if and only if E(IA) = E(IA),
and therefore, the Jordan extension corresponds to the linear extension of
 restricted to indicators. Denneberg [28, Proposition 2.9], has proved that
the Jordan extension coincides with the Carathe´odory extension. Let's give
a shorter version of the proof.
Clearly, if A 2 C then A 2 J; simply take B = X in the denition of
the Carathe´odory eld. Hence, C  J. Conversely, assume that A 2 J.
By Theorem 4.36,  induces a coherent upper prevision, and hence,  is
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sub-additive, so
(B)  (B \ A) + (B n A):
To prove the converse inequality, observe that  is 2-monotone, again by
Theorem 4.36. Hence,
(B)  (B \ A) + (B [ A)   (A):
Again, apply Theorem 4.36, and use Proposition 4.16, to see that
(B [ A)   (A) = E(IB[A)   E(IA) = E(IB[A   IA) = E(IBnA) = (B n A);
where we used the fact that A belongs to the Jordan eld, E(IA) = (A) =
(A) = E(IA), to apply Proposition 4.16. Hence, A 2 C. 
For the purpose of this work, the most important observation is that the
inner set functions induced by nested set functions, possibility measures, and
probability charges, are 2-monotone set functions.
4.3.5 The S-Integral
One of the simplest kinds of integrals on charges one can think of is the S-
integral. Of all integrals we shall discuss, this integral is most closely related
to the idea of natural extension, as we shall prove shortly in Theorem 4.42.
The S-integral was suggested by Moore and Smith [57, Section 5, p. 114,
ll. 1013] to provide a conceptually simpler denition of the Lebesgue in-
tegral. It was then dened by Kolmogoro [50, Zweites Kapitel, x2, p. 663,
Nr. 12] for arbitrary functions, and again by Hildebrandt [42, Sect. 1(f), p. 869]
for bounded functions. Gould [37, Denition 4.3, p. 201, and Denition 6.1&
Theorem 6.2, p. 213] extended the S-integral to unbounded functions and
charges that assume values in a Banach spaceincidentally, Gould aimed
at a generalisation of the Dunford integral. In this section, we shall only
consider the S-integral of bounded functions, i.e., gambles, with respect to
real-valued bounded positive charges. For this case, Bhaskara Rao and Bhas-
kara Rao [9, Section 4.5] have dened the S-integral through a lower and an
upper S-integral; equivalence is immediate from Gould [37, Theorem 4.7(c)],
in case of real-valued positive charges. Hence, Bhaskara Rao's and Bhas-
kara Rao's construction of Hildebrandt's S-integralrestricted to positive
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charges and bounded functionsis similar to Darboux's [14] construction of
Riemann's [66] integral, as we shall discuss in Section 4.3.6. With respect to
the Lebesgue measure (or the Lebesgue-Stieltjes measure, which will be in-
troduced in Denition 4.47), the S-integral is also called the Y-integral, or the
Young-Stieltjes integral. It was introduced by Young [94] and is extensively
discussed by Hildebrandt [43, Chapter VII, Section 3]. The S-integral is a
straightforward generalisation of the Young-Stieltjes integral. For gambles,
the Young-Stieltjes integral provides us with an alternative to, and, in my
opinion, also a simpler formulation, of the Lebesgue-Stieltjes integral; see
Hildebrandt [43]. In particular, it does not involve any measurability condi-
tions. In any case, the Young-Stieltjes integral and the Lebesgue-Stieltjes in-
tegral agree on a very large class of gambles; see Hildebrandt [43, Chapter VII,
Theorem 3.9].
Hildebrandt [42] claims that the S-integral is of the Stieltjes type, whence
the term S-integral. But, as we shall prove in Theorem 4.53, not all Riemann-
Stieltjes integrals are representable by an S-integral: the S-integral is therefore
not really of the Stieltjes type. Nevertheless, we shall keep the term S-integral.
However, the S-integral does generalise the Riemann integral, as well as
a large class of Riemann-Stieltjes integrals. Apparently, this is a new result:
in the vast literature on integration, I have found only very little material
covering this topic, perhaps because the connection requires integration with
respect to charges on elds of R that are not -elds. Let's summarise what
I believe is known:
 If a gamble is Riemann-integrable, then it is S-integrable with respect to
the Lebesgue measure restricted to the eld generated by f[a; x] : x 2 Xg
(which we denote by F(](X)); see Hildebrandt [42, p. 870, ll. 16]we
shall establish the converse of this claim in Corollary 4.54.
 De Finetti [27, Vol. I, Sections 6.26.4, pp. 222241] has argued that
`[the lower and upper Riemann-Stieltjes integral] expresses all that one
can obtain from F, that is, distributional knowledge, [...]' (De Finetti
[27, Vol. I, p. 235, ll. 1417]. This suggests that the lower and upper
Riemann-Stieltjes integral should coincide with the lower and upper
S-integral induced by a Riemann-Stieltjes charge; we shall prove that
this claim is approximately correct, if we follow Darboux's approach to
Riemann-Stieltjes integration (see Section 4.3.6 on p. 132 .).
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So, we shall take some time for an extensive discussion of the relation between
the S-integral and the Riemann-Stieltjes integral; the results are summarised
in Theorem 4.52 on p. 145, Theorem 4.53 on p. 151, and Corollary 4.54 on
p. 156. Why do we do this? Because, as a result, we shall be able to
 provide new characterisations of the Choquet integral described in
Section 4.3.10, and
 characterise the natural extension of cumulative distribution functions
and p-boxes as Riemann-Stieltjes integrals.
This only adds to the importance of the S-integral.
The S-integral, and hence, as we shall see shortly, natural extension,
provides us with a tool to study all of the above-mentioned integrals and
their connections. Conversely, and certainly of more importance for our
purposes here, all of these integrals provide us with a tool to calculate natural
extension itself, not only for probability charges, but for any lower prevision
that avoids sure loss. This will be extensively discussed in Section 4.4.
LetP(F ) denote the set of all nite partitions ofXwhose elements belong
to the eld F . We dene a relation  on P(F ): say thatA  BwheneverB is
a renement ofA, i.e., whenever every element of B is a subset of an element
ofA. It follows easily that
(i)  is reexive: every nite partition is a renement of itself,
(ii)  is transitive: if a nite partition A renes a nite partition B, and B
renes a nite partition C, thenA also renes C, and
(iii)  satises the composition property: since F is a eld, every two nite
partitions in F have a common nite renement in F , i.e., for everyA
and B in P(F ) there is a C in P(F ) such thatA  C and B  C.
A set equipped with a relation that is transitive, reexive, and that satises
the composition property, is called a directed set. Hence, P(F ) is a directed
set with respect to .
As a consequence, we can take the so-called Moore-Smith limit overP(F );
see Moore and Smith [57, Section I, p. 103]: for every net  onP(F ), i.e., every
map  : P(F ) ! R, the Moore-Smith limit of , if it exists, is the unique
real number a such that for every  > 0, there is an A 2 P(F ) such that
j(A) aj <  for allA  A; we shall denote the Moore-Smith limit of a net 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onP(F ) by limB2P(F ) (B). The Moore-Smith limit is a natural generalisation
of the limit of sequences, and this limit is used in the denition of the S-
integral.
Denition 4.40. Let F be a eld onX and let  be a bounded positive charge
on F . A gamble f on X is called S-integrable with respect to  if and only if
the lower and upper S-integral of f
S
Z
f d := lim
B2P(F )
X
B2B
PB( f )(B) = sup
B2P(F )
X
B2B
PB( f )(B); (4.13)
S
Z
f d := lim
B2P(F )
X
B2B
PB( f )(B) = infB2P(F )
X
B2B
PB( f )(B) (4.14)
coincide. In such a case, the S-integral of f with respect to  is dened as
S
Z
f d := S
Z
f d = S
Z
f d: (4.15)
Proof of existence of the Moore-Smith limits. Observe that
P
B2B PB( f )(B) is a
non-decreasing net overB 2 P(F ), and is bounded from above by(X) sup f .
Hence, it converges and its Moore-Smith limit over P(F ) coincides with the
supremum overP(F ). Proof of existence of the upper S-integral is similar. 
In case  is a probability charge, recall that any nite convex combination
and any point-wise limit of coherent lower previsions is coherent, and note
that the lower S-integral with respect to  is the point-wise limit of a net of
convex combinations of coherent lower previsions; in fact, it's a point-wise
limit of the natural extensions of belief functions, introduced in Section 3.5.7.
Hence, up to normalisation, the lower S-integral is a coherent lower prevision,
and the upper S-integral is its conjugate.
Theorem 4.41. Let  be a probability charge. Then the lower S-integral with respect
to  is a 2-monotone coherent lower prevision. The lower S-integral, restricted to
I}(X), corresponds to a completely monotone set function.
Proof. By Denition 4.40, the lower S-integral is the point-wise limit of a net of
convex combinations of vacuous lower previsions. But, by Proposition 3.33
on p. 76, vacuous lower previsions are 2-monotone and coherent, and by
Lemma 3.10 on p. 57, Lemma 3.12 on p. 58, Proposition 3.34 on p. 77, and
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Proposition 3.35 on p. 77, limits and convex combinations of 2-monotone
coherent lower previsions are 2-monotone and coherent. Therefore, the lower
S-integral must be a 2-monotone coherent lower prevision.
Apply Proposition 3.39 on p. 80 and Proposition 3.42 on p. 82 to see why
the lower S-integral, restricted to I}(X), corresponds to a completely monotone
set function. 
The following theorem yields an even stronger result.
Theorem 4.42. Let F be a eld on X and let  be a probability charge on F . For
any gamble f on X it holds that
S
Z
f d = E( f ); S
Z
f d = E( f ): (4.16)
Proof. We start with a simple observation. For every nite subsetA b F and
A 2 R (for all A 2 A) there are a nite partition BA 2 P(F ) and a B 2 R
(for all B 2 BA) such that
X
A2A
AIA =
X
B2BA
BIB:
If
P
B2BA BIB  f , then for any B 2 BA, it holds that B  f (x) for all x 2 B,
and hence, B  infx2B f (x) = PB( f ). So,
P
A2A AIA  f implies that
X
A2A
AIA =
X
B2BA
BIB 
X
B2BA
PB( f )IB  f ; and
X
A2A
A(A) 
X
B2BA
PB( f )(B):
(4.17)
Therefore, by denition of the lower S-integral,
S
Z
f d = sup
B2P(F )
X
B2B
PB( f )(B);
and, taking the supremum over a larger set,
 sup
AbF
8>><>>:
X
A2A
A(A) : A 2 F ; A 2 R;
X
A2A
AIA  f
9>>=>>; = E( f )
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where the equality with E follows from the fact that X 2 F , so we can
omit the constant in Eq. (4.1), and from the self-conjugacy of P, so we can
allow the coe¨cients A to be any real number in Eq. (4.1), instead of only
non-negative reals. Now, invoking Eq. (4.17),
 sup
AbF
X
B2BA
PB( f )(B)
and since fBA : A b F g is a subset of P(F ),
 S
Z
f d:
Equality of the upper S-integral follows by conjugacy. 
Theorem 4.43. Let F be a eld on X and let  be a probability charge on F . Then
S
R
d = E, that is, a gamble f on X is -integrable if and only if it is S-integrable
with respect to  and in such a case
S
Z
f d = E( f ): (4.18)
Proof. Immediately from Theorem 4.42. 
If  is dened on an ample eld, the lower S-integral can be obtained from
the S-integral as follows. This is similar to a result by Aeyels and De Cooman
[21], which was proved in the context of natural extension of a possibility
measure.
Theorem 4.44. Let F be an ample eld on X and let  be a probability charge on
F . Then, for any gamble f on X it holds that
E( f ) = S
Z
f d = S
Z
[ f ]#F d = E([ f ]
#
F ); (4.19)
where the gamble [ f ]#F is dened as
[ f ]#F (x) := P[x]F ( f ) = infy2[x]F
f (y)
for any x in X.
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Proof. From Theorem 3.51 it follows that PA( f ) = PA([ f ]
#
F ) for any A 2 F .
Now, apply the denition of the lower S-integral to obtain that S
R
f d =
S
R
[ f ]#F d. But, [ f ]
#
F is constant on the atoms ofF by its denition, and hence,
by Proposition 4.27, it isF -measurable, and nally, applying Proposition 4.28,
we nd that [ f ]#F is -integrable. Now, apply Theorem 4.43. 
For a general bounded positive charge , the lower S-integral satises
S
Z
f d = (X) S
Z
f d (X) = (X)E 
(X)
( f );
assuming that (X) > 0. If we call the right hand side the natural extension of
, and if we say that a gamble is -integrable whenever it is (X) -integrable,
then Theorem 4.42, Theorem 4.43, and Theorem 4.44 remain valid for all
bounded positive charges.
4.3.6 The Riemann and the Riemann-Stieltjes Integral
Consider a compact interval X = [a; b] in R and the Lebesgue measure 
on the Borel eld B(X). The Riemann integral, as dened by Darboux [14,
Section II, p. 65], is very much like the S-integral with respect to , except
that it takes a Moore-Smith limit over the set S(X) of subdivisions of X,
S(X) :=
(n
[a; x1]; [x1; x2]; : : : ; [xn; b]
o
: a  x1      xn  b
)
; (4.20)
instead of over the set of nite partitions P(B(X)) on the Borel eld B(X).
Indeed, the set S(X) of subdivisions of X constitutes a directed set: for any
S, T 2 S(X), either we dene S jj T if jSj  jT j, where jSj := maxS2S (S),
or we dene S  T if S is a renement of T , i.e., if for any S 2 S there is a
T 2 T such that T  S. Both  and jj are transitive, reexive, and satisfy
the composition property: the set S(X) constitutes a directed set with respect
to both  and jj.
Hence, we have two ways to take the Moore-Smith limit [57, p. 103]
over S(X) to calculate lower and upper integrals. Darboux [14, p. 69, l. 23
p. 70, l. 13] showed that it does not matter whether the Moore-Smith limit
is taken with respect to  or with respect to jj. We, however, shall take
the -limit, because that is more like the S-integral, and hence, like natural
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extension. Note that the original denition of the Riemann integral, by
Riemann [66, Section 4, p. 102], involves the jj-limit, and is not formulated
through lower and upper integrals. For an extensive discussion of these
matters, also see for instance Hildebrandt's book [43]: Chapter II, pp. 2732,
in particular Denition 2.1, Denition 2.2, Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.10.
For our purposes, it is convenient to take the result of Darboux's extension
[14, Section II, pp. 6471] of Riemann's analysis [66, Sections 46, pp. 102108]
as our denition of the Riemann integral, because lower and upper integrals
obtained by the Moore-Smith limit with respect to  are more closely linked
to the lower and upper S-integral, and hence, to natural extension.
Denition 4.45. Let X = [a; b] be a compact interval in R, and let  denote
the Lebesgue measure on the Borel eld B(X). A gamble f on X is called
Riemann integrable if and only if the lower and upper Riemann integral of f
R
Z b
a
f (x) dx := lim
S2S(X)
X
S2S
PS( f )(S) = sup
S2S(X)
X
S2S
PS( f )(S); (4.21)
R
Z b
a
f (x) dx := lim
S2S(X)
X
S2S
PS( f )(S) = infS2S(X)
X
S2S
PS( f )(S) (4.22)
coincide. In such a case, the Riemann integral of f is dened as
R
Z b
a
f (x) dx := R
Z b
a
f (x) dx = R
Z b
a
f (x) dx: (4.23)
The set of Riemann integrable gambles on X is denoted by L dX(X).
Proof of existence of the Moore-Smith limits. Similar to the proof for the lower
and upper S-integral. 
Note that the lower and upper Riemann integrals are sometimes called the
lower and upper Darboux integrals. Again, we have the following interesting
property:
Theorem 4.46. Let X = [0; 1]. The lower Riemann integral on X is a 2-monotone
coherent lower prevision. The lower Riemann integral on X, restricted to I}(X),
corresponds to a completely monotone set function.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.41 on p. 129. 
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Obviously, Theorem 4.46 extends to arbitrary compact intervalsX = [a; b]
in R, after renormalisation.
The Riemann integral can be easily generalised as follows. Subdivisions
consist of closed intervals [x; y] with a  x  y  b. We know that the
Lebesgue measure is the unique (-additive) measure on B(X) such that
([x; y]) = y   x for all a  x  y  b. Now, instead, x a real-valued
non-decreasing bounded function F on X (such functions have very nice
properties: in particular F(x+) := lim>0 F(x + ) exists for every a  x < b
and F(x ) := lim>0 F(x   ) exists for every a < x  b, and F is continuous
except at countably many points of [a; b]; see for instance Schechter [70, Pro-
position 19.22]). Then, as we shall prove below, there is a charge F on a
eld that contains all closed intervals, such that F([x; y]) = F(y)   F(x) for
all a  x  y  b. If we replace the Lebesgue measure  in the denition of
the Riemann integral by this charge F then we obtain exactly the Riemann-
Stieltjes integral dened below. These integrals will play an important r ole in
the natural extension of cumulative distribution functions and p-boxes. Be-
fore proceeding with the denition, a few remarks are necessary to motivate
why we choose our particular approach.
First of all, contrary to the Riemann integral, the Riemann-Stieltjes integ-
ral dened by the (norm based) jj-limit is not equivalent to the Riemann-
Stieltjes integral dened by the (renement based) -limit unless F is con-
tinuous; see for instance Hildebrandt [43, Chapter II, Theorem 10.9]. As
mentioned before, we prefer to take the -limit over S(X) because this con-
struction of the limit is closer to the denition of the S-integral, and hence, to
the idea of natural extension. Another reason is that this construction yields
a strictly larger set of integrable gambles whenever F is not continuous.
If F is continuous, then there actually exists a unique measure F on the
Borel eld B(X) such that F([x; y]) = F(y)   F(x) for all a  x  y  b.
This measure (or, its completion) is called the Lebesgue-Stieltjes measure
induced by F; see Halmos [40, Section 15.9]. It can be dened through the
Lebesgue measure as F(A) := (F(A)) for any A 2 B(X)the continuous
image of a Borel set again is a Borel set. But, if F is not continuous, there is no
such measure: -additivity cannot hold. Indeed, suppose for instance that
F(y+) > F(y), with F(y+) := lim>0 F(y + ) > F(y).
F(y+)   F(x) = inf
n2N
F

y + 1n

  F(x) = inf
n2N
F
h
x; y + 1n
i
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> F

\n2N
h
x; y + 1n
i
= F(y)   F(x);
and a similar strict inequality in case F(x ) < F(x), with F(x ) := lim>0 F(x  
). So, either we have to give up -additivity, or we have to give up that
F([x; y]) = F(y)   F(x) for every closed interval [x; y]. Since we need that
F([x; y]) = F(y)   F(x) in our denition of the Riemann-Stieltjes integral, we
have to give up -additivity for F.
Note that, for instance, Hildebrandt [43, Chapter V, Sections 46] intro-
duces a -additive Lebesgue-Stieltjes measure F even if F is not continuous
(and uses this measure F to dene the Young-Stieltjes integral as the lower S-
integral with respect to F; see Hildebrandt [43, Chapter VII, Denition 3.3]).
However, the equality F([x; y]) = F(x)   F(y) does not hold for all closed
intervals if F is not continuous; instead, it satises F([x; y]) = F(y+)   F(x ).
The same holds for the Lebesgue-Stieltjes integral introduced by for instance
Kallenberg [48, Proposition 2.14, p. 31]. Therefore, these Lebesgue-Stieltjes
measures are not attractive candidates for studying the relation between
the S-integral and the Riemann-Stieltjes integralit is not clear how to ob-
tain the Riemann-Stieltjes integral using these Lebesgue-Stieltjes measures.
Moreover, why insist on a measure if a charge can do the job more eciently?
These are some of the complications that we should be aware of. Note
however, that F is uniquely determined on F[](X), that is the smallest eld
generated by the set of closed (or open) intervals in X; this follows from a
result by Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara Rao [9, Theorem 3.2.5, p. 65]. Below,
we invoke natural extension to obtain the same result. For our purposes,
this charge will be suciently general as a replacement for the Lebesgue
measure in the Riemann-Stieltjes integral if we do not want to assume F to
be continuous. Of course, by the Hahn-Banach theorem, F can be extended
to B(X) (see for instance Schechter [70, Section 29.32, HB26]), but in general
this extension is not unique.
Denition 4.47. Let X = [a; b] be a compact interval of R, and let F be a real-
valued non-decreasing bounded function on X. Dene the Riemann-Stieltjes
charge F as the unique charge on F[](X) such that F([x; y]) = F(y)   F(x) for
every a  x  y  b. If F is continuous, dene the Lebesgue-Stieltjes measure
F as the unique -additive extension of F to the Borel -eld B(X).
Proof of existence and uniqueness. Again we can demonstrate the power of nat-
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ural extension. Assume that F(b)   F(a) = 1. Dene the probability P by
P(I[x;y]) =  P( I[x;y]) = F(y)   F(x)
for every a  x  y  b. If this probability avoids sure loss, then there is
only one linear prevision Q dened on cl(span(fI[x;y] : a  x  y  bg)) =
cl(span(F[](X))) = LF[](X)(X) that is a behavioural extension of P, through
Proposition 4.18(v). But by Theorem 4.30 there is only one charge on F[](X)
whose linear extension to LF[](X)(X) is Q. This is exactly F.
To see that P avoids sure loss, consider the following coherent behavioural
extension of P to F[](X),
F(A) :=
X
I2IA
F(sup I)   F(inf I); (4.24)
for any A 2 F[](X), where IA is the (unique and nite) smallest set of disjoint
intervals that make up A. It is follows immediately that F is a bounded pos-
itive charge, and hence, a probability charge, which extends P. Uniqueness
and existence of F follow as explained above. Note that as a consequence,
F is actually equal to F.
If F(b)  F(a) , 1 and F(b) > F(a), dene G(x) := F(x)F(b) F(a) for all x 2 X. Since
G(b)   G(a) = 1, there is a unique probability charge G on F[](X) such that
G([x; y]) = F(y) F(x)F(b) F(a) for all a  x  y  b, and hence, F := [F(b)   F(a)]G is
the unique charge such that F([x; y]) = F(y)   F(x) for all a  x  y  b.
If F(b) = F(a), then F([x; y]) = F(y)   F(x) = 0 for all a  x  y  b,
extends uniquely to F(A) := 0 for all A 2 F[](X)by the monotonicity of F,
F(;) = 0, and F(X) = 0.
In case F is continuous, F(A) := (F(A)) for any A 2 B(X) identies
a measure with the desired properties, whose uniqueness is similar to the
uniqueness of the Lebesgue measure on B(X); see for instance Halmos [40,
Section 16.9]. 
Unlike the Riemann-Stieltjes charge we have just dened, the Lebesgue-
Stieltjes measure is only dened given that F is continuous. Remark that in
case F is continuous F is usually not equivalent to F: it may happen that
F(A) < F(A) for some A  X. For instance, assume a < b, let F be the
identity map on X, and let A = fx 2 X : x not rationalg. Then F(A) = 0 but
F(A) = F(A) = (F(A)) = (A) = b   a > 0. Hence, by Theorem 4.36(v)
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on p. 117, the natural extension of F does not coincide with the natural
extension of F. Of course, F is equivalent to F on F[](X) (the set A in
the above example is chosen such that it does not belong to F[](X)). As a
consequence, in the denition below F can be replaced by F whenever F is
continuous.
Denition 4.48. Let X = [a; b] be a compact interval in R, let F be a real-
valued non-decreasing bounded function on X. A gamble f on X is called
Riemann-Stieltjes integrable with respect to F if and only if the lower and upper
Riemann-Stieltjes integral of f
R-S
Z b
a
f (x) dF(x) := lim
S2S(X)
X
S2S
PS( f )F(S) = sup
S2S(X)
X
S2S
PS( f )F(S); (4.25)
R-S
Z b
a
f (x) dF(x) := lim
S2S(X)
X
S2S
PS( f )F(S) = infS2S(X)
X
S2S
PS( f )F(S) (4.26)
coincide. In such a case, the Riemann-Stieltjes integral of f is dened as
R-S
Z b
a
f (x) dF(x) := R-S
Z b
a
f (x) dF(x) = R-S
Z b
a
f (x) dF(x): (4.27)
The set of Riemann-Stieltjes integrable gambles on X is denoted by L dF(X).
Proof of existence of the Moore-Smith limits. Similar to the proof for the lower
and upper S-integral. 
The Riemann integral is just the Riemann-Stieltjes integral with respect
to the identity map on X. So in the following, we can concentrate our study
on the Riemann-Stieltjes integral. Again, we have the following interesting
property:
Theorem 4.49. Let X = [a; b] be a compact interval in R, and let F be a real-
valued non-decreasing bounded function on X such that F(b)   F(a) = 1. The
lower Riemann-Stieltjes integral with respect to F is a 2-monotone coherent lower
prevision. Restricted to I}(X), the lower Riemann-Stieltjes integral with respect to F
corresponds to a completely monotone set function.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.41 on p. 129. 
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Theorem 4.49 extends to arbitrary real-valued non-decreasing bounded
functions F on X after renormalisation.
Since F is non-decreasing and bounded, the Riemann-Stieltjes charge F
is guaranteed to be a bounded positive charge. Consequently we can dene
an S-integral with respect to F. In the rest of this section, we shall investigate
the relation between the Riemann-Stieltjes integral and the S-integral with
respect to F, and with respect to other charges related to F.
In case F(b)  F(a) = 1, F is a probability charge, and the lower Riemann-
Stieltjes integral is the point-wise limit of a net of convex combinations of
coherent lower previsions. Hence, up to normalisation, the lower Riemann-
Stieltjes integral is a coherent lower prevision, and the upper Riemann-
Stieltjes integral is its conjugate. One of the many consequences of this simple
observation is that we can restrict our study to the lower Riemann-Stieltjes
integral only, since the upper Riemann-Stieltjes integral follows uniquely
from it.
In order to link the lower Riemann-Stieltjes integral to the lower S-integral
we must somehow be able to convert subdivisions into partitions. Obvious
candidates are nite partitions, whose elements belong to a eld F that con-
tains a suciently large number of intervals, for instance all closed intervals
[x; y] for a  x  y  b. Further on, we shall prove that we can replace
subdivisions S(X) by partitions P(F ), as long as every element of P(F ) can
be approximated by a sequence in S(X) and vice versa. If such elds F exist,
then this suggests yet another way to construct the Riemann-Stieltjes integ-
ral, directly by means of the S-integral. Theorem 4.52 characterises all elds
F for which we can realise the above-mentioned approximation.
First, we need some results about Riemann-Stieltjes integrable indicator
gambles. It is convenient to say that a set A is Riemann-Stieltjes integrable
whenever IA is Riemann-Stieltjes integrable. Roughly stated, the following
lemma connects the Riemann-Stieltjes lower and upper integral of sets to the
inner and outer set functions induced by F, and states that a set is Riemann-
Stieltjes integrable if and only if the parts, that can neither be contained in
nor excluded by closed intervals, are suciently small in Riemann-Stieltjes
charge.
Recall that a real-valued function F onR is said to be continuous on A  R
whenever, for every  > 0 and every x 2 A, there is a ;x > 0 such that, for
every y 2 A, jx   yj < ;x implies that jF(y)   F(x)j < ; in particular, if F is
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continuous at every point of A, then F is continuous on A, but the converse
only holds if A is open.
Lemma 4.50. Let X = [a; b] be a compact interval in R, and let F be a real-valued
non-decreasing bounded function on X. Let A  X. The following propositions
hold.
(i) It holds that
R-S
Z b
a
IA(x) dF(x)  F(A);
with equality if F is continuous on B \ A, where B 2 F[](X) is some set such
that cl(A n B)  A. Similarly,
R-S
Z b
a
IA(x) dF(x)  F(A);
with equality if F is continuous on B n A, where B 2 F[](X) is some set such
that A  int(A [ B).
(ii) If F is continuous on some B 2 F[](X) such that cl(A n B)  A  int(A [ B)
then
R-S
Z b
a
IA(x) dF(x) = F(A) and R-S
Z b
a
IA(x) dF(x) = F(A)
(iii) The set A is Riemann-Stieltjes integrable if and only if
lim
S2S(X)
X
S2S
S*A and S*{A
F(S) = 0: (4.28)
Hence, in such a case
R-S
Z b
a
IA(x) dF(x) = F(A) = F(A): (4.29)
Proof. Throughout the proof, we shall assume that F(b) F(a) = 1. The general
case follows simply by renormalisation.
Observe that PS(IA) = 1 if and only if S * {A, and PS(IA) = 1 if and
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if S  A. This will be repeatedly used. Also observe that
R-S
Z b
a
IA(x) dF(x) = 1   R-S
Z b
a
I{A(x) dF(x) and F(A) = 1   F({A):
This eectively halves the number of things we need to prove.
(i) To show that R-S
R b
a
IA(x) dF(x)  F(A) we shall prove that for every
subdivision S 2 S(X) we can nd a BS 2 F[](X) such that BS  A and
X
S2S
PS(IA)F(S) =
X
S2S
SA
F(S)  F(BS)
In such a case, it will follow that
X
S2S
PS(IA)F(S)  supfF(B) : B 2 F[](X); B  Ag = F(A);
for any subdivision S, and hence,
sup
S2S(X)
X
S2S
PS(IA)F(S) = R-S
Z b
a
IA(x) dF(x)  F(A):
Indeed, take BS = [S2S
SA
S. Since F is zero on nite sets and the sets S 2 S
only overlap on a nite set, it follows from the additivity of the charge F that
F(BS) = F
0BBBBBBBBB@
[
S2S
SA
S
1CCCCCCCCCA =
X
S2S
SA
F(S);
which implies the desired inequality.
To establish R-S
R b
a
IA(x) dF(x)  F(A) in case F is continuous on A \ C
for some C 2 F[](X) such that cl(A n C)  A, we shall show that for every
B 2 F[](X) such that B  A we can nd a KB  0 (that may depend on B) such
that for every  > 0 we can nd a subdivision SB 2 S(X) such that
X
S2SB
PS(IA)F(S) =
X
S2SB
SA
F(S)  F(B)   KB
4.3 EXAMPLES OF NATURAL AND LINEAR EXTENSION 141
We shall then have that
sup
S2S(S)
X
S2S
SA
F(S) = R-S
Z b
a
IA(x) dF(x)  F(B)   KB
for any B 2 F[](X) such that B  A and any  > 0, and hence also for  = 0,
and therefore
R-S
Z b
a
IA(x) dF(x)  supfF(B) : B 2 F[](X); B  Ag = F(A):
Indeed, x  > 0 and B 2 F[](X), B  A. Since F is continuous on A \ C,
for every x 2 A \ C, there is a x; > 0 such that, for every y 2 A \ C,F(x)   F(y) <  whenever x   y < x;. Since both B and C 2 F[](X), also
B n C and B \ C 2 F[](X). Hence, these two disjoint sets, which jointly make
up B, both must be a nite union of disjoint non-empty intervals. Let IB be a
set of disjoint non-empty intervals that make up B n C and let JB be a set of
disjoint non-empty intervals that make up B \ C, or briey, IB is an interval
partition of B nC andJB is an interval partition of B\C (it may happen that
IB or JB are empty).
We are now going to construct a subdivision SB 2 S(X), based on the
interval partition IB of B nC and the interval partitionJB of B\C. Note that
the elements of SB 2 S(X) must be closed intervals.
For each non-empty interval I 2 IB dene the closed interval SI := cl(I).
Since B  A also I  A and therefore it holds that
SI = cl(I) = cl(I n C)  cl(A n C)  A;
where we invoked the special property of C. Obviously also F(SI) = F(I)
since they have exactly the same extreme points.
Since JB makes up B \ C and B  A obviously also J  A \ C for all
J 2 JB. Unfortunately, J is not necessarily closed, and so it may happen that
cl J * A\C. However, we can choose for every J a non-empty closed interval
(possibly a singleton) SJ  J such that
J   SJ
 < J; and
SJ   J
 < J;; (4.30)
where  and  denote the lower and upper end-point (that is, inmum and
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supremum) of an interval . Obviously, since SJ  J  A \ C for all J 2 JB
the extreme points of all intervals J and SJ belong to A\C. By the continuity
of F on A \ C and Eq. (4.30) it follows that
F(J)   F(SJ)
 <  and
F(SJ)   F(J)
 < :
But this means that
F(J)   F(SJ) = F(J) F(SJ)+F(SJ) F(J) =
F(J)   F(SJ)
+
F(SJ)   F(J)
 < 2:
Now clearly all closed intervals SI for I 2 IB and SJ for J 2 JB are disjoint,
up to a possible nite overlap. Hence, there is a subdivision SB 2 S(X) such
that
SB  fSI : I 2 IBg [ fSJ : J 2 JBg:
For this subdivision
X
S2SB
SA
F(S) 
X
I2IB
F(SI) +
X
J2JB
F(SJ) 
X
I2IB
F(I) +
X
J2JB

F(J)   2
= F(B n C) + F(B \ C)   2
JB  = F(B)   2 JB ;
and so the desired inequality is satised for KB = 2
JB  0.
(ii) Immediately from (i).
(iii) By denition, IA is Riemann-Stieltjes integrable if and only if
lim
S2S(X)
X
S2S
PS(IA)F(S) = limS2S(X)
X
S2S
PS(IA)F(S)
Since both Moore-Smith limits exist and are real, this is equivalent to
lim
S2S(X)
0BBBBB@
X
S2S
PS(IA)F(S)  
X
S2S
PS(IA)F(S)
1CCCCCA
= lim
S2S(X)
X
S2S

PS(IA)   PS(IA)

F(S) = 0
But PS(IA)  PS(IA) = 1 if and only if S * {A and S * A, and in all other cases
the dierence is zero since PS  PS. This shows that A is Riemann-Stieltjes
integrable if and only if Eq. (4.28) holds. 
4.3 EXAMPLES OF NATURAL AND LINEAR EXTENSION 143
It follows from this lemma that, if F is continuous at the extreme points
x and y (that is, on a neighbourhood of each of those points), then the in-
tervals [x; y], [x; y), (x; y] and (x; y) are Riemann-Stieltjes integrable and their
Riemann-Stieltjes integrals are all equal to F(y)  F(x). Beware if F is not con-
tinuous at some point x: for instance, the singleton fyg is then not Riemann-
Stieltjes integrable, even though F(fyg) = F(fyg) = F(fyg) = 0.
Let's calculate the lower and upper Riemann-Stieltjes integral of intervals
in the general case, not assuming continuity of F, and derive Riemann-Stieltjes
integrability conditions for intervals from those expressions. Let a  x 
y  b. For closed intervals [x; y] (such as singletons), we get, after some
manipulation, directly from Denition 4.48 that
R-S
Z b
a
I[x;y](z) dF(z) = F(y)   F(x) = F([x; y]); (4.31)
R-S
Z b
a
I[x;y](z) dF(z) = F(y+)   F(x ); (4.32)
if we agree to let F(a ) := F(a) and F(b+) := F(b). Similarly,
R-S
Z b
a
I(x;y)(z) dF(z) = F(y )   F(x+); (4.33)
R-S
Z b
a
I(x;y)(z) dF(z) = F(y)   F(x) = F((x; y)); (4.34)
again, if we agree to let F(a ) := F(a) and F(b+) := F(b). For the other intervals,
we have:
R-S
Z b
a
I[x;y)(z) dF(z) = F(y )   F(x); (4.35)
R-S
Z b
a
I[x;y)(z) dF(z) = F(y)   F(x ); (4.36)
and
R-S
Z b
a
I(x;y](z) dF(z) = F(y)   F(x+); (4.37)
R-S
Z b
a
I(x;y](z) dF(z) = F(y+)   F(x): (4.38)
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if we once more agree to let F(a ) := F(a) and F(b+) := F(b). Observe that the
lower Riemann-Stieltjes integral coincides with the Riemann-Stieltjes charge
F on closed intervals, and the upper Riemann-Stieltjes integral coincides
with F on open intervals.
The countable set A = fa + 1n : n 2 Ng is Riemann-Stieltjes integrable if
F is continuous at every point of A and on [a; a + ] for some  > 0. In
case F is only continuous at every point of A, but not at a itself, then its
lower and upper Riemann-Stieltjes integral are given by 0 and F(a+)   F(a).
But, even if F is continuous everywhere, not every countable set (and hence,
not every Borel set) is Riemann-Stieltjes integrable: for instance, the set
Q = fx 2 [0; 1] : x rationalg is not Riemann integrable. Indeed, because Q
is dense in [0; 1] every closed interval S  [0; 1] with Lebesgue measure
(S) > 0 has the property that S * Q and S * {Q. The last example
clearly shows that the collection of all Riemann-Stieltjes integrable sets is
usually not a -eld. Perhaps surprisingly, it does constitute a eld. This
is a consequence of Proposition 4.18(i)&(v) on p. 102 given that the lower
Riemann-Stieltjes integral has all the properties of a coherent lower prevision
after renormalisation. Below, we give an alternative proof. Hildebrandt [43,
Chapter V, Theorem 2.6] gives a proof in case F is the identity map, that is,
for Riemann integrability.
Proposition 4.51. Let X = [a; b] be a compact interval in R and let F be a real-
valued non-decreasing bounded function onX. The collection of all subsets ofX that
are Riemann-Stieltjes integrable with respect to F is a eld.
Proof. By Lemma 4.50 the set of all Riemann-Stieltjes integrable sets is closed
under complementation, as Eq. (4.28) clearly implies, and contains the empty
set. It remains to show that it is also closed under (nite) union. Let A and
B  X be Riemann-Stieltjes integrable. We must show that A[B is Riemann-
Stieltjes integrable. The following implication holds:

S * A [ B and S * {(A [ B)

=)

(S * A and S * {A) or (S * B and S * {B)

Indeed, if S * A [ B then S * A and S * B, and if S * {(A [ B) then S * {A
or S * {B. From this implication, it is easy to see that for any subdivision
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S 2 S(X)
X
S2S
S*A[B and S*{(A[B)
F(S) 
X
S2S
S*A and S*{A
or
S*B and S*{B
F(S)

X
S2S
S*A and S*{A
F(S) +
X
S2S
S*B and S*{B
F(S):
Now take the Moore-Smith limit over S 2 S(X) and again apply Eq. (4.28) to
see that A [ B is Riemann-Stieltjes integrable. 
Let's now present a theorem that characterises all charges that are, through
Theorem 4.42, equivalent to a given lower Riemann-Stieltjes integral, and
hence, by conjugacy, also equivalent to the corresponding upper Riemann-
Stieltjes integral.
Theorem 4.52. Let X = [a; b] be a compact interval in R and let F be a real-valued
non-decreasing bounded function on X. Let F be any eld on X and let  be any
bounded positive charge on F . Then the lower Riemann-Stieltjes integral with
respect to F is equal to the natural extension of , that is,
R-S
Z b
a
f (x) dF(x) = E( f ) = S
Z
f d for all f 2 L(X); (4.39)
if and only if
(i) every A 2 F is Riemann-Stieltjes integrable and
(A) = R-S
Z b
a
IA(x) dF(x); and
(ii) F is dense in F[](X) in the sense that for every closed interval S ofX and every
 > 0 there is at least one element AS 2 F such that
AS  S and R-S
Z b
a
IASS(x) dF(x) < ;
or equivalently, for every open interval T of X and every  > 0 there is at least
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one element BT 2 F such that
BT  T and R-S
Z b
a
IBTT(x) dF(x) < :
The two inequalities above can also be written as
(AS )   F(S) <  resp.(BT )   F(T) < . This is a consequence of Proposition 4.16 on p. 101 along
with some properties of the lower and upper Riemann-Stieltjes integral we
have just demonstrated; see details in the proof below.
Proof. As usual, we shall assume that F(b)   F(a) = 1 throughout the proof,
as in that case, R-S
R b
a
dF is a coherent lower prevision onL(X). The general
case follows after renormalisation. In the marginal case that F(a) = F(b), the
proof is immediate.
if. Fix any gamble f on X. We rst prove that, under conditions (i) and
(ii), R-S
R b
a
f (x) dF(x)  S
R
f d.
Let S 2 S(X) be any subdivision of X. We shall prove that we can nd
a KS  0, which may depend on S, such that for every  > 0 we can nd a
partition B 2 P(F ) such that
X
S2S
PS( f )F(S)  KS +
X
B2B
PB( f )(B):
If we can do this for every  > 0, then of course also
X
S2S
PS( f )F(S)  S
Z
f d;
for every subdivision S 2 S(X), and hence, R-S
R b
a
f (x) dF(x)  S
R
f d.
Fix therefore  > 0. S is a nite set of closed intervals, so by condition (ii),
for each S 2 S there is an AS 2 F such that AS  S and, applying the
coherence of R-S
R b
a
dF(x), IF  dom R-S
R b
a dF(x) (this is condition (i)),
Proposition 4.16 on p. 101, the fact that the lower Riemann-Stieltjes integral
is equal to the Riemann-Stieltjes charge for closed intervals, ASS = S n AS ,
and AS 2 F ,
R-S
Z b
a
IASS(x) dF(x) = R-S
Z b
a
h
IS(x)   IAS (x)
i
dF(x)
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= R-S
Z b
a
IS(x) dF(x)   R-S
Z b
a
IAS (x) dF(x)
= F(S)   (AS ) =
F(S)   (AS ) < : (4.40)
The nite family A := fAS : S 2 Sg  F does not necessarily constitute a
partition of X, but, since F is a eld, we do have a nite partition B 2 P(F )
such that each AS 2 A is a unique (nite) union of elements of B. For
instance, take for B the atoms of the eld generated byA (nite elds are
ample elds: Theorem 3.51 on p. 88 applies).
DeneBS := fB 2 B : B  AS g for all S 2 S. This set identies all elements
of B which make up AS ; note that BS can be empty, which happens exactly
if AS is the empty set. B is a nite partition, so for every S 2 S it holds that
 >
F(S)   (AS ) =
F(S)    [B2BSB
 =
F(S)  
X
B2BS
(B)

and therefore,
X
S2S
PS( f )F(S) 
X
S2S
PS( f ) +
X
S2S
X
B2BS
PS( f )(B)
and since PS( f )  sup j f j,
 jSj sup j f j +
X
S2S
X
B2BS
PS( f )(B)
and since B  AS  S whenever B 2 BS , it holds that PS  PB whenever
B 2 BS , so
 jSj sup j f j +
X
S2S
X
B2BS
PB( f )(B);
The only two problems left are that some B 2 B might be counted more than
once in the above expression, and that some B 2 B might not be counted at
all. Fortunately, in both cases (B) is at most linear in .
If some B 2 B is counted more than once, then it must be that B 2 BS \BT
for some S , T in S. This conditions happens only if B  AS \ AT . But, the
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elements ofS overlap only on a nite set. Therefore, since the elements ofA
are such that AS  S for all S 2 S, they can also only overlap on a nite set.
Hence, if B 2 BS \ BT then B must a nite, Riemann-Stieltjes integrable set
(not every nite set is Riemann-Stieltjes integrable but B is by construction).
Hence, (B) = R-S
R b
a IB(x) dF(x)  F(B) = 0, and therefore (B) = 0 holds.
On the other hand, if B 2 B is not counted at all, then it must be that
B < BS for all S 2 S. But,
X
B2B
8S2S : B<BS
(B) = 1  
X
B2B
9S2S : B2BS
(B) = 1  
X
S2S
X
B2BS
(B)
< 1  
X
S2S

F(S)    = jSj 
and hence, if B < BS for all S 2 S then it can only be that (B) < jSj .
So, in all cases we nd that
X
S2S
X
B2BS
PB( f )(B)  jSj sup j f j +
X
B2B
PB( f )(B);
and therefore, with KS = 2 jSj sup j f j, the desired inequality is established.
Hence, so is R-S
R b
a
f (x) dF(x)  S
R
f d.
Let's now turn to the converse inequality: we prove that, under conditions
(i) and (ii), also R-S
R b
a
f (x) dF(x)  S
R
f d.
First, assume that f is a non-negative gamble on X; this simplies the
proof considerably. Let B 2 P(F ) be a nite partition of X. We shall show
that we can nd a KB; f  0, that may depend on B and on f , such that for
every  > 0 suciently small, we can nd a subdivision S 2 S(X) such that
X
B2B
PB( f )(B)  KB; f  +
X
S2S
PS( f )F(S):
If we can do this for every  > 0 suciently small, then
X
B2B
PB( f )(B)  R-S
Z b
a
f (x) dF(x);
for every B 2 P(X), and hence, S
R
f d  R-S
R b
a
f (x) dF(x).
Indeed, x  > 0, and observe that, by (i), every B 2 B is Riemann-
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Stieltjes integrable with respect to F, with Riemann-Stieltjes integral (B). By
the denition of Riemann-Stieltjes integrability and Lemma 4.50, there is a
subdivision SB 2 S(X) such that
X
S2SB
SB
F(S) +  > (B); (4.41)
the left-hand side follows by direct application of the denition of the lower
Riemann-Stieltjes integral. Since S(X) is a directed set and B is nite, there
is a subdivision S that renes every SB 2 S(X) for all B 2 B. The above
inequality remains valid when replacing all subdivisions by S. Hence,
X
B2B
PB( f )(B) 
X
B2B
PB( f )
0BBBBBBBBBB@
X
S2S
SB
F(S) + 
1CCCCCCCCCCA
 jBj sup[ f ] +
X
B2B
PB( f )
0BBBBBBBBBB@
X
S2S
SB
F(S)
1CCCCCCCCCCA
= jBj sup[ f ] +
X
S2S
0BBBBBBBBB@
X
B2B
SB
PB( f )
1CCCCCCCCCAF(S)
Fix S 2 S. Since B is a partition, either there is exactly one B0 for which
S  B0, in which case
P
B2B
SB
PB( f ) = PB0 ( f )  PS( f ), or there is no B for which
S  B, in which case PB2B
SB
PB( f ) = 0  PS( f ). So,
X
S2S
0BBBBBBBBB@
X
B2B
SB
PB( f )
1CCCCCCCCCAF(S) 
X
S2S
PS( f )F(S)
The desired inequality follows, with KB; f = jBj sup[ f ], for any non-negative
gamble f .
Since R-S
R b
a
[ + f (x)] dF(x) =  + R-S
R b
a
f (x) dF(x) for any  2 R, and
similarly for the lower S-integralboth are coherent lower previsionsthe
inequality S
R
f d  R-S
R b
a
f (x) dF(x) follows for all gambles f .
only if. Conversely, assume that the lower Riemann-Stieltjes integral
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and the lower S-integral are equal for all gambles f on X. We prove that
conditions (i) and (ii) hold.
(i). First, we must show that all elements of F are Riemann-Stieltjes
integrable. We prove this through contraposition.
Suppose F has bad element A, namely, one that is not Riemann-Stieltjes
integrable. Consider the indicator gamble IA. Obviously, this gamble is F -
measurable, and hence, it is S-integrable with respect to : its S-integral is
simply given by (A). But it is not Riemann-Stieltjes integrable. Hence, the
lower and upper Riemann-Stieltjes integral are not equal, and so certainly at
least one of them must be dierent from the S-integral (A). So, we nd that
R-S
R b
a
IA dF , S
R
IA d or R-S
R b
a
 IA dF , S
R
 IA d. We have arrived at a
contradiction.
Now we have that all elements ofF must be Riemann-Stieltjes integrable,
consider again A 2 F . The S-integral of IA with respect to is obviously equal
to (A). By assumption, this must be equal to the Riemann-Stieltjes integral
of IA. Hence, (A) = R-S
R
IA(x) dF(x) holds for all elements A of F .
Finally, suppose there is a closed interval S and an  > 0 such that for
every A 2 F , A * S or
(A)   F(S)  , or equivalently, if A  S then(A)   F(S)  . Consider the gamble IS. Since S is a closed interval, the
lower Riemann-Stieltjes integral of IS with respect to F is equal to F(S). But
the lower S-integral of IS with respect to  is bounded away from F(S) by at
least . Indeed,
R-S
Z b
a
IS(x) dF(x)   S
Z
IS d
 =
F(S)   supB2P(F )
X
A2B
PA(IS)(A)

=

F(S)   sup
B2P(F )
X
A2B
AS
(A)

and, since  is additive, for any B in P(F ) there is an A0 in F , namely,
A0 := [A2B;AS such that
P
A2B;AS (A) = (A0), and conversely, for every
A0 in F there is a partition B in P(F ), namely, B := fA0;{A0g, such that
(A0) =
P
A2B;AS (A). So,
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=
F(S)   supA2FAS
(A)

=
 infA2FAS

F(S)   (A)

and since, as we demonstrated before, for each A 2 F such that A  S, we
have that F(S)   (A) = R-S
R b
a
IAS(x) dF(x)  0 (see Eq. (4.40) on p. 147),
= inf
A2F
AS

F(S)   (A)  :
Again we have arrived at a contradiction. 
Condition (i) saying that every element of F must be Riemann-Stieltjes
integrable and that the charge of each of these sets A 2 F must be equal to its
Riemann-Stieltjes integral, is obvious. What is striking is that we only have
to add that F is dense in F[](X), as in condition (ii). This weak assumption is
sucient for the linear extension of  to coincide with the Riemann-Stieltjes
integral, and the natural extension of  to coincide with the lower Riemann-
Stieltjes integral. Of course, it has still not been proved that there actually
exist such . That is the subject of the following important theorem, which
gives necessary and sucient conditions on F for the existence of charges 
that satisfy the conditions of Theorem 4.52. Loosely speaking, it says that at
every point F should be continuous from at least one side. In many practical
cases this is satised.
Perhaps it is instructive to note that by Theorem 4.52(i) and Lemma 4.50
the only candidates for  are restrictions of F or F to elds of Riemann-
Stieltjes integrable sets. The theorem suggests a very simple restriction.
Theorem 4.53. Let X = [a; b] be a compact interval in R and let F be a real-valued
non-decreasing bounded function on X. Then there is a eld F on X and a bounded
positive charge onF , such that the lower Riemann-Stieltjes integral with respect to
F is equal to the lower S-integral with respect to  if and only if for every a < x < b
either F(x+) = F(x) or F(x ) = F(x). In that case, such a charge  is given by
the restriction of F to the eld of those sets in F[](X) that are Riemann-Stieltjes
integrable with respect to F.
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Proof. if. Suppose F satises the one-sided continuity condition at every
point a < x < b. Dene the charge  as suggested, that is, the restriction
of F to the eld of Riemann-Stieltjes integrable elements, with respect to F,
in F[](X). We check that  satises the conditions of Theorem 4.52. Every
element of F is Riemann-Stieltjes integrable, and by Lemma 4.50, F(A) =
R-S
R
IA(x) dF(x) for every Riemann-Stieltjes integrable set A 2 F[](X): so
condition (i) is satised.
Now comes a subtle part. We shall need the following result: if F is
continuous at x from the right, then for every  > 0, there is an x > x such
that F is continuous at x (from both sides) and F(x)   F(x) < . Indeed, if
F is continuous at x from the right, then for every  > 0 there is a  such
that F(z)   F(x) <  whenever x < z < x + . But, since F is non-decreasing,
there are only a countable number of points at which F is not continuous
(see for instance Schechter [70, Proposition 19.22]). Hence, since (x; x + ) is
uncountable, there must be an x 2 (x; x + ) at which F is continuous: this
x satises F(x)   F(x) <  as required.
Similarly, we see that if F is continuous at x from the left, then for every
 > 0, there is an x < x such that F is continuous at x and F(x)   F(x) < .
Now, we are in a comfortable situation to check condition (ii) of Theorem 4.52.
Let  > 0, and let S = [x; y] be any closed interval inX. Dene AS = [x; y]
as follows. If x = a or if F is continuous at x > a from the left, take x := x;
otherwise, F must be continuous at x from the right and we can take x > x
such that F(x)   F(x) < , and (by the above result) F is continuous at x. In
both cases it holds that F(x)   F(x) < , and either F is continuous at x from
the left or x = a.
Similarly, if y = b or if F is continuous at y < b from the right, take y := y;
otherwise, F must be continuous at y from the left and we can take y < y
such that F(y)   F(y) < , and F is continuous at y. Again, in both cases it
holds that F(y)   F(y) < , and either F is continuous at y from the right or
y = b.
Hence, it holds that AS  S by denition of x and y. Also, by Eqs. (4.31)
and (4.32) on p. 143, AS is Riemann-Stieltjes integrable since either x = a or
F is continuous at x from the left, and either y = b or F is continuous at y
from the right. Finally,
(AS )   F(S) = F(AS )   F(S) = F(x)   F(x) + F(y)   F(y) < 2;
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since  is a restriction of F. By Eq. (4.40) on p. 147, this establishes condi-
tion (ii) of Theorem 4.52.
only if. Suppose there is an a < x0 < b such that F(x0 ) < F(x0) < F(x0+),
and assume ex absurdo that there is a bounded positive charge  dened on
some eldF onX such that the lower Riemann-Stieltjes integral with respect
to F is equal to the lower S-integral with respect to . By Theorem 4.52(i),
we already have that F contains only Riemann-Stieltjes integrable sets, and
S
R
IA d = (A) = R-S
R b
a IA dF for all A 2 F . So, consider for instance
the closed interval A = [x0; b], which is not Riemann-Stieltjes integrable by
Eqs. (4.31)&(4.32) on p. 143 (and the fact that F(x0 ) , F(x0)), and therefore
does not belong to F . We have proved before that
R-S
Z b
a
IA(x) dF(x) = F(b)   F(x0);
see Eq. (4.31) on p. 143. We shall obtain a contradiction by showing that
S
R
IA d is not equal to F(b)   F(x0).
Dene  as the restriction of F to the eldH of Riemann-Stieltjes integ-
rable sets; note thatF  H sinceF contains only Riemann-Stieltjes integrable
sets. By Lemma 4.50, (B) = F(B) = R-S
R b
a IB dF for all Riemann-Stieltjes
integrable sets B, and hence, also for all B 2 F , since F  H . Therefore,
since  satises Theorem 4.52(i), (B) = (B) for all B 2 F : P is a behavioural
extension of P. Hence, by Proposition 4.7 on p. 98 and Theorem 4.42 on
p. 130,
S
Z
IA d  S
Z
IA d = E(IA) = (A) = sup
B2H ;BA
(B)
where we also invoked Theorem 4.36(v) on p. 117. Since, as we shall prove
below, for every B 2 H , i.e., every Riemann-Stieltjes integrable set B, such
that x0 2 B, there is an  > 0 such that [x0   ; x0]  B, it follows that if B 2 H
and B  A = [x0; b], then x0 < B, i.e., B  (x0; b]:
= sup
B2H ;B(x0;b]
(B)
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Observe that B 2 H and B  (x0; b] imply that (B) = R-S
R b
a IB(x) dF(x) 
R-S
R b
a
I(x0;b](x) dF(x) = F(b)   F(x0+), where we used Eq. (4.37) on p. 143, so
 F(b)   F(x0+)
< F(b)   F(x0) = R-S
Z b
a
IA(x) dF(x):
We have arrived at a contradiction.
It still remains to prove that if B is Riemann-Stieltjes integrable and x0 2 B,
then there must be an  > 0 such that [x0   ; x0]  B; recall that F(x0 ) <
F(x0) < F(x0+).
Indeed, assume ex absurdo that [x0   ; x0] * B for all  > 0. Obviously,
[x0; x0+] * {B for all  > 0, since x0 < {B. Now, since B is Riemann-Stieltjes
integrable, it follows by Lemma 4.50(iii) that
0 = lim
S2S(X)
X
S2S
S*B and S*{B
F(S)
and by restricting the sum to closed intervals that contain x0,
 lim
>0; >0

F([x0; x0   ]) + F([x0; x0 + ]) = F(x0+)   F(x0 ) > 0;
a contradiction. 
Whenever there are points at which F is discontinuous from both sides,
the lower Riemann-Stieltjes integral does not have a lower S-integral rep-
resentation. It can therefore not be written as the natural extension of some
bounded positive charge. In such a case, we could try to do one of the
following.
(i) For some applications, it may be good enough to have only equivalence
with respect to a restricted set of gambles.
(ii) We could try and nd a sequence Fn approximating F such that the se-
quence R-S
R b
a
f (x) dFn(x) converges (in limit inferior) to R-S
R b
a
f (x) dF(x)
for all gambles f on X. If possible there will be also a sequence of
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bounded positive charges n such that S
R
f dn converges (in limit in-
ferior) to R-S
R b
a
f (x) dF(x) by Theorem 4.53.
(iii) Perhaps R-S
R b
a
dF(x) is equivalent to a more general uncertainty struc-
ture. For instance, we know that the lower Riemann-Stieltjes integral
is the point-wise limit of the natural extension of belief functions (up
to normalisation, as always). Hence, we could try to nd a belief
function, or completely monotone set function, as a representation for
the Riemann-Stieltjes integral. However, in many cases we do have a
probability charge representation, so belief functions and completely
monotone set functions probably are an overkill.
(iv) In a similar spirit we could try establishing equivalence to a lower
envelope or a convex mixture of lower S-integrals with respect to F
and related charges.
Let's end this section on Riemann-Stieltjes integrals with some remarks.
First of all, the restriction of F suggested by Theorem 4.53 is usually far
from being restricted to the smallest possible eld.
In case F is continuous, other choices that satisfy the conditions of The-
orem 4.52 are for instance the smallest eld that contains f[a; x] : x 2 Xg. We
shall denote it by F(](X). It consists of all nite unions of intervals of the type
[a; x] and (x; y] for a  x < y  b. The eld of all complements of elements
of F(](X) will be denoted by F[)(X), and this one contains all nite unions of
intervals of the type [x; y) and [y; b] for a  x < y  b. The smallest eld that
contains both of these elds is exactly F[](X) which contains all nite unions
of intervals (this choice is suggested in Theorem 4.53). The elds F(](X) and
F[)(X) have the benet over F[](X) that they have fewer elements.
Still in case F is continuous, we can consider even smaller elds, even
elds with only a countable number of elements. For instance, let A be any
dense subset of X. Then any eld generated by only f[a; x] : x 2 Ag will do.
If A is the set of rational numbers in X, then this eld is countable. Contrast
the partitions generated by these elds with the subdivisions ofX dened in
Eq. (4.20).
In case F is the identity map, Theorem 4.52 says that the natural extension of
the Lebesgue measure restricted to any of these elds will give you the lower Riemann
integral, not only for Riemann integrable gambles, but for any gamble. If it
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had not been proved, such statement would be hardly believable.
Corollary 4.54. Let X = [a; b] be a compact interval in R. The set of bounded
positive charges that are equivalent to the lower Riemann integral on X is exactly
given by all restrictions of the Lebesgue measure  on B(X) to a eld F containing
only Riemann integrable sets and satisfying the condition that F is dense (as in
Theorem 4.52(ii)).
In case F is only continuous from at least one side at every point, it mostly
suces to restrict any of those elds to those sets that are Riemann-Stieltjes
integrable, as suggested by Theorem 4.53. Note that one of the reasons why
this is possible is because, independently of F, the number of intervals that are
not Riemann-Stieltjes integrable is at most countable. Theorem 4.53 exactly
proves that the remaining set of intervals is suciently dense in F[](X).
One more important consequence of Theorem 4.52, is that the Riemann-
Stieltjes charge really lives up to its name if F is continuous, and moreover,
that we might as well take the S-integral with respect to the Lebesgue-Stieltjes
measure for calculating the Riemann-Stieltjes integral (but not for the lower
and upper Riemann-Stieltjes integral).
Proposition 4.55. Let X = [a; b] be a compact interval in R, and let F be a real-
valued non-decreasing bounded function on X. Assume that F is continuous. Then
for any gamble f on X
R-S
Z b
a
f (x) dF(x) = S
Z
f dF:
Hence, f is Riemann-Stieltjes integrable with respect to F if and only if it is S-
integrable with respect to the Riemann-Stieltjes charge F. In such a case, f is also
S-integrable with respect to the Lebesgue-Stieltjes measure F and
R-S
Z b
a
f (x) dF(x) = S
Z
f dF = S
Z
f dF:
Proof. The equality R-S
R b
a
dF(x) = S
R
dF follows from Theorem 4.53; note
that, since F is continuous, all sets in F[](X) are Riemann-Stieltjes integrable
with respect to F (see Eqs. (4.31)(4.38) on pp. 143143). It remains to show
that S
R
dF = S
R
dF on dom

S
R
dF

, i.e., that S
R
dF is an extension
of S
R
dF.
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By denition of the Lebesgue-Stieltjes measure (see Denition 4.47 on
p. 135), F is the unique -additive extension of F to the Borel -eld B(X);
hence, F coincides with F on domF = F[](X). Consequently, PF is a
behavioural extension of PF . So, by Proposition 4.15 on p. 101, EPF = EF is
an extension of EPF = EF : dom EF  dom EF and EF ( f ) = EF ( f ) for every
gamble f in dom EF . But, the S-integral coincides with the linear extension
by Theorem 4.43 on p. 131; this yields the desired equality. 
To see why not every gamble that is S-integrable with respect to the
Lebesgue measure is also Riemann integrable, consider the set
A := fx 2 X : x is rationalg: (4.42)
Obviously, IA is S-integrable with respect to the Lebesgue measure  on the
Borel -eld B(X). Indeed, since A is countable it belongs to B(X), so IA is
B(X)-measurable (it is even B(X)-simple). Now apply Proposition 4.28 and
Theorem 4.43 to nd that IA is S-integrable with respect to .
But it is well-known that IA is not Riemann integrable. Indeed, since the
rational numbers are dense in R it holds that PB(IA) = 0 and PB(IA) = 1 for
every interval B of X that is larger than a singleton, and therefore also for
every element B of a partition inP(F[](X)) (except for nite sets, but these sets
have charge zero so they do not contribute to the lower and upper integral).
Hence, the lower Riemann integral of IA is equal to zero, whereas the upper
Riemann integral of IA is equal to one, which means that IA is not Riemann
integrable.
The following characterisation of Riemann integrability, given for the sake
of completeness, is apparently due to Lebesgue. Note that dom, the domain
of the completion of the Lebesgue measure, constitutes a -eld. Sets in the
domain of  are called Lebesgue measurable sets; see Halmos [40, Section 15].
Theorem 4.56. Let X = [a; b] be a compact interval in R. A gamble f on X is
Riemann integrable if and only if it is dom-measurable and continuous almost
everywhere, that is,
(fx 2 [a; b] : f not continuous at xg) = 0:
Proof. See for instance Schechter [70, Theorem 24.46]. 
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In the light of our previous results, I nd this quite surprising. Indeed,
let F be any eld such that the conditions of Theorem 4.52 are satised; this
is a subset of dom. Then Riemann integrability turns out to lie in between
F -measurability and dom-measurability:
LF (X)  LdX(X)  Ldom(X):
From Theorem 4.56, we might also want to remember that F -measurability
implies continuity almost everywhere, for any eld F that satises the con-
ditions of Theorem 4.52.
4.3.7 Natural Extension of Cumulative Distribution Func-
tions
In this section we shall be concerned with the natural extension of cumulative
distribution functions F, which are self-conjugate p-boxes (F;F). Using the
results of the previous section about Riemann-Stieltjes integrals and its equi-
valence to restrictions of the Riemann-Stieltjes charge to a particular class of
elds, we shall easily establish necessary and sucient conditions for the
natural extension of a cumulative distribution function to be equal to the
lower Riemann-Stieltjes integral with respect to F.
Let's rst characterise the natural extension of F in terms of the lower
S-integral.
Denition 4.57. Let X = [a; b] be a compact interval of R, and let F be
a coherent cumulative distribution function on X. The unique probability
charge F on F(](X) that is equivalent to F, i.e., such that F([a; x]) = F(x) for
all x 2 X, is called the probability charge induced by F.
Proof of existence and uniqueness. Consider the linear extension EF of F. By
denition, this is the linear extension of the coherent probability PF in-
duced by F: for all x 2 X, PF(I[a;x]) =  PF( I[a;x]) = F(x). Through Pro-
position 4.18(i)&(v) on p. 102, EF is dened on at least cl(span(fI[a;x] : x 2
Xg)) = LF(](X)(X), since F(](X) is the eld generated by f[a; x] : x 2 Xg. So we
can dene the charge
F(A) := EF(IA)
for all sets A in the eld F(](X) (which is the eld generated by the collection
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f[a; x] : x 2 Xg).
Clearly PF is a coherent behavioural extension of PF and dom PF 
dom EF. Hence, by Proposition 4.14 on p. 100, it follows that PF is equivalent
to PF, or equivalently, F is equivalent to F. It's uniqueness follows from
Proposition 4.13 on p. 100: every charge  on F(](X) such that ([a; x]) = F(x)
for all x 2 X, induces a coherent behavioural extension of PF. Hence, P
coincides with EF on dom EF \ dom P. But, dom P = dom PF  dom EF,
so, it follows that (A) = EF(IA) = F(A) for all A 2 F(](X):  must be equal to
F. 
Let us emphasise that F is not the Riemann-Stieltjes charge F (but, it
is true that F is a behavioural extension of F). In general, F is not even
equivalent to Funless F is continuous. Since F is equivalent to F by
denition, and the lower S-integral with respect to F is the natural extension
of F as stated in Theorem 4.43 on p. 131, we immediately have that S
R
dF
is the natural extension of PF. Alternatively, note that PF is the natural
extension of PF to IF(](X)[ IF(](X), and S
R
dF is the natural extension of PF ;
therefore, by Corollary 4.9 on p. 98, S
R
dF is also the natural extension of
PF.
Theorem 4.58. Let X = [a; b] be a compact interval of R, and let F be a coherent
cumulative distribution function on X, inducing the probability charge F. Then
EF( f ) = S
Z
f dF for any gamble f on X:
The natural extension EF for a singleton fxgwith a < x  b is given by
EF(Ifxg) = sup
0;A2F(](X);Afxg
F(A) = F(;) = 0;
EF(Ifxg) = inf
0; (x ;x]fxg
F((x   ; x]) = F(x)   F(x );
and for x = a we have EF(Ifag) = EF(Ifag) = F(a). These expressions are easily ob-
tained by invoking the inner and outer set functions (dened in Section 4.3.4)
with respect to F as a means of calculating the natural extension of F, and
hence, F, to events. Taking into account linearity, i.e., Proposition 4.16 on
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p. 101, we have for a < x  y  b that
EF(I[x;y]) = EF(I[a;y])   EF(I[a;x]) + EF(fxg) = F(y)   F(x) and
EF(I[x;y]) = EF(I[a;y])   EF(I[a;x]) + EF(fxg) = F(y)   F(x );
and similarly,
EF(I(x;y)) = EF(I[a;y])   EF(I[a;x])   EF(fyg) = F(y )   F(x) and
EF(I(x;y)) = EF(I[a;y])   EF(I[a;x])   EF(fxg) = F(y)   F(x):
Expressions for other intervals can be obtained in a similar way. We are now
in a comfortable position to connect the natural extension of F to the lower
Riemann-Stieltjes integral.
Theorem 4.59. Let X = [a; b] be a compact interval in R and let F be a coherent
cumulative distribution function on X. Then
EF( f ) = R-S
Z b
a
f (x) dF(x) for all gambles f on X; (4.43)
if and only if F(a) = 0 and F is continuous from the right at every point x 2 [a; b).
Proof. if. Let F be the probability charge induced by F. By Theorem 4.58,
it suces to check the conditions of Theorem 4.52.
Consider A := f[a; x] : x 2 Xg; domF = F(](X) is the eld generated
by A. Every element of A is Riemann-Stieltjes integrable. Indeed, using
Eqs. (4.31)&(4.32) on p. 143, for every a  y < b it holds that
R-S
Z b
a
I[a;y](x) dF(x) = F(y)   F(a)
= F(y+)   F(a) = R-S
Z b
a
I[a;y](x) dF(x);
and therefore, since F(a) = 0, indeed F([a; y]) = F(y) = R-S
R b
a I[a;y](x) dF(x).
For y = b we have
R-S
Z b
a
I[a;b](x) dF(x) = F(b)   F(a) = R-S
Z b
a
I[a;b](x) dF(x);
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so [a; b] is Riemann-Stieltjes integrable too and, again since F(a) = 0, it follows
that F([a; b]) = F(b) = R-S
R b
a I[a;b](x) dF(x). Hence, all sets inA are Riemann-
Stieltjes integrable. By Proposition 4.51 it follows that all sets in the eld
generated byA are Riemann-Stieltjes integrable: all sets in F(](X) = domF
are Riemann-Stieltjes integrable.
Let S = [x; y]  X and  > 0. Take AS = (x; y] in F(](X). Then ASS = fxg,
and hence, R-S
R b
a
IAS(z) dF(z) = 0 < .
So, all conditions of Theorem 4.52 are satised. Therefore,
EF( f ) = EF ( f ) = R-S
Z b
a
f (x) dF(x)
for any gamble f on X.
only if. We are given that EF( f ) = R-S
R b
a
f (x) dF(x) for all gambles f on
X. Take f = I[a;b]. It follows that
1 = EF(I[a;b]) = R-S
Z b
a
I[a;b] dF(x) = F(b)   F(a) = 1   F(a);
and hence, F(a) = 0.
Now let x 2 (a; b) and consider the gamble Ifxg. Then
F(x)   F(x ) = EF(Ifxg) = R-S
Z b
a
Ifxg(z) dF(z) = F(x+)   F(x ):
So, F(x) = F(x+), and hence, F must be continuous from the right at every
x 2 (a; b). For x = a we have
0 = F(a) = F(fag) = E(Ifag) = R-S
Z b
a
Ifag(z) dF(z) = F(a+)   F(a);
and hence, also at x = a, F must be continuous from the right. 
4.3.8 The Dunford Integral
Another way to integrate a charge, introduced by Dunford [31] for measures,
and extended by Dunford and Schwartz [30] to charges, is to start from
an integral dened on simple gambles only, and try to approximate other
gambles by a Cauchy sequence of simple ones. This is the core idea behind
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the denition of the Dunford integral. Note that we use the Dunford integral
forF -simple gambles already dened in Denition 3.19 on p. 65. A nice thing
about its denition is that it applies not only to gambles, but to all functions
f : X ! Rin this sense it is more general than the S-integral introduced in
Section 4.3.5. The denition relies on the outer set function  induced by a
probability charge ; see Denition 4.34 on p. 116
Denition 4.60. Let F be a eld on X and let  be a probability charge on
F . Then a function f : X ! R is called Dunford integrable with respect to  if
and only if there is a sequence of F -simple gambles fn such that
(i) limn;m!+1D
R  fn   fm d! 0, and
(ii) for any  > 0 it holds that limn!+1 
n
x 2 X :
 f (x)   fn(x) > o! 0.
In such a case, the Dunford integral of f with respect to  is dened as
D
Z
f d := lim
n!+1D
Z
fn d; (4.44)
where we should note that the limit on the right hand side is independent of
the sequence fn satisfying the two conditions above. Such sequence is called
a determining sequence for f .
In order to show that Dunford integrals and -integrals coincide on
gambles, we shall need the following lemma.
Lemma 4.61. Let P be any coherent lower prevision on L(X). Let fn be a bounded
sequence of gambles on X, that is, there is an  2 R such that supn2N sup
 fn  .
Then the following statements are equivalent.
(i) limn!+1 P
 fn = 0.
(ii) For any  > 0 it holds that limn!+1 P
n
x 2 X :
 fn(x) > o = 0.
Proof. Dene An; :=
n
x 2 X :
 fn(x) > o.
(i) =) (ii). Let  > 0 and  > 0 such that  < . Then there is an N 2 N
such that P
 fn < 2 for every n  N. Since IAn;   fn IAn; , it follows from
the coherence of P that
P  An;  P
 fn An;


P
 fn

<
2

<  (4.45)
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for every n  N. So limn!+1 P  An; = 0.
(ii) =) (i). Let  > 0. Then there is an N 2 N such that P  An; < +1 for
every n  N. It follows from the coherence of P that
P
 fn  P  fn An; + P  fn{An; <   + 1 +  < 2 (4.46)
for every n  N. 
A rather long proof for the equivalence of Dunford integrability and S-
integrability for gambles, and a proof for the equality of the corresponding
integrals on gambles, was given by Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara Rao [9, The-
orem 4.5.7 and Proposition 4.5.8]. We give a much shorter and conceptually
simpler proof by repeated application of Lemma 4.61.
Theorem 4.62. Let F be a eld on X and let  be a probability charge on F . Let f
be any gamble. Then the following conditions are equivalent.
(i) f is Dunford integrable with respect to .
(ii) f is S-integrable with respect to .
(iii) f is -integrable.
If any (and hence all) of these conditions are satised, then
D
Z
f d = S
Z
f d = E( f ): (4.47)
Proof. Equivalence of S-integrability with respect to  and -integrability,
and equality of the corresponding integrals, has already been established in
Theorem 4.43 on p. 131.
For F -simple gambles, equality of the Dunford integral and natural ex-
tension, and hence, equality of the Dunford integral and the S-integral, was
noted in Section 4.3.3, p. 112 . Equality of the S-integral and the Dunford
integral for F -simple gambles is also immediate from their respective den-
itions; see Denition 3.19 on p. 65 and Denition 4.40 on p. 129. To prove the
general case, we shall extensively use the equality of the S-integral and the
Dunford integral for F -simple gambles.
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Suppose that f is S-integrable with respect to . Then, for any n 2 N,
n > 0, there is a nite partition Bn 2 P(F ) such that
X
B2Bn
PB( f )(B)  
X
B2Bn
PB( f )(B) <
1
n :
Dene the gambles gn :=
P
B2Bn PB( f )IB and hn :=
P
B2Bn PB( f )IB, then, since gn
and hn areF -simple, the above condition can be written as S
R
(gn hn) d < 1n ,
or, since gn  hn, also as S
R gn   hn d < 1n . But gn  f  hn, and hencegn   hn  gn   f . In particular, we nd that, given that the lower S-integral
is coherent,
S
Z gn   f  d  S
Z gn   hn d = S
Z
(gn   hn) d < 1n : (4.48)
Since, again by the coherence of the lower S-integral, S
R gn   gm d 
S
R gn   f  d + SR  f   gm d, this implies that S R gn   gm d converges
to zero. But gn   gm is F -simple, so S
R gn   gm d = D R gn   gm d,
and so D
R gn   gm d must converge to zero as well. Also observe that
supn2N sup
 f   gn  2 sup  f , and hence, Lemma 4.61 applies on Eq. (4.48):
for any  > 0 it holds that S
R n
x 2 X :
 f (x)   gn(x) > o d converges to zero.
Now apply Theorem 4.36(v) on p. 117 and Theorem 4.42 on p. 130 to see
that 
n
x 2 X :
 f (x)   gn(x) > o converges to zero. We have demonstrated
that f is Dunford integrable with respect to . Again by Eq. (4.48), and the
coherence of the lower S-integral (Theorem 3.5(xii) on p. 55) it holds that
S
Z
f d = lim
n!+1 S
Z
gn d = D
Z
f d;
so the corresponding integrals are equal as well.
Conversely, assume that f is Dunford integrable with respect to . Then
there is a sequence fn of F -simple gambles such that for every  > 0 the
sequence
n
x 2 X :
 f (x)   fn(x) > o converges to zero. In particular, there
is an F -simple gamble f such that

n
x 2 X :
 f (x)   f(x) > o < :
Dene the set A :=
n
x 2 X :
 f (x)   f(x) > o, so (A) = inff(B) : A  B 2
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F g < . This means that there must also be a B 2 F such that A  B but
still (B) < . Since f is F -simple there is a nite partition A 2 P(F ) on
whose elements f is constant. Dene the nite partition
B := fBg [ fA \{B : A 2 Ag:
Fix A 2 A. Observe that for any x 2 A\{B it holds in particular that x < A,
and hence
 f (x)   f(x)  . Since actually f is constant on A \{B, we also
nd that, since PA\{B is coherent,
PA\{B ( f )   PA\{B ( f ) = PA\{B ( f   f)   PA\{B ( f   f)
 2PA\{B (j f   fj)  2:
Look at the denition of the S-integral, and dene theF -simple functions
g :=
P
B2B PB( f )IB and h :=
P
B2B PB( f )IB. If we can show that S
R
(g  
h) d  K for some K > 0 which may depend on f , then we have proved
that f is S-integrable. Indeed, in such a case, since g  f  h, and by the
coherence of the lower S-integral,
S
Z
g d  S
Z
f d  S
Z
f d  S
Z
h d  S
Z
g d + K;
for any  > 0, and hence, in the limit for  to zero, we recover that S
R
f d =
S
R
f d: f is S-integrable.
So, let's show that S
R
(g   h) d  K for some K > 0:
S
Z
(g   h) d =
X
B2B

PB( f )   PB( f )

(B)
=

PB ( f )   PB ( f )

(B)
+
X
A2A

PA\{B ( f )   PA\{B ( f )

(A \{B)
 2 sup j f j + 2
X
A2A
(A \{B)
 2(sup j f j + 1)
and hence, the desired inequality is satised for K = 2(sup j f j+1). This means
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that f is S-integrable, with S-integral S
R
f d = lim>0 S
R
g d. From this
equality, which can also be written as lim>0 S
R
jg   f jd = 0, we can infer
two things. Firstly:
lim
n;m!+1D
Z g 1n   g 1m
 d = limn;m!+1 S
Z g 1n   g 1m
 d
 lim
n!+1 S
Z g 1n   f
 d + limm!+1 S
Z  f   g 1m
 d = 0;
and secondly, noting that supn2N
 f   g 1
n
  2 supj f j, and once more applying
Lemma 4.61: for any  > 0 it holds that S
R n
x 2 X :
 f (x)   g 1
n
(x)
 > o d
converges to zero. Now apply Theorem 4.36(v) on p. 117 and Theorem 4.42 on
p. 130 to see that for any  > 0 also 

x 2 X :
 f (x)   g 1n (x)
 > 

converges
to zero. Hence, g 1
n
is a determining sequence for f , so
D
Z
f d = lim
n!+1D
Z
g 1
n
d = lim
n!+1 S
Z
g 1
n
d = S
Z
f d:
So, f is not only S-integrable, also its Dunford integral is equal to its S-integral.
This concludes the proof. 
We shall need the following results on Dunford integration further on,
we refer to Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara Rao [9] for a proof.
Lemma 4.63. Let F be a eld onX and let  be a probability charge on F . Let f be
a Dunford integrable random quantity, and let fn be a determining sequence for f .
Then limn!1D
R
j f   fnjd = 0.
Theorem 4.64. Let F be a eld on X and let  be a probability charge on F . Let f
be a random quantity on X, and let fn be a sequence of Dunford integrable random
quantities. If
(i) limn;m!+1D
R  fn   fm d = 0, and
(ii) for any  > 0 it holds that limn!+1 
n
x 2 X :
 f (x)   fn(x) > o = 0,
then f is Dunford integrable, and D
R
f d = limn!1D
R
fn d.
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4.3.9 Intermezzo: More Properties of the Riemann-Stieltjes
Integral
The results derived in this section will be used in Section 4.3.10. Most of them
are well-known properties, except for Proposition 4.69 and Proposition 4.70.
In Proposition 4.69, we shall give a formula for partial integration of lower
and upper Riemann-Stieltjes integrals, i.e., without imposing any integrabil-
ity, continuity, or other regularity conditions, except for monotonicity. In
Proposition 4.70, we shall generalise a well-known result about modifying
the integrand without changing the value of the Riemann-Stieltjes integral.
Proposition 4.65. Let X = [a; b] be a compact interval in R, let F be a real-valued
non-decreasing bounded function on X. Then
R-S
Z y
a
f (x) dF(x) + R-S
Z b
y
f (x) dF(x) = R-S
Z b
a
f (x) dF(x):
for any gamble f on X and y 2 X.
Proof. Immediately from Denition 4.48, and the observation that for every
subdivision S of [a; b], there is a subdivision of [a; b] that renes both S and
f[a; y]; [y; b]g. 
Proposition 4.66. Let X = [a; b] be a compact interval in R, let F be a real-valued
non-decreasing bounded function on X. The lower and upper Riemann-Stieltjes
integral are uniformly continuous on L(X) with respect to the supremum norm.
Proof. This follows from the coherence of the lower Riemann-Stieltjes integral
and Theorem 3.5(xiii). 
Proposition 4.67. Let X = [a; b] be a compact interval in R, and let F be a
real-valued non-decreasing bounded function on X. The set of Riemann-Stieltjes
integrable gambles with respect to F is a uniformly closed linear lattice, on which the
Riemann-Stieltjes integral is a positive linear functional.
Proof. Immediately from Theorem 4.49 on p. 137 and Proposition 4.18(vi) on
p. 102. 
Proposition 4.68. Let X = [a; b] be a compact interval in R, and let f be a non-
decreasing or non-increasing gamble on X. Then f is Riemann integrable.
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Proof. Suppose f is non-decreasing. For each  > 0, select a subdivision
S 2 S(X) such that (S) <  for each S 2 S. We nd that
X
S2S
h
PS( f )   PS( f )
i
(S) < 
X
S2S
h
PS( f )   PS( f )
i
= 
 sup f   inf f  ;
where the last equality holds because f is non-decreasing. We nd that
R
Z b
a
f (x) dx   R
Z b
a
f (x) dx = inf
S2S(X)
X
S2S
h
PS( f )   PS( f )
i
(S)
 inf
>0
X
S2S
h
PS( f )   PS( f )
i
(S)
 inf
>0

 sup f   inf f  = 0:
Therefore, f is Riemann integrable.
If f is non-increasing, then   f is non-decreasing, and hence, Riemann
integrable. From Proposition 4.67 it follows that f is also Riemann integrable.

Proposition 4.69. Let X = [a; b] be a compact interval in R, and let f and g be
non-decreasing gambles on X. Then
R-S
Z b
a
f (x) dg(x) + R-S
Z b
a
g(x) d f (x)
= f (b)g(b)   f (a)g(a):
= R-S
Z b
a
f (x) dg(x) + R-S
Z b
a
g(x) d f (x)
Hence, f is Riemann-Stieltjes integrable with respect to g if and only if g is Riemann-
Stieltjes integrable with respect to f , and in such a case
R-S
Z b
a
f (x) dg(x) + R-S
Z b
a
g(x) d f (x) = f (b)g(b)   f (a)g(a):
Proof. Since f and g are non-decreasing, for any closed interval S inX it holds
that PS( f ) = f (min S) and PS(g) = g(max S). We nd
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R-S
Z b
a
f (x) dg(x) + R-S
Z b
a
g(x) d f (x)
= lim
S2S(X)
X
S2S
h
PS( f )g(S) + PS(g) f (S)
i
= lim
S2S(X)
X
S2S
n
f (min S)[g(max S)   g(min S)]
+ g(max S)[ f (max S)   f (min S)]
o
= lim
S2S(X)
X
S2S
  f (min S)g(min S) + g(max S) f (max S)	
=   f (a)g(a) + f (b)g(b):

It is well-known that if two gambles f and g are Riemann integrable,
and dier at most on a countable set, or more general, on a set of outer
Lebesgue measure zero, then their Riemann integrals are equal; for instance,
see Darboux [14, Section IV, p. 75, ll. 1220] in case f and g dier only
on a nite set, see Hildebrandt [43, Chapter II, Theorem 15.9, p. 74] for a
generalisation to Riemann-Stieltjes integrals, and requiring only that f and g
dier at most on a set of measure zero (with respect to what could be called
the outer Riemann-Stieltjes measure).
We give a very short proof of a stronger version of this property: if
both f and g are Riemann-Stieltjes integrable, then their Riemann-Stieltjes
integrals are equal whenever they dier only on a set whose indicator has zero
lower Riemann-Stieltjes integral. Indeed, surprisingly, and perhaps counter-
intuitively, we only need the lower Riemann-Stieltjes integral of the indicator
to be zero. For instance: if two Riemann integrable gambles f and g dier
only on a set of inner Lebesgue measure zero, then their Riemann integrals
are equal.
Proposition 4.70. Let X = [a; b] be a compact interval of R, let F be a bounded
non-decreasing real-valued function on X, and let f and g be gambles on X that are
Riemann-Stieltjes integrable with respect to F. If f = g except on a set of zero lower
Riemann-Stieltjes integral, i.e., if f (x) = g(x) for all x 2 X n N, where N is some
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subset of X such that R-S
R b
a
IN(x) dF(x) = 0, then
R-S
Z b
a
f (x) dF(x) = R-S
Z b
a
g(x) dF(x):
Proof. Immediately from the 2-monotonicity of the lower Riemann-Stieltjes
integral (Theorem 4.49 on p. 137) and Proposition 4.19(ii) on p. 104. 
Enrique Miranda (personal communication) has proved that, if f and
g are Riemann integrable gambles that are equal except on N  X, then
R
R b
a
IN(x) dx = 0 if and only if (N) = 0; this tells us that the above condition
reduces to a well-known condition in case of Riemann integration:
Corollary 4.71. Let X = [a; b] be a compact interval of R, and let f and g be
gambles on X that are Riemann integrable. Let N = fx 2 X : f (x) , g(x)g. Then
R
R b
a
IN(x) dx = 0 if and only if the outer Lebesgue measure of N is zero, and in that
case, R
R b
a f (x) dx = R
R b
a g(x) dx.
Proof. Equality of the Riemann integrals follows from Proposition 4.70. It
remains to show the equivalence of the two conditions. Let us denote by  is
the restriction of the Lebesgue measure to F[](X).
if. If the outer Lebesgue measure of N is zero, then so must be the lower
Riemann integral of IN, since
(N)  (N)  (N) = R
Z b
a
IN(x) dx;
where we used Lemma 4.50(i) on p. 139 in the nal step.
only if. Since f and g are Riemann-integrable, so is j f   gj (by Proposi-
tion 4.67), and since R
R b
a
IN(x) dx = 0 it also follows that R
R b
a j f (x) g(x)jdx = 0.
Indeed,
0  R
Z b
a
j f (x)   g(x)jdx  supj f   gjR
Z b
a
IN(x) dx = 0
By Theorem 4.56, it follows in fact that j f   gj is dom-measurable, and so
there is a sequence hn of non-negative dom-simple gambles that converges
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uniformly to j f   gj from below. But, for every n inN,
0  S
Z
hn d  S
Z
j f   gjd
 R
Z b
a
j f (x)   g(x)jdx = R
Z b
a
j f (x)   g(x)jdx = 0;
so S
R
hn d = 0. Now, x n inN. Since hn is dom-simple, there is an  > 0
such that, for any x in X, hn(x) > 0 if and only if hn(x) > . Therefore,
0 = S
Z
hn d  (fx 2 X : hn(x) > g)  0;
which in turn implies that (fx 2 X : hn(x) > 0g must be zero as well. But,
since the non-negative sequence of gambles hn converges uniformly to the
non-negative gamble j f   gj from below,
fx 2 X : f (x) > 0g =
[
n2N
fx 2 X : hn(x) > 0g;
and so, since  is a measure, it follows that (fx 2 X : f (x) > 0g) = 0 as well.
But,  is an extension of , so the equivalence is established. 
4.3.10 Natural Extension of 2-Monotone Set Functions: The
Choquet Integral
Let us now proceed with a general denition of the Choquet integral, due
to Choquet [11, Section 48.1, p. 265], and introduced before as a behavioural
extension of 2-monotone set functions to simple gambles, and investigate its
relation to natural extension. The most general, and I think also the most
elegant way of extending the Choquet integral with respect to 2-monotone
set functions for arbitrary gambles, is suggested by Walley; see Walley [85,
Section 6, p. 52, ll. 2224] and Walley [86, Note 2 of Section 3.2, p. 502]:
he observes that through natural extension we don't need to impose any
measurability conditionscompare for instance with Greco's [38] upper -
measurability; a denition is given below.
Walley's argument is as follows. First, we extend, through natural ex-
tension, the 2-monotone set function  dened on a eld F to a set function
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 dened on the power set }(X). This set function  is 2-monotone; see
Theorem 4.36(iv). Now, generalising a result by Walley [85], we can show
that, for gambles, Greco's [38] Choquet integral with respect to  is equal, on
its domain of upper -measurable gambles, to the natural extension of P .
Hence, since  is equal, on its domain, to the natural extension of , also the
Choquet integral with respect to  is the natural extension of P to upper
-measurable gambles; this is a consequence of Proposition 4.8. But, every
gamble on X is upper -measurable, since  is dened on the -eld }(X)
and every gamble on X is }(X)-measurable. So, the Choquet integral with
respect to  is the natural extension of P to the set of all gambles. The details
of the proof will be given below.
In conclusion, for 2-monotone measures, it makes perfect sense to take
Greco's [38] Choquet integral with respect to  also as the Choquet integral
with respect to , unless you like unnecessarily complicated measurability
conditions. Of course, as described in great detail by Denneberg [28], Greco's
[38] approach is more general because it allows for a Choquet integral with
respect to an arbitrary set function, not just 2-monotone set functions dened
on a eld. However, Walley [85, Corollary 6.2] proved that the Choquet
integral with respect to a set function dened on the power set, positive,
and (;) = 0corresponds to a coherent lower prevision if and only if  is
2-monotone; in a completely dierent context, this result was rst proved
by Choquet [11, Theorem on p. 289], and a very general formulation of this
result can be found in Denneberg [28, Chapter 6]. Therefore, in our study
of the interplay between integration and natural extension, it is not exactly
clear what is the r ole of the Choquet integral with respect to set functions
that are not 2-monotone. However, we shall not concern ourselves with this
question any further.
In the denition below, the Choquet integral expressed as Riemann and
Riemann-Stieltjes integrals are well-known results. Our contribution is also
an expression of the Choquet integral in terms of a Dunford and an S-integral
with respect to the Lebesgue measureor any suciently dense restriction
of the Lebesgue measure, as suggested by Theorem 4.52. These are simple
consequences of Proposition 4.55 on p. 156 and Theorem 4.62 on p. 163
Denition 4.72. Let F be a eld onX and let  be a 2-monotone set function
on F . Let f be any gamble on X. Let G; f be the lower decreasing distribution
function of f with respect to , and F; f the upper distribution function of f
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with respect to , that is,
G; f (z) := (fx 2 X : f (x) > zg); and
F; f (z) := (fx 2 X : f (x)  zg) = 1   G; f (z);
for any z 2 R, where  denotes the dual 2-alternating set function induced
by . The Choquet integral of f with respect to  is dened as
C
Z
f d := inf f +D
Z
[inf f ;sup f ]
G; f d;
= inf f + S
Z
[inf f ;sup f ]
G; f d;
= inf f + R
Z sup f
inf f
G; f (z) dz;
=R-S
Z sup f
inf f 
z dF; f (z);
=R
Z 0
0^inf f
[G; f (z)   1] dz + R
Z 0_sup f
0
G; f (z) dz;
=R
Z 1
0
G ; f (t) dt;
where the Dunford integral and the S-integral are taken with respect to the
Lebesgue measure  onB(R),  > 0 is arbitrary, and G ; f is the pseudo-inverse
of G; f which is dened as
G ; f (t) := inf f _ supfz 2 [inf f ; sup f ] : G; f (z) > tg; for all t 2 [0; 1]:
Proof of existence and equality of all integrals. Since G; f is non-increasing it is
Riemann integrable on [inf f ; sup f ] by Proposition 4.68. The Riemann in-
tegral of G; f can be converted into an S-integral using Proposition 4.55 on
p. 156. The S-integral is equal to the Dunford integral by Theorem 4.62
on p. 163. The Riemann integral converts into a Riemann-Stieltjes integral
through Proposition 4.69 on p. 168:
inf f + R
Z sup f
inf f
G; f (z) dz
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= inf f   R
Z sup f
inf f
h
 G; f (z)
i
dz
and since  G; f is non-decreasing, we can apply Proposition 4.69,
= inf f  
(
  R-S
Z sup f
inf f
z d
h
 G; f (z)
i
+ sup f

 G; f (sup f )

  inf f

 G; f (inf f )
 )
and since G; f = F; f  1, we can replace the Riemann-Stieltjes integral with
respect to  G; f with a Riemann-Stieltjes integral with respect to F; f . Also,
G; f (sup f ) = (;) = 0, hence,
= inf f  
(
 R-S
Z sup f
inf f
z dF; f (z) + (inf f )G; f (inf f )
)
= inf f

1   G; f (inf f )

+ R-S
Z sup f
inf f
z dF; f (z)
= (inf f )F; f (inf f ) + R-S
Z sup f
inf f
z dF; f (z)
Now, observe that, since F; f is non-decreasing and again applying Proposi-
tion 4.69,
R-S
Z inf f
inf f 
z dF; f (z) =  R
Z inf f
inf f 
F; f (z) dz
+ (inf f )F; f (inf f )   (inf f   )F; f (inf f   )
= (inf f )F; f (inf f ):
and apply Proposition 4.65.
Next, observe that
inf f = 0 ^ inf f + 0 _ inf f
= R
Z 0
0^inf f
( 1) dz + R
Z 0_inf f
0
(+1) dz
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and since G; f (z) = (X) = 1 whenever 0  x < inf f ,
= R
Z 0
0^inf f
( 1) dz + R
Z 0_inf f
0
G; f (z) dz;
and, by Proposition 4.65,
R
Z sup f
inf f
G; f (z) dz = R
Z 0
0^inf f
G; f (z) dz + R
Z sup f
0_inf f
G; f (z) dz;
Hence, by Proposition 4.65 and Proposition 4.67,
inf f + R
Z sup f
inf f
G; f (z) dz
= R
Z 0
0^inf f
( 1) dz + R
Z 0_inf f
0
G; f (z) dz
+ R
Z 0
0^inf f
G; f (z) dz + R
Z sup f
0_inf f
G; f (z) dz
= R
Z 0
0^inf f
[G; f (z)   1] dz + R
Z 0_sup f
0
G; f (z) dz:
For the equality involving the Riemann integral over G ; f we refer to
Denneberg [28, Proposition 1.2, Lemma 1.3 and Corollary 1.5]. 
To see why we need to integrate from inf f    when expressing the
Choquet integral as a Riemann-Stieltjes integral, let  be any 2-monotone set
function and consider a constant gamble a 2 R(X). Then
F;a(z) = (fx 2 X : a  zg) =
8>>><>>>:
0; if z < a;
1; if z  a:
Clearly, inf a = sup a = a, and hence,
R-S
Z a
a
z dF;a(z) = 0;
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which is not the Choquet integral of the constant gamble a. But,
R-S
Z a
a 
z dF;a(z) = sup
0<<
h
0 + P[a +;a](z)  1
i
= a;
and similar for the upper Riemann-Stieltjes integral,
R-S
Z a
a 
z dF;a(z) = inf
0<<
h
0 + P[a +;a](z)  1
i
= a:
In the literature, when the Choquet integral is dened as a Riemann-
Stieltjes integral, the Riemann-Stieltjes integral is over R instead of over
[inf f   ; sup f ]. This agrees with our denition since
lim
c! 1R-S
Z inf f 
c
z dF; f (z) = 0; and lim
d!+1
R-S
Z d
sup f
z dF; f (z) = 0:
Now apply Proposition 4.65 to see that
R-S
Z +1
 1
z dF; f (z) := limc! 1
d!+1
R-S
Z d
c
z dF; f (z) = R-S
Z sup f
inf f 
z dF; f (z):
A similar argument shows that
R
Z 0
 1
[G; f (z)   1] dz + R
Z +1
0
G; f (z) dz
= R
Z 0
0^inf f
[G; f (z)   1] dz + R
Z 0_sup f
0
G; f (z) dz:
Our denition of lower decreasing distribution function extends and
simplies the denition of the decreasing distribution function for upper
-measurable gambles in case  is a 2-monotone set function. As a con-
sequence, our denition of the Choquet integral extends the denition of the
Choquet integral for upper -measurable gambles. The proof of this claim,
given below for the sake of completeness, is immediate.
Denition 4.73. Let  be a 2-monotone set function dened on a eld F .
A gamble f is called upper -measurable if there is an at most countable set
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N  R such that
(fx 2 X : f (x) > zg) = (fx 2 X : f (x) > zg)
for all z 2 R n N; note that the left hand side is G; f (z). If f is upper -
measurable, then any real-valued function equal to G; f except on an at most
countable set is called a decreasing distribution function of f with respect to .
The denition of upper -measurability relies on both the inner set func-
tion  and the outer set function  induced by . Recall that  is 2-monotone,
as stated in Theorem 4.36(iv), but usually  will not be 2-monotone.
Proposition 4.74. Let  be a 2-monotone set function dened on a eld F . Let f
be an upper -measurable function. Then G; f is a decreasing distribution function
of f with respect to .
Proof. G; f is equal to G; f except on the empty set, which is an at most
countable subset of R. Now, apply the denition of decreasing distribution
function. 
Corollary 4.75. Let  be a 2-monotone set function dened on a eld F . Let f be
an upper -measurable function, and let G; f be a decreasing distribution function
of f with respect to . Then
C
Z
f d = R
Z 0
0^inf f
[G; f (z)   1] dz + R
Z 0_sup f
0
G; f (z) dz;
Proof. Simply observe that the Riemann integral over G; f is equal to the
Riemann integral over G; f , since they are equal except on an at most count-
able subset of R: every countable subset of R has Lebesgue measure zero,
and therefore, the lower Riemann integral of its indicator is zero too, so
Proposition 4.70 applies. 
So, our denition of the Choquet integral is a generalisation of the Cho-
quet integral found in Greco [38] and Denneberg [28] for upper -measurable
gambles, at least, when  is 2-monotone. Again, the Choquet integral of set
functions that are not 2-monotone may not give us the natural extension; this
was established by Walley [85], Corollary 6.2.
The previously dened notions of lower decreasing distribution function
and Choquet integral of Denition 3.29 on p. 74, which deals with F -simple
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gambles only, are compatible with Denition 4.72. Indeed, let  be a 2-
monotone set function dened on a eldF , and let f be anF -simple gamble.
For any z 2 R,
G; f (z) = (fx 2 X : f (x) > zg) = (fx 2 X : f (x) > zg);
since fx 2 X : f (x) > zg is in F for any z 2 R,  is the natural extension of 
and  is coherent; see Theorem 4.36 on p. 117. This is establishes equivalence
of the two denitions, for F -simple gambles.
Let's now proceed with the main result of this section, which is due to
Walley [85]: the Choquet integral with respect to a 2-monotone set function
 is equal to the natural extension of . Below, we give more direct proofin
contradistinction to Walley, we do not rely on duality results (i.e., results of
Section 4.4).
Theorem 4.76. Let F be a eld on X and let  be a 2-monotone set function on F .
For any gamble f on X it holds that
E( f ) = C
Z
f d = inf f + R
Z sup f
inf f
G; f (z) dz:
Proof. Let f be a }(X)-simple gamble on X. We can write the gamble f as
b0 +
Pn
i=1 biIBi with b0 in R, b1, . . . , bn in R and strictly positive, and X % B1 %
B2 %    % Bn % ;. It follows easily from Denition 4.72, Theorem 4.36 and
Proposition 4.8 that G; f = G; f , since () = . Therefore, also C
R
f d =
C
R
f d. Hence,
C
Z
f d = C
Z
f d = b0 +
nX
i=1
bi(Bi);
where the last equality was established in Eq. (3.12) on p. 75. From the
coherence of E and Theorem 4.36, it follows that
E
0BBBBB@b0 +
nX
i=1
biIBi
1CCCCCA  b0 +
nX
i=1
biE(IBi ) = b0 +
nX
i=1
bi(Bi);
hence,
E( f )  C
Z
f d:
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It was established in Lemma 3.30 that C
R
d is a coherent lower previ-
sion on the set of }(X)-simple gambles. Obviously, C
R
d is a behavioural
extension of . Hence, by the denition of natural extension as the point-wise
smallest behavioural extension,
C
Z
f d = C
Z
f d  E ( f ) = E( f );
where we again applied Theorem 4.36 and Proposition 4.8.
We conclude that C
R
d = E on the set of }(X)-simple gambles. But,
with respect to the topology of uniform convergence onL(X), this set is dense
in L(X), so if we can show that both lower previsions E and C
R
d are
continuous on L(X), then C
R
d = E on the set of all gambles on X, and
the theorem is established.
Indeed, E is coherent, so it is continuous with respect to the topology of
uniform convergence by Theorem 3.5(xiii) on p. 55. Also, for any  > 0 and
any gambles f and g on X, if supj f   gj < , then
C
Z
f d = inf f + R
Z sup f
inf f
(fx 2 X : f (x) > zg) dz
and since fx 2 X : f (x) > zg  fx 2 X : g(x) +  > zg, and inf f  inf g + ,
 inf g +  + R
Z sup f
inf f
(fx 2 X : g(x) +  > zg) dz
= inf g +  + R
Z sup f 
inf f 
(fx 2 X : g(x) > zg) dz
but, (fx 2 X : g(x) > zg) = G;g(z), and invoking Proposition 4.65 on p. 167,
= inf g +  + R
Z sup g
inf g
G;g(z) dz
+ R
Z inf g
inf f 
G;g(z) dz   R
Z sup g
sup f 
G;g(z) dz
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and since 0  G;g(z)  1, it follows that R
R inf g
inf f  G;g(z) dz  inf g inf f+ 
supj f   gj +  < 2, and  R
R sup g
sup f  G;g(z) dz  0, so
< 3 + C
Z
g d:
Reversing the roles of f and g, we nd that also C
R
g d < 3 + C
R
f d.
Concluding, if supj f   gj < , then it must hold that
C
Z
f d   C
Z
g d
 < 3;
so C
R
d is uniformly continuous with respect to the topology of uniform
convergence on L(X). (Note: now we have proved that C
R
d is coher-
ent, the bound 3 in the above equation can actually be improved to ; see
Theorem 3.5(xiii) on p. 55.) 
We can now also prove the following quite remarkable result. The only
if part of the proof is due to Hugo Janssen (personal communication). Recall
the denition of 2-monotone lower previsions: see Denition 3.32 on p. 76.
Proposition 4.77. A coherent lower prevision, dened on the setL(X) of all gambles
on X, is 2-monotone, if and only if there is a eld F on X such that the set function
, dened by (A) := P(IA) for all A in F , is 2-monotone, and
P( f ) = EP ( f ) = C
Z
f d;
for all gambles f on X.
Proof. if. It suces to show that
C
Z
f _ g d + C
Z
f ^ g d  C
Z
f d + C
Z
g d
for all gambles f and g on X. This is a well-known result; see for instance
Denneberg [28, p. 162, ll. 13, and Exercise 13.1, p. 170].
only if. Dene F := }(X) and (A) := P(IA) for all A  X. The natural
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extension of P is given by
E( f ) = sup
8>><>>:
nX
i=1
iP(IAi ) : n 2N; i  0;Ai  X;
nX
i=1
iIAi  f
9>>=>>; :
It is easy to see that E  P. Indeed, by denition, E is the smallest coherent
extension of P, and obviously, P is a coherent extension of P, so it should
hold that E  P.
If we can now show that, for any }(X)-simple gamble f = Pmj=1  jIB j , there
is a particular choice of  j's and B j's such that
Pm
j=1  jP(IB j )  P( f ), then we
have proved that E( f )  P( f ), and hence, E( f ) = P( f ), for all }(X)-simple
gambles f .
Indeed, assuming that f is }(X)-simple, it may be written as 1IB1 +Pm
j=2  jIB j with 1 2 R, B1 = X,  j  0 for j > 1, and B j % B j+1 for 1 < j < m.
From the coherence and the 2-monotonicity of P, it follows that
P( f ) = 1   2 + P
0BBBBBB@
mX
j=2
 jB j
1CCCCCCA + P(2)
 1   2 + P
0BBBBBB@min
8>>><>>>:2;
mX
j=2
 jB j
9>>>=>>>;
1CCCCCCA + P
0BBBBBB@max
8>>><>>>:2;
mX
j=2
 jB j
9>>>=>>>;
1CCCCCCA
= 1   2 + P  2B2 + P
0BBBBBB@2 +
mX
j=3
3B j
1CCCCCCA
= 1 + 2P (B2) + P
0BBBBBB@
mX
j=3
3B j
1CCCCCCA
= 1   3 + 2P (B2) + P
0BBBBBB@
mX
j=3
3B j
1CCCCCCA + P(3)
 1   3 + 2P (B2) + P
0BBBBBB@min
8>>><>>>:3;
mX
j=3
 jB j
9>>>=>>>;
1CCCCCCA + P
0BBBBBB@max
8>>><>>>:3;
mX
j=3
 jB j
9>>>=>>>;
1CCCCCCA
= 1   3 + 2P (B2) + P  3B3 + P
0BBBBBB@3 +
mX
j=4
 jB j
1CCCCCCA
= 1 + 2P (B2) + 3P (B3) + P
0BBBBBB@
mX
j=4
 jB j
1CCCCCCA
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 : : :
 1 +
mX
j=2
 jP

B j

:
This ends the proof for }(X)-simple gambles.
Now, for any gamble f on X, there is a sequence of simple gambles fn
converging uniformly to f such that f  fn for all n 2 N. Hence, it holds
that E( f )  E( fn) = P( fn) for every n 2 N. Since, by the coherence of
P, P( fn) converges to P( f ), and  is preserved in the limit, we nd that
E( f )  P( f ). 
So, any coherent lower prevision that is 2-monotone on L(X) is repres-
entable by a Choquet integral. Kra¨tschmer [53, Proposition 4.3, p. 477, and
Theorem 4.4(3), p. 478] has given necessary and sucient conditions for a
coherent lower prevision to be representable by a Choquet integral, with only
very few restrictions on the domain of the lower prevision, based on Greco's
representation theorem; he assumes that P is Stonean (whereas we assumed
2-monotonicity), which is in case of a coherent lower prevision P on L(X)
equivalent to P( f _ a) + P( f ^ a) = P( f ) + a for all gambles f (this is a weak
version of co-monotone additivity).
4.3.11 Natural Extension of Nested Set Functions
Theorem 4.78. Let  and  be nested set functions. For any gamble f on X, it holds
that
EP ( f ) = inf f + R
Z sup f
inf f
supf(A) : A 2 dom ; A  fx 2 X : f (x) > zggdz;
EP ( f ) = sup f   R
Z sup f
inf f
inff(A) : A 2 dom; A  fx 2 X : f (x)  zggdz:
Proof. The rst equality follows from Theorem 4.36(i)&(ii) on p. 117, The-
orem 3.46 on p. 85, Corollary 4.9 on p. 98, and Theorem 4.76. The second
equality follows then from Proposition 4.10 on p. 99: if  denotes the dual of
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, then
EP ( f ) = EP( f )
= inf f + R
Z sup f
inf f
supf(A) : A 2 dom ; A  fx 2 X : f (x) > zggdz
= inf f + R
Z sup f
inf f
supf1   ({A) : A 2 dom ; A  fx 2 X : f (x) > zggdz
= sup f   R
Z sup f
inf f
inff(A) : A 2 dom; A  fx 2 X : f (x)  zggdz

4.3.12 Natural Extension of Belief Functions
We already constructed the natural extension of a belief function in The-
orem 3.44 on p. 84; the proof of this claim is immediate from Theorem 4.76.
4.3.13 Natural Extension of Necessity and Possibility Meas-
ures
The equations below are alternative expressions for natural extension of
necessity and possibility measures given by De Cooman and Aeyels [21],
Eq. (1)&(2) for arbitrary gambles (i.e., not necessarilyF -measurable gambles).
Theorem 4.79. Let N be a necessity measure with necessity distribution , and let
 be a possibility measure with possibility distribution . For any gamble f on X,
it holds that
EPN ( f ) = inf f + R
Z sup f
inf f
inf
x2X
f (x)z
(x) dz;
EP( f ) = sup f   R
Z sup f
inf f
sup
x2X
f (x)z
(x) dz:
Proof. To prove the rst equality, use Theorem 4.36(vi) on p. 117, Theorem 3.46
on p. 85, Corollary 4.9 on p. 98, and Theorem 4.76indeed,
GN; f (z) = N(fx 2 X : f (x) > zg) = infx2X
f (x)z
(x):
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The second equality follows then from Proposition 4.10 on p. 99. 
4.4 Duality
4.4.1 Avoiding Sure Loss, Coherence, and Natural Extension:
An Alternative Characterisation
There is a nice connection between lower previsions and compact convex
sets of linear previsions.
Denition 4.80. We can dene a map from lower previsions to sets of linear
previsions. LetK  L(X), and assume thatK is negation invariant: K =  K .
With any lower prevision P such that dom P  K , we can associate the set of
all linear behavioural extensions of P with domain K
MKP =
n
Q : Q 2 PK (X); (8 f 2 dom P)

Q( f )  P( f )
o
: (4.49)
The set ML(X)P is denoted by MP.
Conversely, we can dene a map from sets of linear previsions to lower
previsions. With any setM of linear previsions whose domain includes K ,
we can associate a lower prevision EKM onK , dened by
EKM( f ) := inffQ( f ) : Q 2 Mg: (4.50)
for any f 2 K .
The following theorem is a generalisation of a result by Walley [86, Sec-
tions 3.3.3&3.4.1, pp. 134136].
Theorem 4.81. Let P be any lower prevision, let K be a negation invariant subset
of L(X), and assume that dom P  K . Then the following propositions hold.
(i) P avoids sure loss if and only if
MKP , ;: (4.51)
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(ii) If P avoids sure loss, then its natural extension EP satises
EP( f ) = min
n
EQ( f ) : Q 2MKP
o
for any gamble f on X; hence, (4.52)
= min
n
Q( f ) : Q 2MKP
o
for any f 2 K : (4.53)
(iii) P is coherent if and only if
P( f ) = min
n
Q( f ) : Q 2MKP
o
(4.54)
for any f 2 dom P.
Proof. See Walley [86, Sections 3.3.3&3.4.1, pp. 134136] for the case in which
K = L(X). The general case is then straightforward. Let's prove Eq. (4.52).
Let f 2 L(X). Any Q 2 MKP is a coherent (even linear) behavioural
extension of P. So, by Proposition 4.7 on p. 98, for any Q 2 MKP , EQ is a
coherent behavioural extension of EP, and hence,
EP( f )  inf
n
EQ( f ) : Q 2MKP
o
:
If we now can show that there is a linear prevision Q 2 MKP such that
EP( f )  EQ( f ), then Eq. (4.52) is established. By Walley [86, Section 3.4.1,
p. 136], we know that
EP( f ) = min
n
R( f ) : R 2MP
o
;
or equivalently, there is a linear prevision S in MP such that EP( f ) = S( f ).
Dene Q as the restriction of S to K : Q := SjK . Then, again by Walley [86,
Section 3.4.1, p. 136],
EQ( f ) = min
n
R( f ) : R 2MQ
o
 S( f ) = EP( f );
since S 2MQ.
The remainder of the proof is easy. 
The two mappings given in Denition 4.80 constitute isomorphisms
between particular sets of sets of linear previsions and lower previsions.
To characterise these isomorphisms, we endow the setPK (X) of linear previ-
sions dened on a common domain K  L(X) with the topology of point-wise
186 INFERENCE
convergence on members of K , or simply, the topology of point-wise convergence:
Q ! Q if and only if Q( f )! Q( f ) for all f in K (with respect to the usual
topology on R).
If K is a linear space, and if we view PK (X) as a subset of the setVK (X)
of all continuous linear real-valued maps on K (where K is endowed with
the topology of uniform convergence), i.e., the topological dual of K , then
the topology of point-wise convergence is nothing but the so-called weak-
* topology. The weak-* topology is well-studied in the literature: it turns
VK (X) into a locally convex topological vector space (see Schechter [70,
28.15(a), p. 760]) that is Hausdor (see Schechter [70, 28.15(b), p. 760]) and
paracompact (see Kelley [49, Problem N(c), p. 242]). In particular, the weak-*
topology is normal (see Kelley [49, Chapter 5, Corollary 32, p. 159]): this
turns out to be crucial in linking the weak-* topology on VK (X) with the
topology of point-wise convergence on PK (X).
For an arbitrary negation invariant set K of gambles, and a gamble f in
K , the real-valued map f  dened by
f (Q) := Q( f )
for any linear prevision Q inPK (X) is called evaluation map onPK (X) induced
by f . The set of all evaluation maps on PK (X) induced by gambles in K is
denoted by
K  := f f  : f 2 Kg:
Note that the topology of point-wise convergence is the weakest topology
under which all elements of K  are continuous: it is the topology induced by
K .
We rst link the topology on PK (X) of point-wise convergence on mem-
bers of K , the weak-* topology on the topological dual of Vspan(K )(X), and
the subset Pspan(K )(X) ofVspan(K )(X), in the lemma below.
Lemma 4.82. Let K  L(X), and assume that K is negation invariant. Endow
PK (X) with the topology of point-wise convergence, and endow Vspan(K )(X) with
the weak-* topology. Consider Espan(K ) as a mapping from PK (X) to Vspan(K )(X).
The following statements hold.
(i) Espan(K ) is one-to-one, and maps PK (X) onto Pspan(K )(X).
(ii) Espan(K ) establishes an embedding of PK (X) intoVspan(K )(X).
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(iii) Pspan(K )(X) is a compact subset ofVspan(K )(X), and hence,PK (X) is a compact
space.
Proof. To simplify our notation, we shall denote Espan(K )P by P0.
(i). By Proposition 4.13 on p. 100 and Proposition 4.18(v) on p. 102, every
linear prevision P on K has a unique linear extension P0 to span(K ), which
satises
P0
0BBBBB@
nX
i=1
i fi
1CCCCCA =
nX
i=1
iP( fi);
for all n 2 N, non-negative real numbers 1, . . . , n, and gambles f1, . . . ,
fn in K ; this equality simply follows from the self-conjugacy and the coher-
ence of P (Theorem 3.5(v)&(vi) on p. 55). This establishes a one-to-one and
onto mapping between PK (X) and Pspan(K )(X)one-to-one because of the
uniqueness of the linear extension, and onto because any linear prevision R
on span(K ) is uniquely determined by its values on K , i.e., R = Q0 for some
linear prevision Q onK .
(ii). First, note that the relative topology on Pspan(K )(X), as a subset
of Vspan(K )(X) equipped with the weak-* topology, is exactly the topology
of point-wise convergence on members of span(K ). So we must prove
that Espan(K ) establishes a homeomorphism between PK (X) equipped with
the topology of point-wise convergence on members of K , and its image
Pspan(K )(X) equipped with the topology of point-wise convergence on mem-
bers of span(K ): let Q denote a net in PK (X), let Q denote an element of
PK (X), and let Q0 and Q0 denote the unique linear extensions of Q and
Q to span(K ); does it hold that Q( f ) ! Q( f ) for all f 2 K if and only if
Q0(g)! Q0(g) for all g 2 span(K )?
Clearly, if Q0(g) ! Q0(g) for all gambles g 2 span(K ), then also Q( f ) =
Q0( f )! Q0( f ) = Q( f ) for all f 2 K .
Conversely, if Q( f )! Q( f ) for all f 2 K , then
Q0
0BBBBB@
nX
i=1
i fi
1CCCCCA =
nX
i=1
iQ( fi)!
nX
i=1
iQ( fi) = Q0
0BBBBB@
nX
i=1
i fi
1CCCCCA
for all n 2 N, non-negative real numbers 1, . . . , n, and gambles f1, . . . , fn
inK . So, Q0(g)! Q0(g) for all g 2 span(K ).
(iii). (Method of proof due to Walley [86, Section 3.6, pp. 145146]) Clearly,
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by Theorem 3.7 on p. 56, it follows that
Pspan(K )(X) =
\
f2span(K )
[ f ] 1([inf f ;+1));
where f  is the evaluation map onVspan(K )(X) induced by f . So, Pspan(K )(X)
is a closed subset ofVspan(K )(X). Also, for any  > 0, if supj f   gj <  for two
gambles f and g in span(K ), then for any P in Pspan(K )(X) it holds that
P( f )   P(g) < ;
by the coherence of P (Theorem 3.5 on p. 55). So, Pspan(K )(X) is also equicon-
tinuous. Compactness of Pspan(K )(X) is now immediate from the Banach-
Alaoglu-Bourbaki theorem; see for instance Schechter [70, 28.29(UF26)].
Compactness of Pspan(K )(X) now simply follows from (i) and (ii): since
Pspan(K )(X) is a compact subset ofVspan(K )(X), it follows that the topological
spacePspan(K )(X), equipped with the relative topology, is compact; the inverse
of Espan(K ) is continuous on this compact space, and maps Pspan(K )(X) onto
PK (X). But, the continuous image of a compact set is compact, whencePK (X)
is compact too. 
Surprisingly, span(K ) characterises all continuous real-valued mappings
on PK (X):
Corollary 4.83. Let K  L(X), and assume that K is negation invariant. A real-
valued mapping on PK (X) is continuous with respect to the topology of point-wise
convergence on members ofK if and only if it belongs to span(K ).
Proof. Let be a real-valued mapping onPK (X). Obviously, if 2 span(K ),
then  is continuous, since if Q ! Q, then
(Q) =
nX
i=1
i f i (Q) =
nX
i=1
iQ( fi)!
nX
i=1
iQ( fi) =
nX
i=1
i f i (Q) = (Q):
Conversely, assume that is continuous onPK (X). Dene the real-valued
mapping 0 on Pspan(K )(X) by
0(Q0) :=  
h
Espan(K )
i 1
(Q0) = (Q);
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for every Q 2 PK (X); where Q0 is the unique linear extension of Q. By
Lemma 4.82,Pspan(K )(X) is a weak-* compact, and hence, a weak-* closed sub-
set ofVspan(K )(X). Moreover, the weak-* topology is paracompact (see Kelley
[49, Problem N(c), p. 242]), and hence, normal (see Kelley [49, Chapter 5,
Corollary 32, p. 159]). Therefore, by Tietze's extension theorem (see Kelley
[49, Problem O(a), p. 242] or Willard [91, p. 103]), we can continuously extend
0 toVspan(K )(X).
It is well-known that0 is continuous with respect to the weak-* topology
if and only if it is an evaluation map onVspan(K )(X); see for instance Schechter
[70, 28.15(c)]. Therefore, there is a gamble f 2 span(K ) such that 0(Q0) =
Q0( f ) for all Q0 inPspan(K )(X), sincePspan(K )(X)  Vspan(K )(X); see for instance
Kelley [49, Problem W(c), p. 108], or Schechter [70, 28.15(c)]. Consequently,
there are n 2 N, real numbers 1, . . . , n, and gambles f1, . . . , fn in K , such
that for every Q inPK (X) (recall thatPK (X) is homeomorphic toPspan(K )(X)):
(Q) = 0(Q0) = Q0
0BBBBB@
nX
i=1
i fi
1CCCCCA
where the right hand side can also be written as
=
nX
i=1
iQ( fi) =
nX
i=1
i f i (Q):
So,  2 span(K ). 
We are now ready to prove our isomorphism. It is convenient to rst
introduce the following denition.
Denition 4.84. Let K  L(X), and assume that K is negation invariant. A
compact (with respect to the topology of point-wise convergence) convex set
M of linear previsions on K is called decomposable if, for every 1, . . . , n in
R, f1, . . . , fn inK , and  > 0, there are  in R, n inN, non-negative 1, . . . ,
n in R, and gambles f 1 , . . . , f

n in K , such that  +
Pn
i=1 

i f

i 
Pn
i=1 i fi
and
min
Q2M
nX
i=1
iQ( fi)   +  +
nX
i=1
i minQi2M
Qi( f i )
IfK is a linear space, then every compact convex setMof linear previsions
on K is decomposable: we can always choose  = 0, n = 1, 1 = 1, and
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f 1 =
Pn
i=1 i fi. It then follows from the linearity of Q inM that
Pn
i=1 iQ( fi) =
Q( f 1 ).
In general, if K is not a linear space, then not every compact convex set
of linear previsions on K is decomposable. For instance, let X = f1; 2; 3g,
f = If1g, and g = If2g, and dene the linear previsions Q and R on f f ;  f ; g; gg
as
Q( f ) =  Q(  f ) = 0:1; R( f ) =  R(  f ) = 0:2;
Q(g) =  Q( g) = 0:1; R(g) =  R( g) = 0:2;
and dene the compact and convex set
M := fQ + (1   )R :  2 [0; 1]g ;
ThenM is not decomposable: indeed, it's not hard to see that MK
EKM
,M:
MKEKM
=
n
S 2 PK (X) : Q( f ) ^ R( f )  S( f )  Q( f ) _ R( f ) and
Q(g) ^ R(g)  S(g)  Q(g) _ R(g)
o
;
for instance, S( f ) =  S(  f ) = Q( f ) ^ R( f ) = 0:1 and S(g) =  S( g) = Q(g) _
R(g) = 0:2 is a linear prevision that belongs to MK
EKM
but not to M. As the
theorem below tells us, it follows thatM is not decomposable.
Theorem 4.85. Let K  L(X), and assume that K is negation invariant. Then
EK and MK establish onto and one-to-one maps between non-empty compact (with
respect to the topology of point-wise convergence) convex decomposable sets of linear
previsions onK and coherent lower previsions onK .
Proof. Walley [86, Section 3.6.1, pp. 145146] proved the case in which K =
L(X). The general case is straightforward, once the condition of decompos-
ability is recognised; let's complete the details.
LetM be a non-empty compact convex decomposable set of linear previ-
sions onK , and let P be a coherent lower prevision onK : it suces to show
that EKM is a coherent lower prevision on K , that MKP is a compact convex
decomposable set of linear previsions onK , and that
MKEKM
=M and EKMKP = P:
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Indeed, EKM() = inffQ() : Q 2 Mg is a coherent lower prevision on K by
Lemma 3.11 on p. 57: it is the lower envelope of coherent previsions.
Clearly, MKP is convex: for any Q and R in M
K
P and any  2 [0; 1], it holds
that S := Q+ (1 )R is a linear prevision onK (Lemma 3.10(iii)), and since
Q + (1   )R  P + (1   )P = P, it follows that S is a linear behavioural
extension of P toK , so S belongs to MKP .
To show that MKP is compact with respect to the topology of point-wise
convergence, it suces by Lemma 4.82 to prove that Mspan(K )P is weak-*
compact. Equivalently, we must show that every real-valued continuous
map on Mspan(K )P achieves a minimum and a maximum; see Schechter [70,
17.26(B)&17.30(c)] (and recall that Mspan(K )P is paracompact). Let  be a real-
valued continuous map on Mspan(K )P . By Corollary 4.83, there is a gamble
f 2 span(K ) such that that  = f . But by Theorem 4.81(iii), f  achieves a
minimum and a maximum, namely Espan(K )P ( f ) and E
span(K )
P ( f ), on M
span(K )
P .
Hence, Mspan(K )P is weak-* compact, or equivalently, M
K
P is compact with
respect to the topology of point-wise convergence.
Also, MKP is decomposable: let 1, . . . , n inR, and f1, . . . , fn inK . Apply
Theorem 4.81(ii) and Lemma 4.82(i) to see that
EP
0BBBBB@
nX
i=1
i fi
1CCCCCA = min
8>><>>:Q0
0BBBBB@
nX
i=1
i fi
1CCCCCA : Q0 2Mspan(K )P
9>>=>>;
= min
8>><>>:
nX
i=1
iQ( fi) : Q 2MKP
9>>=>>; :
Now apply the expression for natural extension, Eq. (4.1) on p. 96, and use
the fact that P( f ) = EP( f ) for any f 2 dom P (which holds since P is coherent):
for every  > 0, there are  in R, n inN, non-negative 1, . . . , 

n in R, and
gambles f 1 , . . . , f

n inK , such that  +
Pn
i=1 

i f

i 
Pn
i=1 i fi and
EP
0BBBBB@
nX
i=1
i fi
1CCCCCA   +  +
nX
i=1
i EP( f

i ):
This establishes the decomposability of MKP .
To see that MK
EKM
 M, observe that any linear prevision inM is a behavi-
oural extension of EKM.
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Conversely, to establish that MK
EKM
 M, we show that if Q 2 PK (X) but
Q <M, then Q is not a behavioural extension of EKM. Assume that Q <M.
Denote by Q0 the linear extension of Q to span(K ), and byM0 the set of
linear extensions of elements ofM to span(K ): clearly,M0 is weak-* compact,
and Q0 <M0, by Lemma 4.82. So, fQ0g andM0 are disjoint non-empty weak-
* compact convex subsets of the set Vspan(K )(X) of continuous real-valued
linear maps on span(K ), if we endow span(K ) with the topology of uniform
convergence; note that Pspan(K )(X) is a weak-* compact subset ofVspan(K )(X).
Hence, by the Hahn-Banach theorem (see Schechter [70, 28.4(HB19)]) there
is a weak-* continuous linear functional  dened on Vspan(K )(X) such that
(Q0) < minf(R0) : R0 2 M0g. Since  is weak-* continuous, it must be an
evaluation map on Vspan(K )(X) (see Schechter [70, 28.15(c)]), i.e., there are
n 2N, real numbers 1, . . . , n, and gambles f1, . . . , fn inK , such that
nX
i=1
iQ( fi) = Q0
0BBBBB@
nX
i=1
i fi
1CCCCCA
< min
8>><>>:R0
0BBBBB@
nX
i=1
i fi
1CCCCCA : R0 2 M0
9>>=>>; = min
8>><>>:
nX
i=1
iR( fi) : R 2 M
9>>=>>; :
By the decomposability of M, for any  > 0, there are 0 in R, m in N,
non-negative 1, . . . , 

m in R, and g1, . . . , g

m inK such that
0 +
mX
j=1
j Q(g

j ) 
nX
i=1
iQ( fi)
< min
8>><>>:
nX
i=1
iR( fi) : R 2 M
9>>=>>;   + 0 +
mX
j=1
j min
n
R(gj ) : R 2 M
o
:
Choosing for instance  := 12
min Pni=1 iR( fi) : R 2 M	  Pni=1 iQ( fi) > 0,2
0 +
mX
j=1
j Q(g

j ) < 

0 +
mX
j=1
j min
n
R(gj ) : R 2 M
o
:
2Hint: if a  b < c  d, then 0 < 12 [c   b] < c   b  d   a. . . so a < d   12 [c   b]. . .
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This strict inequality can only hold if there is some j 2 f1; : : : ;mg such that
Q(gj ) < min
n
R(gj ) : R 2 M
o
= EKM(g

j ):
Thus, Q is not a behavioural extension of EKM. 
In other words, the set of non-empty compact convex decomposable sets
of linear previsions on K equipped with EK is isomorphic to the set of
coherent lower previsions onK equipped with the identity map.
4.4.2 Consequences of Duality
If the domain K consists of a set of measurable gambles with respect to a
eld, we can invoke the isomorphism established in Theorem 4.30 on p. 114.
Note that we endow the set of probability charges on F with the topology
of point-wise convergence: it is immediate that this space is homeomorphic
to the set of linear previsions on IF [  IF endowed with the topology of
point-wise convergence; the homeomorphism is simply P.
In the corollary below, we view ELF (X) as a mapping from sets of probab-
ility charges on a eld F to sets of linear previsions on LF (X):
ELF (X)m :=
n
ELF (X) :  2 m
o
;
where m is an arbitrary set of probability charges on F . Similarly, we view
F as a mapping from sets of linear previsions onLF (X) to sets of probability
charges on F :
FM :=
n
FQ : Q 2 M
o
;
whereM is an arbitrary set of linear previsions on LF (X).
Corollary 4.86. Let F be a eld on X. Then ELF (X)  ELF (X) and F MLF (X)
establish one-to-one and onto maps between non-empty compact convex sets of
probability charges on F and coherent lower previsions on LF (X).
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 4.30 on p. 114 and Theorem 4.85 on p. 190.
Note that, because LF (X) is a linear space, decomposability of ELF (X)m , where
m is an arbitrary non-empty compact convex set of probability charges on F ,
is immediate. 
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Corollary 4.86 induces another characterisation of natural extension, for
instance through the lower S-integral. If F is a eld such that dom P consists
of F -measurable gambles only, let's denote by mFP the set of charges on F ,
whose linear extensions to LF (X) are behavioural extensions of P:
mFP := 
F
 MLF (X)P = FMLF (X)P
; (4.55)
The following proposition provides equivalent expressions for mFP .
Proposition 4.87. Let P be any lower prevision, let F be a eld on X and assume
that dom P  LF (X). Then
mFP =
(
 2 P(F ) : 8 f 2 dom P; P( f )  S
Z
f d
)
and if additionally P avoids sure loss and EP is 2-monotone,
=
(
 2 P(F ) : 8A 2 F ; EP(IA)  (A)
)
:
Proof. The rst equality is a consequence of Eq. (4.55) and Theorem 4.43, by
which the natural extension E of  coincides with the lower S-integral with
respect to . To prove the second equality, we show that P( f )  S
R
f d for
all f in dom P if and only if EP(IA)  (A) for all A in F .
Indeed, if P( f )  S
R
f d for all f , then S
R
d is a behavioural extension
of P, and so by Proposition 4.7 on p. 98, it follows that also EP must be a
behavioural extension of the natural extension of S
R
d, which is equal
to S
R
d. So EP(g)  S
R
g d for all gambles g, and in particular, for all
indicator gambles IA, A 2 F .
Conversely, suppose that P avoids sure loss, EP is 2-monotone, and
EP(IA)  (A) for all A in F , and let f 2 dom P. Since f is F -measurable,
there is a sequence fn of F -simple gambles converging uniformly to f (see
Denition 4.25 on p. 109). Without loss of generality, we may write the fn as
b0;n +
Pmn
j=1 b j;nIA j;n , with b0;n, b1;n, . . . , bmn;n in R, b1;n, . . . , bmn;n non-negative,
and A1;n, . . . , Amn;n inF . By the coherence and 2-monotonicity of EP it follows
that
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EP( fn) = EP
0BBBBBB@b0;n +
mnX
j=1
b j;nIA j;n
1CCCCCCA
= b0;n +
mnX
j=1
b j;nEP

IA j;n

 b0;n +
mnX
j=1
b j;n

IA j;n

= S
Z
fn d;
using Proposition 4.77 on p. 180 and Eq. (3.12) on p. 75. Since fn converges
uniformly to f , and EP and S
R
d are continuous with respect to the topo-
logy of uniform convergence, it follows that also
P( f )  EP( f ) = limn!+1EP( fn)  limn!+1 S
Z
fn d = S
Z
f d;
which establishes the desired inequality. 
Corollary 4.88. Let P be any lower prevision, let F be a eld onX and assume that
dom P  LF (X). Then the following propositions hold.
(i) P avoids sure loss if and only if there is a probability charge  on F such that
P( f )  S
Z
f d for all f 2 dom P:
(ii) If P avoids sure loss, then
EP( f ) = min
(
S
Z
f d :  2 mFP
)
for any gamble f on X; hence,
= min
(
S
Z
f d :  2 mFP
)
for any F -measurable gamble f :
(iii) P is coherent if and only if
P( f ) = min
(
S
Z
f d :  2 mFP
)
for all f 2 dom P:
For ample elds, we actually do not have to use the lower S-integral, the
S-integral is sucient. This generalises a result by Aeyels and De Cooman
[21, Section 3, p. 182] in connection with the natural extension of possibility
measures.
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Corollary 4.89. Let P be any lower prevision that avoids sure loss, let F be an
ample eld on X, and assume that all gambles in dom P are constant on the atoms
of F . If P avoids sure loss, then
EP( f ) = min
(
S
Z
[ f ]#F d :  2 mFP
)
for any gamble f on X, where the gamble [ f ]#F is dened as
[ f ]#F (x) := P[x]F ( f ) = infy2[x]F
f (y)
for any x in X.
Proof. By Proposition 4.27, dom P  LF (X), and hence, Corollary 4.88 ap-
plies. Now, use Theorem 4.44. 
4.4.3 A Dual Characterisation of 2-Monotonicity
The following is a straightforward generalisation of a result by Walley [85].
Corollary 4.90. A set function  dened on a eld F is 2-monotone if and only if
for any two sets A and B in F such that A  B, there is a probability charge  on F
such that (A) = (A), (B) = (B) and (C)  (C) for all C 2 F .
Proof. See Walley [85, Corollary 6.4] in case F = }(X). For the sake of
completeness, let's give the proof for the general case.
if. Let D and E be sets in F . Then, identifying D \ E with A and D [ E
with B, we nd that there is a probability charge  such that
(D [ E) + (D \ E) = (D [ E) + (D \ E) = (D) + (E)  (D) + (E):
So  is 2-monotone.
only if. Let A and B be sets in F , and assume that A  B. By The-
orem 3.31 on p. 76 we know that P is coherent. By Corollary 4.88, there
is a probability charge on F such that (C)  (C) for all C 2 F , and
E(IA + IB) = E(IA + IB). But, by Theorem 4.76 and Eq. (3.12), it follows that
E(IA+ IB) = (A)+(B). Also, E(IA+ IB) = (A)+(B). Since (A)  (A) and
(B)  (B), the equality (A)+(B) = (A)+(B) can only hold if (A) = (A)
and (B) = (B). 
Chapter 5
Cauchy Extension of Lower
Previsions
As we discussed in Chapter 4, any lower prevision on X that avoids sure loss
can be extended to a coherent lower prevision on the set of all gambles on X,
i.e., to the set of all bounded real-valued random variables that are a function
of X. In this chapter, we further extend a lower prevision, to a set containing
also unbounded real-valued random variables. We draw inspiration from
the Dunford integral (see Section 4.3.8 on p. 161), which is dened not only
for gambles, but also for unbounded real-valued random variables satisfying
the conditions of Denition 4.60.
5.1 Random Quantities and Extended Lower Pre-
visions
A random quantity f on a random variable X is a real-valued gain, expressed
in a xed linear utility scale, that is a function of X; it is an XR-mapping,
interpreted as an uncertain gain: if x turns out to be the realisation of X,
then we receive an amount f (x) of utility. Considering random quantities on
dierent random variables, we may write f (X) in order to emphasise that f
is a random quantity on X.
The set of all random quantities on X is denoted by R(X). The setL(X) of
gambles on X is a subset ofR(X), and alsoR(X) is a linear latticean ordered
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linear space such that every two vectors have a supremum and an inmum
with respect to the point-wise addition, the point-wise scalar multiplication
and the point-wise ordering; the operations, f + g,  f , f  g, f _ g, and
f ^ g, for random quantities f and g and real numbers , can be generalised
from L(X)dened in Section 3.3.1to R(X) by verbatim translation. The
denitions of sup f and inf f generalise as follows:
sup f := minfa 2 R : a  f g; and
inf f := maxfa 2 R : a  f g;
where R is the set of extended real numbers, that is, R [ f 1;+1g.
The extended lower prevision P( f ) of a random quantity f is dened as the
supremum buying price for f ; P( f ) is the highest extended real number s 2 R
such that for any real price t 2 R that is strictly lower than s, we are willing
to pay t prior to observation of X, if we are guaranteed to receive f (x) when
observing X = x. Mathematically, we dene an extended lower prevision on
X as a real-valued mapping dened on some subset dom P, the domain of P,
of the set R(X) of random quantities. Indeed, we do not require an extended
lower prevision to be dened on the set of all random quantities. Troaes
and De Cooman [79, Proposition 3(iii)] have shown that, by generalising
the notions of avoiding sure loss and coherence in a straightforward way,
any extended lower prevision that avoids sure loss has a least committal
coherent behavioural extension to the set of all random quantities; we shall
briey summarise these results below in Section 5.2.
Extended lower previsions dier from lower previsions, dened in Sec-
tion 3.3.1, in two ways: they are dened on a larger setthe set of random
quantitiesand they take values in a larger setthe set of extended real
numbers. If P( f ) =  1, then this means that we are not willing to buy f
at any price t 2 R; this can be reasonable if f is unbounded from below. If
P( f ) = +1, then this means that we are willing to buy f at any price; whether
this is reasonable or not is arguable, but, for instance, the Saint Petersburg
paradox, introduced by Jakob Bernoulli [7], provides an instance of a random
quantity, unbounded from above, that is possibly worth to be bought at any
pricealthough this does not go without any controversy.
Similar to gambles, we can also interpret random quantities f as an un-
certain loss: if x turns out to be the true value of X, we lose an amount f (x)
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of linear utility. The extended upper prevision P( f ) of the gamble f is then the
inmum selling price for f ; it is the lowest extended real number s, such that
for any real price t 2 R strictly larger than s, we are willing to receive t prior
to observation of X, if we are guaranteed to lose f (x) when observing X = x.
Since a gain r is equivalent to a loss r it should hold that P( f ) =  P(  f ): from
any extended lower prevision P we can infer a so-called conjugate extended
upper prevision P on dom P =  dom P which represents the same behavioural
dispositions. We can therefore restrict our attention to the study of extended
lower previsions only, without loss of generality. Also, if we use the notation
P for an extended lower prevision, P always denotes its conjugate.
It may happen that P is self-conjugate, that is, dom P = dom P and P( f ) =
P( f ) for all random quantities f 2 dom P. In such a case, we may simply
write P instead of P or P whenever it is clear from the context whether we are
considering either buying or selling prices (or both). We call a self-conjugate
extended lower prevision P simply an extended prevision, and P( f ) represents
a so-called fair price for the random quantity f : we are willing to buy f for any
price t < P( f ), and we are willing to sell f for any price t > P( f ). Extended
previsions, interpreted as fair prices, were considered by Crisma, Gigante
and Millossovich [13, 12], as an extension of the work of De Finetti [26].
5.2 Inference Revisited
For the sake of completeness, let's briey summarise the main results of
Troaes and De Cooman [79] on avoiding sure loss, coherence, and nat-
ural extension of extended lower previsions, discuss the main problem that
arises, and propose a solution, which is also due to Troaes and De Cooman
[78]. This section consists mainly of an approximately verbatim translation
of results by Walley [86], and observing that, despite all technical diculties,
manybut not allof the results for lower previsions carry over to extended
lower previsions. Perhaps, the reader may wish to skip to Section 5.3 and
refer back to Section 5.2 only when needed; we only rely on it in motivat-
ing the need for a behavioural extension that is dierent from the natural
extension described in Section 5.2.3, and in proving that the Dunford-type
extension described further on, really is a coherent behavioural extensionin
the following we characterise coherence for extended lower previsions: it
turns out that, when extending a lower prevision to a real-valued extended
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lower prevision dened on a linear space, the conditions for coherence are a
verbatim generalisation of Theorem 3.6 on p. 56, however, unfortunately, the
proof of this, at rst sight, simple result, only follows after a rather technical
analysis.
We shall accept the following axioms of rationality governing dispositions
towards buying and selling random quantities; this is a literal generalisation
of the rules described in Section 3.3.3.
Axiom 5.1 (Axioms of Rationality for Random Quantities). For arbitrary
random quantities f and g on X and arbitrary real numbers s and t the
following should hold.
(i) We are disposed to buy f for any price strictly less than inf f (accepting
a sure gain).
(ii) We are disposed not to buy f for any price strictly larger than sup f
(avoiding a sure loss).
(iii) If we are disposed to buy f for s then we should be disposed to buy  f
for s, for any strictly positive  2 R (scale independence).
(iv) If we are disposed to buy f for s and g for t then we should be disposed
to buy f + g for s + t (accepting combined transactions).
(v) If we are disposed to buy f for s and g  f then we should be disposed
to buy g for s (monotonicity).
5.2.1 Avoiding Sure Loss Revisited
Denition 5.2. An extended lower prevision P on X is said to avoid sure loss
if for every n 2 N, non-negative 1, . . . , n in R, and random quantities f1,
. . . , fn in dom P such that
Pn
i=1 iP( fi) is well-dened, we have that
sup
2666664
nX
i=1
i fi
3777775 
nX
i=1
iP( fi): (5.1)
Explanation. Suppose that Eq. (5.1) fails for some n 2 N, non-negative 1,
. . . , n inR, and random quantities f1, . . . , fn in dom P such that
Pn
i=1 iP( fi)
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is well-dened. Then,
 :=
nX
i=1
iP( fi) > sup
2666664
nX
i=1
i fi
3777775 =: :
This can only hold if  ,  1 and  2 R. It implies that we may choose a
 2 R such that  >  >   Pni=1 i fi, which means that if we buy Pni=1 i fi
at a price , we incur a sure loss of at least    . But, by Axiom 5.1, we are
disposed to buy
Pn
i=1 i fi at this price , since  =
Pn
i=1 iP( fi) >  (recall that
 =  1 does not occur). 
Compare with Denition 3.2 on p. 50: contrary to lower previsions, we
cannot restrict the coe¨cients 1, . . . , n to integer values in order to charac-
terise avoiding sure loss of extended lower previsions; roughly said, Deni-
tion 3.2(A)&(B) are not equivalent when generalised to extended lower pre-
visions, so we need to take the strongest condition. Of course, Denition 5.2
generalises Denition 3.2: a lower prevision avoids sure loss according to
Denition 3.2 if and only if it avoids sure loss according to Denition 5.2.
Why does it not suce to consider only integer combinations? LetX = R,
dene the random quantity f by f (x) := x for all x 2 X, and consider the
extended lower prevision P, with domain f f ; p2 f g, dened by P( f ) = 1 and
P( p2 f ) = 2. Since n   mp2 , 0 for every n and m in N not both zero,
we nd that sup
h
n f  mp2 f
i
= +1 for every n and m in N not both zero.
Consequently, the inequality
sup
h
n f  m
p
2 f
i
 n + 2m;
holds for every n and m in N not both zero, and if n and m are both zero,
then the inequality also holds: we constructed an extended lower prevision
P such that
sup
2666664
nX
i=1
fi
3777775 
nX
i=1
P( fi)
for every n 2N, and random quantities f1, . . . , fn in dom P such that
Pn
i=1 P( fi)
is well-dened such that
Pn
i=1 P( fi) is well-dened; but P does not avoid sure
loss: for 1 =
p
2, f1 = f , 2 = 1, and f2 =  
p
2 f , it holds that
sup 1 f1 + 2 f2 = 0 < 1 + 22 = 1P( f1) + 2P( f2):
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5.2.2 Coherence Revisited
Denition 5.3. An extended lower prevision P is called coherent if for every
n 2N, non-negative 0, 1, . . . , n in R, and random quantities f0, f1, . . . , fn
in dom P such that
Pn
i=1 iP( fi)   0P( f0) is well-dened, we have that
sup
2666664
nX
i=1
i fi   0 f0
3777775 
nX
i=1
iP( fi)   0P( f0): (5.2)
Explanation. Suppose that Eq. (5.2) fails for some n 2 N, non-negative 0,
1, . . . , n in R, and random quantities f0, f1, . . . , fn in dom P such thatPn
i=1 iP( fi)   0P( f0) is well-dened. Then,
nX
i=1
iP( fi)   0P( f0) > sup
2666664
nX
i=1
i fi   0 f0
3777775 :
The case 0 = 0 was explained in Section 5.2.1; assume that 0 , 0. Then,
 :=
nX
i=1
i
0
P( fi)   P( f0) > sup
2666664
nX
i=1
i
0
fi   f0
3777775 =: :
This can only hold if  2 R and  ,  1, and therefore P( f0) < +1, and
1 :=
Pn
i=1
i
0
P( fi) is well dened. So, 1    > P( f0) and 1 >  1. Observe
that, by the denition of ,
nX
i=1
i
0
fi     f0: (5.3)
Since  = 1   P( f0) is well dened and  ,  1, it suces to consider the
following cases, since we know that P( f0) < +1:
(a) P( f0) 2 R. We are disposed to buy the right hand side of Eq. (5.3) for
any price strictly less than P( f0). But, we may also infer from the other
assessments P( f1), . . . , P( fn) and Axiom 5.1, that we are disposed to
buy the left hand side of Eq. (5.3) for any price strictly less than 1   .
Consequently, by Axiom 5.1(v), we are disposed to buy the right hand
side of Eq. (5.3), f0, for any price strictly less than 1   . But this price
1  is strictly larger than the supremum price P( f0) for f0, which points
to an inconsistency in the assessments.
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(b) P( f0) =  1. Since there is no price we are disposed to buy the right hand
side of Eq. (5.3) for, there is also no price we are disposed to buy the left
hand side of Eq. (5.3) for, by Axiom 5.1(v). But, since 1 >  1, we are
disposed to buy
Pn
i=1
i
0
fi for any price strictly smaller than 1, which
again points to a contradiction in the assessments.

Compare to Denition 3.3 on p. 52: again, contrary to lower previsions,
we cannot restrict the coe¨cients 0, 1, . . . , n to integer values in order to
characterise coherence of extended lower previsions: Denition 3.3(A)&(B)
are not equivalent when generalised to extended lower previsions, so we take
the strongest condition. Of course, Denition 5.3 generalises Denition 3.3:
a lower prevision is coherent according to Denition 3.3 if and only if it is
coherent according to Denition 5.3. We even have a slightly stronger result:
Corollary 5.4. An extended lower prevision P, dened on a subset of gambles on
X, is coherent, if and only if P is a coherent lower prevision.
Proof. Immediate, if we can show that P is real-valued. This follows from
Theorem 5.5(i) below. 
By the way, Corollary 5.4 has no equivalent for avoiding sure loss: for
instance, the extended lower prevision P dened on f0g by P(0) :=  1 clearly
avoids sure loss, but P is not a lower prevision.
The following theorem summarises the most important properties of co-
herence; it is a straightforward generalisation of Theorem 2.6.1 of Walley [86].
In the proof, we make extensive use of Appendix A.
Theorem 5.5. Let P be a coherent extended lower prevision on X. Let f and g be
random quantities on X, let f be a net of random quantities on X, let a be a constant
random quantity on X, and let  be a non-negative real number. Then the following
statements hold whenever every term and every operation is well dened.
(i) inf[ f ]  P( f )  P( f )  sup[ f ]
(ii) P(a) = P(a) = a
(iii) P( f + a) = P( f ) + a; P( f + a) = P( f ) + a
(iv) f  g + a =) P( f )  P(g) + a and P( f )  P(g) + a
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(v) P( f ) + P(g)  P( f + g)  P( f ) + P(g)  P( f + g)  P( f ) + P(g)
(vi) P( f ) = P( f ); P( f ) = P( f )
(vii) P(j f j)  P( f ); P(j f j)  P( f )
(viii)
P( f )   P(g)  P(j f   gj); P( f )   P(g)  P(j f   gj)
(ix) P(j f + gj)  P(j f j) + P(jgj); P(j f + gj)  P(j f j) + P(jgj)
(x) P( f _ g) + P( f ^ g)  P( f ) + P(g)  P( f _ g) + P( f ^ g),
P( f ) + P(g)  P( f _ g) + P( f ^ g)  P( f ) + P(g) and
P( f ) + P(g)  P( f _ g) + P( f ^ g)  P( f ) + P(g).
(xi) P(j f   f j)  ! 0 =) P( f)  ! P( f ) and P( f)  ! P( f )
Proof. (i). Take n = 0, 0 = 1 and f0 = f in Eq. (5.2). We nd that   inf[ f ] =
sup[  f ]   P( f ). Take n = 0, 0 = 1 and f0 =   f in Eq. (5.2). We nd that
sup[ f ]   P(  f ) = P( f ). Take n = 2, 1 = 2 = 1, 0 = 0 and f1 =   f2 = f
in Eq. (5.2). We nd that 0  P( f ) + P(  f ) = P( f )   P( f ) whenever the right
hand side is well dened. By Lemma A.9(iv) we nd that P( f )  P( f ).
(ii). This follows from (i).
(iii). Take n = 1, 1 = 0 = 1, f1 = f and f0 = f +  in Eq. (5.2). We
nd that    P( f )   P( f + ) whenever the right hand side is well dened.
Take n = 1, 1 = 0 = 1, f1 = f +  and f0 = f in Eq. (5.2). We nd that
  P( f + )   P( f ) whenever the right hand side is well dened. Therefore
 = P( f + )   P( f ) whenever the right hand side is well dened, whence
P( f + ) = P( f ) +  by Lemma A.9(iv).
(iv). By Eq. (5.2) we nd that   sup[ f   g]  P( f )   P(g) whenever
the right hand side is well dened. Using Lemma A.9(iv) we nd that
P( f )  P(g) + .
(v). We prove the rst inequality. Take n = 2, 1 = 2 = 0 = 1, f1 = f , f2 =
g and f0 = f + g. By Eq. (5.2) we nd that 0  P( f )+P(g) P( f + g) whenever
the right hand side is well dened, and consequently, by Lemma A.9(iv),
P( f ) + P(g)  P( f + g) whenever the left hand side is well dened.
Next, we prove the second inequality. Take n = 2, 1 = 2 = 0 = 1,
f1 = f + g, f2 =  g and f0 = f . By Eq. (5.2) we nd that 0  P( f + g)+P( g) 
P( f ) = P( f + g)   P(g)   P( f ) whenever the right hand side is well dened.
Now use Lemma A.9(iv).
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Next, we prove the third inequality. Take n = 2, 1 = 2 = 0 = 1,
f1 =   f   g, f2 = f and f0 =  g. By Eq. (5.2) we nd that 0  P(  f   g) +
P( f )   P( g) =  P( f + g) + P( f ) + P(g) whenever the right hand side is well
dened. Apply Lemma A.9(iv).
Finally, we prove the fourth inequality. Take n = 2, 1 = 2 = 0 = 1,
f1 =   f , f2 =  g and f0 =   f   g. By Eq. (5.2) we nd that 0  P(  f ) +
P( g)   P(  f   g) =  P( f )   P(g) + P( f + g) whenever the right hand side is
well dened. Invoke Lemma A.9(iv).
(vi). Take n = 1, f0 = f , f1 =  f , 0 =  and 1 = 1 in Eq. (5.2). We
nd that 0  P( f )   P( f ) whenever the right hand side is well dened.
Next take n = 1, f0 =  f , f1 = f , 0 = 1 and 1 =  in Eq. (5.2). We nd
that 0  P( f )   P( f ) whenever the right hand side is well dened. By
Lemma A.9(iv), P( f ) = P( f ).
(vii). This follows from f  j f j and (iv).
(viii). From (v) and (iv) it follows that whenever P( f ) P(g) is well dened,
we have that
P( f )   P(g) = P( f ) + P( g)  P( f   g)  P(j f   gj); and
P(g)   P( f ) = P(g) + P(  f )  P(g   f )  P(j f   gj):
We conclude that
P( f )   P(g)  P(j f gj) whenever P( f ) P(g) is well dened.
To prove the second inequality, notice that
P( f )   P(g) = P(  f )   P( g)  P(j f   gj);
whenever the left hand side is well dened.
(ix). This follows from
 f + g   f  + g, (iv) and (v).
(x). This follows from f _ g + f ^ g = f + g and (v).
(xi). If P( f ) is real, then
P( f)   P( f ) is well-dened and P( f)  ! P( f )
follows from (viii).
If P( f ) =  1, then, by (viii) and Lemma A.9(iv),
P( f)  P( f ) + P(j f   f j);
whenever the right hand side is well-dened. But, eventually, this is the
case, since, eventually, P(j f   f j) is real: it converges to zero. It follows that,
eventually, P( f) =  1.
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If P( f ) = +1, then, by (viii) and Lemma A.9(iv),
P( f )  P( f) + P(j f   f j);
whenever the right hand side is well-dened. But, eventually, this is the
case, since, eventually, P(j f   f j) is real: it converges to zero. So, eventually,
P( f) = +1.
For P use
 f   f = (  f )   (  f). 
If dom P is a linear space, then we have the following simple necessary
and sucient condition for coherence; compare to Walley [86, Theorem 2.5.5,
p. 75]. For extended previsions, this result was proved by Crisma, Gigante
and Millossovich [12, Theorem 3.6].
Theorem 5.6. Let P be an extended lower prevision and assume that dom P is a
linear space. Then P is coherent if and only if the following statements hold for any
random quantities f and g in dom P and any non-negative real number :
(1) P( f )  inf[ f ],
(2) P( f ) = P( f ), and
(3) P( f + g)  P( f ) + P(g), whenever the right hand side is well dened.
Proof. If P is coherent, then (1), (2), and (3) follow from Theorem 5.5
Conversely, suppose that P satises (1), (2), and (3). We prove that Eq. (5.2)
holds. Take n 2 N, non-negative 0, 1, . . . , n in R, and random quantities
f0, f1, . . . , fn in dom P such that
Pn
i=1 iP( fi)   0P( f0) is well-dened, and
dene f = 0 f0, g =
Pn
i=1 i fi, and h = f   g; since dom P is a linear space, f ,
g, and h are in dom P. By (2), P( f ) = 0P( f0), and by (2) and (3),
P(g) 
nX
i=1
P(i fi) =
nX
i=1
iP( fi); (5.4)
whenever the right hand side is well dened. Moreover, by (3), P( f ) 
P(g)+P(h) whenever the right hand side is well dened, and therefore, again
by Lemma A.9(iv), also P( f ) P(g)  P(h) whenever the left hand side is well
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dened. Using (1), we have that P(h)  inf[h]. Summarising,
sup
2666664
nX
i=1
i fi   0 f0
3777775 = sup[g   f ] = sup[ h] =   inf[h]
  P(h)  P(g)   P( f )
whenever the right hand side is well dened, and thus by Eq. (5.4) and
Lemma A.9(v),

nX
i=1
iP( fi)   0P( f0);
whenever the right hand side is well denedwhich is the case by assump-
tion. This proves that P is a coherent extended lower prevision. 
There is a subtle dierence between Theorem 5.6 and its counterpart for
lower previsions on gambles, Theorem 3.6 on p. 56: for Theorem 5.6 to hold,
condition (2) must also hold for  = 0. To see why, consider the extended
lower prevision dened by P( f ) = +1 for all random quantities f on X: P
satises Theorem 5.6(1)&(2)&(3) for any random quantities f and g on X
and any non-negative real number , except for  = 0, but, P is clearly not
coherent; it does not even avoid sure loss.
Let's not forget to mention the following important result.
Lemma 5.7. The following statements hold.
(i) The restriction of an extended lower prevision avoiding sure loss also avoids
sure loss.
(ii) The restriction of an extended coherent lower prevision is also coherent.
(iii) The restriction of an extended linear prevision to a prevision is also linear.
Proof. Immediately from Denition 5.2 and Denition 5.3. 
5.2.3 Natural Extension Revisited
Let P be any extended lower prevision, and letK be a set of random quantities
that includes dom P. As in Section 4.1 on p. 95, let's, again, carefully sum up
the properties which the natural extension EKP of P toK should satisfy. First,
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any behavioural disposition expressed by P should also be expressed by EKP ;
it should be a behavioural extension of P:
Denition 5.8. An extended lower prevision Q is called a behavioural extension
of an extended lower prevision P if dom P  dom Q and P( f )  Q( f ) for any
random quantity f 2 dom P.
Thus, dom P  K and EKP ( f )  P( f ) for all f in dom P. Secondly, EKP
must be coherent. And, last but not least, we want the buying prices EKP
to be as low as possible: any coherent behavioural extension of P to K
must also be a behavioural extension of EKP . This can only be the case
when EKP is the point-wise smallest coherent behavioural extension of P to
K . Summarising, dening natural extension as the least committal coherent
behavioural extension, we nd that natural extension for extended lower
previsions is nothing but the following verbatim translation of Denition 4.2:
Denition 5.9. Let P be an extended lower prevision, and let dom P  K 
R(X). The point-wise smallest coherent behavioural extension of P toK , if it
exists, is called the natural extension of P toK , and is denoted by EKP .
Note that the notation EP is reserved for the natural extension of a lower
prevision P to the setL(X) of all gambles on X; see Denition 4.2. The natural
extension of an extended lower prevision to the set of all random quantities
will be explicitly denoted by ER(X)P .
For now, it is still not yet clear how compatible Denition 5.9 is with Den-
ition 4.2: is the natural extension of lower previsions to random quantities,
as in Denition 5.9, an extension of the natural extension of lower previsions
to gambles, as in Denition 4.2? This will follow from the following theorem,
which also tells us that avoiding sure loss of P is necessary and sucient for
the existence of its natural extension EKP . It also gives an explicit expression
for EKP , and number of criteria to check avoiding sure lossbut, note that
there are some subtle but important dierences from Theorem 4.3.
Theorem 5.10. Let P be an extended lower prevision, and let dom P  K  R(X).
Dene the extended lower prevision E on R(X) by
E( f ) := sup
(
 +
nX
i=1
iP( fi) w.d. :  2 R; n 2N;
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1; : : : ; n  0; f1; : : : ; fn 2 dom P;  +
nX
i=1
i fi  f
)
(5.5)
for any random quantity f 2 R(X). The following conditions are equivalent.
(i)  1 < E( f ) < +1 for some random quantity f on X.
(ii)  1 < E( f ) < +1 for any gamble f on X.
(iii) E is a coherent extended lower prevision on R(X).
(iv) The natural extension of P toK exists and is equal to E restricted toK .
(v) P has at least one coherent behavioural extension.
(vi) P has at least one behavioural extension that avoids sure loss.
(vii) P avoids sure loss.
Proof. It suces to establish (vii) =) (iv) =) (v) =) (vi) =) (vii) and
(vii) =) (iii) =) (ii) =) (i) =) (vii).
(vii) =) (iv). Suppose that P avoids sure loss. Before going into detail,
let's sketch the proof. (a) First, we prove that E is a coherent extended lower
prevision on R(X); it immediately follows that also its restriction to K is a
coherent extended lower prevision. (b) We then prove that E( f )  P( f ) for
every random quantity f 2 dom P. This establishes that E, restricted to K ,
is a coherent behavioural extension of P. (c) Next, we prove that, for any
coherent extended lower prevision Q on K , if Q( f )  P( f ) for all f 2 dom P,
then Q( f )  E( f ) for all f 2 K . This establishes that E is the point-wise
smallest coherent behavioural extension of P to K . Let's ll in the details
now.
(a) We check that E, which is an extended lower prevision dened on the
linear space of all random quantities on X, satises the conditions of
Theorem 5.6:
(1). Let f be any random quantity on X. If inf f is real, then E( f )  inf f
is immediate: consider  = inf f and n = 0 in Eq. (5.5). If inf f =  1,
then the inequality E( f )  inf f is immediate. The case inf f = +1 never
occurs.
(2). Let f be any random quantity on X, and let  be any strictly pos-
itive real. Then the equality E( f ) = E( f ) follows from Lemma A.8
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(distributivity in R), and the observation that, there are  2 R, n 2 N,
non-negative 1, . . . , n in R, and random quantities f1, . . . , fn in dom P
such that +
Pn
i=1 iP( fi) is well dened and +
Pn
i=1 i fi  f , if and only
if, there are  2 R, n 2 N, non-negative 1, . . . , n in R, and random
quantities f1, . . . , fn in dom P such that  +
Pn
i=1 iP( fi) is well dened
and  +
Pn
i=1 i fi   f : identify  with  and i with i.
The case  = 0 follows if we can show that E(0)  0; the converse
inequality already follows from (1). By Eq. (5.5), we must show that
 +
Pn
i=1 iP( fi)  0 for any  2 R, n 2 N, non-negative 1, . . . , n in R,
and random quantities f1, . . . , fn in dom P such that  +
Pn
i=1 iP( fi) is
well dened and +
Pn
i=1 i fi  0. Indeed, since  is real, also
Pn
i=1 iP( fi)
is well dened, so, since P avoids sure loss, it follows from Eq. (5.1) that
nX
i=1
iP( fi)  sup
2666664
nX
i=1
i fi
3777775 :
But, since+
Pn
i=1 i fi  0, we also nd that sup
Pn
i=1 i fi
   . Together
with the above inequality, this implies that
Pn
i=1 iP( fi)   , and hence,
by LemmaA.9(iv), also +
Pn
i=1 iP( fi)  0. This shows that E(0)  0, and
hence, the case  = 0 is established too.
(3). Let f and g be two random quantities on X, and suppose that
E( f ) + E(g) is well dened. Then,
E( f ) + E(g) = sup
(
 +
nX
i=1
iP( fi) w.d. :  2 R; n 2N;
1; : : : ; n  0; f1; : : : ; fn 2 dom P;  +
nX
i=1
i fi  f
)
+ sup
(
 +
mX
i=1
iP(gi) w.d. :  2 R; m 2N;
1; : : : ; m  0; g1; : : : ; gm 2 dom P;  +
mX
i=1
igi  g
)
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and by Lemma A.9(viii),
= sup
(
 +  +
nX
i=1
iP( fi) +
mX
i=1
iP(gi) w.d. :
;  2 R; n;m 2N;
1; : : : ; n; 1; : : : ; m  0; f1; : : : ; fn; g1; : : : ; gm 2 dom P;
 +
nX
i=1
i fi  f ;  +
mX
i=1
igi  g
)
and since+
Pn
i=1 i fi  f and +
Pm
i=1 igi  g imply that++
Pn
i=1 i fi+Pm
i=1 igi  f + g,
 E( f + g):
We nd that E is a coherent extended lower prevision on R(X). By
Lemma 5.7, it follows that also the restriction of E to K is a coherent
extended lower prevision.
(b) We show that E( f )  P( f ) for all random quantities f 2 dom P: indeed,
consider  = 0, n = 1, 1 = 1, and f1 = f in Eq. (5.5).
(c) Let Q be a coherent extended lower prevision on K , and assume that
Q( f )  P( f ) for all f 2 dom P. We must show that Q( f )  E( f ) for all
f 2 K . Let f 2 K , then
E( f ) = sup
(
 +
nX
i=1
iP( fi) w.d. :  2 R; n 2N;
1; : : : ; n  0; f1; : : : ; fn 2 dom P;  +
nX
i=1
i fi  f
)
and applying Lemma A.9(vii),
= sup
(
 +
nX
i=1
iP( fi) w.d. and >  1 :  2 R; n 2N;
1; : : : ; n  0; f1; : : : ; fn 2 dom P;  +
nX
i=1
i fi  f
)
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and observe that, since P( fi)  Q( fi) for all i 2 f1; : : : ;ng, if +
Pn
i=1 iP( fi)
is well dened and strictly larger than  1, then also  + Pni=1 iQ( fi) is
well dened and  +
Pn
i=1 iP( fi)   +
Pn
i=1 iQ( fi). Hence,
 sup
(
 +
nX
i=1
iQ( fi) w.d. :  2 R; n 2N;
1; : : : ; n  0; f1; : : : ; fn 2 dom P;  +
nX
i=1
i fi  f
)
but, since Q is coherent, it follows by Theorem 5.5 that  +
Pn
i=1 iQ( fi) 
Q(+
Pn
i=1 i fi)  Q( f ) whenever the left hand side is well dened. Hence,
 Q( f ):
(iv) =) (v) =) (vi). Immediate.
(vi) =) (vii). Let Q be any behavioural extension of P that avoids sure
loss. We need to show that P avoids sure loss: take any n 2 N, non-
negative 1, . . . , n inR, and random quantities f1, . . . , fn in dom P such thatPn
i=1 iP( fi) is well-dened. If
Pn
i=1 iP( fi) =  1, then Eq. (5.1) is immediate.
Otherwise, since P( fi)  Q( fi) for all i 2 f1; : : : ;ng, also
Pn
i=1 iQ( fi) is well
dened, and
nX
i=1
iP( fi) 
nX
i=1
iQ( fi)
and since Q avoids sure loss,
 sup
2666664
nX
i=1
i fi
3777775 :
Hence, P avoids sure loss.
(vii) =) (iii). Suppose P avoids sure loss. We already established (vii) =)
(iv), and hence, (iv) holds forK = R(X): in particular, E is a coherent extended
lower prevision on R(X).
(iii) =) (ii). By Theorem 5.5(i).
(ii) =) (i). Immediate.
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(i) =) (vii). We show that, if P does not avoid sure loss, then E( f ) >  1
implies that E( f ) = +1, for any random quantity f . So, if P does not avoid
sure loss, then E( f ) = 1 for all random quantities f . Equivalently, if P
avoids sure loss, then  1 < E( f ) < +1 for at least one random quantity f .
Suppose that P does not avoid sure loss, and assume that E( f ) >  1.
Then, there are n 2 N, non-negative 1, . . . , n in R, and random quantities
f1, . . . , fn in dom P such that
Pn
i=1 iP( fi) is well-dened and sup
Pn
i=1 i fi

<Pn
i=1 iP( fi). Hence, there is an  2 R such that
Pn
i=1 i fi    and   <Pn
i=1 iP( fi), that is,
 +
nX
i=1
i fi  0 <  +
X
iP( fi):
So, from the expression for natural extension,
E( f ) = sup
(
 +
mX
i=1
iP(gi) w.d. :  2 R; m 2N;
1; : : : ; m  0; g1; : : : ; gm 2 dom P;  +
mX
i=1
igi  f
)
we get by Lemma A.9(vii)
= sup
(
 +
mX
i=1
iP(gi) w.d. and >  1 :  2 R; m 2N;
1; : : : ; m  0; g1; : : : ; gm 2 dom P;  +
mX
i=1
igi  f
)
which is obviously also equal to
= sup
(
 +
mX
i=1
iP(gi) + 

 +
X
iP( fi)

w.d. and >  1 :
 2 R; m 2N;   0;
1; : : : ; m  0; g1; : : : ; gm 2 dom P;
 +
mX
i=1
igi + 
0BBBBB@ +
nX
i=1
i fi
1CCCCCA  f
)
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andthis is rather subtlesince E( f ) >  1, there are  2 R, m 2 N, non-
negative 1, . . . , m in R, and random quantities g1, . . . , gm in dom P such
that
Pm
i=1 iP(gi) is well-dened,  +
Pm
i=1 iP(gi) >  1, and  +
Pm
i=1 igi  f .
Fixing these , m, 1, . . . , m, and g1, . . . , gm in the above supremum, and
using the fact that  +
Pn
i=1 i fi  0, we see that
 sup
(
 +
mX
i=1
iP(gi) + 

 +
X
iP( fi)

:   0
)
:
since, by construction,  +
Pm
i=1 igi + 
 
 +
Pn
i=1 i fi
  f is satised for all
  0. Now, since +Pmi=1 iP(gi) >  1 by construction, and +PiP( fi) > 0,
the argument tends to +1 as  increases, so
= +1;
which establishes the proof. 
Again, there are some subtle dierences between Theorem 4.3 on p. 96
and Theorem 5.10. Firstly, even if there is a random quantity f on X such that
E( f ) < +1, P may still incur sure loss. Indeed, let X = R, dene the random
quantity f on X by f (x) := x for all x 2 X, and dene the extended lower
prevision P on f f ; 0g by P( f ) =  1, and P(0) = 1. Clearly, P does not avoid
sure loss: sup[0] < P(0). Nevertheless, E( f ) =  1 < +1; however, note that
E(g) = 1 for every random quantity g on X: E(g) =  1 if g is unbounded
from below, and E(g) = +1 otherwise. In connection with Theorem 5.6,
observe that E only satises condition (1) for random quantities that are
unbounded from below, condition (2) for strictly positive , and condition
(3): even though E is not coherent, it does have a coherent restriction. This
phenomenon did not occur for lower previsions, by Theorem 4.3(i).
Secondly, it may happen that E( f ) = 1 for some random quantity f ,
even if P is a coherent lower prevision, i.e., real-valued, dened on gambles
only, and coherent. Indeed, for any lower prevision P, E( f ) is  1 whenever
f is unbounded from below. As an example of a lower prevision P and a
random quantity f such that E( f ) = +1, let X = fx 2 R : x  0g, let f be the
identity map on X, and dene P on the set f f ^ n : n 2 Ng of gambles by
P( f ^ n) := n. Then, P is a coherent lower prevision; it is a restriction of the
coherent lower prevision Q(g) := limn!1 infxn g(x) dened for all gambles
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g on X. Nevertheless, since E( f )  P( f ^ n) = n for all n 2 N, it holds that
E( f ) = +1. Observe that, in this case, E is coherent.
ER(X)P uniquely determines the natural extension E
K
P of P to any domain
K that includes dom P:
Corollary 5.11. Let P be an extended lower prevision, and let dom P  K  R(X).
Then EKP exists if and only if E
R(X)
P exists, and in such a case
EKP ( f ) = E
R(X)
P ( f ) for all f 2 K :
So, as before, from now on, in proofs, we can focus our attention on
the natural extension ER(X)P of P to the set of all random quantities on X.
Corollary 5.11 also tells us that the natural extension of a lower prevision P to
a larger setK of gambles, as dened in Section 4.1, is given by the restriction
of ER(X)P toK : ER(X)P is an extension of EP, in the mathematical sense.
Again, an alternative, and simpler expression for natural extension is
obtained when P is dened on a linear space and is coherent; also see The-
orem 4.5.
Theorem 5.12. Let P be any coherent extended lower prevision dened on a linear
space, and let dom P  K  L(X). Then the natural extension of P to K exists,
and for any random quantity f 2 K ,
EKP ( f ) := supfa + P(g) : a 2 R; g 2 dom P; a + g  f g: (5.6)
Proof. Look at Eq. (5.5) and note that, by Theorem 5.5,
nX
i=1
iP( fi)  P
0BBBBB@
nX
i=1
i fi
1CCCCCA ; (5.7)
whenever the left hand side is well dened. Since we are looking for the
supremum, we can replace
Pn
i=1 iP( fi) by P(g) with g =
Pn
i=1 i fi. 
Again, EKP coincides with P on dom P if P is coherent; this follows directly
from the denition of natural extension in case dom P = K .
Proposition 5.13. Let P be an extended lower prevision, and let dom P  K 
R(X). If P is coherent then P and EKP coincide on dom P.
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Proof. By the denition of natural extension, P coincides with Edom PP on
dom P. But, by Theorem 5.10(iv), EKP is an extension of E
dom P
P , and hence,
also EKP coincides with P on dom P. 
Also Proposition 4.7, Proposition 4.8, and Corollary 4.9 generalise to ex-
tended lower previsions.
Proposition 5.14. Let P and Q be extended lower previsions on X that avoid sure
loss. If Q is a behavioural extension of P, then ER(X)Q is a behavioural extension of
ER(X)P too: E
R(X)
Q ( f )  E
R(X)
P ( f ) for every random quantity f on X.
Proof. If Q is a behavioural extension of P, then any coherent behavioural
extension of Q is also a coherent behavioural extension of P; now apply the
denition of natural extension to R(X): it is the point-wise smallest coherent
behavioural extension to the set of all random quantities on X. 
Proposition 5.15. Let P be an extended lower prevision that avoids sure loss. Let
Q be any coherent behavioural extension of P. Then P is equivalent to Q (that is,
ER(X)P = E
R(X)
Q ) if and only if Q and E
R(X)
P coincide on dom Q.
Proof. if. Since Q is a behavioural extension of P, any behavioural extension
of Q is also a behavioural extension of P. Hence, ER(X)Q  E
R(X)
P . To prove the
converse inequality, let R be any coherent behavioural extension of P to the
set of random quantities on X. The claim is established if we can show that
R is also a behavioural extension of Q. Indeed, R  ER(X)P by denition of
natural extension. Since Q = ER(X)P on dom Q it follows that also R  Q on
dom Q, which means that R is a behavioural extension of Q.
only if. Suppose ER(X)P = E
R(X)
Q . Since Q is coherent, it follows from
Proposition 4.6 that Q and ER(X)Q coincide on dom Q, and hence, E
R(X)
P and Q
coincide on dom Q. 
Corollary 5.16. Let P be an extended lower prevision that avoids sure loss, and let
dom P  J  K  R(X). Then
EK
EJP
( f ) = EKP ( f ); for all f 2 K ; and EJP ( f ) = EKP ( f ); for all f 2 J :
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5.2.4 Duality Revisited
In order to prove duality results, we must rst try to endow R(X) with a
suciently strong topological structure, required to apply versions of the
Hahn-Banach theorem.
Denition 5.17. For any extended lower prevision P that avoids sure loss,
the extended real number
 fP := ER(X)P (j f j), dened for any random quantity
f on X, is called the P-norm of f .
Denition 5.18. For any extended lower prevision P that avoids sure loss,
the set KP :=

f 2 R(X) : ER(X)P (j f j) < +1

=

f 2 R(X) :
 fP < +1

is called
the P-space.
Proposition 5.19. Suppose P avoids sure loss. The following propositions hold.
(i) KP contains any random quantity f 2 dom P that is bounded from below and
satises P( f ) < +1.
(ii) If f 2 KP and jgj  j f j, then g 2 KP.
(iii) L(X)  KP, i.e., any gamble on X belongs to the P-space.
(iv) KP, equipped with kkP, is a semi-normed linear lattice.
Proof. (i) Indeed, for any x 2 X, it holds that j f (x)j  f (x) + 0 _ (  inf f ): if
f (x)  0, then j f (x)j = f (x), and if f (x) < 0, then j f (x)j =   f (x)    inf f ; in
both cases, the desired inequality follows. Hence, j f j  f + 0 _ (  inf f ), and
therefore, by the coherence of ER(X)P and Theorem 5.5(iv),
ER(X)P (j f j)  E
R(X)
P ( f ) + 0 _ (  inf f )
and, by denition, ER(X)P is a behavioural extension of P, so E
R(X)
P ( f )  P( f ):
 P( f ) + 0 _ (  inf f )
and since, by assumption, P( f ) < +1 and inf f >  1,
< +1:
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(ii). Immediate.
(iii). Immediate by the coherence of ER(X)P and Theorem 5.5(i): E
R(X)
P (j f j) 
supj f j < +1 for any gamble f on X.
(iv). Immediate the coherence of ER(X)P and Theorem 5.5: E
R(X)
P (j f j)  0
for any random quantity f , ER(X)P (j f j) = jjE
R(X)
P (j f j) for any  2 R and any
random quantity f , and ER(X)P (j f + gj)  E
R(X)
P (j f j) + E
R(X)
P (jgj), for any random
quantities f and g. 
Lemma 5.20. Let P be a real-valued coherent extended lower prevision dened
on a linear lattice of random quantities, that contains all constant gambles. Let
D  dom P. Then the following conditions are equivalent.
(A) P  Pni=1 fi  0 for every n 2N and f1 ,. . . , fn inD.
(B) P
Pn
i=1  j f j

 0 for every n 2 N, non-negative 1 ,. . . , n in R, and f1, . . . ,
fn inD.
(C) There is a linear behavioural extension Q of P such that Q( f )  0 for every f in
D.
Proof. (A) =) (B). Suppose that (A) holds, and assume ex absurdo that
P
Pn
j=1  j f j

=   < 0 for a particular choice of n 2 N, 1; : : : ; n  0 and
f1; : : : ; fn in D. Let  = P
Pn
j=1
 f j and let  = 2+1 . Since Q is dense in R,
there are non-negative rational numbers  j 2 Q such that  j   j   j + 
for every j 2 f1; : : : ;ng. By Lemma 3.4 we nd that  j f j   j f j + 
 f j for
every j 2 f1; : : : ;ng. Let k 2N be a common denominator of 1; : : : ; n and let
m j = k j 2N. We nd that
P
0BBBBBB@
nX
j=1
 j f j
1CCCCCCA  P
0BBBBBB@
nX
j=1
 j f j + 
 f j
1CCCCCCA
 P
0BBBBBB@
nX
j=1
 j f j
1CCCCCCA + P
0BBBBBB@
nX
j=1
 f j
1CCCCCCA =   +  <  =2:
We conclude that P
Pn
j=1 m j f j

<  k=2 < 0. This contradicts (A).
(B) =) (C). Dene
E = fg 2 dom P; P(g)  0g;
V = fg 2 dom P; g  Pnj=1  j f j for some n 2N; f j 2 D [ E;  j  0g:
5.2 INFERENCE REVISITED 219
It is straightforward to show that V is a convex subset of dom P. By Pro-
position 5.19(iv), it follows that dom P, equipped with kkP, is a topological
(semi-normed) linear space. First, we give some properties ofV.
(a) First we prove that g 2 V =) P(g)  0. If g 2 V then we can write that
g  Pkj=1  j f j +Plj=1  jh j with k; l 2 N,  j;  j  0, f j 2 D and h j 2 E. By
(B) and the coherence of P it follows that indeed
P(g)  P
0BBBBBB@
kX
j=1
 j f j
1CCCCCCA + P
0BBBBBB@
lX
j=1
 jh j
1CCCCCCA  0 + 0:
(b) Next we prove that g 2 intV =) P(g) > 0, where intV denotes the
topological interior ofV. If g 2 intV then there is an  > 0 such that

h 2 dom P;
h   gP < 

 V:
The inequality
h   gP <  is satised for h = g  =2, which implies that
g   =2 2 V. From (a) it follows that P(g   =2)  0 and we nd that
indeed P(g)  =2 > 0.
(c) Next we prove that P(g) > 0 =) g 2 intV. Suppose that P(g) > 0. It
suces to prove that the neighbourhood

h 2 dom P;
h   gP < P(g)=2

of g is a subset ofV. Assume that
h   gP < P(g)=2. We nd that
P(g) + P( h)  P(g   h)  P(jg   hj) < P(g)=2:
This implies that P( h) <  P(g)=2, or equivalently P(h) > P(g)=2 > 0. We
nd that h 2 E  V. We conclude that g 2 intV.
(d) Finally, we prove that 0 < intV. Take the contraposition of (b) and use
the fact that P(0) = 0  0.
Now we are ready to apply a version of the Hahn-Banach theorem. By
assumption, 1 2 dom P, and P(1) = 1 > 0. By (c) this implies that 1 2 intV ,
;. Dene the non-empty sets A = V and B = f0g. A is convex, intA , ;,
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B is convex and intA \ B = ;. By a version of the Hahn-Banach theorem
(see for instance Holmes [44, 11E, p. 63]), there is a continuous real-valued
linear mapping on dom P such that for every f 2 A and g 2 Bwe have that
( f )  (g). Since B only contains the zero gamble, it follows that ( f )  0
for every f 2 V.
Dene the extended prevision Q = =(1). We have that Q( f )  0 for
every f 2 V; clearly, Q is self-conjugate. So, to prove that Q is a linear
extended lower prevision, it suces to check the conditions of Theorem 5.6.
(1). We shall prove that Q( f ) = ( f )=(1)  P( f ) for every f 2 dom P:
then, clearly, also Q( f )  inf f . Let f 2 dom P. The inequality is satised if
( f )  (1)P( f ). By the linearity of  this is equivalent to 

f   P( f )

 0;
recall that P is assumed to be real-valued. This holds since P

f   P( f )

 0
which implies that f   P( f ) 2 E  V, and  is non-negative on V by
construction.
(2)&(3). Immediate, since Q is a real-valued linear mapping.
It remains to prove that Q is a behavioural extension of Pbut this was
shown above in (1)and that is non-negative onD: this follows at once from
the observation thatD  V, and that is non-negative onV by construction.
(C) =) (A) Suppose that Q is a linear extended lower prevision such that
dom P  dom Q, Q( f )  P( f ) for all f 2 dom P, and Q( f )  0 for every f 2 D.
Let n 2N and f1, . . . , fn 2 D. It follows that P
Pn
j=1 f j

 Q
Pn
j=1 f j

, and from
(C) it follows that Q
Pn
j=1 f j

 0, We conclude that indeed P
Pn
j=1 f j

 0 for
every n 2N and every f1, . . . , fn 2 D. 
Let MKP denote the set of linear extended previsions that are behavioural
extensions of P to a negation invariant set of random quantities K that in-
cludes dom P.
Theorem 5.21. Let P be any extended lower prevision, and let dom P  K  R(X).
The following statements hold.
(i) If MKP , ;, then P avoids sure loss. Conversely, if P avoids sure loss and
dom P  K  KP, then MKP , ;.
(ii) If P avoids sure loss and dom P  K  KP, then its natural extension ER(X)P
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satises
ER(X)P ( f ) = infQ2MKP
ER(X)Q ( f ) for any f in R(X); (5.8)
EKPP ( f ) = minQ2MKP
EKPQ ( f ) for any f inKP, and hence; (5.9)
EKP ( f ) = minQ2MKP
Q( f ) for any f inK : (5.10)
(iii) If P avoids sure loss and dom P  K  KP, then P is coherent if and only if
P( f ) = min
Q2MKP
Q( f ) for any f 2 dom P: (5.11)
Proof. (i). If MKP , ;, choose any Q 2 MKP . Then for every n 2 N, non-
negative 1, . . . , n in R, and random quantities f1, . . . , fn in dom P such
that
Pn
i=1 iP( fi) is well-dened, we have that
sup
2666664
nX
i=1
i fi
3777775 
nX
i=1
iQ( fi) 
nX
i=1
iP( fi);
since Q avoids sure loss, so P avoids sure loss as well.
Conversely, if P avoids sure loss, deneD := ;. Note that since dom P 
K  KP, it holds that EKPP is real-valued. Also, since D = ;, Lemma 5.20(B)
trivially applies, and by Lemma 5.20(C), there is a linear behavioural exten-
sion Q of EKPP , and hence, of P.
(ii). Let f be any gamble on X. Clearly, ER(X)P ( f )  inf
n
ER(X)Q ( f ) : Q 2
MKP
o
, since the natural extension of P is the point-wise smallest coherent
behavioural extension of P, and the natural extensions of linear extensions of
P must also be behavioural extensions of P.
We rst show that, for any f 2 KP, there is a Q in MKP such that E
KP
P ( f ) 
EKPQ ( f ), establishing Eq. (5.9). Indeed, let f 2 KP, and chooseD := fE
KP
P ( f )  f g;
note that EKPP is coherent, real-valued, and is dened on a linear lattice that
contains all constant gambles, and moreover EKPP

EKPP ( f )    f

 0 for any
  0: so Lemma 5.20(B) applies. By Lemma 5.20(C), there is a linear
behavioural extension R of EKPP , and hence, of P, such that R

EKPP ( f )   f

 0,
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i.e., EKPP ( f )  R( f ). The restriction Q of R toK still is a behavioural extension
of P: Q belongs to MKP . Clearly, R( f )  E
KP
Q ( f ), since R is a behavioural
extension of Q, by denition of Q. We conclude that EKPP ( f )  E
KP
Q ( f ).
Eq. (5.10) simply follows from the fact that Q = EKQ for any coherent
prevision Q onK ; see Proposition 5.13 on p. 215.
Finally, we prove that, for any random quantity f , there is a Q in MKP such
that
ER(X)P ( f )  infQ2MKP
ER(X)Q ( f );
establishing Eq. (5.8). This is trivially satised in case ER(X)P ( f ) = +1. Note
that, by the transitivity of natural extension (Corollary 5.16 on p. 216), the
expression of natural extension from a linear space (Theorem 5.12 on p. 215),
and Eq. (5.9), it follows that
ER(X)P ( f ) = sup
g2KP; g f
EKPP (g) = sup
g2KP; g f
min
Q2MKP
EKPQ (g):
If ER(X)P ( f ) =  1, then, since E
KP
P (g) belongs to R for every g 2 KP, it must be
that there is no g 2 KP such that g  f . Consequently, also
ER(X)Q ( f ) = sup
g2KP; g f
EKPQ (g) =  1;
for any Q in MKP : so in this case,
inf
Q2MKP
ER(X)Q ( f ) =  1 = E
R(X)
P ( f );
and the desired inequality holds too. Finally, if ER(X)Q ( f ) 2 R, then, for every
 > 0, there is a g 2 KK such that g  f and
ER(X)P ( f )  minQ2MKP
EKPQ (g) + :
Since g  f , it follows that ER(X)Q (g)  E
R(X)
Q ( f ) for all Q in M
K
P , and hence,
ER(X)P ( f )  infQ2MKP
ER(X)Q ( f ) + ;
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for all  > 0 (note that the minimum is now an inmum: we cannot guarantee
that the minimum is still achieved), and therefore, also for  = 0: again, we
recover the desired inequality.
(iii). Immediate from (ii), and the fact that, whenever P is coherent, it
must holds that EKP ( f ) = P( f ) for all f 2 dom P. 
It's nice to know when exactly dom P  KP. The following corollary
may serve as a guidance to construct extended lower previsions that satisfy
exactly this requirement.
Corollary 5.22. Suppose P avoids sure loss. Then dom P  KP whenever there are
random quantities f1, . . . , fn in dom P that are bounded from below, such that
(i) P( f1) < +1, . . . , P( fn) < +1, and
(ii) for all g in dom P there are non-negative real numbers a0, a1, . . . , an inR such
that jgj  a0 +
Pn
i=1 aij fij.
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 5.19. 
For instance, if P is a lower prevision (i.e., real-valued and dened on
gambles only) that avoids sure loss, then the conditions of Corollary 5.22 are
satised, and hence, dom P  KP.
5.2.5 Duality and Lower Integrals for Random Quantities?
The lower S-integral of a random quantity f with respect to a probability
chargeon a eldF can be dened as follows; this is similar to Kolmogoro's
[50, Zweites Kapitel, x2, p. 663, Nr. 12] denition of the S-integral, and also
similar to (but slightly more general than) Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara Rao's
[9, Denition 9.1.1, p. 231] denition of what they call the renement integral:
S
Z
f d := lim
B2P(F )
X
B2B
PB( f )(B);
the sum in the right-hand side is always well dened, since always PB( f ) <
+1. Similarly, we dene the upper S-integral S
R
f d, and the S-integral
S
R
f d if the lower and upper S-integral coincide. This generalises Deni-
tion 4.40 on p. 129 to random quantities. However, with the above denition,
we don't have anymore that ER(X) () coincides with S
R
d; the proof of
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Theorem 4.42 on p. 130 does not generalise to random quantities, because
PB( f ) may be  1, and (B) = 0 at the same time, for some random quantity
f on X and some B in F .
For instance, the lower S-integral of the random quantity f ( 1n ) :=  n for all
n 2N, n  1, and f (x) := 0 for all other x 2 [0; 1], with respect to the Lebesgue
measure on [0; 1], is equal to zero, but ER(X) ( f ) =  1: indeed, E
R(X)
P ( f ) =  1
for any lower prevision P that avoids sure loss, and any random quantity f
that is unbounded from below, simply because there are no gambles g such
that g  f , so the expression for natural extension, Eq. (5.5) on p. 209, results
in a supremum over the empty set, which is  1.
A similar consideration holds for the Dunford integral, which is dened
in Section 4.3.8 not only for gambles, but also for random quantities, as long
as they satisfy the conditions of Dunford integrability: with the same gamble
f , again it holds that D
R
f d = 0the sequence fn of gambles dened by
fn := 0 is a determining sequence for f which is dierent from ER(X) ( f ).
Another consequence of these observations, is that we have no equivalent
of Corollary 4.88 on p. 195 for extended lower previsions: there are coherent
extended lower previsions R and random quantities f in dom R such that,
for every eld F and every set m of probability charges on F , still
R( f ) <
8>><>>:inf2m ER(X) ( f ); inf2m S
Z
f d; inf
2m D
Z
f d
9>>=>>; ;
we have to assume that f is Dunford integrable with respect to all  in m
for the last expression to have any meaning. Concluding, there is no gen-
eral equivalence between sets of probability charges and coherent extended
lower previsions on R(X) similar to Corollary 4.88, neither through natural
extension, lower S-integrals, or Dunford integrals.
We now turn to the following question: are there coherent extended lower
previsions, not necessarily dened only on gambles, that are representable
by natural extension, lower S-integrals, or Dunford integrals? As the Dun-
ford integral already guarantees the existence of an extension of a probability
charge to a real-valued coherent extended prevision, which may be dened
also on unbounded random quantities, we try to construct extended lower
previsions from lower previsions through Cauchy sequences, similar to the
construction of the Dunford integral, and we prove that these are represent-
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able through a lower envelope of Dunford integrals.
This yields two results at once: (i) a representation of real-valued co-
herent extended lower previsions through Dunford integrals, and (ii) a way
to extend coherent lower previsions to coherent extended lower previsions
that are still real-valued, and that are not overly conservativerecall that
ER(X)P ( f ) =  1 for any lower prevision P that avoids sure loss and any ran-
dom quantity f unbounded from below; simply taking the natural extension
of a lower prevision, we are not disposed to buy any random quantity that
is unbounded from below: that's rather conservative.
5.3 Extension of Lower Previsions to Essentially
Bounded Random Quantities
5.3.1 Null Sets and Null Random Quantities
From now on, unless stated otherwise, we shall assume that P is a coherent
lower prevision dened onL(X), and P is its conjugate upper prevision. If we
start out with a lower prevision Q that avoids sure loss, then we can always
end up with such a P by natural extension of Q as explained in Chapter 4.
We shall only rely on the coherence of P, and on nothing else.
A rst step towards an extension of lower previsions to possibly unboun-
ded random quantities, is initiated by the observation that a coherent lower
prevision may be invariant under a change of the values of gambles in some
states x 2 X. For instance, suppose we throw a pebble and when it lands,
the distance between its centre and a reference point near us is measured.
Consider the measured distance X (in metres); X is a random variable, and
it takes values in the set of non-negative reals. Prior to the throw, we are
guaranteed to receive a reward f (x) := x ^ 100 in units of some linear utility:
we receive the gamble f . Alternatively, consider the unbounded random
quantity g(x) := x for every x  100 and g(x) :=  x otherwise. If we are
very condent that we cannot throw a pebble further than 100m, then f is
equivalent with g: changing this gamble f at any state x  100 does not
change our expected reward.
This shows that, depending on your beliefs, the values of a gamble can
sometimes be modied in some states without changing our expected re-
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ward. Already observe that there is a similar phenomenon in the theory of
integration: for example, changing the value of the integrand in a countable
number of points of the real line does not change the value of the Lebesgue
integral. Therefore, it does not matter whether the integrand is bounded on
these points or not.
Denition 5.23. A subset A of X is called P-null if P(IA) = 0. The set of all
P-null sets is denoted byNP.
The following theorem states that P-null sets are just those sets for which
we are absolutely certainprepared to bet at all odds on the factthat they
do not contain the outcome of X.
Theorem 5.24. A subset A of X is P-null if and only if P( KIA + I{A) > 0 for all
K  0 and  > 0.
Proof. If A could contain the outcome of X, accepting KIA+I{A could result
in an arbitrary large loss by choosing K suciently large and  suciently
small. Hence, intuitively, it is clear that the condition yields a sucient
condition for A to be a P-null set. Mathematically, this follows from the
coherence of P:
0 < P( KIA + I{A)  KP( IA) + P(I{A);
and hence,
KP(IA) < P(I{A);
for all K  0 and  > 0. This can only be satised if P(IA) = 0. Indeed, if
P(IA) , 0 then any K > 
P(I{A)
P(IA)
will violate the inequality.
Conversely, assume that IA is P-null. Then P( IA) =  P(IA) = 0 and
P(I{A) = P(1   IA) = 1   P( IA) = 1. Using these equalities, we nd that
P( KIA + I{A)  KP( IA) + P(I{A) =  > 0:
for all K  0 and  > 0. 
Proposition 5.25. The following statements hold.
(i) ; is a P-null set. X is not a P-null set.
(ii) If A is a P-null set and B  A, then B is a P-null set.
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(iii) If A1; : : : ;An are P-null sets, then
Sn
i=1 Ai is a P-null set.
Proof. (i) follows from [86, Theorem 2.7.4(b)]. (ii) follows from [86, The-
orem 2.7.4(a)&(c)]. (iii) follows from [86, Theorem 2.7.4(a)&(j)]. 
Corollary 5.26. The following statements hold.
(i) NP is a proper ideal of subsets of X.
(ii) (NP;) is a directed set.
Proof. (i). Simply observe that Proposition 5.25(i)&(ii)&(iii) are the dening
properties of a proper ideal.
(ii). Recall that a directed set is a partially pre-ordered set in which any
two elements are dominated by another element, i.e., which satises the
composition property. This follows from Proposition 5.25(iii). Indeed, if A
and B 2 NP then A  C and B  C for C = A [ B 2 NP. 
Denition 5.27. A random quantity f is called P-null if for every  > 0,
P(fx 2 X : j f (x)j > g) = 0:
The set of all P-null random quantities is denoted by R0P.
A random quantity is P-null if, for all  > 0, we are absolutely certain
prepared to bet at all odds, in the sense of Theorem 5.24, on the factthat its
absolute value will not exceed .
Coherence does not imply downward continuity, but still, why not P(fx 2
X : j f (x)j , 0g) = 0 as a denition? Clearly, it implies our denition, but it is
too restrictive as demonstrated by the following example, adapted from Bhas-
kara Rao and Bhaskara Rao [9, Proposition 4.2.7(ii) and Example 2.3.5(1)].
Let X = N. Let P be an upper prevision dened by P(IA) := 0 if A is nite
and P(IA) := 1 otherwise; P is coherent and can therefore be extended to
a coherent upper prevision on all gambles through natural extension. Let
f (n) := 1=(n + 1). Then, as intuitively expected, f is a P-null gamble, but
P(fn 2N : j f (n)j , 0g) = 1 , 0.
Denition 5.28. Two random quantities f and g are equal almost everywhere
with respect to P if f   g is P-null. In this case, we use the notation f = g a.e. P.
228 CAUCHY EXTENSION OF LOWER PREVISIONS
Denition 5.29. A random quantity f is dominated almost everywhere with
respect to P by a random quantity g if there is a P-null random quantity N
such that f  g + N. In this case, we use the notation f  g a.e. P. We also
dene the expressions f  +1 a.e. P and  1  f a.e. P to be true for every
random quantity f .
The following proposition gives some properties of P-null random quant-
ities.
Proposition 5.30. Let A  X. Let f , g, h, f1, f2, g1, and g2 be random quantities.
Let a and b be real numbers. Then the following statements hold.
(i) A is a P-null set if and only if IA is a P-null gamble.
(ii) If A is P-null, then IA f is P-null.
(iii) If f and g are P-null, then
 f , a f + bg, f _ g and f ^ g are P-null.
(iv) If
 f   g a.e. P and g is P-null, then f is P-null.
(v) If f  g a.e. P and g  h a.e. P, then f  h a.e. P.
(vi) f  g a.e. P and g  f a.e. P if and only if f = g a.e. P.
(vii) Assume that a and b are non-negative. If f1  f2 a.e. P and g1  g2 a.e. P,
then a f1 + bg1  a f2 + bg2 a.e. P.
(viii) If f = g a.e. P and g = h a.e. P, then f = h a.e. P.
(ix) If f1 = f2 a.e. P and g1 = g2 a.e. P, then
 f1 =  f2 a.e. P, a f1 + bg1 =
a f2 + bg2 a.e. P, f1 _ g1 = f2 _ g2 a.e. P and f1 ^ g1 = f2 ^ g2 a.e. P.
Proof. (i). This follows from Denition 5.23 and Denition 5.27.
(ii). For any  > 0, we have that fx 2 X : jIA(x) f (x)j > g  A. Using the
monotonicity of P, we nd that IA f is a P-null random quantity.
(iii). Treating sum and scalar multiplication separately and assuming that
a , 0 (the case a = 0 is immediate), this follows from
fx 2 X : jj f j(x)j > g = fx 2 X : j f (x)j > g;
fx 2 X : ja f (x)j > g = fx 2 X : j f (x)j > = jajg;
fx 2 X : j f (x) + g(x)j > g  fx 2 X : j f (x)j > =2g [ fx 2 X : jg(x)j > =2g;
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and the monotonicity and sub-additivity of P. The maximum and the min-
imum of f and g can be written as linear combinations of f , g and j f   gj,
f _ g = ( f + g + j f   gj)=2; f ^ g = ( f + g   j f   gj)=2;
so these cases follow from the previous ones.
(iv). By denition of j f j  jgj a.e. P there is a P-null random quantity N
such that j f j  jgj +N. We nd that
fx 2 X : j f (x)j > g  fx 2 X : jg(x)j > =2g [ fx 2 X : jN(x)j > =2g:
Now use the monotonicity and sub-additivity of P.
(v). By denition there are two P-null random quantities N and M such
that f  g +N and g  h +M. It follows that f  h + (N +M). By (iii) N +M
is a P-null random quantity. We nd that f  h a.e. P.
(vi). if. Obvious. only if. By denition there are two P-null random
quantities N and M such that f  g + N and g  f + M. It follows that
  jMj  f   g  jNj, which implies that
 f   g  jNj _ jMj. By (iii) jNj _ jMj
is a P-null random quantity. It follows from (iv) that f   g is also a P-null
random quantity. We nd that f = g a.e. P.
(vii). By denition there are two P-null random quantities N and M such
that f1  f2+N and g1  g2+M. It follows that a f1+bg1  a f2+bg2+(aN+bM).
By (iii) aN + bM is a P-null random quantity. We nd that a f1 + bg1 
a f2 + bg2 a.e. P.
(viii). By denition there are two P-null random quantities N and M such
that f = g +N and g = h +M. It follows that f = h + (N +M). By (iii) N +M
is a P-null random quantity. We nd that f = h a.e. P.
(ix) By denition there are two P-null random quantities N and M such
that f1 = f2 + N and g1 = g2 +M. It follows that
 f2   jNj   f1   f2 + jNj.
By (iii)   jNj and jNj are P-null random quantities. From (vi) we nd that f1 =  f2 a.e. P. It also follows that a f1 + bg1 = a f2 + bg2 + (aN + bM).
By (iii) aN + bM is a P-null random quantity. We nd that a f1 + bg1 =
a f2 + bg2 a.e. P. The maximum and the minimum of f1 and g1 can be written
as linear combinations of f1, g1 and
 f1   g1, and a similar statement holds
for the maximum and the minimum of f2 and g2, so these cases follow from
the previous ones. 
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Corollary 5.31. The set of P-null random quantities constitutes a linear lattice with
respect to the point-wise ordering of random quantities.
Corollary 5.32. The binary relation  a.e. P is a partial pre-order on the set of
random quantities with associated equivalence relation = a.e. P.
5.3.2 Null Gambles
Lemma 5.33. Let f be a gamble. Let a be a real number. If P(j f j) = 0 then
P(a f ) = P(a f ) = 0.
Proof. Assume that P(j f j) = 0. Then we also have P(ja f j) = jajP(j f j) = 0. It
follows from the coherence of P that
0 =  P(ja f j) = P( ja f j)  P(a f )  P(a f )  P(ja f j) = 0:
We may therefore conclude that P(a f ) = P(a f ) = 0. 
Proposition 5.34. Let f and g be gambles . Let a and b be real numbers. Then the
following statements hold.
(i) f is a P-null gamble if and only if P(j f j) = 0.
(ii) If f and g are P-null gambles then P(a f + bg) = P(a f + bg) = 0.
Proof. (i). Immediate from Lemma 4.61 on p. 162, with a constant sequence
fn := f .
(ii). By (i) we have that P(j f j) = 0 and P(jgj) = 0. From Lemma 5.33
it follows that P(a f ) = P(a f ) = 0 and P(bg) = P(bg) = 0. Using the super-
linearity of the coherent P, the sub-linearity of P and P(h)  P(h) for every
gamble h, we nd that
0 = P(a f ) + P(bg)  P(a f + bg)  P(a f + bg)  P(a f ) + P(bg) = 0;
so indeed P(a f + bg) = P(a f + bg) = 0. 
5.3.3 Essentially Bounded Random Quantities
We now explain how lower and upper previsions can be extended easily to
random quantities that are bounded on the complement of a P-null set.
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Denition 5.35. Let f be a random quantity. Then the following conditions
are equivalent; if any (hence all) of them are satised, we say that f is P-
essentially bounded above.
(A) There is a P-null set A  X such that f is bounded above on {A.
(B) There is a gamble g such that f  g a.e. P.
(C) There is a gamble g such that P(fx 2 X : f (x) > g(x)g) = 0.
Proof of equivalence. (A) =) (B). Let A  X be a P-null set such that f is
bounded above on {A. Dene the gamble g := ( f {A) _ 0 and dene the
random quantity N := IA f , then f  g +N. If we can prove that N is a P-null
random quantity, then (B) is established. Let  > 0. Since jN(x)j >  implies
that x 2 A, we nd that
fx 2 X : jN(x)j > g  A:
Now use the monotonicity of P (which again follows from the coherence of
P).
(B) =) (C). Let g be a gamble such that f  g a.e. P. Then there is a
P-null random quantity N such that f  g+N. We also have that f  g+ jNj.
It follows that if f (x) > g(x) + 1 then jN(x)j > 1. Dene the gamble h := g + 1.
Then we nd that
fx 2 X : f (x) > h(x)g  fx 2 X : jN(x)j > 1g:
Now use the monotonicity of the coherent P and the fact that N is a P-null
random quantity.
(C) =) (A). Let g be a gamble such that P(fx 2 X : f (x) > g(x)g) = 0.
Dene A := fx 2 X : f (x) > g(x)g then A is a P-null set. Since I{A f  I{Ag it
follows that f is bounded above on {A. This establishes (A). 
Denition 5.36. A random quantity f is called P-essentially bounded below if
  f is P-essentially bounded above.
Denition 5.37. Let f be a random quantity. Then the following conditions
are equivalent; if any (hence all) of them are satised, we say that f is P-
essentially bounded; the set of all P-essentially bounded random quantities is
denoted byK ]P(X).
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(A) f is P-essentially bounded above and below.
(B) j f j is P-essentially bounded above.
(C) There is a gamble f[ such that f = f[ a.e. P.
Proof of equivalence. (A) =) (B). Assume that there are gambles g1 and g2
such that g1  f a.e. P and f  g2 a.e. P. This implies that there are P-null
random quantities N1 and N2 such that g1  f +N1 and f  g2+N2 It follows
that j f j  jg1j + jg2j + jN1j + jN2j. We nd that j f j  jg1j + jg2j a.e. P.
(B) =) (C). Assume that there is a gamble g such that P(fx 2 X : j f (x)j >
g(x)g) = 0. Dene A := fx 2 X : j f (x)j > g(x)g and f[ := f {A. If we can show
that f   f[ is a P-null random quantity then f = f[ a.e. P. Let  > 0. Then
fx 2 X : j f (x)   f[(x)j > g  A:
Now use the monotonicity of the coherent P.
(C) =) (A). Notice that f = f[ a.e. P implies that f  f[ a.e. P and
f[  f a.e. P. 
Corollary 5.38. K ]P(X) is a linear lattice.
Proof. By Denition 5.37(C), we can writeK ]P(X) as f f+N : f 2 L(X); N 2 R0Pg.
This is a linear space by Corollary 5.31 on p. 229.
Is it also a lattice? By Denition 5.37(B), it is immediate that a random
quantity f on X is essentially bounded if and only if j f j is essentially bounded,
and hence f 2 K ]P(X) if and only if j f j 2 K ]P(X). Since we already proved that
K ]P(X) is a linear space, it follows that K ]P(X) is a lattice: f _ g and f ^ g can
be written as linear combinations of j f   gj and j f + gj. 
5.3.4 Extension to Essentially Bounded Random Quantities
Since for every P-essentially bounded random quantity f , there is a gamble
f[ such that f = f[ a.e. P, we can dene P( f[) and P( f[) to be the lower and
upper prevision of f . This extends the domain of P and P from the set of all
gambles to the set of all P-essentially bounded random quantities. However,
we still have to check whether the lower prevision does not depend on the
particular choice of f[. This is the subject of the following proposition and
corollary.
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Proposition 5.39. Let f and g be gambles. If f  g a.e. P then P( f )  P(g) and
P( f )  P(g).
Proof. Assume that f  g a.e. P. By Denition 5.29, there is a P-null random
quantity N0 such that f  g + N0. But, this means that there is also a P-null
gamble N such that f  g+N. Indeed, take N = jN0j^ j f   gj. Then N is P-null
because N  jN0j, and N is a gamble because supjNj  supj f   gj < +1.
It follows from the coherence of P that
P( f )  P(g +N)  P(g) + P(N);
P( f )  P(g +N)  P(g) + P(N):
By Proposition 5.34(i) we know that P(N) = 0. We conclude that P( f )  P(g)
and P( f )  P(g). 
Corollary 5.40. Let f and g be gambles. If f = g a.e. P then P( f ) = P(g) and
P( f ) = P(g).
Denition 5.41. For any P-essentially bounded random quantity f , we dene
the extended lower and upper previsions by P]( f ) := P( f[) and P
]
( f ) := P( f[),
where f[ is any gamble on X such that f = f[ a.e. P. The gamble f[ is called a
determining gamble for f with respect to P, or simply a determining gamble for f .
Note that, if f is P-essentially bounded, then it follows from Deni-
tion 5.37(C) that f[ exists, and it follows from Corollary 5.40 that the lower
and upper prevision of f are independent of the choice of the determining
gamble f[.
Theorem 5.42. P] and P] are extensions of P and P, respectively.
Proof. Let f be a gamble on X. Then f is a determining gamble for itself. It
follows from Denition 5.41 that P]( f ) = P( f ) and P]( f ) = P( f ). 
Theorem 5.43. P] is a coherent extended lower prevision on K ]P(X), and P
] is its
conjugate.
Proof. Obviously, for any P-essentially bounded random quantity f , it holds
that P]( f ) = P( f[) =  P(  f[) =  P
]
(  f ), so, P] is indeed the conjugate of P].
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Since, by Corollary 5.38 on p. 232, K ]P(X) is a linear space, it suces to
check that P] satises the conditions of Theorem 5.6 on p. 206. Let f and g be
random quantities inK ]P(X), and let  be a non-negative real number.
(1). We must show that P]( f )  inf f . If inf f =  1, then the claim is
immediate. Otherwise, if inf f >  1, let f[ be any determining gamble for
f : f[ = f a.e. P. Then, also f[ _ inf f = f _ inf f a.e. P, so, f[ _ inf f is a
determining gamble for f _ inf f = f . Hence,
P]( f ) = P( f[ _ inf f )  inf f ;
since f[ _ inf f  inf f .
(2). We must show that P]( f ) = P]( f ). If  = 0, then the claim is
evident. If  > 0, then f[ is a determining gamble for f if and only if  f[ is a
determining gamble for  f , and hence,
P]( f ) = P( f[) = P( f[) = P]( f ):
(3). We are left to show that P]( f + g)  P]( f )+P](g). If f[ is a determining
gamble for f , and g[ is a determining gamble for g, then f[+g[ is a determining
gamble for f + g, whence:
P]( f + g) = P( f[ + g[)  P( f[) + P(g[) = P]( f ) + P](g):
So, P] is coherent. 
5.3.5 Examples
Let P := PX be the vacuous lower prevision on L(X). Then the empty set
is the only P-null set. The only P-null random quantity is 0. We have that
L(X) = K ]P(X), P = P] and P = P
]
.
More generally, let P := PA be the vacuous lower prevision on L(X) with
respect to a non-empty subset A of X: P( f ) = infx2A f (x). Then, NP = fB 
X : B \ A = ;g, R0P = f f 2 R(X) : IA f = 0g, K ]P(X) = f f 2 R(X) : IA f 2 L(X)g,
and
P]( f ) = inf
x2A
f (x); (5.12)
for any f inK ]P(X), i.e., any f that is bounded on A.
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For another example, let F be a eld, let  be a probability charge on F ,
and let P := E. A set A is a P-null set if and only if it is a -null set, as
dened for instance by Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara Rao [9, Denition 4.2.2],
i.e., if and only if (A) = 0; this is immediate from Theorem 4.36(v) on p. 117.
Consequently, a random quantity is a P-null random quantity if and only if
it is a -null function, as for instance dened by Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara
Rao [9, Denition 4.2.4], i.e., if and only if fx 2 X : j f (x)j > g is a -null set
for all  > 0. A random variable is P-essentially bounded if and only if it
is -essentially bounded, again as dened for instance by Bhaskara Rao and
Bhaskara Rao [9, Denition 4.2.8], i.e., if and only if it is bounded on the
complement of a -null set. In fact, if f is a P-essentially bounded random
quantity, and f has an F -simple determining gamble f[, then f is Dunford
integrable with respect to , and
P]( f ) = D
Z
f d;
indeed, simply observe that any determining gamble f[ for f determines a
determining sequence fn := f[ for f , in the sense of Denition 4.60.
We shall prove further on that, for an arbitrary lower prevision Q that
avoids sure loss, and whose domain is a subset of LF (X), it holds that
E]Q( f ) = min
2mFQ
D
Z
f d;
for any EQ-essentially bounded random quantity f that has an F -simple
determining gamble f[: on this set of random quantities, the extended lower
prevision E]Q is representable by a lower envelope of Dunford integrals. Of
course, having an F -simple determining gamble is quite a strong condition
in general, even if F is the power set on X. Therefore, further on, we shall
prove a more general result; see Theorem 5.76 on p. 265.
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5.4 Extension of Lower Previsions by Hazily Con-
vergent Cauchy Sequences
5.4.1 Introduction
Instead of approximating a random quantity f by a gamble f[ that is equal
to f outside a null set, we now shall try approximating f by a sequence of
gambles fn, converging hazily to f , i.e., converging to f outside a null set (see
Denition 5.44 on p. 236): in this way, we may extend a lower prevision P to
a larger set of random quantities, i.e., larger than K ]P(X). However, it is easy
to construct dierent sequences of gambles, that converge hazily to the same
random quantity f , but for which the lower prevision doesn't converge to the
same number. In Proposition 5.48 on p. 239, we shall give sucient condi-
tions for such candidate sequences to converge to the same lower prevision,
which are very similar to the conditions of Dunford integrability; compare
to Denition 4.60 on p. 162. In essence, this comes down to requiring fn to be
a Cauchy sequence with respect to the P-norm. The random quantities for
which this Cauchy construction is possible are called previsible, and we shall
prove that the resulting extension yields coherent extended lower and upper
previsions.
A very reasonable way of approximating an unbounded random quantity
is by a sequence of cuts: we shall prove that every previsible random variable
can be approximated by a sequence of cuts. Moreover, the converse also
holds: if a random variable can be approximated by cuts, then it is previsible.
We shall prove an analogon of the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem,
in order to establish this.
Finally, we shall show that, for linear previsions, our extension coincides
with the Dunford integral, and, for arbitrary lower previsions, our extension
is given by a lower envelope of Dunford integrals.
5.4.2 Hazy Convergence
Denition 5.44. Let f be a random quantity, and let f be a net of random
quantities. Then the following conditions are equivalent; if any (hence all)
of them are satised, we say that the net f converges P-hazily to f and we use
the notation f
P ! f .
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(A) For every  > 0, lim

P(fx 2 X : j f (x)   f(x)j > g) = 0.
(B) For every  > 0, eventually P(fx 2 X : j f (x)   f(x)j > g) < .
Proof of equivalence. We rst prove that (A) implies (B). Let  > 0 and  > 0.
Then (A) implies that there is a N; such that for every   N;
P(fx 2 X : j f (x)   f(x)j > g) < :
Take  := .
Next we prove that (B) implies (A). Let  > 0 and  > 0. Then (B) implies
that there is an N such that for every   N
P(fx 2 X : j f (x)   f(x)j > g) < :
Let M; := Nminf;g. It follows that for every  M; we have that
P(fx 2 X : j f (x)   f(x)j > minf; gg) < minf; g < :
Since
fx 2 X : j f (x)   f(x)j > g)  fx 2 X : j f (x)   f(x)j > minf; gg):
we nd that indeed
P(fx 2 X : j f (x)   f(x)j > g) < :
for every  M;. 
Proposition 5.45. Let f and g be random quantities. Let f be a net of random
quantities. Then the following statements hold.
(i) If f
P ! f and f = g a.e. P then f P ! g.
(ii) Conversely, if f
P ! f and f P ! g then f = g a.e. P.
Proof. The proof follows from
fx 2 X : j f(x)   g(x)j > g
 fx 2 X : j f(x)   f (x)j > =2g [ fx 2 X : j f (x)   g(x)j > =2g;
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fx 2 X : j f (x)   g(x)j > g
 fx 2 X : j f (x)   f(x)j > =2g [ fx 2 X : j f(x)   g(x)j > =2g;
and the monotonicity and sub-additivity of the coherent P. 
Proposition 5.46. Let f and g be two random quantities. Let f and g be two
nets of random quantities. Assume that f
P ! f and g
P ! g. Let a and b be real
numbers. Then a f + bg, j fj, f _ g and f ^ g converge P-hazily to a f + bg,
j f j, f _ g and f ^ g, respectively.
Proof. For the linear combination, we treat addition and scalar multiplication
separately. For the addition we have that
fx 2 X : j f (x) + g(x)   f(x)   g(x)j > g
 fx 2 X : j f (x)   f(x)j > =2g [ fx 2 X : jg(x)   g(x)j > =2g:
Using the monotonicity and sub-additivity of the coherent P, it follows that
lim
n!1P(fx 2 X : j f (x) + g(x)   f(x)   g(x)j > g)
 lim
n!1P(fx 2 X : j f (x)   f(x)j > =2g)
+ lim
n!1P(fx 2 X : jg(x)   g(x)j > =2g)
= 0 + 0;
whence indeed f + g
P ! f + g.
For scalar multiplication, we may assume that the scalar a is non-zero (the
case a = 0 is immediate). Then
lim
n!1P(fx 2 X : ja f (x)   a f(x)j > g)
= lim
n!1P(fx 2 X : j f (x)   f(x)j > =jajg) = 0;
whence a f
P ! a f .
For the absolute value we have
fx 2 X :
j f (x)j   j f(x)j > g  fx 2 X : j f (x)   f(x)j > g:
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Again use the monotonicity of the coherent P.
The maximum and the minimum of f and g can be written as linear
combinations of f , g and j f   gj,
f _ g = ( f + g + j f   gj)=2; f ^ g = ( f + g   j f   gj)=2;
so this case follows from the previous cases. 
5.4.3 Previsibility
Lemma 5.47. Let f be a non-negative gamble. Then, for every  > 0 there is a
 > 0 such that for every A  X, if P(A) <  then P( f A) < .
Proof. Let  > 0. If sup f = 0 then f  0 and P( f A) = 0 independently of
A  X, whence P( f A) < . Hence, we may assume that sup f > 0. Dene
 := = sup f . If P(A) < , then we nd that P( f A)  sup f P(A) < sup f =
. 
Proposition 5.48. Let fn and gn be two sequences of gambles converging P-hazily
to a random quantity h. Suppose that
lim
n;m!1P(j fn   fmj) = 0; and limn;m!1P(jgn   gmj) = 0;
i.e., that fn and gn are Cauchy with respect to the P-norm. Then the limits
limn!1 P( fn) and limn!1 P(gn) exist, are nite and coincide. Also the limits
limn!1 P( fn) and limn!1 P(gn) exist, are nite and coincide.
Proof. First we prove that the limits exist and are nite. This follows from the
inequalities (see the properties of coherence listed in Theorem 3.5 on p. 55)
jP( fn)   P( fm)j  P(j fn   fmj); jP( fn)   P( fm)j  P(j fn   fmj);
jP(gn)   P(gm)j  P(jgn   gmj); jP(gn)   P(gm)j  P(jgn   gmj):
Since the right hand sides converge to zero, the left hand sides must con-
verge to zero too. This means that P( fn), P( fn), P(gn) and P(gn) are Cauchy
sequences. By the completeness of R, their limits exist and are nite.
We prove limn!1 P( fn) = limn!1 P(gn) and limn!1 P( fn) = limn!1 P(gn).
Dene the gamble Nn := j fn   gnj. Again by the coherence of P (Theorem 3.5
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on p. 55), we have that
jP( fn)   P(gn)j  P(Nn); jP( fn)   P(gn)j  P(Nn):
The proof is complete if we can show that P(Nn) converges to zero. This is
what we now set out to do.
For every n 2N and every A  X, dene an(A) := P(NnA). We must prove
that an(X) converges to zero.
Every an is an element of the function space R}(X). Equip this function
space with the topology of uniform convergence on}(X). From the complete-
ness of R, it follows that R}(X) is complete with respect to the topology of
uniform convergence on }(X); see for instance Schechter [70, Section 19.12].
We rst claim that an converges with respect to the topology of uniform
convergence on }(X). Indeed, consider A  X, then, using the coherence of P
(in particular, using that jP(h) P(h0)j  P(jh h0j),
jhj  jh0j  jh h0j  jhj+ jh0j,
jhjA  jhj for all gambles h and h0, and the monotonicity and sub-linearity of
P), we nd that
jan(A)   am(A)j =
Pj fn   gnjA   Pj fm   gmjA

 P
j fn   gnj   j fm   gmjA
 P
   fn   gn     fm   gm A
 P
   fn   fm    gn   gm 
 P

j fn   fmj

+ P

jgn   gmj

:
Since the right hand side converges to zero independently of A, it follows
that an is Cauchy with respect to the topology of uniform convergence on
}(X). By the completeness ofR}(X) with respect to this topology, we nd that
an indeed converges uniformly on }(X).
Uniform convergence implies point-wise convergence, so for every A  X
we can dene a(A) := limn!1 an(A). We must prove that a(X) = 0.
Let  > 0. By the convergence of an with respect to the topology of uniform
convergence on }(X), there is an M 2N such that for every A  X and every
n M
jan(A)   a(A)j < : (5.13)
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By Lemma 5.47, there is a  > 0 such that for every A  X we have that if
P(A) <  then P(NMA) = aM (A) < . Since a(A)  ja(A)   aM (A)j + aM (A), it
follows from Eq. (5.13) that for all A  X
P(A) <  =) a(A) < 2: (5.14)
Dene B := fx 2 X : NM (x) , 0g, then NM {B = 0. This implies that
P(NM {B) = aM ({B) = 0. From Eq. (5.13) it follows that a({B) < .
Next we prove that a(X) < 5.
1. Consider the case P(B) = 0. Then a(B) = limn!1 P(NnB) = 0 since
0  P(NnB)  sup NnP(B) = 0 for every n 2 N. By the sub-additivity of
P it follows that a(X)  a(B) + a({B) < 0 +  < 5.
2. Now consider the other case P(B) > 0. Since fn and gn converge P-hazily
to h, it follows from Proposition 5.46 that Nn = j fn   gnj converges P-
hazily to 0. By the denition of P-hazy convergence, this implies that
for the , M and  constructed above, there is a K M, such that for
all n  K
P(fx 2 X : Nn(x) > =P(B)g) < : (5.15)
Dene C := fx 2 X : NK (x)  =P(B)g. By the sub-additivity of the
coherent P we have that a(X)  a(B \ C) + a(B \ {C) + a({B). We now
investigate each term of this sum.
(i) By Eq. (5.13) we get a(B \ C) < aK (B \ C) + , since K  M.
Since NK(x)  =P(B) for all x 2 C and P(B \ C)  P(B), we nd
that aK (B \ C) = P(NKB \ C)  (=P(B))P(B \ C)  . Therefore
a(B \ C) < 2.
(ii) We claim that a(B\{C) < 2. By Eq. (5.15) it follows that P({C) <
. The claim is established using P(B\{C)  P({C) and Eq. (5.14).
(iii) We have already proved that a({B) < .
In both cases it follows that a(X) < 5. Since this holds for any  > 0, we may
conclude that indeed a(X) = 0. 
Denition 5.49. A random quantity f is called P-previsible if there is a se-
quence fn of gambles such that
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(i) fn converges P-hazily to f , and
(ii) fn is a Cauchy sequence with respect to the P-norm.
The sequence fn is called a determining sequence of gambles for f with respect to
P, or simply a determining sequence for f . The set of all P-previsible random
quantities is denoted byK xP(X). For any P-previsible random quantity f , we
dene the extended lower and upper previsions Px( f ) := limn!1 P( fn) and
Px( f ) := limn!1 P( fn), where fn is any determining sequence for f .
Recall the denition of the P-norm, Denition 5.17 on p. 217. So, since P
is a coherent lower prevision dened on L(X), condition (ii) simply means
that
lim
n;m!1
 fn   fmP = limn;m!1EP(j fn   fmj) = limn;m!1P(j fn   fmj) = 0;
whence, if a random quantity f is P-previsible, then, by Proposition 5.48,
Px( f ) and Px( f ) exist, are nite and are independent of the choice of the
determining sequence fn for f .
Obviously, every gamble f is P-previsible, since the constant sequence
fn := f is a determining sequence for f : L(X)  K xP(X). Moreover, every
P-essentially bounded random quantity f is P-previsible, since the constant
sequence fn := f[ is a determining sequence for f , if f[ is a determining
gamble for f : L(X)  K ]P(X)  KxP(X). We even have a stronger result:
Theorem 5.50. Px and Px are extensions of P] and P], respectively.
Proof. Let f 2 K ]P(X). Let f[ be a determining gamble for f . Dene fn := f[
for every n 2 N. Then fn is a determining sequence for f . It is immediate
from Denition 5.49 that Px( f ) = P( f[) = P
]
( f ) and Px( f ) = P( f[) = P]( f ). 
Theorem 5.51. Let f and g be P-previsible random quantities. Let fn be a determ-
ining sequence for f and let gn be a determining sequence for g. Let a and b be real
numbers. Then a fn + bgn, j fnj, fn _ gn and fn ^ gn are determining sequences for
a f + bg, j f j, f _ g and f ^ g, respectively. Hence, a f + bg, j f j, f _ g and f ^ g are
P-previsible.
Proof. P-hazy convergence follows from Proposition 5.46 on p. 238. To check
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the Cauchy condition, use the inequalities
P
(a fn + bgn)   (a fm + bgm)  jajPj fn   fmj + jbjPjgn   gmj;
P
j fnj   j fmj  Pj fn   fmj
and the fact that the maximum and the minimum of f and g can be written
as linear combinations of f , g and j f   gj. 
Corollary 5.52. K xP(X) is a linear lattice.
Proposition 5.53. Px is a coherent extended lower prevision on K xP(X), and P
x is
its conjugate.
Proof. Obviously, for any P-previsible random quantity f , it holds that Px( f ) =
limn!1 P( fn) = limn!1( P(  fn)) =   limn!1 P(  fn) =  Px(  f ), so, Px is
indeed the conjugate of Px.
Since, by Corollary 5.52, K xP(X) is a linear space, it suces to check that
Px satises the conditions of Theorem 5.6 on p. 206. Indeed, let f and g be
random quantities inK xP(X), and let  be a non-negative real number.
(1). We must show that Px( f )  inf f . If inf f =  1, then the claim
is immediate. Otherwise, if inf f >  1, note that, if fn is a determining
sequence for f , then fn _ inf f is a determining sequence for f _ inf f = f , by
Theorem 5.51. Hence,
Px( f ) = lim
n!1P( fn _ inf f )  inf f ;
since fn _ inf f  inf f , and since P is coherent.
(2). We must show that Px( f ) = Px( f ). If  = 0, then the claim is
evident. If  > 0, then, by Theorem 5.51, fn is a determining sequence for
f if and only if  fn is a determining sequence for  f , and hence, using the
coherence of P,
Px( f ) = lim
n!1P( fn) = limn!1P( fn) =  limn!1P( fn) = P
x( f ):
(3). We are left to show that Px( f + g)  Px( f )+Px(g). If fn is a determining
sequence for f , and gn is a determining sequence for g, then, by Theorem 5.51,
fn+ gn is a determining sequence for f + g, whence, again using the coherence
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of P:
Px( f + g) = lim
n!1P( fn + gn)  limn!1

P( fn) + P(gn)

= lim
n!1P( fn) + limn!1P(gn) = P
x( f ) + Px(g):
So, Px is coherent. 
As a result of the coherence of Px, it follows that Px satises all of the prop-
erties listed in Theorem 5.5 on p. 203. There are a few additional properties,
which are worth mentioning here:
Proposition 5.54. Let f and g be P-previsible random quantities. If f  g a.e. P
then Px( f )  Px(g) and Px( f )  Px(g).
Proof. If f  g a.e. P, then, by denition, there is a P-null random quantity N
such that f  g + N. Let hn be a determining sequence for g   f . Since N is
P-null, it holds that g   f = g   f + N a.e. P, and so, by Proposition 5.45, hn
also converges P-hazily to g   f + N: consequently, hn is also a determining
sequence for g   f +N. By Theorem 5.51, we nd that (hn)+ := hn _ 0 is also
a determining sequence for (g   f + N)+ = g   f + N (recall that f  g + N).
It follows that
Px(g)   Px( f )  Px(g   f ) = lim
n!1P(hn) = P
x(g   f +N) = lim
n!1P((hn)
+)  0;
Px(g)   Px( f )  Px(g   f ) = lim
n!1P(hn) = P
x(g   f +N) = lim
n!1P((hn)
+)  0:
This completes the proof. 
Denition 5.55. For any P-previsible random quantity f , the P-previsible norm
of f is dened by
 fxP := Px(j f j).
Note that the P-previsible norm coincides with the restriction of the Px-
norm to the set of P-previsible random quantities. Consequently, it holds
thatKxP(X), equipped with kkxP, is a semi-normed linear lattice (see Proposi-
tion 5.19(iv)).
Theorem 5.56. Let f be a P-previsible random quantity. Then f is a P-null random
quantity if and only if
 fxP = 0.
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Proof. Dene A := fx 2 X : j f (x)j > g.
First we show that the condition is sucient. Suppose
 fxP = 0. Let  > 0.
Since j f j  A  0 it follows from the monotonicity of Px (Theorem 5.5(iv))
that 0 =
 fxP  P(A)  0. We nd that P(A) = 0 for every  > 0, i.e., f is
P-null.
Next we show that the condition is necessary. Suppose that f is a P-null
random quantity, i.e., P(A) = 0 for every  > 0. We prove that the constant
sequence fn := 0 is a determining sequence for j f j. For P-hazy convergence,
we need that P(fx 2 X :
j f (x)j   fn(x) > g) converges to zero for every  > 0.
Indeed, since fx 2 X :
j f (x)j  fn(x) > g = A and P(A) = 0 for every  > 0 we
have P-hazy convergence. The Cauchy condition is satised since we have a
constant sequence. We nd that fn := 0 is a determining sequence for j f j. It
follows that Px(j f j) = P(0) = 0. 
Finally, we show how sequences of previsible random quantities may also
be used as determining sequences.
Lemma 5.57. Let f be a P-previsible random quantity. Let fn be a determining
sequence for f . Then fn converges to f with respect to the P-previsible norm:
Px(j f   fnj)! 0.
Proof. By Theorem 5.51, j fm   fnj is a determining sequence for j f   fnj. Using
Denition 5.49, it follows that
lim
n!1P
x
(j f   fnj) = limn!1

lim
m!1P(j fm   fnj)

= lim
n;m!1P(j fm   fnj) = 0:
This ends the proof. 
Theorem 5.58. Let fn be a sequence of P-previsible random quantities. Suppose
that
(i) fn converges P-hazily to f ,
(ii) limn;m!1 P
x
(j fn   fmj) = 0.
Then f is P-previsible, Px( f ) = limn!1 Px( fn) and P
x
( f ) = limn!1 P
x
( fn).
Proof. Fix n in N. Since fn is P-previsible and by Lemma 5.57, there is a
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gamble gn such that
Px(j fn   gnj) < 1=n; (5.16)
P(fx 2 X : j fn(x)   gn(x)j > 1=ng) < 1=n:
We prove that the gn constitute a determining sequence for f .
First, we show that the sequence gn converges P-hazily to f . Let  > 0.
Since fn converges P-hazily to f , there is an N 2N such that
P(fx 2 X : j fn(x)   f (x)j > =2g) < =3 (5.17)
for every n  N. Dene M := maxfN; d2=eg. Then for every n  M we
have that
fx 2 X : jgn(x)   f (x)j > g
 fx 2 X : jgn(x)   fn(x)j > 1=Mg [ fx 2 X : j fn(x)   f (x)j > =2g:
It follows from Eq. (5.16), Eq. (5.17) and the sub-additivity of the coherent P
that
P(fx 2 X : jgn(x)   f (x)j > g)  1=M + =3 < =2 + =2 = ;
for every n M. We nd that gn converges P-hazily to f .
Next, we have that
gn   gmP =
gn   gmxP 
gn   fnxP +
 fn   fmxP +
 fm   gmxP :
Since all terms of the sum on the right side of the inequality converge to zero,
it follows that
gn   gmP converges to zero, i.e., gn is Cauchy in P-norm. We
conclude that gn is a determining sequence for f , and it follows that f is
P-previsible.
Finally, we have that
 fn   fxP 
 fn   gnxP +
gn   fxP :
Since both terms of the sum on the right side of the inequality converge to
zero (see (5.16) and Lemma 5.57), it follows that
 fn   fxP converges to zero.
Now use Theorem 5.5(xi) on p. 203. 
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5.5 Approximation by Cuts
In this section, we establish a constructive way in order to determine whether
a random quantity is previsible, and to nd a determining sequence for an ar-
bitrary previsible random quantity. In constructing determining sequences,
it seems sensible to look at so-called cuts:
Denition 5.59. Let f be a random quantity. For a and b non-negative real
numbers the (a,b)-cut of f is dened by
fa;b(x) :=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 b if f (x) <  b;
a if f (x) > a;
f (x) otherwise:
If an and bn are sequences of non-negative real numbers converging to
innity, we shall now establish that fan;bn is a determining sequence for f
with respect to P if and only if f is P-previsible, in which case Px( f ) =
limn!1 P( fan;bn ). The proof of this fact is simple, if we rst introduce some
new mathematical machinery.
5.5.1 A New Type of Measurability
Denition 5.60. Let f be a random quantity. Then the following conditions
are equivalent; if any (hence all) of them are satised, we say that f is P-
measurable.
(A) There is a sequence of simple gambles fn converging P-hazily to f .
(B) For every  > 0 there is a partition fF0;F1; : : : ;Fng ofX such that P(F0) < 
and j f (x)   f (x0)j <  for every x, x0 2 Fi, i = 1, . . . , n.
(C) There are two sequences an and bn of non-negative real numbers conver-
ging to innity such that fan;bn converges P-hazily to f .
(D) For every two sequences an and bn of non-negative real numbers conver-
ging to innity we have that fan;bn converges P-hazily to f .
Proof of equivalence of Denition 5.60(A)&(B). First we prove that (A) implies
(B). Let  > 0. Since fn converges P-hazily to f , there is an m inN such that
P(fx 2 X : j f (x)   fm(x)j > =3g) < :
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Let g := fm =
Pn
i=1 ciEi. Let F0 := fx 2 X : j f (x)   g(x)j > =3g. We have that
P(F0) < . Let Fi := Ei \ {F0, i = 1, . . . , n. Since fE1; : : : ;Eng is a partition
of X, it follows that fF0;F1; : : : ;Fng is also a partition of X. For i = 1, . . . , n
we have for every x, x0 2 Fi that g(x) = g(x0) = ci, j f (x)   g(x)j  =3 and
j f (x0)   g(x0)j  =3. We nd that
j f (x)   f (x0)j = j f (x)   g(x) + g(x0)   f (x0)j  =3 + =3 < :
This establishes (A) =) (B).
Next we prove that (B) =) (A). Let n 2N n f0g, and let fFn;0;Fn;1; : : : ;Fn;kn g
be a partition of X such that P(Fn;0) < 1=n and j f (x)   f (x0)j < 1=n for every x,
x0 2 Fn;i, i = 1, . . . , kn. Fix some xn;i in Fn;i, i = 1, . . . , kn. Dene the simple
gamble
fn :=
knX
i=1
f (xn;i)Fn;i:
We claim that fn converges P-hazily to f . Let  > 0. Dene M := d1=e. By
construction of fn we have for every n M that
fx 2 X : j f (x)   fn(x)j > g  Fn;0:
It follows that
P(fx 2 X : j f (x)   fn(x)j > g)  P(Fn;0) < 1=n:
This establishes (B) =) (A). 
To prove equivalence of Denition 5.60(B)&(C)&(D) we rst need to prove
some lemma's. All of these use Denition 5.60(A) or (B) for P-measurability.
Lemma 5.61. Every gamble is P-measurable.
Proof. Let f be a gamble. Let  > 0. Since f is bounded there is a sequence
fn of simple gambles converging uniformly to f , i.e., there is an N 2N such
that for every n  N and every x 2 X we have that j f (x)   fn(x)j < . This
implies that
P(fx 2 X : j f (x)   fn(x)j > g) = P(;) = 0
for all n  N. We nd that fn converges P-hazily to f . We conclude that f is
P-measurable. 
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Denition 5.62. A random quantity f is called P-smooth if for every  > 0
there is a k > 0 such that P(fx 2 X : j f (x)j > kg) < .
Lemma 5.63. Every P-measurable random quantity is P-smooth.
Proof. Let f be a P-measurable random quantity. Let  > 0. By Deni-
tion 5.60(B) there is a partition fF0;F1; : : : ;Fng of X such that P(F0) <  and
j f (x)   f (x0)j <  for every x; x0 2 Fi, i = 1; : : : ;n.
Fix i 2 f1; : : : ;ng. Fix x0 in Fi. Then j f (x)j  j f (x0)j +  for every x 2 Fi. It
follows that f is bounded on Fi.
Next, dene
k := nmax
i=1
supfj f (x)j : x 2 Fig;
then j f (x)j > k only if x 2 F0. By the monotonicity of the coherent P we nd
that
P(fx 2 X : j f (x)j > kg)  P(F0) < :
This establishes the claim. 
Lemma 5.64. Let f be a random quantity. Let f be a net of P-measurable random
quantities. If f converges P-hazily to f then f is P-measurable.
Proof. We verify Denition 5.60(B). Let  > 0. Since f converges P-hazily to
f there is an 0 such that
P(fx 2 X : j f (x)   f0 (x)j > =4g) < =2:
Dene A := fx 2 X : j f (x)  f0 (x)j > =4g. Then P(A) < =2 and j f (x)  f0 (x)j 
=4 for all x 2 {A.
Since f0 is P-measurable there is a partition fF0;F1; : : : ;Fng of X that
satises P(F0) < =2 and j f0 (x)   f0 (x0)j < =2 for all x; x0 2 Fi, i = 1; : : : ;n.
Dene E0 := A[F0 and Ei := ({A)\Fi, i = 1; : : : ;n. Since fF0;F1; : : : ;Fng is
a partition ofX, we have that fE0;E1; : : : ;Eng is also a partition ofX. It follows
that
P(E0) = P(A [ F0)  P(A) + P(F0) < =2 + =2 = 
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and
j f (x)   f (x0)j = j f (x)   f0 (x) + f0 (x)   f0 (x0) + f0 (x0)   f (x0)j
 j f (x)   f0 (x)j + j f0 (x)   f0 (x0)j + j f0 (x0)   f (x0)j
< =4 + =2 + =4 = :
for all x; x0 2 ({A) \ Fi = Ei. 
Proof of the equivalence of Denition 5.60(B)&(C)&(D). First, we prove that (B)
implies (D). Since f is P-measurable, f is also P-smooth (Lemma 5.63). This
means that for every  > 0 there is a k > 0 such that
P(fx 2 X : j f (x)j > kg) < : (5.18)
Let an and bn be two sequences of non-negative real numbers converging to
innity. For these sequences there is an N in N such that for every n  N
we have that an  k and bn  k.
Let  > 0. For every n  N we nd that
fx 2 X : j fan;bn (x)   f (x)j > g  fx 2 X : j f (x)j >  +minfan; bngg
 fx 2 X : j f (x)j >  + kg
 fx 2 X : j f (x)j > kg
Now use the monotonicity of the coherent P and inequality Eq. (5.18) to
conclude that fan;bn converges P-hazily to f .
It is clear that (D) implies (C).
Finally we prove that (C) implies (B). Assume there are two sequences
an and bn of non-negative real numbers converging to innity such that fan;bn
converges P-hazily to f . Since fan;bn is bounded, it follows from Lemma 5.61
that fan;bn is P-measurable for every n 2N. Now use Lemma 5.64. 
5.5.2 A Dominated Convergence Theorem
Lemma 5.65. Let f be a random quantity. Let fn be a sequence of gambles converging
P-hazily to f . Then there is a sequence gn of gambles converging P-hazily to f such
that jgnj  2j f j for every n 2N.
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Proof. Since fn converges P-hazily to f there is a subsequence fnk such that
for all k inN
P(fx 2 X : j f (x)   fnk (x)j > 1=kg) < 1=k:
Dene Ak := fx 2 X : j f (x)   fnk (x)j > 1=kg then we have for every k 2N that
P(Ak) < 1=k (5.19)
and for every x 2 {Ak that
j f (x)   fnk (x)j  1=k: (5.20)
Dene
gk(x) :=
8>>><>>>:
fnk (x) if x 2 {Ak and j fnk (x)j > 2=k;
0 otherwise:
Since fnk is bounded, we have that gnk is bounded as well.
We now show that jgkj  2j f j for all k 2N. Consider x in X.
1. If x 2 Ak or j fnk (x)j  2=k then jgk(x)j = 0 and the inequality jgk(x)j 
2j f (x)j is satised.
2. Assume that x 2 {Ak and j fnk (x)j > 2=k. By Eq. (5.20) we have that
jgk(x)j = j fnk (x)j  j fnk (x)   f (x)j + j f (x)j  1=k + j f (x)j: (5.21)
From Eq. (5.20) and j fnk (x)j > 2=k we nd that also
1=k  j fnk (x)j   j f (x)j > 2=k   j f (x)j
which implies that
j f (x)j > 1=k: (5.22)
From Eq. (5.21) and Eq. (5.22) we nd that indeed jgk(x)j  2j f (x)j.
In both cases we have that jgk(x)j  2j f (x)j. We conclude that jgkj  2j f j.
Finally, we prove that gk converges P-hazily to f . Let  > 0. Then
fx 2 X : j f (x)   gk(x)j > g
= fx 2 Ak : j f (x)   gk(x)j > g [ fx 2 {Ak : j f (x)   gk(x)j > g:
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If k > 1= then it follows from Eq. (5.20) that fx 2 {Ak : j f (x)   gk(x)j > g = ;.
Using Eq. (5.19) and the monotonicity and sub-linearity of P, we nd that for
every k > 1=
P(fx 2 X : j f (x)   gk(x)j > g)  P(Ak) + P(;) < 1=k + 0:
This ends the proof. 
Lemma 5.66. Let f be a positive P-previsible random quantity. Then, for every
 > 0 there is a  > 0 such that for every A  X, if P(A) <  then Px( f A) < .
Proof. Let  > 0. By Lemma 5.57 there is a gamble g such that Px(j f  gj) < =2.
Dene  := =(2 supjgj). Let A  X and assume that Px(A) = P(A) < . Then,
taking into account the coherence of Px (Theorem 5.5 on p. 203),
Px( f A)  Px(j f   gjA) + Px(jgjA) = Px(j f   gjA) + P(jgjA)
 Px(j f   gj) + supjgjP(A) < =2 + =2 = :
This ends the proof. 
Theorem 5.67. Let f be a P-previsible random quantity. Let g be a random quantity.
Suppose that jgj  j f j a.e. P. Then g is P-previsible if and only if g is P-measurable.
Proof. Assume P-previsibility of g. P-measurability follows from Deni-
tion 5.49, Lemma 5.61 and Lemma 5.64.
Conversely, assume that g is P-measurable. By Lemma 5.65 there is a
sequence gn of gambles converging P-hazily to g such that gn  2jgj for every
n 2N.
Let A  X. Since jgj  j f j a.e. P we have that jgnj  2j f j a.e. P which
implies that jgn   gmjA  4j f jA a.e. P for every n;m 2 N. Applying Proposi-
tion 5.54 on p. 244, we nd that
P(jgn   gmjA)  Px(4j f jA) (5.23)
for every A  X and every n;m 2N.
Now we show that
gn   gmP converges to zero. Let  > 0. Then, by
Lemma 5.66 there is a  > 0 such that for every A  X
Px(A) <  =) Px(4j f jA) < : (5.24)
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Since gn converges P-hazily to g, there is an N in N such that for all
n;m  N we have that
P(fx 2 X : jgn(x)   gm(x)j > g)
 P(fx 2 X : jgn(x)   g(x)j > =2g) + P(fx 2 X : jg(x)   gm(x)j > =2g)
< =2 + =2 = :
Dene Bnm := fx 2 X : jgn(x)   gm(x)j > g) then for all n;m  N we have that
Px(Bnm) < . From Eq. (5.24) it follows that
Px(4j f jBnm) < 
for all n;m  N. We also have that
jgn(x)   gm(x)j  :
for all x 2 {Bnm. Using Eq. (5.23) it follows that
P(jgn   gmj)  P(jgn   gmjBnm) + P(jgn   gmj{Bnm)
 Px(4j f jBnm) + Px({Bnm) <  +  = 2:
for all n;m  N.
We conclude that gn is a determining sequence for g, so g is P-previsible.

The next theorem is a dominated convergence theorem for our extension
Px.
Theorem 5.68. Let g be a P-previsible random quantity. Let fn be a sequence of
P-measurable random quantities such that j fnj  jgj a.e. P for every n 2 N. Let f
be a random quantity. Then the following statements are equivalent.
(i) fn converges P-hazily to f .
(ii) f is P-previsible and
 f   fnxP converges to zero and hence, Px( fn)  ! Px( f )
and Px( fn)  ! Px( f ).
Proof. By Theorem 5.67 fn is P-previsible for every n 2N.
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We rst prove that (i) implies (ii). Assume that fn converges P-hazily to
f . Then (ii) follows from Theorem 5.58, if we can show that fn is a Cauchy
sequence, that is, limn;m!1
 fn   fmxP = 0.
Let  > 0. By Lemma 5.66 there is a  > 0 such that for every A  X, if
Px(A) <  then P
x
(jgjA) < . Since j fnj  jgj a.e. P for every n 2 N, it follows
from Proposition 5.54 on p. 244 that also
Px(A) <  =) Px(j fnjA) <  (5.25)
for every n 2N.
Since fn converges P-hazily to f there is a N in N such that for every
n  N
P(fx 2 X : j f (x)   fn(x)j > =2g) < =2:
This implies that for every n;m  N
P(fx 2 X : j fn(x)   fm(x)j > g) < :
Dene Enm := fx 2 X : j fn(x)   fm(x)j > g, then
Px(Enm) < ;
j fn   fmj{Enm  ;
for every n;m  N. By Eq. (5.25) we also have that Px(j fnjEnm) <  and
Px(j fmjEnm) < . for every n;m  N. Using the coherence of Px, and The-
orem 5.5 on p. 203 in particular, we nd that
Px(j fn   fmj)  Px(j fn   fmjEnm) + Px(j fn   fmj{Enm)
 Px(j fnjEnm) + Px(j fmjEnm) + 
<  +  +  = 3;
for every n;m  N. This establishes that (i) implies (ii).
Next we prove that (ii) implies (i). Assume that f is P-previsible and f   fnxP converges to zero. We need to prove that fn converges P-hazily to
f . This means that for every 1; 2 > 0 there is a N1;2 such that for every
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n  N1;2 we have that
P(fx 2 X : j f (x)   fn(x)j > 1g) < 2:
This will be established if, for every 1; 2 > 0, we can prove the existence of a
sequence of sets En (which may depend on 1 and 2) such that P(En) < 2 and
j f   fnj{En  1 hold for every n  N1;2 . Indeed, suppose that the second
inequality holds, then
{En  fx 2 X : j f (x)   fn(x)j  1g;
which implies that
En  fx 2 X : j f (x)   fn(x)j > 1g;
and now use the rst inequality and the monotonicity of the coherent P.
Let 1; 2 > 0. Dene r := 1=3 and  := 12=10.
Dene gn := j f   fnj. Since
 f   fnxP converges to zero there is an N 2N
such that for every n  N
Px(gn) < : (5.26)
gn is non-negative and P-previsible. So it follows from Denition 5.49,
Lemma 5.57, and the coherence of Px (Theorem 5.5(xi) on p. 203) that there are
numbers M, Kr;=r 2 N, and a sequence of non-negative (use Theorem 5.51
on p. 242) gambles hn, such that whenever n  maxfM;Kr;=rg it holds that
jPx(gn)   P(hn)j < ; (5.27)
P(fx 2 X : jgn(x)   hn(x)j > rg) < =r: (5.28)
Let Lr; = maxfN;M;Kr;=rg. Dene An := fx 2 X : jgn(x)  hn(x)j > rg, then for
all n  Lr; it holds that
P(An) < =r; (5.29)
jgn   hnj{An  r: (5.30)
Dene Bn := fx 2 X : hn(x) > rg, then for all n it holds that (recall that Zn is
256 CAUCHY EXTENSION OF LOWER PREVISIONS
non-negative, so Bn  hn=r)
P(Bn)  P(hn)=r; (5.31)
jhn(x)j{Bn  r: (5.32)
Finally, dene En := An [ Bn then we have for every n  Lr; that
P(En)  P(An) + P(Bn) < =r + P(hn)=r < =r +

Px(gn) + 

=r
< 3=r = 9102 < 2;
where we subsequently used the inequalities Eq. (5.29), Eq. (5.31), Eq. (5.27)
and Eq. (5.26). We also have that
j f   fnj{En = gn{En  (hn + r){En  r + r = 231 < 1;
where we subsequently used the inequalities Eq. (5.30) and Eq. (5.32). This
establishes that (ii) implies (i). 
5.5.3 Previsibility by Cuts
Corollary 5.69. Let an and bn be two sequences of non-negative real numbers
converging to innity. A random quantity f is P-previsible if and only if fan;bn is a
determining sequence for f .
Proof. If fan;bn is a determining sequence for f then f is P-previsible by Den-
ition 5.49. This proves suciency.
To prove necessity, suppose that f is P-previsible, then by Theorem 5.67
f is P-measurable. It follows that the sequence fan;bn converges P-hazily to f .
Also the gamble fan;bn is P-measurable by Lemma 5.61, and j fan;bn j  j f j. From
Theorem 5.68 it follows that
lim
n;m!1
 fan;bn   fam;bmxP  limn!1
 fan;bn   fxP + limm!1
 f   fam;bmxP
= 0 + 0 = 0:
We nd that fan;bn is a determining sequence for f . 
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5.5.4 The 2-Monotone Case: A Choquet Integral for Previs-
ible Random Variables
In this section, we generalise the representation theorem for 2-monotone
lower previsions P (Proposition 4.77 on p. 180) to extended lower previsions
Px.
In Section 4.3.10, we dened the Choquet integral of an arbitrary gamble,
with respect to an arbitrary 2-monotone set function . Let's generalise the
Choquet integral to random quantities:
Denition 5.70. Let F be a eld onX and let  be a 2-monotone set function
on F . Let f be any random quantity on X. Let G; f be the lower decreasing
distribution function of f with respect to , that is,
G; f (z) := (fx 2 X : f (x) > zg);
for any z 2 R.The Choquet integral of f with respect to  is dened as
C
Z
f d := R
Z 0
 1
[G; f (z)   1] dz + R
Z +1
0
G; f (z) dz
= lim
a!+1R
Z 0
 a
[G; f (z)   1] dz + limb!+1R
Z b
0
G; f (z) dz;
whenever the sum in the right hand side is well dened, and in such a case,
we say that f is Choquet integrable with respect to .
Proof of integrability and existence of the limits. Observe that since G; f (z) 1 is
non-increasing in z, it's Riemann integrable over [ a; 0] by Proposition 4.68 on
p. 167. Also, since G; f (z)  1  0 for all z inR, it follows that R
R 0
 a[G; f (z) 
1] dz is non-increasing in a: thus, the limit of R
R 0
 a[G; f (z) 1] dz for a! +1
must exist (and coincides with the inmum over a).
Riemann integrability of G; f (z) over [0; b] and existence of the limit for
b! +1 is proved in a similar way. 
Lemma 5.71. Let f : R  R ! R. Then lima;b!1 f (a; b) = f  if and only if
limn!1 f (an; bn) = f  for every two sequences an and bn of non-negative real num-
bers converging to innity.
Proof. if. Assume that f (a; b) does not converge to f  as a, b ! 1. This
means that there is an  > 0 such that for every R > 0 there are aR, bR  R such
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that j f (aR; bR)  f j  . This holds in particular for every R = n, n 2N. Hence,
there are two sequences an and bn such that an, bn  n and j f (an; bn)   f j  .
Consequently, there are two sequences an and bn of non-negative real numbers
converging to innity for which f (an; bn) does not converge to f  as n!1.
only if. Let an and bn be any two sequences of non-negative real num-
bers converging to innity, that is, for every R > 0 there is an NR 2 N such
that n  NR implies that an, bn  R. Assuming that lima;b!1 f (a; b) = f , for
every  > 0 there is an R > 0 such that a, b  R implies that j f (a; b)   f j < .
Hence, it holds in particular that j f (an; bn)   f j <  for every n  NR , or
equivalently, limn!1 f (an; bn) = f . 
Theorem 5.72. Let P be a 2-monotone coherent lower prevision on L(X). Let  be
any 2-monotone set function, dened on a eld F , such that P = E. If a random
quantity f is P-previsible, then f is Choquet integrable, and
Px( f ) = C
Z
f d:
Proof. By Proposition 4.77 on p. 180, there always is a 2-monotone set function
 dened on a eld F , such that P = E.
Assume that f is P-previsible. By Corollary 5.69, for every two sequences
of non-negative real numbers converging to innity, fan;bn is a determining
sequence for f . It follows that
Px( f ) = lim
n!1P( fan;bn )
since fan;bn is a determining sequence for f . But, fan;bn is a gamble, so we
already know that P( fan;bn ) = C
R
fan;bn d:
= lim
n!1
 
R
Z 0
0^inf fan ;bn
[G; fan ;bn (z)   1] dz + R
Z 0_sup fan ;bn
0
G; fan ;bn (z) dz
!
and, since  an  0 ^ inf fan;bn and 0 _ sup fan;bn  bn, and moreover since
R
R 0^inf fan ;bn
 an [G; fan ;bn (z)   1] dz = 0 and R
R bn
0_sup fan ;bn
G; fan ;bn (z) dz = 0, we can
also write, applying Proposition 4.65 on p. 167,
= lim
n!1
 
R
Z 0
 an
[G; fan ;bn (z)   1] dz + R
Z bn
0
G; fan ;bn (z) dz
!
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but now, since G; fan ;bn (z) = G; f (z) for every z in [ an; bn):
= lim
n!1
 
R
Z 0
 an
[G; f (z)   1] dz + R
Z bn
0
G; f (z) dz
!
and, this holds for every two sequences an and bn of non-negative real num-
bers converging to innity. Hence, applying Lemma 5.71:
= lim
a;b!1
 
R
Z 0
 a
[G; f (z)   1] dz + R
Z b
0
G; f (z) dz
!
= lim
a!1R
Z 0
 a
[G; f (z)   1] dz + limb!1R
Z b
0
G; f (z) dz
and it also follows in particular that this sum is well dened. So, f is Choquet
integrable, and
= C
Z
f d:
The theorem is established. 
Finally, note that Choquet integrability with respect to , does not neces-
sarily imply E-previsibility: for instance, it may happen that C
R
f d is not
nite even if f is Choquet integrable. However, for any Choquet integrable
random quantity, we do have that
C
Z
f d = lim
n!1E( fan;bn );
where an and bn are arbitrary sequences of non-negative real numbers, and the
limit on the right hand side is independent of the choice of these sequences;
this is immediate from the proof of Theorem 5.72.
5.6 Lower Envelopes of Dunford Integrals
We now show how the extension Px of a lower prevision P is representable as
the lower envelope of a set of Dunford integrals with respect to probability
charges on a eld F . First, we need to prove some lemmas.
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Lemma 5.73. Let P and Q be two coherent lower prevision dened on the setL(X) of
all gambles on X. If Q is a behavioural extension of P, then the following statements
hold.
(i) Any determining sequence for a random quantity f with respect to P is also a
determining sequence for f with respect to Q.
(ii) If a random quantity is P-previsible, then it is also Q-previsible.
(iii) Qx is a behavioural extension of Px.
Proof. Let fn be a determining sequence for f with respect to P. We prove
that fn is also a determining sequence for f with respect to Q.
Since Q dominates P we have that Q(h)  P(h) for every gamble h. It
follows that for every  > 0 and every n;m 2N
0  Q(fx 2 X : j f   fnj > g)  P(fx 2 X : j f   fnj > g)
0  Q(j fn   fmj)  P(j fn   fmj)
From Denition 5.49 it follows that the right hand sides converge to zero.
It follows that the left hand sides converge to zero too. We nd that fn is a
determining sequence for f with respect to Q.
Clearly, this implies that f is Q-previsible whenever f is P-previsible.
Since Q dominates P, Qx also dominates Px for every P-previsible random
quantity f . Indeed, let fn be a determining sequence for f with respect
to P. We have already proved that fn is also a determining sequence for
f with respect to Q. Since Q( fn)  P( fn) for every n 2 N we nd that
limn!1Q( fn)  limn!1 P( fn), since the limits on both sides exist. It follows
that Qx( f )  Px( f ) for every P-previsible random quantity f . 
Recall Denition 4.11 on p. 99 and Theorem 4.62 on p. 163: a gamble f is
-integrable if and only if E( f ) = E( f ), if and only if f is Dunford integrable
with respect to , if and only if f is S-integrable.
Lemma 5.74. Let F be a eld on X, let  be a probability charge on F , and let f be
any random quantity on X. Then the following statements are equivalent.
(i) f is Dunford integrable with respect to .
(ii) f is E-previsible and has a determining sequence fn with respect to E con-
sisting of -integrable gambles only.
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(iii) f is E-previsible and has a determining sequence fn with respect to E con-
sisting of F -measurable gambles only.
(iv) f is E-previsible and has a determining sequence fn with respect to E con-
sisting of F -simple gambles only.
If any (and hence, all) of these conditions is satised, then
Ex( f ) = D
Z
f d = lim
n!1E( fn) = limn!1D
Z
fn d:
Proof. (iv) =) (iii) =) (ii). Immediate from Proposition 4.28 on p. 112.
(ii) =) (i). Since fn is a determining sequence for f with respect to P, it
holds that E(j fn   fmj)! 0, and, for all  > 0, E(fx 2 X : j fn   f j > g)! 0.
The rst condition can be written as D
R
j fn   fmjd ! 0; indeed, by
Theorem 4.42 on p. 130 we have that E = S
R
d, by Theorem 4.41 on p. 129
it follows that S
R
d is a 2-monotone coherent lower prevision, and so by
Proposition 4.18(vi), it follows that the domain of E = S
R
d is a linear
lattice: thus, for any n and m inN, we nd that j fn   fmj belongs to dom E.
Now, by Theorem 4.62 on p. 163, the S-integral and the D-integral coincide
on dom E, so, indeed E(j fn   fmj) = D
R
j fn   fmjd! 0.
By Theorem 4.36(v) on p. 117, the second condition, E(fx 2 X : j fn   f j >
g)! 0, can be written as (fx 2 X : j fn   f j > g)! 0.
Now use the fact that the fn are -integrable, or equivalently, Dunford
integrable with respect to , and apply Theorem 4.64 on p. 166 to see that f
is Dunford integrable with respect to , with Dunford integral
D
Z
f d = lim
n!1D
Z
fn d = limn!1E( fn) = limn!1E( fn) = E
x
( f );
where the last equality follows from the fact that f is E-previsible, with
determining sequence fn.
(i) =) (iv). If f is Dunford integrable, then there is a sequence of F -
simple gambles fn such that D
R
j fn   fmjd ! 0, and, for all  > 0, (fx 2
X : j f (x)  fn(x)j > g)! 0. These conditions can be written as E(j fn  fmj)! 0,
and, for all  > 0, E(fx 2 X : j f (x)   fn(x)j > g) ! 0, so, fn is a determining
sequence for f with respect to E. 
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Lemma 5.75. Let F be a eld on X, and let Q be a lower prevision that avoids
sure loss, and whose domain consists of F -measurable gambles only, i.e., dom Q 
LF (X). Let f be an EQ-previsible random quantity that has a determining sequence
fn with respect to EQ consisting of F -simple gambles only. Then the following
statements hold.
(i) fn is a determining sequence for f with respect to every probability charge  in
mFQ , and hence, f is Dunford integrable with respect to every  in m
F
Q .
(ii) For every linear behavioural extension R of ExQ, there is a probability charge 
in mFQ such that R( f ) = D
R
f d.
(iii) Conversely, for every probability charge  in mFQ , there is a linear behavioural
extension R of ExQ such that D
R
f d = R( f ).
Proof. (i). Let  2 mFQ . By denition (see Eq. (4.55) on p. 194), E is a
behavioural extension of Q, and therefore also of EQ , so the claim follows
from Lemma 5.73(i), Lemma 5.74, and the fact that each fn is F -simple.
(ii). Let R be any linear behavioural extension of ExQ. Dene the probability
charge  on F by (A) := R(IA) for all A in F . First, we show that  belongs
to mFQ (dened in Eq. (4.55) on p. 194): RjLF (X) is a coherent behavioural
extension of the linear prevision P, and so, by Proposition 4.14 on p. 100,
since LF (X)  E, for any F -measurable gamble g it follows that
E(g) = E RjLF (X) (g)
but RjLF (X) is coherent, and therefore coincides with its natural extension on
its domain,
= R(g)
but, by assumption, R is a behavioural extension of ExQ, so
 ExQ(g)
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and so, if g is in dom Q  LF (X), we may applying Theorem 5.42 on p. 233
and Theorem 5.50 on p. 242 to nd that
= EQ(g):
So, E is a behavioural extension of EQ
LF (X). And since dom Q consists of
F -measurable gambles only, it follows that E is a behavioural extension of
Q, and therefore,  belongs to mFQ .
By (i), it follows that f is Dunford integrable with respect to , with
determining sequence fn. It remains to prove that R( f ) = D
R
f d.
Indeed, since each fn is F -simple, we may write fn =
Pmn
j=1 a j;nIA j;n , with
a1;n, . . . , amn;n in R and A1;n, . . . , Amn;n in F , and it easily follows that R( fn) =
D
R
fn d using the linearity of R and Denition 3.19 on p. 65. Since, by (i), fn
is a determining sequence for , it follows that D
R
fn d! D
R
f d. Can we
also show that R( fn)! R( f )? Of course: by Lemma 5.57 on p. 245, it follows
that ExQ(j f   fnj) ! 0; but, E
x
Q(j f   fnj)  R(j f   fnj) for all n 2 N, so, it must
hold that R(j f   fnj)! 0 as well. By the coherence of R (see Theorem 5.5(xi)
on p. 203), we nd that R( f ) = limn!1 R( fn).
(iii). Conversely, let  be any probability charge in mFQ . Dene the
extended lower prevision
S(g) := sup
(
ExQ(g   h) +D
Z
h d :
h 2 dom ExQ; h Dunford integrable with respect to 
)
for all random quantities g in dom ExQ. It is easy to show that S is a coherent
behavioural extension of ExQ. Clearly, it is a behavioural extension of E
x
Q:
choose h = 0. We are left to show that S is coherent. Clearly, S(g1 + g2) 
S(g1) + S(g2), and S(g) = S(g) whenever  > 0, follow easily from the
denition of S, simply by using the coherence of ExQ. It remains to prove
that S(0) = 0. Using Lemma 5.74, it follows that D
R
h d = Ex(h) for every h
that is Dunford integrable with respect to . Also, by Lemma 5.73, and the
fact that E is a behavioural extension of EQ (since  belongs to m
F
Q ), it also
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follows that Ex(h)  E
x
Q(h) for any such h. So,
S(0) = sup
(
ExQ(0   h) +D
Z
h d :
h 2 dom ExQ; h Dunford integrable with respect to 
)
 sup
(
ExQ(0   h) + E
x
Q(h) :
h 2 dom ExQ; h Dunford integrable with respect to 
)
= 0;
and since S is a behavioural extension of ExQ, it follows also that S(0)  0, so,
S(0) = 0. We conclude that S is a coherent behavioural extension of ExQ.
Now, since f is Dunford integrable with respect to  (by (i)), it also follows
that S( f )  D
R
f d (choose h = f ), and
S( f ) =  S(  f ) =   sup
(
ExQ(  f   h) +D
Z
h d :
h 2 dom ExQ; h Dunford integrable with respect to 
)
= inf
(
ExQ( f + h)  D
Z
h d :
h 2 dom ExQ; h Dunford integrable with respect to 
)
 D
Z
f d
(choose h =   f ). So, S( f ) = S( f ) = D
R
f d.
Concluding, by Theorem 5.21(i) on p. 220, it follows that MKSS , ;; take
any R in MKSS . But, since S is a behavioural extension of E
x
Q, it follows that
KExQ  KS, and hence, we nd that R is indeed a linear behavioural extension
of ExQ. Finally, since S( f )  R( f )  S( f ) by construction of R, we nd that
R( f ) = D
R
f d. 
Here's the icing on the cake.
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Theorem 5.76. Let F be a eld on X, and let Q be a lower prevision that avoids
sure loss, and whose domain consists of F -measurable gambles only, i.e., dom Q 
LF (X). Then, for every EQ-previsible random quantity f that has a determining
sequence with respect to EQ consisting of F -measurable gambles only, it holds that
ExQ( f ) = min
2mFQ
D
Z
f d:
Proof. Note that f is Dunford integrable with respect to all  in mFQ , by
Lemma 5.74. Also note that dom ExQ  KExQ , since ExQ is a real-valued coherent
lower prevision. Applying Theorem 5.21(iii) on p. 220, it follows that
ExQ( f ) = min
R2M
dom ExQ
ExQ
R( f )
and by by Lemma 5.74, the sequence fn may assumed to be F -simple instead
of F -measurable. Applying Lemma 5.75,
= min
2mFQ
D
Z
f d:

Chapter 6
Optimality under
Uncertainty
Let us consider a system, to which we may apply an action a, freely chosen
from a set A of available actions. We want to nd the optimal actions from A,
i.e., those actions that perform best according to some criterion. For instance,
it is often assumed that each action induces a real-valued gain Ja: in that case,
an action a is considered optimal in A if it induces the highest gain among
all actions in A. More generally, we may wish to nd the set opt (A) of all
optimal actions in A, i.e., the set of all actions that induce the highest gain.
If there is no uncertainty regarding the gains Ja, a 2 A, then the solution
to this problem is simply given by
opt (A) = arg max
a2A
Ja:
Note that opt (A) may be empty; however, if we assume that the set fJa : a 2 Ag
is a compact subset ofRthis holds if A is a nite setthen opt (A) contains
at least one element. Secondly, note that even if opt (A) contains more than
one action, all actions a in opt (A) induce the same gain Ja; so, if, in the
end, the gain is all that matters, it suces to identify only one action a in
opt (A)often, this greatly simplies the analysis.
In many situations, the gain Ja induced by an action a is inuenced by
variables which may not be well-known. Assuming that these variables can
be modelled through a random variable X, it is customary to consider the
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gain Ja as a random quantity on X; random quantities were introduced in
Section 5.1. We view Ja as a real-valued gain that is a function of X, and that
is expressed in a xed utility scale; so, Ja is an XR-mapping, interpreted
as an uncertain gain: if x turns out to be the realisation of X, and we apply
action a, then we receive an amount of utility Ja(x). Which action should we
choose?
6.1 A Classical Approach: Maximising Expected
Utility
Let's consider a common case, where our knowledge about X is modelled
through a probability charge  on a eld F on X, as we discussed in Sec-
tion 3.5.2 on p. 61 . and Section 4.3.2 on p. 109 . Usually, assuming that the
gains Ja are bounded random quantities, the eld F is chosen such that all
gains Ja, a 2 A, are F -measurable; see Denition 4.25 on p. 109, and Propos-
itions 4.26&4.27. Then, a common way to arrive at a set of optimal actions,
goes through their expected utility:
P(Ja) := D
Z
Ja d = S
Z
Ja d = E(Ja);
where the right hand side is given by the Dunford integral, S-integral, or
P-integral respectively; the equality of all these integrals was established in
Theorem 4.62 on p. 163, and integrability of the random quantities Ja follows
from theirF -measurability, i.e., Proposition 4.28 on p. 112. For simplicity, we
shall assume that  is independent of a: the action a does not inuence our
beliefs about X. This is called act-state independence.
If we interpret  as a prevision P, then P(Ja) is nothing but the prevision
of Ja obtained through natural extension of P: in this interpretation, the
expected utility of Ja corresponds to the prevision of Ja, i.e., the fair price for
Ja, as explained on p. 48. So, as far as it makes sense to maximise expected
utility:
opt (A) := arg max
a2A
P(Ja): (6.1)
Again, opt (A) may be empty, but if we assume for instance that the set
fJa : a 2 Ag is compact with respect to the topology of uniform convergence,
which holds for instance if A is nite, then opt (A) contains at least one
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element. Moreover, even if opt (A) contains more than one action, all actions
a in opt (A) induce the same expected gain P(Ja); so, if, in the end, the expected
gain is all that matters, it again suces to identify only one action a in opt (A),
which may simplify the analysis.
6.2 Generalising Maximal Expected Utility: Why
and How?
6.2.1 The Tossing Machine
To see why maximising expected utility, i.e., Eq. (6.1), is not always a desirable
criterion for selecting all optimal actions from a set A of actions, consider a
tossing machine, to which we may apply either one of the following actions:
 a0: The machine tosses the coin, and whatever the outcome, we receive
nothing, i.e., there is neither gain nor loss.
 a1: The machine tosses the coin, and if the outcome is heads, we receive
two units of utility. Otherwise, we lose one unit of utility.
 a2: The machine tosses the coin, and if the outcome is heads, we lose
one unit of utility. Otherwise, we gain two units of utility.
In the manual of the machine, it is only stated that when taking an action
in A = fa0; a1; a2g, the coin will turn up either heads or tails. The gains Ja1
and Ja2 depend on this outcome, say X. Therefore, we shall consider them
as random quantities on X; obviously, we can also consider Ja0 as a constant
random quantity on X. The random variable X assumes values inX = fH;Tg,
with H for heads and T for tails, so
Ja0 (H) = 0; Ja1 (H) = 2; Ja2 (H) =  1;
Ja0 (T) = 0; Ja1 (T) =  1; Ja2 (T) = 2:
Without any further information regarding the mechanism of the tossing
machine, only three solutions for opt (A) are reasonable, once we recognise
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that the gains and the given information share a symmetry:
opt1 (A) = fJa0g;
opt2 (A) = fJa1 ; Ja2g; and
opt3 (A) = fJa0 ; Ja1 ; Ja2 g:
Indeed, these are the only sets which reect the symmetry of the problem: our
beliefs regarding the machine's coin do not change when switching heads
with tails, so Ja1 can be optimal if and only if Ja2 is optimal, because Ja1
transforms into Ja2 and vice versa when switching heads with tails.
Which one is the most reasonable? Should we select a0? Should we not
select a0? Or, should we arbitrary apply any action in A? For sure, selecting
a0 is the safest choice: we are guaranteed not to lose. On the other hand, we
may gain 2 units of utility applying a1 or a2, whereas applying a0 we shall
not gain anything at all: actions a1 and a2 have more potential. However,
arguably, it may be criticised that we have insucient knowledge about the
machine in order to weigh the risk against the potential: therefore, we might
as well consider all actions in A as optimal. These are arguments in favour
of each of the three choices opt1 (A), opt2 (A), and opt3 (A).
On the other hand, opt1 (A) excludes the potential of gaining two units
of utility. Moreover, as opt1 (A) contains one action only, it excludes the
possibility of learning: we don't have much information to start from, so,
since we don't have act-state independence a priori (it's not stated in the
manual), it could be worth trying also actions that are not risk averse, in
order to gain information about how we should choose our actions in the
future. The set opt2 (A) is larger, but the actions a1 and a2 may be too risky:
perhaps, we are not willing to lose one unit of utility, even though we possibly
gain two units. Apparently, this leaves us with opt3 (A), the largest set of the
three, as the most reasonable set of optimal actions.
Let's try and investigate how maximising expected utility solves this
problem. First of all, note that F = }(X) = f;; fHg; fTg; fH;Tgg is the unique
eld such that all random quantities Ja0 ,Ja1 , and Ja2 are F -measurable, and
note that any probability charge  on F is uniquely determined by its value,
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say, on fHg: if we denote (fHg) by p, then  is given by
(;) = 0; (fH;Tg) = 1;
(fHg) = p; (fTg) = 1   p:
The machine's manual does not give us a clue about the value of p, so, in
principle, we are not able to maximise expected utility; unless we hypothet-
ically assume that there is a value p 2 [0; 1] governing the probabilities of the
machine's coin: then, applying Denition 3.19 on p. 65,
P(Ja0 ) = D
Z
Ja0 d = 0;
P(Ja1 ) = D
Z
Ja1 d = 3p   1; and
P(Ja2 ) = D
Z
Ja2 d = 2   3p:
As a function of the hypothetical value p 2 [0; 1], the set of optimal actions in
A, in the sense of Eq. (6.1), maximising expected utility, is
opt (A) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
fa2g; if 0  p < 12 ;
fa1; a2g; if p = 12 ;
fa1g; if 12 < p  1:
What do we observe?
 For almost any value of p, maximising expected utility yields a unique
optimal action.
 For almost any value of p, maximising expected utility yields neither
opt1 (A), nor opt2 (A), nor opt3 (A), and hence, does not reect the sym-
metry of the problem regarding heads and tails; only in the marginal
case p = 12 , it yields one of the suggested solutions, namely, opt2 (A).
 The risk-averse action a0 never belongs to the set of optimal actions:
apparently, maximising expected utility tends against risk aversion.
Concluding, maximising expected utility may not be desirable, because:
 Independently of the probability charge , it yields almost always a
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unique optimal action, which is rather surprising in case we have only
little information: it cannot seriously model indecision.
 If it is not a priori clear how to identify , an (necessarily arbitrary)
choice of  may have an unidentiable eect on what we call optimal.
In particular, maximising expected utility does not incorporate robust-
ness.
 It may not reect the symmetry of the problem, unless we impose this
symmetry on  itself. However, often there simply is no probability
charge  reecting the symmetry of the problem, which at the same
time also reects our beliefs regarding X. For instance, in the above
example, symmetry dictates p = 12 , but nevertheless, this value of p
does not correspond to the given information: we have no clue about
the value of p.
 Apparently, maximising expected utility may tend against risk aver-
sion.
6.2.2 Assumptions and Notation
Convinced of the desirability of going beyond maximising expected utility,
we now discuss a number of ways to derive criteria of optimality based
on coherent extended lower previsions, instead of probability charges. Of
course, we wish to retain maximising expected utility as a special case, i.e.,
when we can represent our beliefs through a probability charge, these criteria
should coincide with maximising expected utility.
Therefore, we must be able to link coherent extended lower previsions
with probability charges, or, more generally, with expected utility. This
requires us to impose a number of technical limitations on the extended
lower previsions modelling our beliefs.
Recall how, in the previous chapters, we modelled our beliefs about a
random variable X through the assessment of supremum buying prices Q( f )
for random quantities f in some subset dom Q of the set R(X) of all random
quantities on X; we called the mapping Q an extended lower prevision (see
Section 3.2 on p. 42., and Section 5.1 on p. 197.). If this Q was not vulnerable
to so-called Dutch book arguments, then we said that Q avoided sure loss (see
Denition 5.2 on p. 200), and in this case, we explained how to derive from
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Q, through natural extension (see Section 5.2.3 on p. 207 ., Denition 5.9
in particular), and convergence methods similar to Dunford integration (see
Section 5.4.3 on p. 239 ., Denition 5.49 on p. 241 in particular), a coherent
extended lower prevision P dened on a much larger set dom P of random
quantities. Moreover, for a number of special cases, we explained how
this extension P could be viewed as the lower envelope of integrals with
respect to probability charges, or, more generally, as a lower envelope of
linear extended previsions: the key to this result was essentially that Q had a
real-valued extension P dened on a linear lattice that contained all constant
random quantities; see Lemma 5.20 on p. 218.
For instance, if we start with an extended lower prevision Q that avoids
sure loss, we end up with such a coherent extended lower prevision by taking
P := ER(X)Q
KQ ;
whereKQ is the linear lattice of random quantities f for which ER(X)Q (j f j) < +1;
note that KQ contains also all bounded random quantities, and hence, all
constant random quantities. Alternatively, if we start with a lower prevision
Q (i.e., Q real-valued and dened on bounded random quantities only) that
avoids sure loss, then we also end up with such a coherent extended lower
prevision by taking
P := ExQ;
which is dened on the linear lattice of all EQ-previsible random quantities;
again, all bounded random quantities belong to this linear lattice. So, from
now on, we shall assume that P is a real-valued coherent extended lower
prevision, dened on linear lattice of random quantities on X that contains
at least the set R(X) of all constant random quantities on X, and all ran-
dom quantities Ja induced by actions a in A. Of course, there are extended
lower previsions that do not satisfy this requirement, but nevertheless, we
shall impose these restrictions, as they lead to a number of very practical
consequences, and as they cover all cases in which we start with an extended
lower prevision Q such that dom Q  KQ, which can be guaranteed to hold
by restricting Q to be real-valued, and careful choice of the domain of Q, as
explained in Corollary 5.22 on p. 223; for instance, it always holds in case Q
is a lower prevision.
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Let's briey summarise the consequences of this assumption.
(i) The set dom P equipped with the P-norm, which is dened by
 fP :=
P(j f j) for all f in dom P, is a topological vector spacenote that j f j
belongs to dom P whenever f does, since dom P is a linear lattice. How-
ever, it turns out that the P-norm topology is slightly too weak for the
purpose of this work: we need to strengthen it with point-wise conver-
gence on members ofX (also called the weak convergence). Concretely,
we shall say that a net f in dom P converges to f in dom P if
8>>><>>>:
P(j f   f j)! 0; and
f(x)! f (x); for all x 2 X;
(6.2)
unless explicitly stated otherwise, dom P is assumed to be endowed
with the topology induced by this convergence. It turns dom P into
a locally convex topological vector space, which also happens to be
Hausdor. A topological basis at 0 consists for instance of the convex
sets
f f 2 dom P : P(j f j) <  and f (x) < (x)g;
for  > 0, and (x) > 0 for all x 2 X. It has more open sets and more closed
sets than the P-norm topology and the weak topology, but it has less
compact sets than the P-norm topology and the weak topology. In any
case, this topology is weaker than the topology of uniform convergence.
Note that in caseX is nite, it reduces to the weak topology, which is in
that case also equivalent to the topology of uniform convergence.
Interestingly, if P = ExQ, then the set L(X) of bounded random quant-
ities is dense in dom P with respect to this topology; this is an imme-
diate consequence of Corollary 5.69 on p. 256 (previsibility by cuts)
and Lemma 5.57 on p. 245 (convergence in P-norm of determining se-
quences).
(ii) For ease of notation, we shall denote set Mdom PP of linear extended
previsions on dom P that are behavioural extensions of P byM, or by
MP in case we study more than one extended lower prevision at the
same time. This setM is non-empty, convex, and compact with respect
to the topology of point-wise convergence on members of dom P, and
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it uniquely determines P:
P( f ) = min
Q2M
Q( f );
for any f in dom P. If P = ExQ and all random quantities in dom P have
F -measurable determining sequences with respect to EQ, then we even
have that
P( f ) = min
2mFQ
D
Z
f d;
i.e., M is fully characterised by a non-empty convex compact set of
probability charges mFQ ; see Theorem 5.76 on p. 265.
6.2.3 A Technical Lemma About Preorders
A relation that is reexive and transitive is called a preorder, and such pre-
orders are used to model preference. In this section, we prove a technical but
very useful lemma about the existence of maximal elements with respect to
preorders; it's an abstraction of a result proved by De Cooman and Troaes
[23].
Let V be any set, and let Q be any preorder on V. An element v of a
subset S ofV is called Q -maximal in S if, for all w in S, w Q v implies v Q w.
The set of Q -maximal elements is denoted by
maxQ (S) :=
n
v 2 S : (8w 2 S)(w Q v =) v Q w)
o
: (6.3)
For any v in S, we also dene the up-set of v relative to S as
"S
Q
v := fw 2 S : w Q vg :
Lemma 6.1. LetV be a Hausdor topological space. Let Q be any preorder onV
such that for any v in V, the set "V
Q
v is closed. Then, for any non-empty compact
subset S ofV, the following statements hold.
(i) For every v in S, the set "S
Q
v is non-empty and compact.
(ii) The set maxQ (S) of Q -maximal elements of S is non-empty.
(iii) For every v in S, there is a Q -maximal element w of S such that w Q v.
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Proof. (i). Since Q is reexive, it follows that v Q v, so "S
Q
v is non-empty. Is
it compact? Clearly, "S
Q
v = S \ "V
Q
v, so "S
Q
v is the intersection of a compact
set and a closed set, and therefore "S
Q
v must be compact too.
(ii). Let S0 be any subset of the non-empty compact set S that is linearly
ordered with respect to Q . If we can show that S0 has an upper bound
in S with respect to Q , then we can infer from a version of Zorn's lemma
[70, (AC7), p. 144] (which also holds for preorders) that S has a Q -maximal
element. Let then fv1; v2; : : : ; vng be an arbitrary nite subset of S0. We can
assume without loss of generality that v1 Q v2 Q    Q vn, and consequently
"S
Q
v1  "SQv2      "SQvn. This implies that the intersection
Tn
k=1 "SQvk = "SQv1
of these up-sets is non-empty: the collection
n
"S
Q
v : v 2 S0
o
of compact and
hence closed (V is Hausdor) subsets ofS has the nite intersection property.
Consequently, since S is compact, the intersection Tv2S0 "SQv is non-empty as
well, and this is the set of upper bounds of S0 in Swith respect to Q . So, by
Zorn's lemma, S has a Q -maximal element: maxQ (S) is non-empty.
(iii). Combine (i) and (ii) to show that the non-empty compact set "S
Q
v has
a maximal element w with respect to Q . It is then a trivial step to prove that
w is also Q -maximal in S: we must show that for any u in S, if u Q w, then
w Q u. But, if u Q w, then also u Q v since w Q v by construction. Hence,
u 2 "S
Q
v, and since w is Q -maximal in "S
Q
v, it follows that w Q u. 
6.3 P-Maximality
6.3.1 Pair-Wise Choice
Maximality is a criterion of optimality based on pair-wise choice. Let's briey
explain the basics of pair-wise choice, and how it leads to optimality.
We model pair-wise choice by a relation R on A: for a pair of actions a and
b in A, we say that aRb, if we are disposed to choose a whenever we have the
choice between only a and b. Clearly, R is a relation on A. What properties
must R satisfy? If we are presented with only a single action a in A, then we
have no choice but to choose a. So, for any a in A, it always holds that aRa: R
is reexive. If we are presented with only two actions a and b in A, we have
no choice but to choose a, or to choose b. So, for any actions a and b in A, it
always holds that aRb or bRa: R is complete.
Denition 6.2. A complete and reexive relation R on A is called a choice
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relation.
So, a choice relation determines optimality on pairs: it tells us which actions
we may choose from a given pair of actions. But, how does a choice relation
lead to optimality when the set of actions contains more than two elements?
Looking at optimality through pair-wise choice can be traced back to at
least Condorcet [16]his method is perhaps most clearly explained in his
voting examples; see for instance Condorcet [16, pp. lvjlxix, 4.e Exemple].
More recently, Sen [73] has studied optimality based on pair-wise choice
under very general assumptions. In agreement with Condorcet's method,
given a complete and reexive relation R on Aa choice relationwe should
select (see Sen [73, p. 55, Eq. (1)])
optR (A) := fa 2 A : (8b 2 A)(aRb)g: (6.4)
This simply means that we are disposed to choose a from A, whenever, for all
b in A, we are disposed to choose a from fa; bg. In this way, pair-wise choice,
i.e., a notion of optimality on pairs, leads to a notion of optimality on larger
sets. The mapping optR (), as a mapping from subsets of A to subsets of A, is
called a social choice function, if optR (B) is non-empty for every non-empty
subset B of A:
Denition 6.3. A mapping opt () : }(A) ! }(A), satisfying opt (B)  B for
all B  A, and opt (B) , ; whenever B , ;, is called a social choice function.
Of course, as we already noted in Section 3.2 on p. 42 ., it is an important
observation that not all reasonable social choice functions are representable
by Eq. (6.4), i.e., by choice relations.
Sen [73] extensively studied the interplay between general social choice
functions opt (), choice relations R, and social choice functions optR () in-
duced by such relations R, as in Eq. (6.4). As lower previsions naturally lead
to pair-wise preference, Walley [86] inferred an optimality criterion based on
lower previsions, essentially invoking Eq. (6.4). Let's briey explain how this
works.
Suppose we are given a strict partial order, i.e., a transitive and anti-
reexive relation, > on A, which models strict preference on A: we say that
a > b, whenever we strictly prefer a over b. In terms of pair-wise choice, a > b
means that we shall never choose b from fa; bg. In eect, from fa; bg, we shall
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only choose a. So, any choice relation R> that is compatible with the choices
implied by >, must satisfy that a > b if and only if aR>b and not bR>a. But,
this property uniquely determines R>.
Indeed, since R> is a choice relation, it must be complete: it always holds
that aR>b or bR>a. So, not bR>a implies aR>b. Therefore, aR>b and not bR>a, is
equivalent to not bR>a. Hence a > b is equivalent to not bR>a, or, equivalently,
a  b is equivalent to bR>a: a is not strictly preferred to b, if and only if we
are disposed to choose b from fa; bg. So, within Sen's framework [73, p. 55,
Eq. (1)], given a notion of strict preference >, the only way to end up with a
set of optimal actions is by choosing R equal to :
opt

(A) := fa 2 A : (8b 2 A)(a  b)g:
Since > is a strict partial order, it follows that  is complete and reexive, and
hence, a choice relation. Moreover,  is acyclic, so, as Sen [73, p. 55] remarks,
it follows that opt

(A) is non-empty whenever A is nite. In particular,
opt

() is a social choice function on nite sets. We shall call actions in
opt

(A) >-maximal because they correspond to the elements of A that are
maximal with respect to the strict partial order >, i.e., they correspond to
those actions in A for which there is no action in A that is strictly preferred
to it:
opt

(A) = max> (A) := fa 2 A : (8b 2 A)(a  b)g: (6.5)
Now, following Walley [86, Sections 3.73.9], we can easily derive a strict
partial order from the coherent extended lower prevision P, which has the
interpretation of a strict preference. Recall that the extended lower prevision
P( f ) of a random quantity f has a behavioural interpretation as a supremum
acceptable price for buying f : P( f ) is the highest real number s 2 R such that
for any price t 2 R that is strictly lower than s, we are willing to pay t prior
to observing X, if we are guaranteed to receive f (x) once X = x has been
observed. This allows us to dene a strict partial order >P on dom P whose
interpretation is that of strict preference. We also introduce a preorder >P,
which satises max>P () = max>P (); recall that we dened maximality for
preorders in Eq. (6.3) on p. 275, and maximality for strict partial orders in
Eq. (6.5) on p. 278.
Denition 6.4. For any two random quantities f and g in dom P, we say that
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f is strictly preferred to g with respect to P, and write f >P g, if
P( f   g) > 0 or ( f  g and f , g):
We say that f is preferred to g with respect to P, and we write f >P g, if
P( f   g) > 0 or f  g:
Indeed, assuming act-state independence, if f  g and f , g then we
should strictly prefer f to g, since f can only induce a higher gain than g. On
the other hand, P( f   g) > 0 expresses that we are willing to pay some strictly
positive price to exchange g for f , which again means that we strictly prefer
f to g. The preference relation >P is a preorder: it is reexive and transitive.
Moreover, >P is the weakest preorderi.e., comparing the fewest pairsthat
agrees with >P: f >P g if and only if either f >P g or f = g. Also, >P is
anti-symmetric: if f >P g and g >P f then f = g. A reexive, transitive, and
anti-symmetric relation is called a partial order, so, >P is actually a partial
order on dom P.
It is clear that we can also use the coherent extended lower prevision P
to express a strict preference between any two actions a and b in A, based on
their gains Ja and Jb: if Ja >P Jb, then the uncertain gain Ja is strictly preferred
to the uncertain gain Jb, and therefore the action a should also be strictly
preferred to b. In such a case, we may also write a >P b.
Similarly, we shall write a >P b if Ja >P Jb, and a  b if Ja  Jb. Note that,
whereas >P and  are partial orders on dom P, they may only be preorders
on A, since it may happen that Ja = Jb for two dierent actions a and b in A.
The relation >P is anti-reexive and transitive: this follows from the
coherence of P (in particular, P( f   f ) = 0 and P(h   f )  P(h   g) + P(g   f )).
So, it is indeed a strict partial order on dom P, and therefore also on A. Hence,
as we explained above, this leads to the following criterion of optimality (see
Walley [86, Section 3.9.2, p. 161]):
Denition 6.5. An action a in A is called P-maximal in A if no action in A is
strictly preferred to a with respect to >P:
opt
P
(A) = max>P (A) = max>P (A) = fa 2 A : (8b 2 A)(aPb)g:
Proof of equality. All equalities are immediate consequences of the denitions
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of opt
P
(A) and max>P (A), except for the equality max>P (A) = fa 2 A : (8b 2
A)(aPb)g. Indeed, since for any a and b in A, it holds that aPb, if and only if
JaP Jb, if and only if Ja 
P Jb or Ja = Jb, if and only if Jb >P Ja implies Ja = Jb,
if and only ifusing the fact that >P is a partial order on dom PJb >P Ja
implies Ja >P Jb, if and only if b >P a implies a >P b. So, by Eq. (6.3) on p. 275,
it follows that that max>P (A) = fa 2 A : (8b 2 A)(aPb)g. 
It's convenient to denote byJA the set of gain random quantities induced
by actions in A,
JA := fJa : a 2 Ag:
The P-maximal actions in A are precisely those actions whose induced gain
is a maximal element of JA with respect to the strict partial order >P, or
equivalently, with respect to the partial order >P, so
a 2 opt
P
(A) () Ja 2 optP (JA) :
Let's now give a number of important properties of P-maximality.
6.3.2 Monotonicity
The more determinate our beliefs, the smaller the set of P-maximal actions:
Theorem 6.6. If Q is a behavioural extension of P, then max>Q (A)  max>P (A).
Proof. Suppose that a is Q-maximal in A. Then, for all b in A, it holds that
aQb, i.e., Q(Jb   Ja)  0, and Jb 6 Ja or Jb = Ja. But, if Q(Jb   Ja)  0, then it
must also hold that P(Jb   Ja)  0, since that Q is a behavioural extension of
P. So, for all b in A, it holds that P(Jb   Ja)  0, and Jb 6 Ja or Jb = Ja, i.e., aPb:
a must be P-maximal as well. 
6.3.3 P-Maximality Through Point-Wise Maximality
In this section, we derive a simple way to nd P-maximal actions, and we
show how P-maximality generalises maximising expected utility. The fol-
lowing theorem generalises a result by Walley [86, Section 3.9.2, p. 161].
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Theorem 6.7. An action a in A is P-maximal if and only if it is -maximal and
P(Ja   Jb)  0 for all actions b in A:
max>P (A) = max>P (A) =
n
a 2 max (A) : (8b 2 A)(P(Ja   Jb)  0)
o
and if JA is compact, then a in A is P-maximal if and only if a is -maximal and
P(Ja   Jb)  0 for all -maximal actions b in A:
=
n
a 2 max (A) : (8b 2 max (A))(P(Ja   Jb)  0)
o
Proof. First, note that, for any random quantity f in dom P, the set "dom P f is
closed. Indeed, if a net g in "dom P f converges to g in dom P, i.e.,
P(jg   gj)! 0 and 8x 2 X : g(x)! g(x);
then g belongs to "dom P f : since g(x)  f (x) for all x 2 X, it follows that also
lim g(x) = g(x)  f (x) for all x 2 X, so g 2 "dom P f . Hence, "dom P f is closed,
and therefore Lemma 6.1 on p. 275 applies on dom P with preorder .
By the denition of P-maximality, it easily follows that
max>P (A) =
n
a 2 A : (8b 2 A)

P(Ja   Jb)  0 and (Ja 6 Jb or Ja = Jb)
o
;
but, if a does not belong to max (A), then there is a b in A such that Jb  Ja
and Jb , Ja, and hence, it cannot hold that Ja 6 Jb or Ja = Jb. Therefore, any a
in A such that Ja 6 Jb or Ja = Jb for all b in A must be -maximal:
=
n
a 2 max (A) : (8b 2 A)

P(Ja   Jb)  0 and (Ja 6 Jb or Ja = Jb)
o
but, if a belongs to max (A), then it must hold that Ja 6 Jb or Ja = Jb for all
b in A. Indeed, if Ja  Jb and Ja , Jb, then Ja cannot belong to max (A), a
contradiction. So,
=
n
a 2 max (A) : (8b 2 A)

P(Ja   Jb)  0
o
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which establishes the rst equality. Now assume that JA is compact. Con-
sider b in A. If a belongs to max (A), then, by Lemma 6.1(iii), there is a
-maximal c in A such that Jc  Jb. But, since P(Ja   Jb)  P(Ja   Jc) whenever
Jc  Jb, this implies that P(Ja  Jb)  0 whenever P(Ja  Jc)  0 for all-maximal
actions c in A. So, if P(Ja   Jc)  0 for all c in max (A), then this must also
hold for all b in A; and conversely, it is obvious that if P(Ja   Jb)  0 for all b
in A, then the same also holds for all c in max (A). We nd
=
n
a 2 max (A) : (8c 2 max (A))

P(Ja   Jc)  0
o
which establishes the second equality. 
As a consequence, if all random quantities in JA are -maximal, i.e., if
Ja 6 Jb or Ja = Jb for all a and b in A, then the set of P-maximal actions in A
are exactly those actions a in A such that P(Ja   Jb)  0 for all actions b in A.
If additionally P is self-conjugate, i.e., if P( f ) = P( f ) for all f in dom P and
using P( f ) as a notation for both P( f ) and P( f ), this condition means that
P-maximal actions a maximise their prevision P.
Corollary 6.8. Suppose that P is self-conjugate. The following statements hold.
(i) If JA = max (JA), then max>P (A) = arg maxa2A P(Ja).
(ii) If JA is compact, then max>P (A) = arg maxa2max A P(Ja).
Proof. Apply Theorem 6.7, and observe that, for any a and b in A, P(Ja  Jb)  0
if and only if P(Ja)  P(Jb) by the self-conjugacy and coherence of P. 
So, in case P is self-conjugate, P-maximality corresponds in essence to
maximising expected utility as dened in Eq. (6.1) on p. 268. Note that, in
Corollary 6.8(i), we don't need to impose compactness of JA.
6.3.4 Existence of Dominating P-Maximal Actions
P-maximal actions do not always exist: not every preordered set has maximal
elements. A fairly general sucient condition for the existence of P-maximal
elements in A is that JA should be compact with respect to the topology in-
troduced in Eq. (6.2) on p. 274. This generalises a result mentioned by Walley
[86, Section 3.9.2]. In fact, we prove a stronger result in Theorem 6.9 below,
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which turns out to be very important in proving that the dynamic program-
ming approach works for P-maximality in Chapter 7, p. 299 . Theorem 6.9
is a slightly stronger version of an earlier result proved by De Cooman and
Troaes [23]: Theorem 6.9 does not hold only for extended lower previsions
dened on bounded random quantities only, as was the case for the earlier
version, and secondly, it requires compactness of JA with respect to a topo-
logy that is weaker than the topology of uniform convergence (and therefore
has more compact sets).
Theorem 6.9. If JA is non-empty and compact, then for every action a in A, there
is a P-maximal action b in A such that b >P a.
Proof. We already observed that max>P (A) = max>P (A); see Denition 6.5.
So, by Lemma 6.1(iii) on p. 275, it would suce to prove that for any random
quantity f in dom P, the set "dom P>P f is closed. Unfortunately, "
dom P
>P
f is not
closed in general. Therefore, instead, for a given random quantity Ja in JA,
we shall identify a random quantity Jb in max>P (JA) such that Jb >P Ja, using
preorders Q for which "dom P
Q
f is closed.
Indeed, consider the point-wise order  (which is not only a preorder, but
even a partial order) dened by f  g whenever f (x)  g(x) for all x 2 X, and
the preorder <P dened by f <P g whenever P( f   g)  0. We rst show that
the sets "dom P f and "dom P<P f are closed, for any random quantity f in dom P.
The closedness of "dom P f has been demonstrated in the proof of Theorem 6.7.
Let's prove that "dom P<P f is closed.
For instance, let g be any net in "dom P<P f , and suppose that g converges
to a random quantity g in dom P:
P(jg   gj)! 0 and 8x 2 X : g(x)! g(x):
We must show that g belongs to "dom P<P f . Indeed, since P(jg   gj) ! 0, it
follows by Theorem 3.5(xi) on p. 55 that P(g   g) ! P(g   g) = 0. Also,
for every , it holds that P(g   f )  P(g   g) + P(g   f )  P(g   g), since
g 2 "dom P<P f . Therefore, P(g   f )  lim P(g   g) = 0, so g 2 "
dom P
<P
f .
Now, given Ja, we construct Jb as follows. By Lemma 6.1(iii), there is a
-maximal element Jc in JA such that Jc  Ja. In particular, it follows that
Jc >P Ja, so, if Jc happens to be P-maximal, then we may take b = c and the
theorem is established. If Jc is not P-maximal, then
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(a) by Theorem 6.7, there is at least one action d in max (A) such that P(Jc  
Jd) < 0,
(b) by Lemma 6.1(i) "JA<P Jd is compact, and therefore, since P is continuous
(see Theorem 3.5(xi)), the mapping P achieves a maximum on "JA<P Jd, say,
at Je 2 "JA<P Jd. For every random quantity Js in "
JA
<P
Jd, it holds that
P(Je   Js)  P(Je) + P( Js) = P(Je)   P(Js)  0; (6.6)
(c) by Lemma 6.1(iii) there is a -maximal element Jb inJA such that Jb  Je.
We now show that Jb is P-maximal in JA, and that Jb >P Ja.
But, by construction, Jb is -maximal inJA, so, by Theorem 6.7 it suces
to show that P(Jb   Js)  0 for all s in max (A). Indeed, if Js 2 "JA<P Jd, then
P(Jb  Js)  P(Je  Js) since Jb  Je by construction, and P(Je  Js)  0 by Eq. (6.6).
On the other hand, if Js < "JA<P Jd, then P(Js   Jd) < 0, and hence, since Jb  Je,
P(Jb   Js)  P(Je   Js)  P(Je   Jd) + P(Jd   Js) > 0;
because P(Je   Jd)  0 by construction of Je, and P(Jd   Js) =  P(Js   Jd) > 0
since Js < "JA<P Jd.
So, Jb is P-maximal in JA. It remains to show that Jb >P Ja. Indeed, since
Jb  Je and Jc  Ja,
P(Jb   Ja)  P(Je   Jc)  P(Je   Jd) + P(Jd   Jc) > 0;
because P(Je   Jd)  0 by construction of Je, and P(Jd   Jc) =  P(Jc   Jd) > 0 by
construction of Jd. 
6.4 M-Maximality
6.4.1 Robustifying Preference
In the theory of Bayesian sensitivity analysis, also called Bayesian robustness,
belief is modelled through a set m of probability measures, which is assumed
to contain the `true', but unknown, probability measure ; see for instance
Berger [6], in case m corresponds to set of posterior probability distributions.
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A similar model is obtained in quasi-Bayesian theory, where sets of probability
measures represent partial preference orderings that satisfy certain systems
of axioms, similar to the axioms of rationality, given in Axiom 3.1 on p. 49;
see Giron and Rios [35] in caseX is a nite set; also see Seidenfeld, Schervish
and Kadane [72] for a very general representation of preferences, using sets
of probability/utility pairs.
Central to these theories is that a random quantity f is to be preferred
to a random quantity g whenever it is preferred under all candidate models
 2 m. This leads to the denition (or representation) of a `robustied'
preference ordering >m. Let us denote by P( f ) the expected utility of f with
respect to , i.e., say that the P are linear behavioural extensions of the  in
m dened on a common domain K  R(X); for simplicity, assume that K is
a linear space, and JA  K . Then, for each  we already have a preference
ordering, namely >P , dened in Denition 6.4. These preference orderings
induce the following robustied preference:
Denition 6.10. For any a and b in A, we say that a >m b whenever a >P b
for all  2 m.
We have already established an onto and one-to-one correspondence
between coherent extended lower previsions of the form P = ExQ (where
Q is a lower prevision that avoids sure loss) and convex compact sets of
probability charges on }(X); see Theorem 5.76 on p. 265. For these lower
previsions, the above denition can also be written as:
Denition 6.11. For any a and b in A, we say that a >M b whenever a >R b
for all R 2 M.
Recall thatM denotes the set of extended linear previsions on dom P which
are behavioural extensions of P.
We shall take the above denition as a general denition of robustied
preference >M: the set M is assumed to contain the `true', but unknown,
prevision (i.e., expected utility operator) R.
SinceM is assumed to be compact and convex, it is not dicult to show
that the partial orders >M and >P on dom P are one and the same, simply
through observation that P is the lower envelope ofM. Indeed, since P( f ) =
minR2M R( f ) for all f in dom P, for any a and b in A it holds that Ja  Jb or
P(Ja   Jb) > 0, if and only if Ja  Jb or minR2M R(Ja   Jb) > 0, and, since this
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minimum is actually reached for some R inM, this holds if and only if Ja  Jb
or R(Ja   Jb) > 0 for all R inM. So, >M is equal to >P.
As a result, Bayesian robustness can be modelled through P-maximality,
whenever (i) m induces a compact and convex set of previsions (expected
utility operators) dened on a common linear space K  R(X), and (ii)
the lower envelope P of this set of previsions satises the conditions of
Section 6.2.2 on p. 272 . Note that these assumptions are in particular
satised whenX is a nite space, m is a convex and compact set of probability
measures on }(X), and K = R(X), i.e., the case discussed by Giron and Rios
[35].
6.4.2 Robustifying Choice Functions: E-Admissibility
But there is in the literature yet another notion of optimality that can be as-
sociated with the compact convex set of extended linear previsions M: an
action a can be considered optimal in A if it is a maximal element of A with re-
spect to the preorder >R for some R 2 M. This notion of optimality is a special
case of what Levi [54, Section 4.8] calls `E-admissibility' (we have a unique
utility function, whereas Levi allows for a convex set of utility functions, and
secondly, we only consider the static case here, whereas E-admissibility also
extends to dynamic systems). This notion of optimality does not generally
coincide with the ones associated with the preorders >M and >P, unless the
set JA is convex; see for instance Walley [86, Section 3.9.5, pp. 162163]. We
are therefore led to consider the following notion of optimality:
Denition 6.12. An action a in A is calledM-maximal, if it is R-maximal for
some R inM:
optM (A) :=
[
R2M
opt
R
(A) =
[
R2M
max>R (A) : (6.7)
6.4.3 Monotonicity
The more determinate our beliefs, the smaller the set ofM-maximal actions
(this is similar to Theorem 6.6 on p. 280).
Theorem 6.13. If Q is a behavioural extension of P, then maxMQ (A)  maxMP (A).
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Proof. If Q is a behavioural extension of P, then any linear behavioural ex-
tension S of Q is also a linear behavioural extension of P, and hence, a linear
behavioural extension of an elementnamely, the restriction of S to dom P
ofMP.
Suppose that a isMQ-maximal in A. Then, there is a linear behavioural
extension Sa of Q such a is Sa-maximal in A. But, since Sa is also a linear
behavioural extension of an Ra inMP, it follows from Theorem 6.6 on p. 280
that a is Ra-maximal, and henceMP-maximal. 
6.4.4 M-Maximality Through Point-Wise Maximality
Theorem 6.14. An action a in A isM-maximal if and only if it is -maximal in A
and there is an Ra inM such that Ra(Ja   Jb)  0 for every action b in A:
max>P (A) =
n
a 2 max (A) : (9Ra 2 M)(8b 2 A)(Ra(Ja   Jb)  0)
o
;
and if JA is compact, then a in A is P-maximal if and only if a is -maximal in A
and there is an Ra inM such that Ra(Ja   Jb)  0 for every -maximal action b in A:
=
n
a 2 max (A) : (9Ra 2 M)(8b 2 max (A))(Ra(Ja   Jb)  0)
o
:
Proof. Immediate from Eq. (6.7) and Theorem 6.7 on p. 280. 
6.4.5 When P-Maximality andM-Maximality Coincide
In any case,M-maximality implies P-maximality (see Walley [86, Sect. 3.9.4,
p. 162, ll. 2628]):
Proposition 6.15. If a isM-maximal in A, then it is also P-maximal in A.
Proof. If a is M-maximal in A, then, by Theorem 6.14, a is -maximal and
there is a linear extended prevision Ra inM such that Ra(Ja   Jb)  0 for all b
in A. But, by denition ofM, Ra is a behavioural extension of P: Ra( f )  P( f )
for all f in dom P. Hence, a is -maximal and P(Ja   Jb)  Ra(Ja   Jb)  0 for
all b in A. Applying Theorem 6.7, we nd that a is P-maximal in A. 
The converse does not need to hold: we have demonstrated in Sec-
tion 6.2.1 on p. 269 . that optM (A) does not need to coincide with optP (A);
also see Walley [86, Section 3.9.9, p. 165] for a counterexample. As already
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mentioned before, the converse is however guaranteed to hold if A contains
no more than two elements (Schervish, Seidenfeld, Kadane, and Levi [71]) or
if JA is convex (Walley [86, Section 3.9.5, maximality theorem]):
Theorem 6.16. If A contains no more than two actions, then optM (A) = optP (A).
Proof. Immediate. 
Theorem 6.17. If JA is convex, then optM (A) = optP (A).
Proof. (Proof adapted from Walley [86, Section 3.9.5, maximality theorem])
Let a 2 A and dene K = fJa   Jb : b 2 Ag. Since JA is convex, so is K . By
Theorems 6.7&6.14, it suces to prove that P( f )  0 for all f inK if and only
if there is a Q inM such that Q( f )  0 for all f inK .
if. Immediate since P( f )  Q( f ) for all f inK .
only if. Assume that P( f )  0 for all f in K . Since K is convex, condi-
tion (B) of Lemma 5.20 on p. 218 is satised, so, condition (C) of Lemma 5.20
must be satised as well: there is a linear behavioural extension R of P such
that R( f )  0 for all f in K . Now take the restriction Q of R to dom P: Q
belongs toM and satises the desired property. 
6.5 P-Maximinity and P-Maximaxity
6.5.1 Worst-Case and Best-Case Ranking
Another common generalisation of maximising expected utility ranks actions
according to the lower (or upper) prevision of their gain gambles:
Denition 6.18. An action a in A is called P-maximin in A if it is maximal in
A with respect to the preorder wP dened by a wP b whenever
P(Ja) > P(Jb) or Ja  Jb:
Similarly, an action a in A is called P-maximax in A if it is maximal in A with
respect to the preorder wP dened by a wP b whenever
P(Ja) > P(Jb) or Ja  Jb:
For an axiomatic study of P-maximin, we refer to Gilboa and Schmeidler
[34]. For some reason, P-maximax does not enjoy the same popularity as
6.5 P-MAXIMINITY AND P-MAXIMAXITY 289
P-maximin, but it has been applied as a criterion of optimality in the theory
of Markov decision processes, see Satia and Lave [68].
6.5.2 No Monotonicity
More determinate beliefs usually do not lead to a smaller set P-maximin
or P-maximax actions. Indeed, consider the example of Section 6.2.1 on
p. 269 .: without any further information about the coin, P is the vacuous
lower prevision on fH;Tg, and the P-maximin solution is fa0g. Suppose we
receive additional information: the coin will always land heads up. This
information is modelled by taking P equal to the vacuous lower prevision on
fHg; the corresponding P-maximin solution is fa1g, which is clearly no subset
of fa0g.
6.5.3 Through Pointwise Maximality
Again, point-wise maximality helps (also see Walley [86, Sect. 3.9.7, pp. 163
164]):
Theorem 6.19. An action a in A is P-maximin if and only if it is -maximal and
P(Ja)  P(Jb) for all actions b in A:
maxwP (A) =
n
a 2 max (A) : (8b 2 A)(P(Ja)  P(Jb))
o
and if JA is compact, then a in A is P-maximin if and only if a is -maximal and
P(Ja)  P(Jb) for all -maximal actions b in A:
= arg max
a2max(A)
P(Ja):
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 6.7 on p. 280. 
Theorem 6.20. An action a in A is P-maximax if and only if it is -maximal and
P(Ja)  P(Jb) for all actions b in A:
maxwP (A) =
n
a 2 max (A) : (8b 2 A)(P(Ja)  P(Jb))
o
290 OPTIMALITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY
and if JA is compact, then a in A is P-maximax if and only if a is -maximal and
P(Ja)  P(Jb) for all -maximal actions b in A:
= arg max
a2max(A)
P(Ja):
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 6.7 on p. 280. 
Corollary 6.21. The following statements hold.
(i) If JA = max (JA), then
maxwP (A) = arg maxa2A P(Ja) and maxwP (A) = arg maxa2A P(Ja):
(ii) If JA is compact, then
maxwP (A) = arg maxa2max A
P(Ja) and maxwP (A) = arg maxa2max A
P(Ja):
6.5.4 P-Maximin and P-Maximax Imply P-Maximality
The following proposition connects P-maximinity and P-maximaxity with
P-maximality.
Proposition 6.22. If an action a is P-maximin or P-maximax in A, then it also
P-maximal in A.
Proof. By the coherence of P, it follows that P(Ja   Jb)  P(Ja)   P(Jb) and
P(Ja   Jb)  P(Ja)   P(Jb) for any a and b in A. So, if a is P-maximin or P-
maximax in A, then, by these inequalities and Theorem 6.19 or Theorem 6.20,
it follows that a is -maximal in A and P(Ja   Jb)  0 for all b in A. But, by
Theorem 6.7 on p. 280, this means that a is P-maximal in A. 
6.5.5 P-Maximax ImpliesM-Maximality
P-maximin does not necessarily imply M-maximality: that was demon-
strated by the example of Section 6.2.1 on p. 269 . However, P-maximax
does implyM-maximality.
Proposition 6.23. If an action a is P-maximax in A, then it alsoM-maximal in A.
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Proof. Suppose that a is P-maximax in A, i.e., by Theorem 6.20, a is-maximal,
and P(Ja)  P(Jb) for all b in A. Since P(Ja) = maxQ2MQ(Ja), there is an R inM
such that R(Ja) = P(Ja). So, for all b in A,
R(Ja) = P(Ja)  P(Jb) = max
Q2M
Q(Jb)  R(Jb);
and therefore, a must beM-maximal as well, by Theorem 6.14. 
6.5.6 Existence of Dominating P-Maximin and P-Maximax
Actions
The existence of dominating P-maximin and P-maximax actions, which will
turn out to be very important in dynamic programming, is again guaranteed
if JA is compact.
Theorem 6.24. IfJA is non-empty and compact, then for every action a in A, there
is a P-maximin action b in A such that b wP a. Similarly, for every action a in A,
there is a P-maximax action b in A such that b wP a.
Proof. By Lemma 6.1(iii), there is a -maximal element Jc in JA such that
Jc  Ja. In particular, it follows that Jc wP Ja, so, if Jc happens to be P-
maximin, then we may take b = c and the theorem is established. If Jc is not
P-maximin, then
(a) by Theorem 6.19, there is at least one action d in max (A) such that
P(Jc) < P(Jd),
(b) by the continuity of P (see Theorem 3.5(xi)) and the compactness of JA,
P achieves a maximum onJA, say, at Je. For every random quantity Js in
JA, it holds that
P(Je)  P(Js): (6.8)
(c) by Lemma 6.1(iii) there is a -maximal element Jb inJA such that Jb  Je.
We now show that Jb is P-maximin in JA, and that Jb wP Ja (note that this b
has been constructed independently of a).
By construction, Jb is -maximal in JA, so, by Theorem 6.19 it suces to
show that P(Jb)  P(Js) for all s in A. But this follows from P(Jb)  P(Je) since
Jb  Je by construction, and P(Je)  P(Js) by Eq. (6.8).
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So, Jb is P-maximin in JA. It remains to show that Jb wP Ja. Indeed, since
Jb  Je and Jc  Ja,
P(Jb)  P(Je)  P(Jd) > P(Jc)  P(Ja);
because P(Je)  P(Jd) by construction of Je, and P(Jd) > P(Jc) by construction
of Jd.
The construction of a dominating P-maximax action is similar. 
6.6 Interval Dominance and Weak P-Maximality
6.6.1 Denition
Yet another criterion of optimality is obtained as follows:
Denition 6.25. An action a in A is called weakly P-maximal in A if it is
maximal in A with respect to the preorder P dened by a P b whenever
P(Ja) > P(Jb) or Ja  Jb:
The inequality P(Ja) > P(Jb) is sometimes also called interval dominance:
it says that the interval [P(Ja);P(Ja)] is completely on the right side of the
interval [P(Jb);P(Jb)].
6.6.2 Weak?
By the coherence of P, it follows that P(Ja  Jb)  P(Ja) P(Jb), so P-maximality
implies weak P-maximality; whence the name weak P-maximality.
Proposition 6.26. If a is P-maximal in A, then it is also weakly P-maximal in A.
6.6.3 Monotonicity
The more determinate our beliefs, the smaller the set of weakly P-maximal
actions (this is similar to Theorem 6.6 on p. 280 and Theorem 6.13 on p. 286).
Theorem 6.27. If Q is a behavioural extension of P, then maxQ (A)  maxP (A).
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Proof. Suppose that a is Q-maximal in A. Then, for all b in A, it holds that
Q(Ja)  Q(Jb), and Jb 6 Ja or Jb = Ja. But, if Q(Ja)  Q(Jb), then it must also
hold that P(Ja)  P(Jb), since that Q is a behavioural extension of P. So, for
all b in A, it holds that P(Ja)  P(Jb), and Jb 6 Ja or Jb = Ja: a must be weakly
P-maximal as well. 
6.6.4 Weak P-Maximality Through Point-Wise Maximality
Also for this type of optimality, point-wise maximality helps.
Theorem 6.28. An action a in A is weakly P-maximal if and only if it is -maximal
and P(Ja)  P(Jb) for all actions b in A:
maxP (A) =
n
a 2 max (A) : (8b 2 A)(P(Ja)  P(Jb))
o
and ifJA is compact, then a in A is weakly P-maximal if and only if a is -maximal
and P(Ja)  P(Jb) for all -maximal actions b in A:
=
n
a 2 max (A) : (8b 2 max (A))(P(Ja)  P(Jb))
o
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 6.7 on p. 280. 
6.6.5 Existence of Dominating Weakly P-Maximal Actions
Theorem 6.29. IfJA is non-empty and compact, then for every action a in A, there
is a weakly P-maximal action b in A such that b P a.
Proof. By Lemma 6.1(iii), there is a -maximal element Jc in JA such that
Jc  Ja. In particular, it follows that Jc P Ja, so, if Jc happens to be weakly
P-maximal, then we may take b = c and the theorem is established. If Jc is
not weakly P-maximal, then
(a) by Theorem 6.28, there is at least one action d in max (A) such that
P(Jc) < P(Jd),
(b) by the continuity of P (see Theorem 3.5(xi)) and the compactness of JA,
P achieves a maximum onJA, say, at Je. For every random quantity Js in
JA, it holds that
P(Je)  P(Js): (6.9)
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(c) by Lemma 6.1(iii) there is a -maximal element Jb inJA such that Jb  Je.
We now show that Jb is weakly P-maximal inJA, and that Jb P Ja (note that
this b has been constructed independently of a).
By construction, Jb is -maximal in JA, so, by Theorem 6.28 it suces to
show that P(Jb)  P(Js) for all s in A. But this follows from P(Jb)  P(Je) since
Jb  Je by construction, and P(Je)  P(Je)  P(Js) by Eq. (6.9).
So, Jb is weakly P-maximal inJA. It remains to show that Jb P Ja. Indeed,
since Jb  Je and Jc  Ja,
P(Jb)  P(Je)  P(Jd) > P(Jc)  P(Ja);
because P(Je)  P(Jd) by construction of Je, and P(Jd) > P(Jc) by construction
of Jd. 
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6.7 Summary of Optimality Criteria
 In general, the following implications hold:
P-maximax P-maximin
M-maximal P-maximal
weakly P-maximal
-maximal
?
HHHHHj ?
-
HHHHHHj ?
?
 If P is self-conjugate, thenM = fPg, and all criteria of optimality coincide
(except of course for -maximality):
P-maximax P-maximin
M-maximal P-maximal
weakly P-maximal
?
HHHHHj ?
6
-
HHHHHHj
Y 6
?

6
HH
HH
Y
 All criteria derived directly from pair-wise preference (such as P-maxi-
mality, weak P-maximality, -maximality, P-maximinity, and P-maxi-
maxity) satisfy the following principle: ifJA is compact, then for every
action a in A there is an optimal b in A such that b is preferred to a.
 All rene max (): any optimal action a in A is -maximal in A.
 For any of these criteria, except for P-maximinity and P-maximaxity, if
Q dominates P, then optimality with respect to Q, implies optimality
with respect to P. Roughly said, the more determinate our beliefs, the
smaller the set of optimal actions.
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The last property, which we have called monotonicity, has a nice intuitive
interpretation: the more determinate our beliefs, the more decisive we are.
P-maximinity and P-maximaxity violate this principle: they imply strong
decisiveness even if our beliefs are very weak. This is demonstrated by the
example of Section 6.2.1 on p. 269 .: P-maximin yields a unique solution,
namely a0, the safest choice.
Part II
Dynamic Programming
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Chapter 7
Dynamic Programming with
Uncertain Gain
In this chapter, we shall generalise the optimisation technique of dynamic
programming for discrete-time systems with an uncertain gain function, as-
suming that uncertainty about the gain function is described by an extended
lower prevision P. We shall show that, in general, only for P-maximality
and M-maximality an optimal feedback can be constructed by solving a
Bellman-like equation. This result is due to De Cooman and Troaes [24, 23].
7.1 Introduction
The main objective in optimal control is to nd out how a system can be
inuenced, or controlled, in such a way that its behaviour satises certain
requirements, while at the same time maximising a given gain function.
A very ecient method for solving optimal control problems for discrete-
time systems is the recursive dynamic programming technique, introduced by
Richard Bellman [4].
7.1.1 The Principle of Optimality
In Figure 7.1 we depict a situation where a system can go from state a to
state c through state b in three ways: following the paths ,  and . We
denote the gains associated with these paths by J, J and J respectively.
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Figure 7.1: Principle of Optimality
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Figure 7.2: Dynamic Programming
Assume that path  is optimal, meaning that J > J and J > J. Then
it follows that path  is the optimal way to go from b to c. To see this,
observe that J = J + J for  2 f; ; g (we shall assume throughout that
gains are additive along paths) and derive from the inequalities above that
J > J and J > J. This simple observation, which Bellman called the
principle of optimality, forms the basis for the recursive technique of dynamic
programming for solving an optimal control problem. To see how this is
done in principle, consider the situation depicted in Figure 7.2. Suppose we
want to nd the optimal way to go from state a to state e. After one time step,
we can reach the states b, c and d from state a, and the optimal paths from
these states to the nal state e are known to be ,  and , respectively. To
nd the optimal path from a to e, we only need to compare the costs J + J,
J + J and J + J of the respective candidate optimal paths ,  and ,
since the principle of optimality tells us that the paths ,  and  cannot
be optimal: if they were, then so would be the paths ,  and . This, written
down in a more formal language, is what is essentially known as Bellman's
equation. It allows us to solve an optimal control problem fairly eciently
through a recursive procedure, by calculating optimal paths backwards from
the nal state.
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7.1.2 Uncertain Gain
In applications, it may happen that the gain function, which associates a
gain with every possible control action and the resulting behaviour of the
system, is not well known. This problem is most often treated by modelling
the uncertainty about the gain by means of a probability measure, and by
maximising the expected gain under this probability measure, as in Section 6.1
on p. 268 . Due to the linearity of the expectation operator, this approach
does not change the nature of the optimisation problem in any essential way,
and the usual dynamic programming method can therefore still be applied.
As an example, consider the simple linear system described by
xk+1 = axk + buk; k = 0; : : : ;N   1 (7.1)
where xk 2 R denote the system state and uk 2 R the control at time k, and
where a and b are non-zero real numbers. Given an initial state x0 and a
sequence u of successive controls u0, u1, . . . , uN 1, the systems goes through
the successive states x1, x2, . . . , xN determined by Eq. (7.1), and we assume
that with this control there is associated a gain
J(x0;u; !) =  
N 1X
k=0
[x2k + !u
2
k];
where ! is some strictly positive real constant. Solving the present optimal
control problem consists in nding a control u that brings the system at
time N in a given nal state x f , while at the same time maximising the gain
J(x0;u; !). The dynamic programming approach achieves this by reasoning
backwards in time. First, the control uN 1 is determined that maximises the
gain
 x2N 1   !u2N 1 =  
x f   buN 1
a
2   !u2N 1:
This control also determines a unique xN 1, and the procedure is then repeated
by nding a control uN 2 that maximises the gain x2N 2 + !u2N 2 . . . The
principle of optimality then ensures that the u found in this recursive manner
indeed solves the optimal control problem. When ! is not well known, and
only its probability distribution is given, the optimal control problem is
solved by maximising the expected value of the gain, i.e., by maximising
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expected utility, which can in this special example be done by replacing !
with its expectation.
We have argued in Chapter 6 that optimality cannot always be modelled
adequately through maximising expected utility, because, roughly speaking,
there may not be enough information available to identify a single probability
measure. In those cases, it is more appropriate to represent the available
knowledge by an extended coherent lower prevision, or what is in many cases
mathematically equivalent, a set of probability measures. This approach has
been applied to estimation and control by for instance Wolfe [93], Cheve´
and Congar [10], Utkin and Gurov [81], and Kozine and Utkin [52]. In the
example above, it may for instance happen that the probability distribution
for ! is only known to belong to a given set: e.g., ! is normally distributed
with mean zero, but the variance is only known to belong to an interval
[2; 2]; or ! itself is only known to belong to an interval [!;!].
Two questions now arise naturally. First of all, how should we formulate
the optimal control problem: what does it mean for a control to be optimal
with respect to an uncertain gain function, where the uncertainty is represen-
ted through an extended coherent lower prevision? In Chapter 6, under the
assumption that our beliefs are not aected by our actions, we have iden-
tied ve dierent optimality criteria, each with a dierent interpretation
(although they coincide for precise probability models), and we have stud-
ied the relations between them. A second question, which we shall address in
this chapter, is whether it is still possible to solve the corresponding optimal
control problems using the ideas underlying Bellman's dynamic program-
ming method? We shall show in Section 7.2 that this is the case for only
two of the ve optimality criteria we have studied: only for these a general-
ised principle of optimality holds, and the optimal controls are solutions of
suitably generalised Bellman-like equations. In order to arrive at this con-
clusion, we study the properties that an abstract notion of optimality should
satisfy for the Bellman approach to work. To illustrate how our ideas can be
implemented, we shall present two numerical example in Sections 7.3&7.4.
Of course, other authors, such as Satia and Lave [68], White and Eldeib
[90], Givan, Leach, and Dean [36], and Harmanec [41], have extended the
dynamic programming algorithm to systems with uncertain gain and/or un-
certain dynamics, where the uncertainty is modelled by a set of probability
distributions. But none of them seem to have questioned in what sense their
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generalised dynamic programming method leads to optimal paths. Here we
approach the problem from the opposite, and in our opinion, more logical
side: one should rst dene a notion of optimality and investigate whether
the dynamic programming argument holds for it, rather than blindly gen-
eralise Bellman's algorithm without showing that it actually yields optimal
controls.
In the remainder of this section, we introduce the basic concepts and
notation used in the remainder of this chapter.
7.1.3 The System
For a and b inN, the set of natural numbers c that satisfy a  c  b is denoted
by [a; b]. Let
xk+1 = f (xk;uk; k)
describe a discrete-time dynamical system with k 2 N, xk 2 X and uk 2 U.
The set X is the state space (e.g., Rn, n 2N n f0g), and the setU is the control
space (e.g., Rm, m 2 N n f0g). The map f : X  U N ! X describes the
evolution of the state in time: given the state xk 2 X and the control uk 2 U
at time k 2 N, it returns the next state xk+1 of the system. For practical
reasons, we impose a nal time N beyond which we are not interested in
the dynamics of the system. Moreover, it may happen that not all states and
controls are allowed at all times: we demand that xk should belong to a set of
admissible states Xk at every instant k 2 [0;N], and that uk should belong to a
set of admissible controlsUk at every instant k 2 [0;N   1], where Xk  X and
Uk  U are given. The setXN may be thought of as the set we want the state
to end up in at time N.
7.1.4 Paths
A path is a triple (x; k;u), where x 2 X is a state, k 2 [0;N] a time instant, and
u : [k;N   1] ! U a sequence of controls. Such a path xes a unique state
trajectory x : [k;N] ! X, which is dened recursively through xk = x and
x`+1 = f (x`;u`; `) for every ` 2 [k;N   1]. It is said to be admissible if x` 2 X`
for every ` 2 [k;N] and u` 2 U` for every ` 2 [k;N 1]. We denote the unique
map from the empty set ; toU by u;. If k = N, the control u does nothing:
it is equal to u;. The unique path starting and ending at time k = N in x 2 X
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is denoted by (x;N;u;).
The set of admissible paths starting in the state x 2 Xk at time k 2 [0;N] is
denoted byU(x; k), i.e.,
U(x; k) = (x; k;u) : (x; k;u) admissible path	 :
For example, U(x;N) = f(x;N;u;)g whenever x 2 XN andU(x;N) = ; other-
wise.
If we consider a path with nal time M dierent from N, then we write
(x; k;u)M (assume k  M  N). Observe that (x; k;u)k can be identied
with (x; k;u;)k; it is the unique path (of length zero) starting and ending at
time k in x. Let 0  k  `  m. Two paths (x; k;u)` and (y; `; v)m can be
concatenated if y = x`. The concatenation is denoted by (x; k;u; `; v)m or by
(x; k;u)`  (y; `; v)m. It represents the path that starts in state x at time k, and
results from applying control ui for times i 2 [k; `  1] and control vi for times
i 2 [`;m   1]. In particular,
(x; k;u)` = (x; k;u)k  (x; k;u)` = (x; k;u)`  (x`; `;u)`:
The set of admissible paths starting in state x 2 Xk at time k 2 [0;N] and
ending at time ` 2 [k;N] is denoted by U(x; k)`. In particular we have that
U(x; k)k = f(x; k;u;)kg if x 2 Xk, andU(x; k)k = ; otherwise. Moreover, for any
(x; k;u)` 2 U(x; k)` and anyV  U(x`; `), we use the notation
(x; k;u)` V = f(x; k;u)`  (x`; `; v) : (x`; `; v) 2 Vg:
7.1.5 The Gain Function
We assume that applying the control action u 2 U to the system in state x 2 X
at time k 2 [0;N 1] yields a real-valued gain g(x;u; k; !). Moreover, reaching
the nal state x 2 X at time N also yields a gain h(x; !). The parameter !
collects all variables that inuence the gain. If we knew its value, say !, we
would know the gains to be g(x;u; k; !) and h(x; !). As it is, the value of !
is uncertain, so we shall consider ! as the uncertain outcome of a random
variable 
 that takes values in a set 
. So the gains are uncertain as well,
and we shall consider them as random quantities on 
. It is important to
note that
 only inuences the gains; it has no eect on the system dynamics,
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which are assumed to be known perfectly well. We shall also assume that
our beliefs about 
 are inuenced nor by the initial state of the system, nor
by the sequence of controls applied to the system: essentially, this is what we
have called act-state independence in Chapter 6beware of the fact that the
standard terminology is rather unfortunate in the context of systems theory,
as the word state in act-state dependence refers to the random variable

, and not the state of the system.
We shall only consider the important case that the gains are additive along
paths, i.e., with a path (x; k;u) we associate a gain J(x; k;u; !) given by:
J(x; k;u; !) =
N 1X
i=k
g(xi;ui; i; !) + h(xN; !);
for any ! 2
 (gain additivity). If M < N, we also use the notation
J(x; k;u; !)M =
M 1X
i=k
g(xi;ui; i; !):
It will be convenient to associate a zero gain with an empty control action:
for k 2 [0;N] we let J(x; k;u; !)k = 0.
The main objective of optimal control can now be formulated as follows:
given that the system is in the initial state x 2 X at time k 2 [0;N], nd a
control sequence u : [k;N   1]!U resulting in an admissible path (x; k;u)
such that the corresponding gain J(x; k;u; !) is maximal. Moreover, we
would like this control sequence u to be such that its value uk at time k is a
function of x and k only, since in that case the control can be realised through
state feedback.
If ! is known, then the problem reduces to the classical problem of dy-
namic programming, rst studied and solved by Bellman [4]. We shall
assume here that the available information about the true state of the world
is modelled through an extended coherent lower prevision P dened on a suf-
ciently large set dom P of random quantities on 
. A special case of this
obtains when P is an extended linear prevision. Recall from Chapter 5 that
extended linear previsions are precise probability models; they are previsions
or fair prices in the sense of de Finetti [27], and in many cases, they can be
interpreted as expectation operators associated with probability measures,
or more generally, probability charges.
306 DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING WITH UNCERTAIN GAIN
For a given path (x; k;u), the corresponding gain J(x; k;u; !) can be seen
as a real-valued map on 
, which is denoted by J(x; k;u) and is called the
gain random quantity associated with (x; k;u). In the same way we dene
the gain random quantities g(xk;uk; k), h(xN) and J(x; k;u)M. There is gain
additivity: J(x; k;u; `; v)m = J(x; k;u)` + J(x`; `; v)m for k  `  m  N, and
J(x; k;u)k = 0. We denote by J(x; k) the set of gain random quantities for
admissible paths from initial state x 2 Xk at time k 2 [0;N]:
J(x; k) = fJ(x; k;u) : (x; k;u) 2 U(x; k)g :
We shall assume that P is a real-valued coherent extended lower prevision,
and that dom P is a linear lattice that contains at least all constant random
quantities and all gain random quantities g(xk;uk; k) and h(xN), for all k 2
[0;N 1], all xk inXk, all uk inUk, and all xN inXN. As a consequence, we can
endow dom P with a topology that suits our purpose very well, and we can
also associate with P a compact convex setM of extended linear previsions
dened on dom P such that P( f ) = minQ2MQ( f ) for any f in dom P; this has
been discussed in Section 6.2.2 on p. 272 .
7.2 Conditions for Dynamic Programming Under
a General Notion of Optimality
In Chapter 6, we have discussed ve dierent ways of associating optimal
paths with a lower prevision P, all of which occur in the literature. We
now propose to nd out whether, for these dierent types of optimality, we
can use the ideas behind the dynamic programming method to solve the
corresponding optimal control problems.
To this end, we take a closer look at Bellman's analysis as described in
Section 7.1, and we investigate which properties a generic notion of optim-
ality must satisfy for his method to work. Let us therefore assume that there
is some property, called -optimality, which a path in a given set of paths P
either has or does not have. If a path in P has this property, we say that it
is -optimal in P. We shall denote the set of the -optimal elements of P by
opt (P). By denition, opt (P)  P. Further on, we shall apply our ndings
to the various instances of -optimality described above.
7.2 CONDITIONS FOR DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING 307
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
b
c
d
a e









Figure 7.3: A More General Type of Dynamic Programming
We may also view opt as an operator on subsets of a space P, that
maps any subset T of P to a (possibly empty) subset opt (T) of that set T.
Social choice functions are a particular type of optimality operators, which
additionally satisfy opt (T) , ; whenever T , ;.
7.2.1 The Principle of Optimality
Consider Figure 7.3, where we want to nd the -optimal paths from state a
to state e. Suppose that after one time step, we can reach the states b, c and
d from state a. The -optimal paths from these states to the nal state e are
known to be , , and  and , respectively. For the dynamic programming
approach to work, we need to be able to infer from this a generalised form
of the Bellman equation, stating essentially that the -optimal paths from
a to e, a priori given by opt
 f; ; ; ; ; g, are actually also given
by opt
 f; ; ; g, i.e., the -optimal paths in the set of concatenations
of ,  and  with the respective -optimal paths , , and  and . It is
therefore necessary to exclude that the concatenations  and  with the
non--optimal paths  and  can be -optimal. This amounts to requiring that
the operator opt should satisfy some appropriate generalisation of Bellman's
principle of optimality that will allow us to conclude that  and  cannot be
-optimal because then  and  would be -optimal as well. Denition 7.3
below provides a precise general formulation.
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7.2.2 Insensitivity to The Omission of Non-Optimal Paths
But, perhaps surprisingly for someone familiar with the traditional form
of dynamic programming, opt should satisfy an additional property: the
omission of the non--optimal paths  and  from the set of candidate -
optimal paths should not have any eect on the actual -optimal paths: we
need that
opt
 f; ; ; ; ; g = opt  f; ; ; g :
This is obviously true for the simple type of optimality that we have looked
at in Section 7.1, but it need not be true for the more abstract types that
we want to consider here. Equality will be guaranteed if opt is insensitive
to the omission of non--optimal elements from f; ; ; ; ; g, in the
following sense.
Denition 7.1. Consider a set S , ; and an optimality operator opt dened
on the set }(S) of subsets of S such that opt (T)  T for all T  S. Elements
of opt (T) are called -optimal in T. The optimality operator opt is called
insensitive to the omission of non--optimal elements from S if opt (S) = opt (T)
for all T such that opt (S)  T  S.
The following proposition gives an interesting sucient condition for this
insensitivity in case optimality is associated with a (family of) strict partial
order(s): it suces that every non-optimal path is strictly dominated by an
optimal path.
Proposition 7.2. Let S be a non-empty set provided with a family of strict partial
orders > j, j 2 J. Dene for T  S, opt> j (T) =
n
a 2 T : (8b 2 T)(b 6> j a)
o
as the set
of maximal elements of T with respect to > j, and let optJ (T) =
S
j2J opt> j (T). Then
opt> j , j 2 J and optJ are optimality operators. If for some j 2 J,
(8a 2 S n opt> j (S))(9b 2 opt> j (S))(b > j a); (7.2)
then opt> j is insensitive to the omission of non-> j-optimal elements from S. If
Eq. (7.2) holds for all j 2 J, then optJ is insensitive to the omission of non-J-optimal
elements from S.
Proof. Consider j in J, and assume that Eq. (7.2) holds for this j. Let opt> j (S) 
T  S, then we must prove that opt> j (S) = opt> j (T). First of all, if a 2 opt> j (S)
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then b 6> j a for all b in S, and a fortiori for all b in T, whence a 2 opt> j (T).
Consequently, opt> j (S)  opt> j (T). Conversely, let a 2 opt> j (T) and assume
ex absurdo that a < opt> j (S). It then follows from Eq. (7.2) that there is some c
in opt> j (S) and therefore in T such that c > j a, which contradicts a 2 opt> j (T).
Next, assume that Eq. (7.2) holds for all j 2 J. Let optJ (S)  T  S, then
we must prove that optJ (S) = optJ (T). Consider any j 2 J, then opt> j (S) 
optJ (S)  T  S, so we may infer from the rst part of the proof that opt> j (S) =
opt> j (T). By taking the union over all j 2 J, we nd that indeed optJ (S) =
optJ (T). 
We are now ready for a precise formulation of the dynamic programming
approach for solving optimal control problems associated with general types
of optimality. We assume that we have some type of optimality, called -
optimality, that allows us to associate with the set of admissible pathsU(x; k)
starting at time k in initial state x, an optimality operator opt dened on
the set }(U(x; k)) of subsets of U(x; k). For each such subset V, opt (V) is
then the set of admissible paths that are -optimal in V. The principle of
optimality states that the optimality operators associated with the various
U(x; k) should be related in a special way.
Denition 7.3 (Principle of Optimality). -optimality satises the principle of
optimality if it holds for all k 2 [0;N], x 2 Xk, ` 2 [k;N] and (x; k;u) inU(x; k)
that if (x; k;u) is -optimal inU(x; k), then (x`; `;u) is -optimal inU(x`; `).
This may also be expressed as:
opt (U(x; k)) 
[
(x;k;u)`2U(x;k)`
(x; k;u)`  opt (U(x`; `)) :
The Bellman equation now states that applying the optimality operator to
the right hand side suces to achieve equality. (Usually this is stated with
` = k + 1.)
Theorem 7.4 (Bellman Equation). Let k 2 [0;N] and x 2 Xk. Assume that -op-
timality satises the principle of optimality, and that the optimality operator opt for
U(x; k) is insensitive to the omission of non--optimal elements fromU(x; k). Then
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for all ` 2 [k;N]:
opt (U(x; k)) = opt
0BBBBBB@
[
(x;k;u)`2U(x;k)`
(x; k;u)`  opt (U(x`; `))
1CCCCCCA ;
that is, a path is -optimal if and only if it is a -optimal concatenation of an admissible
path (x; k;u)` and a -optimal path of U(x`; `).
Proof. Fix k in [0;N], ` 2 [k;N] and x 2 Xk. Dene
V1 =
[
(x;k;u)`2U(x;k)`
(x; k;u)`  opt (U(x`; `)) ; and,
V2 =
[
(x;k;u)`2U(x;k)`
(x; k;u)` 

U(x`; `) n opt (U(x`; `))

:
Obviously, U(x; k) = V1 [ V2 and V1 \ V2 = ;. We have to prove that
opt (U(x; k)) = opt (V1). By the principle of optimality, no path in V2 is -
optimal inU(x; k), soV2\opt (U(x; k)) = ;. This implies that opt (U(x; k)) 
V1  U(x; k), and since opt is assumed to be insensitive to the omission of
non--optimal elements fromU(x; k), it follows that opt (U(x; k)) = opt (V1).

Let us now apply these general results to the specic types of optimality
introduced in Chapter 6. For all ve optimality operators opt>P , optM, optwP ,
optwP , and optP , we shall check whether we can use a Bellman equation to
solve the corresponding optimal control problem.
7.2.3 P-Maximality
We rst consider the optimality operator opt>P that selects from a set of paths
S those that are the maximal elements of S with respect to the preorder >P.
The following lemma roughly states that strict preference amongst paths with
respect to >P is preserved under concatenation and truncation. As a result,
the principle of optimality with respect to P-maximality holds.
Lemma 7.5. Let k 2 [0;N] and ` 2 [k;N]. Consider the paths (x; k;u)` inU(x; k)`
and (x`; `; v), (x`; `;w) in U(x`; `). Then (x`; `; v) >P (x`; `;w) if and only if
(x; k;u)`  (x`; `; v) >P (x; k;u)`  (x`; `;w).
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Proof. Let f , g, and h be random quantities in dom P. The statement is proved
if we can show that g >P h if and only if f + g >P f + h. But P(g  h) > 0 if and
only if P(( f + g)  ( f + h)) = P(g  h) > 0, g  h if and only if f + g  f + h, and
nally, g , h if and only if f + g , f + h. This establishes the equivalence. 
Proposition 7.6 (Principle of Optimality). Let k 2 [0;N], x 2 Xk and (x; k;u) 2
U(x; k). If (x; k;u) is P-maximal inU(x; k) then (x`; `;u) is P-maximal inU(x`; `)
for all ` 2 [k;N].
Proof. If (x`; `;u) is not P-maximal, then there is a path (x`; `;u) such that
(x`; `;u) >P (x`; `;u). By Lemma 7.5 we nd that
(x; k;u)`  (x`; `;u) >P (x; k;u)`  (x`; `;u) = (x; k;u):
This means that (x; k;u)`  (x`; `;u) is preferred to (x; k;u), and therefore
(x; k;u) cannot be P-maximal, a contradiction. 
As a direct consequence of Theorem 6.9 on p. 283, and Proposition 7.2, we
see that if J(x; k) is compact, then the optimality operator opt>P associated
with U(x; k) is insensitive to the omission of non-P-maximal elements. To-
gether with Proposition 7.6 and Theorem 7.4, this allows us to infer a Bellman
equation for P-maximality.
Corollary 7.7. Let k 2 [0;N] and x 2 Xk. If J(x; k) is compact, then for all
` 2 [k;N]
opt>P (U(x; k)) = opt>P
0BBBBBB@
[
(x;k;u)`2U(x;k)`
(x; k;u)`  opt>P (U(x`; `))
1CCCCCCA ; (7.3)
that is, a path is P-maximal if and only if it is a P-maximal concatenation of an
admissible path (x; k;u)` and a P-maximal path of U(x`; `).
Corollary 7.7 results in a procedure to calculate all P-maximal paths. In-
deed, opt>P (U(x;N)) = fu;g for every x 2 XN, and opt>P (U(x; k)) can be
calculated recursively through Eq. (7.3). It also provides a method for con-
structing a P-maximal feedback: for every x 2 Xk, choose any (x; k;u(x; k)) 2
opt>P (U(x; k)). Then (x; k) = uk(x; k) realises a P-maximal feedback.
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Figure 7.4: A Counterexample
7.2.4 M-Maximality
We now turn to the optimality operator optM, dened through Eq. (6.7)
on p. 286. If we recall Proposition 7.2, we see that optM is insensitive to the
omission of non-M-maximal elements ofU(x; k) wheneverJ(x; k) is compact.
By Proposition 7.6, optM satises the principle of optimality (indeed, if a
path isM-maximal, then it must be P-maximal for some P 2 M, and by the
proposition any truncation of it is also P-maximal, hence alsoM-maximal).
This means that the Bellman equation also holds for M-maximality under
similar conditions as for P-maximality. As shown in Theorem 6.17 on p. 288,
both types of optimality coincide if J(x; k) is convex.
7.2.5 P-Maximinity and P-Maximaxity
We come to the types of optimality associated with the strict partial orders
wP and wP. It follows from Theorem 6.24 on p. 291 and Proposition 7.2
that if J(x; k) is compact, the optimality operator optwP is insensitive to the
omission of non-P-maximin paths from U(x; k), and a similar observation
holds for optwP . But, as the following counterexample shows, the principle of
optimality holds for neither P-maximinity, nor P-maximaxity, and therefore
the dynamic programming approach may not work here. Essentially, this
is because the preorders wP and wP are not vector orderingsthey are not
compatible with gain additivity: contrary to expected gains, lower and upper
expected gains are not additive.
Example 7.8. Consider the dynamical system depicted in Figure 7.4. Let
 =
f]; [g and denote the random quantity that maps ] 7! x and [ 7! y by 
x; y.
Let P be the vacuous lower prevision on 
, dened by P(
x; y) = minfx; yg.
Assume that J() = h2; 0i, J() = h0; 1i and J() = h 2; 0i (there is zero gain
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associated with the nal state). Then  bP : indeed, h2; 1i does not dom-
inate h0; 0i point-wise, and P(h2; 1i) = minf2; 1g  minf0; 0g = P(h0; 0i) or
equivalently h0; 0imaximises the smallest expected gain. Hence, we nd that
 is P-maximin. But  AP : indeed, P(h0; 1i) = minf0; 1g > minf 2; 0g =
P(h 2; 0i), which means that  is not P-maximin. So P-maximinity does not
satisfy the principle of optimality.
It's not so hard to construct a similar counterexample for P-maximaxity.
7.2.6 Weak P-Maximality
It can be shown easily that ifJ(x; k) is compact, the optimality operator optP
onU(x; k) is insensitive to the omission of non-weakly-P-maximal paths from
U(x; k). But, as the following counterexample shows, we cannot guarantee
that the principle of optimality holds for weak P-maximality, and therefore
the dynamic programming approach may not work here. Again, this is
because the partial order P is not compatible with gain additivity. It also
indicates that by solving the Bellman-type equation advocated in [41], we
will not necessarily get paths that are optimal in the sense described above.
Example 7.9. Consider again the dynamical system depicted in Figure 7.4.
As before, let 
 = f]; [g, let P be the vacuous lower prevision on 
, and
denote the random quantity that maps ] 7! x and [ 7! y by 
x; y. Assume
that J() = h2; 0i, J() = h0; 0i and J() = h 1; 1i (there is zero gain associated
with the nal state). Then  2P : indeed, h2; 0i does not dominate h1; 1i
point-wise, and, P(h2; 0i) = minf2; 0g  maxf1; 1g = P(h1; 1i). Hence, we
nd that  is weakly P-maximal. But  P : indeed, P(h0; 0i) = minf0; 0g >
maxf 1; 1g = P(h 1; 1i), which means that  is not weakly P-maximal. So,
weak P-maximality does not satisfy the principle of optimality.
7.3 Example: Pol&Jo versus Renthouse
Suppose we have a total amount of money x at our disposal, which we can
invest into two companies, named Pol&Jo and Renthouse, and which we
shall simply denote by 0 and 1. We denote our investment in company 0 by
u0, and in company 1 by u1. Observe that x, u0 and u1 are non-negative real
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numbers, and u0 + u1  x. The total gain is
J(x;u0;u1) = !0u0 + !1u1 + !2(x   u0   u1);
where !0 > 0, !1 > 0 are gain factors (for companies 0 and 1), and !2 > 0
is the devaluation factor (of the money we have not invested). We wish to
maximise the gain, but, we are uncertain about !0, !1 and !2. We know that
!0 = 1 + g0 +  and !1 = 1 + g1 + . g0 and g1 model the productivities of
the companies, and models economical variations that aect each company
in the same way, such as the global economical state. We do not make any
assumption about the dependence between g0, g1,  and !2. We only know
that g0 2 [0:0; 0:3], g1 2 [0:1; 0:2],  2 [ 0:1; 0:2] and !2 2 [0:85; 0:95]. This
leads to the following lower prevision on the set L(
0;
1;
2) of bounded
random quantities on (
0;
1;
2):
P( f ) = inf
n
f (1 + g0 + ; 1 + g1 + ; !2) :
g0 2 [0:0; 0:3]; g1 2 [0:1; 0:2];  2 [ 0:1; 0:2]; !2 2 [0:85; 0:95]
o
:
This P is intuitively acceptable as a supremum buying price for any bounded
random quantity f on
0 
1 
2, as we have explained in Section 3.5.1 on
p. 60, Eq. (3.5) in particular.
We formulate this problem in terms of a dynamical system. If we dene
x0 = x and, recursively xk+1 = xk   uk, the total gain is precisely equal to
J(x;u; 0), with g(xk;uk; k; !) = !kuk and h(x2; !) = !2x2. Each state xk repres-
ents the money we can invest in companies `  k, and should therefore be
non-negative. Obviously, there is gain additivity.
Note that the gain random quantities !0u0, !1u1, and !2x2, are P-essen-
tially bounded, so, for the purpose of optimal control, it suces to consider
the (real-valued) extended lower prevision P] dened on the set (linear lattice)
of all P-essentially bounded random quantities; see Chapter 5, Section 5.3 on
p. 225 , Eq. (5.12) on p. 234 in particular. We now wish to nd all u0 and
u1 such that the gain J(x;u0;u1) is P]-maximal. Observe that this is a two-
dimensional optimisation problem. For any initial state x, the set J(x; 0) of
admissible gain random quantities is compact: the set A = f(u0;u1) : u0 
0;u1  0;u0 + u1  1g is closed and bounded, and therefore compact with
respect to the usual topology on R2, and J(x; ; ), as a mapping from A to
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K ]P(
1;
2;
3), is continuous: if u0 ! u0 and u1 ! u1, then
u0!0 + u1!1 + (x   u1   u2 )!2 ! u0!0 + u1!1 + (x   u1   u2)!2
for all (!0; !1; !2) in
0 
1 
2 (point-wise convergence), and
P](jJ(x;u0 ;u1 )   J(x;u0;u1)j)
 (1 + 0:3 + 0:2   0:85)ju0   u0j + (1 + 0:2 + 0:2   0:85)ju0   u0j ! 0
(P]-norm convergence).
So, there is gain additivity, andJ(x; 0) is compact, so Corollary 7.7 applies:
we can solve this problem using dynamic programming.
For k = 1, we nd that the control u1 = x1 is optimal from state x1 at
time 1. Indeed, rst observe that all controls are maximal with respect to the
point-wise order. In that case, optimality of u1 is equivalent to P
]
(J(x1;u1; 1) 
J(x1; v1; 1))  0 for all v1. This holds if and only if
sup
n
(1 + g1 +    !2)(u1   v1) :
g1 2 [0:1; 0:2];  2 [ 0:1; 0:2]; !2 2 [0:85; 0:95]
o
 0;
and thus, if and only if u1  v1 for all v1. Hence, optimal paths maximise u1.
The highest u1 we can choose such that x2 is still non-negative is u1 = x1.
For k = 0, the dynamic programming argument says that we only have
to consider concatenations of (x0;u0; 0)1 with optimal paths from state x1 =
x0 u0, of which there is only one, (x1; x1; 1), as we showed. Again all controls
are maximal with respect to the point-wise order. But
P]

J((x0;u0; 0)1  (x0   u0; x0   u0; 1))   J((x0; v0; 0)1  (x0   v0; x0   v0; 1))

 0
also holds for any u0 and any v0. Indeed, the inequality is equivalent to
sup
n
(g0   g1)(u0   v0) : g0 2 [0:0; 0:3]; g1 2 [0:1; 0:2];  2 [ 0:1; 0:2]
o
 0
which obviously holds for any choice of u0 and v0. Thus, all paths (x0;u0; 0)1
(x0   u0; x0   u0; 1) are optimal.
In conclusion, the information implies that we should invest all money x,
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but we cannot infer how we should divide x over the two companies.
By our dynamic programming approach we have have managed to solve
this two-dimensional optimisation problem by reducing it to two one-dimen-
sional ones, which are each very easy to solve. In the more general case of
uncertain investment with n companies, we initially have a n-dimensional
optimisation problem, and dynamic programming reduces this to n very
simple one-dimensional optimisation problems.
Let's now discuss a more sophisticated example.
7.4 Example: Robust Sequence Alignment
7.4.1 Introduction
Aligning genetic sequences is a very widely used and important technique
in bioinformatics, see for instance Mount [58]. To give a few examples,
through sequence alignment we can determine evolutionary relationships
among species, and in particular, we can reconstruct phylogenetic trees. An
alignment may also reveal functional regions in genetic sequences. Such
information may for example lead to the discovery of new or improved
drug treatments, or may help in deciding what treatment is best tted for
a particular patient genotype. Sequence alignment is also a handy tool in
predicting structural and biochemical properties of sequences.
The alignment problem is usually formulated as an optimisation problem.
Basically, positive scores are assigned to matches, and negative scores are
assigned to mismatches and gaps. These scores are summarised in what is
called a score matrix. We aim to nd the alignment with the highest total score.
This approach has two benets: (i) it allows us to characterise the optimal
(best) alignment from all possible alignments in an objective way, and (ii)
the highest score, corresponding to the best alignment, provides us with an
objective measure of the quality of this alignment. Moreover, Needleman and
Wunsch [60] have developed an ecient dynamic programming algorithm
to calculate the optimal alignment of a small number of sequences (say,
two or three sequences). In this article, we will focus on pair-wise sequence
alignment, that is, the alignment of only two sequences.
Clearly, aligning genetic sequences relies heavily on the choice of the
score matrix: how should we reward matches, and how should punish gaps
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and mismatches? In practice, a large number of score matrices are being
used, and precise choice of the score matrix relies on additional assumptions
about the sequences under study. For example, when using PAM score
matrices, introduced by Dayho, Schwartz, and Orcutt [15], and on which
we will focus here, the following assumptions are made (a more detailed
explanation follows in Section 7.4.2):
 the evolutionary distance of the sequences to their closest common
ancestor is known,
 evolution is in an equilibrium point,
 in this equilibrium point, there is evolutionary reversibilityany point
mutation is as probable as its reverse,
 point mutations at dierent locations in the sequence are i.i.d., and
 point mutations at dierent times are i.i.d.
Dierent evolutionary distances induce dierent score matrices. These ma-
trices are denoted by PAM(T), where T denotes the evolutionary distance
between the sequences under study and their closest common ancestor. Of
course, the above assumptions are not meant to summarise the current state
of the artmuch research in molecular evolution is devoted to generalising
these assumptions.
Estimating the evolutionary distance is a major issue in molecular evol-
ution, especially when comparing short sequences. Indeed, `estimation bias
usually occurs when the sequence length is short so that stochastic eects
are strong' (Gu and Li [39, p. 5899, right column, ll. 2527]). In many cases,
one can only rely on the sequences under study to estimate evolutionary
distanceno additional information is available.
One approach is somehow to guess the evolutionary distance from the
similarity of the two sequences. Typically, PAM250 is chosen if the sequences
are 20% similar, PAM120 if they are 40% similar, PAM60 if they are 60% sim-
ilar, etc. It is however not entirely clear how in general similarity percentages
can be derived from two sequences, prior to alignment.
Another approach consists in solving the optimisation problem not for
one, but for a set of PAM matrices, or even with dierent other methods,
and then choose the method that returns the highest optimal score. The
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H-alpha V-LSPADKTNVKAAWGKVGAHAGEYGAEA
| | | | | | |||| | | ||
H-beta VHLTPEEKSAVTALWGKV--NVDEVGGEA
X 10 20
Figure 7.5: An extract from a possible alignment of hemoglobin alpha and beta chains,
produced by `Alion' (Nevill-Manning, Huang, and Brutlag [61]).
performance of dierent alignment methods has been studied, and one of
the interesting results that have come out of such studies is that `for dierent
pairs many dierent methods create the best alignments', and hence, that `if
a method that could select the best alignment method for each pair existed,
a signicant improvement of the alignment quality could be gained' (see
Elofsson [32]). However, in practice it is computationally unfeasible to try out
a large numbers of methods and to tune all parameters (such as evolutionary
distance, gap penalty, etc.) for each one of them.
We shall investigate whether a bias in the evolutionary distance also leads
to a bias in the optimal alignment. In particular, we shall generalise the well-
known Needleman-Wunsch algorithm (see Needleman and Wunsch [60]) in
order to determine whether an alignment, or parts of it, are insensitive to
the evolutionary distance in an interval. In order to do so, we rely on the
extension of the dynamic programming formalism developed before.
7.4.2 Optimal Sequence Alignment
What is Sequence Alignment?
A sequence alignment consists of writing two (or more) sequences in rows,
and writing similar characters in the same column. In doing so, one is
allowed to introduce so-called gaps, denoted by a dash `-' in either one of
the sequences. Assuming that the sequences are derived from a common
ancestor sequence, matches correspond to conserved regions, mismatches
correspond to mutations and gaps correspond to deletions or insertions,
briey called indels, in either one of the sequences. Figure 7.5 gives an
example of an amino acid alignment.
It is convenient to represent alignments in a grid, as depicted in Figure 7.6.
All paths from the upper left corner to the lower right corner represent pos-
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sible alignments. The path drawn in Figure 7.6 corresponds to the alignment
given in Figure 7.5. A diagonal move introduces no gaps, a downwards
move introduces a gap in the upper sequence, a rightwards move introduces
a gap in the lower sequence.
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Figure 7.6: Alignments can be conveniently represented in a grid.
When trying to explain evolutionary relationships between sequences,
we should identify the alignment that has the highest chance of being the
result of an evolutionary process. That is, we try to explain the alignment as
the result of evolution from a common ancestor.
We rst show how evolutionary dynamics can be described on the level of
genetic sequences. Then we show how a score matrix is obtained from these
dynamics, and how the resulting optimisation problem indeed identies the
alignment that has the highest chance of being the result of evolution from a
common ancestor.
Evolutionary Sequence Dynamics
The PAM (`point accepted mutation') matrices are widely accepted as the
standard scoring system when looking for evolutionary relationships in pro-
tein sequences. They are related to the evolution of amino acid sequences
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described by a Markov model for amino acid substitution (see Dayho,
Schwartz, and Orcutt [15]). Indels, which introduce alignment gaps, are
not modelled by PAM and are treated separately. We will only give a very
brief description of the basic ideas underlying the dynamics. A more ex-
tensive discussion and improvements of this approach can be found in for
instance Dayho, Schwartz, and Orcutt [15], Jones, Taylor, and Thornton [46],
Benner, Cohen, and Gonnet [5], and Mu¨ller and Vingron [59].
Let At(i) denote the amino acid at site i at (discrete) time t of a sequence of
length N. It is rst assumed that amino acids mutate independently at each
site of the sequence. This implies that the probability of the sequence At to
evolve to the sequence At+s is equal to
P[At+sjAt] =
QN
i=1 P[At+s(i)jAt(i)]: (7.4)
Hence, it suces to know only the probabilities P[At+s(i)jAt(i)] at each site i
of the sequence. It is also assumed that amino acids mutate independently
in time,
P[At+s(i)jAt(i)] =
Qt+s 1
r=t P[Ar+1(i)jAr(i)]: (7.5)
We thus only need to know the probabilities P[Ar+1(i)jAr(i)] at each site i and
time r.
Finally, assuming that the transition probabilities are identically distrib-
uted in time and space, P[Ar+1(i)jAr(i)] does not depend on the actual values
of r and i, but only on the amino acids Ar(i) and Ar+1(i). Hence, if we know for
any pair (a; b) of amino acids the probability P[bja] of a being substituted by b
after one unit of time, then we also know the probability of any sequence At
evolving to At+s, through Eqs. (7.4) and (7.5). Under the assumptions made
so far, this establishes that we can model evolution of amino acid sequences
through a Markov model.
It is convenient to assume that evolution from ancestors to descendants
is modelled by the same Markov process as the evolution from descendants
to ancestors, that is, that the Markov process is time-reversible. Assuming
P[bja] > 0 for all amino acid pairs (a; b), the Markov process attains a stationary
distribution  after a sucient long time. Moreover,  is independent of the
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initial distribution, and is the unique solution of
X
a
P[bja][a] = [b]: (7.6)
Assuming we attained this equilibrium, the process is time-reversible if and
only if (Ross [67])
P[bja][a] = P[ajb][b]: (7.7)
Consider two amino acid sequences, B and C, that have evolved from
a common ancestor A in t time units. Assuming time-reversibility, and
assuming that all amino acids in A are i.i.d. according to the stationary
distribution , evolution from A to B and C in t time units is equivalent to
evolution from B to A in t time units, and then from A to C in t time units.
But this is equivalent to evolution from B to C in 2t time units. Hence, we can
calculate the probability of B and C having evolved from a common ancestor
in t time units simply by calculating the probability of C having evolved from
B in 2t time units.
In practice, the transition probabilities P[bja] of the Markov model are
estimated using a large dataset of sequences that have already been aligned
(originally, sequences from closely related species were considered, that is,
sequences of at least 85% similarity). Many generalisations of this model
have been developed, dropping stationarity of the transition probabilities,
allowing dierent transition probabilities on dierent sites, etc.
A Log Likelihood Ratio Scoring
Using the Markov model for amino acid evolution, a scoring matrix is derived
that has the interpretation of a log likelihood ratio. The entries of the matrix
are roughly given by (up to a normalisation factor)
st(a; b) = log
Levol[a; b](t)
Lrand[a; b]
; (7.8)
that is, the logarithm of the likelihood that a and b are aligned as a con-
sequence of the evolutionary Markov process from a common ancestor t
time units ago, divided by the likelihood that a and b are aligned `by chance',
that is, as a consequence of a multinomial process, where amino acid frequen-
cies are obtained from the same data used to construct the Markov model.
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A positive score st(a; b) means that a and b are more likely to be aligned by
evolution than by chance, a negative score means the opposite. Remark that
st(a; b) = st(b; a).
To obtain a score for sequences, recall that we assumed dierent sites on
sequences to be independent. Hence, the log likelihood ratio of two aligned
sequences B and Cof equal length and without gapsis obtained by adding
the log likelihood ratios at each site of the sequences:
St(B;C) =
NX
i=1
st(B(i);C(i)) (7.9)
If we interpret the score as a gain and sequences as paths, we already observe
that there is `gain additivity'; we shall rely on this property when applying
dynamic programming.
Gap Scoring
More generally, let B be a sequence of length N, and let C be a sequence of
length M. Consider any alignment u of B and C, and denote the characters
(amino acids or gaps) at site i in the alignment by Bu(i) and Cu(i). The score
of the alignment is given by
St(B;C)(u) =
KX
i=1
st(Bu(i);Cu(i)); (7.10)
where K is the length of the alignment. If both Bu(i) and Cu(i) are amino acids,
the st(Bu(i);Cu(i)) is given by the log likelihood ratio (Eq. (7.8)). If either one
of them, say Bu(i), is a gap, then the score is given by minus the gap opening
penalty g if Bu(i   1) is not a gap, and by minus the gap extension penalty r if
Bu(i   1) is a gap (g and r are positive).
Choice of Score Matrix and Gap Penalties
As argued before, the score for a pair of amino acids is given by Eq. (7.8). This
score rewards alignments that are more likely by evolution than `by chance',
and punishes alignments that are less likely by evolution than `by chance'.
Gap openings are less likely than gap extensions, and therefore the gap
opening penalty g is chosen substantially higher than the gap extension
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penalty r. The gap penalties should also be chosen relative to the range of
scores in the score matrix. If the gap penalty is too high, gaps will never
appear in the optimal alignment. And if it is too low, too many gaps will
appear in the optimal alignment.
Much research has been devoted to analysing how the score matrix and
gap penalties should be chosen. The choice of the score matrix is based
mainly on the evolutionary dynamical model and estimates of the evolu-
tionary distance. Through statistical analysis, appropriate gap opening and
extension penalties have been motivated for various score matrices (see for
instance Pearson [64]).
One result is that a good choice for the score matrix, and consequently also
a good choice for the gap penalties, can be made based on the evolutionary
distance between sequences and their closest common ancestor.
Needleman-Wunsch Algorithm
Finding the optimal alignment is at rst sight an extremely hard computa-
tional task. The number of possible alignments of two sequences of length N
grows exponentially with N. Even for sequences of modest length, comput-
ing power is far from able to compare that many sequences in a reasonable
amount of time.
Dynamic programming provides a method for exponentially reducing
the number of alignments that need to be considered in order to nd the
optimal one (see Needleman and Wunsch [60]). We shall not discuss the
original algorithm here; instead, we shall immediately discuss a generalised
version of the algorithm in Section 7.4.4 further on, as the original version is
then simply obtained as a special case.
7.4.3 Modelling Evolutionary Distance by a Coherent Lower
Prevision
In Section 7.4.2, it was argued that a good choice of the score matrix and the
gap penalties can be made based on the evolutionary distance between the
sequences under study and their closest common ancestor. Unfortunately,
for short sequences, estimation of evolutionary distance is subject to serious
bias due to stochastic eects (see Gu and Li [39]). Instead of somehow
trying to improve evolutionary distance estimates between short sequences
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by reducing stochastic eectsthis may well be impossiblewe propose a
dierent approach.
Instead, does a bias in the evolutionary distance also lead to a bias in the
optimal alignment? Or, in other words, how sensitive is the alignment to
the chosen value for evolutionary distance? It is well-known that optimal
alignment is quite sensitive to the choice of the score matrix, especially for
long sequences (see Elofsson [32]). But for short sequences, this does not
need to be the case. To give an extreme example: if we would nd that
the optimal alignment is independent of the evolutionary distance, we also
should not have to worry about it.
Lower previsions provide the perfect tool for performing such a sens-
itivity analysis. Let us briey recall the essentials of the theory of lower
previsions that we need and apply them to the alignment problem.
Let T = ft 2 R : t  0g be the space of possible evolutionary distances t
between two sequences B and C and their closest common ancestor. Let T
denote the corresponding random variable, which takes values inT . Assume
that the only additional information we have about T is that it takes a value
in the interval [t1; t2], for some t1  t2. This information is modelled by
a vacuous lower prevision relative to [t1; t2] (see Section 3.5.1 on p. 60 and
Section 5.3 on p. 225 , Eq. (5.12) on p. 234 in particular), and leads to the
following strict preference relation between alignments (see Denition 6.4
on p. 278; note that for simplicity of exposition, we omit the point-wise
ordering):
Denition 7.10 (Preference). Let u and v be two alignments (of B and C).
Then, u is said to be strictly preferred to v, and we write u >[t1;t2] v, if
inf
t2[t1;t2]
[St(B;C)(u)   St(B;C)(v)] > 0: (7.11)
The total scores S(B;C)(u), interpreted as random quantities on T, are
assumed to be bounded on [t1; t2]; this is usually the case, and it allows us to
apply the dynamic programming results of this chapter without any further
complications.
If u >[t1;t2] v then there is an  > 0 such that St(B;C)(u) > St(B;C)(v) +  for
every t 2 [t1; t2]. This means that, independently of the evolutionary distance
in [t1; t2], u is (uniformly) a strictly better alignment of B and C than v. In
such a case, we should of course prefer u over v.
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The optimisation problem can now also be restated. Usually, the partial
order >[t1;t2] will not have a greatest element. Therefore, it makes more
sense to look for undominated, or maximal elements, as we have argued in
Section 6.3.1 on p. 276 .
Denition 7.11 (Maximality). Say an alignment u is maximal with respect to
[t1; t2] if v [t1;t2] u, that is, if
sup
t2[t1;t2]
[St(B;C)(u)   St(B;C)(v)]  0; (7.12)
for all possible alignments v of B and C.
The idea behind this denition is that, if we do not prefer any other
alignment v over u, then we should consider u as a good alignment candidate.
Through pair-wise comparison, the information we have does not allow us
to make a better choice than u. An ecient algorithm for nding all maximal
alignments will be given in Section 7.4.4. But let us rst make a few important
remarks.
Firstly, the notion of maximality generalises the classical notion of optim-
ality. Indeed, if t1 = t2 = t then any maximal alignment actually maximises
the score St(B;C)(v) over all possible alignments v (this is a very simple in-
stance of Corollary 6.8 on p. 282).
Secondly, it is often argued that it is important to nd the best alignment.
But, when looking for maximal alignments, we do not obtain a single solu-
tion, but rather a set of solutionsperhaps even a pretty large set. At rst
sight, this may seem undesirable. Nevertheless, even a set of best possible
alignments can be useful:
 If we obtain a large set, then this simply means that we have insucient
information in order to construct the best alignment.
 We might be lucky and nd that there is only one maximal alignment. If
that is the case, we actually also know that this alignment is insensitive
to any assumptions made about evolutionary distance in the interval
[t1; t2].
 More generally, there may be certain constant patterns in the set of
maximal alignments, i.e., it may happen that certain regions are con-
sistently aligned over the whole set of maximal alignments. We then
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do not only know that these regions are optimally aligned, but also
that they are insensitive to any assumptions made about evolutionary
distance in the interval [t1; t2].
7.4.4 Finding Maximal Alignments Through Dynamic Pro-
gramming
We briey discuss how the dynamic programming algorithm is implemented
to nd all maximal alignments.
Let B be a sequence of length N, and let C be a sequence of length M.
First, nding maximal alignments of B and C is restated in terms of nding
the maximal paths of a dynamical system. This is done by interpreting
alignments as paths of a dynamical system, and scores as gains associated
with that path. Figure 7.6 on p. 319 illustrates how to interpret pair-wise
alignment as a dynamical system. The grid represents the state space. At
each point in the grid we can move either rightwards, downwards, or along
the diagonal (except at the right and bottom borders). The gain associated
with a move from position (i; j) if the previous move was p, is given by
Gt(i; j; p; #) =
8>>><>>>:
rt; if p =#
gt; otherwise
Gt(i; j; p;!) =
8>>><>>>:
rt; if p =!
gt; otherwise
Gt(i; j; p;&) = St(B(i);C( j))
The gain associated with a path is simply given by the sum of the gains of
each move.
The gain depends on the evolutionary distance t. Since the gain also
depends on the previous move we must extend the state space with an addi-
tional state variable p at each point (i; j) in order to remember our previous
move. Otherwise, we cannot apply the dynamical programming formalism.
Let U(i; j; p) denote the set of all paths from (i; j; p) to the right bottom
corner. Observe that p denotes the previous move, p 2 f#;!;&g, which is
needed in order to calculate the gain (in order to tell the dierence between
a gap opening and a gap extension). LetV(i; j; p) denote the set of maximal
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paths from (i; j; p) to the bottom right corner, that is,
V(i; j; p) = max>[t1 ;t2]U(i; j; p) (7.13)
It is convenient to dene V(i; j; p) = ; whenever i > N or j > M. Observe
that U(i; j; p) is a nite set for every state (i; j; p). Hence, the compactness
condition under which the generalised Bellman equation holds is trivially
satised [24].
Theorem 7.12 (Generalised Bellman Equation). For any state (i; j; p) the fol-
lowing equality holds:
V(i; j; p) = max
>[t1 ;t2]
(
(i; j; p; #) V(i + 1; j; #); (i; j; p;!) V(i; j + 1;!);
(i; j; p;&) V(i + 1; j + 1;&)
)
(7.14)
where (i; j; p; #)V(i+ 1; j; #) denotes the set of all concatenations of the downward
move from state (i; j; p), with a maximal path from state (i + 1; j; #), etc.
Eq. (7.14) yields an ecient recursive algorithm to calculate the set of all
maximal paths V(0; 0;&), and hence, all maximal alignments. It solves a
global maximisation problem by solving 3MN smaller maximisation prob-
lems (see Figure 7.7).
7.4.5 Test Case
As a demonstration of our approach, consider two sequences of length 80:
VLSPADKTNVKAAWGKVGAHAGYGAEALERMFLSFPTTKTYFPHFDLSHGSAVKGHGKKVAKALSAVHLDDMPNALSALS
MVHLTPEEKSAVTALWGKVNVDEVGGEALGRLVSRLLVVYPWTQRFFESFGDLSTPDAVMGNPKVKAHGKKVLGAFSDGL
The relation between these sequences is quite well known, but, for the sake
of exposition, let's assume we don't know anything about the evolutionary
distance between these two sequences. Let's therefore consider the collection
of all PAM matrices ever considered in sequence alignment: PAM2, PAM3,
. . . , up to PAM450: PAM2 corresponds to a very short evolutionary distance,
and PAM450 corresponds to an extremely long evolutionary distance (see
Dayho, Schwartz, and Orcutt [15]).
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** initialisation **
for p=|,-,\
MAX(N,M,p)={(M,N,p)}
for i=0 to N
MAX(i,M+1,p)={}
next i
for j=0 to M
MAX(N+1,j,p)={}
next j
next p
** dynamic programming **
for i=N to 0
for j=M to 0
for p=|,-,\
if (i<N) or (j<M)
** Bellman **
MAX(i,j,p)=max{
(i,j,p;|)+MAX(i+1,j,|),
(i,j,p;-)+MAX(i,j+1,-),
(i,j,p;\)+MAX(i+1,j+1,\)
}
next p
next j
next i
Figure 7.7: A rough sketch of the algorithm for calculating maximal alignments.
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Running the above algorithm, we nd a very modest number of optimal
alignments: the set of all alignments has only 18 maximal elements (see
Table 7.1).
Moreover, within this set, there are surprisingly long robust segments: in
all of the 18 maximal alignments, the pattern
V--LSPADKTNVKAAWGKVGAHAGYGAEALE??--??FLSFPTTKTYFPHF-DLSHGSA????????????????????????????
MVHLTPEEKSAVTALWGKVNVDEV-GGEALG??VS??LVVYPWTQRFFESFGDLSTPDA????????????????????????????
is present. Consequently, the choice of the PAM matrix is irrelevant to the
alignment of these subsequences. The simulation, implemented through a
very simple, hardly optimised C++ program, takes 5 minutes, 37 seconds,
and 660 milliseconds, on a 1.8GHz Mobile Intel r Pentium with 512 mega-
bytes of memory. As a comparison, on the same machine, this document was
LATEX'ed from raw LATEX source in 27 seconds and 491 milliseconds.
This example demonstrates one possible way of how the theory of lower
previsions can be applied in bioinformatics, allowing us to substantially
weaken assumptions we have to make about data, for instance about the
evolutionary distance. In this example, we did that by means of an interval
rather than using a point estimate: it turns out that a good alignment (or set
of alignments) still can be found in an ecient way, through a generalisation
of the well-known Needleman-Wunsch algorithm.
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Chapter 8
Dynamic Programming and
Learning Dynamics
Throughout Chapter 7, we have assumed the system dynamics to be de-
terministic. This greatly simplied the discussion, still encompassed a large
number of interesting applications, and did not suer from the computational
problems which are often encountered when dealing with non-deterministic
dynamical systemssimply because in general the number of possible (ran-
dom) paths tends to grow exponentially with the size of the state spaceX and
the number of time steps. Nevertheless, when studying the optimal control
of dynamical systems, one easily nds examples where the dynamics itself
is subject to uncertainty. It certainly seems an interesting challenge to study
also these systems from the view-point of the theory of lower previsions, and
to know in what cases those computational problems can be overcome. As
a initial step in that direction, we investigate in this chapter the applicability
of Bellman's dynamical programming algorithm to a very simple type of
dynamical system, namely with
 nite state space X, and
 nite control spaceU.
First, we shall review the most important results already achieved in this
eld, and identify their shortcomings. Then, in an attempt to remedy those
shortcomings, we shall suggest a dierent model, and try to nd all optimal
paths based on the notions introduced in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.
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8.1 Introduction
One of the most important models describing non-deterministic nite-state
systems are Markov decision processes, which are essentially controlled
Markov chainsnote that Markov chains were originally devised to study
natural language texts; see Markov [55]. Markov decision processes model
the uncertainty about the dynamics through so-called transition probabilit-
ies. Assuming the reward for each transition under each control action to
be known, an optimal control is then obtained by maximising the expected
reward; this comes down to maximising expected utility, as explained in Sec-
tion 6.1 on p. 268. This maximisation problem, and many variants thereof,
can be solved eciently using dynamic programming techniques; see for
instance Bertsekas [8] for an excellent overview.
Already early in the development of the theory of Markov decision pro-
cesses it was recognised that the transition probabilities themselves are often
subject to uncertainty, simply because they are often hard to measure in prac-
tice. To deal with the lack of information about the transition probabilities,
two solutions have been suggested and studied in the literature:
(i) learningwe update our knowledge about the transition probabilities
as we observe transitions; see for instance Bellman [3], Martin [56], and
Satia and Lave [68].
(ii) setswe only assume that the transition probabilities belong to some
convex set; see for instance Wolfe and Dantzig [93], Satia and Lave [68],
White and Eldeib [90], Givan, Leach, and Dean [36], Harmanec [41],
and Kozine and Utkin [52].
Both solutions have their drawbacks. The learning-based solution relies
heavily on prior information about the transition probabilities. If this prior
information is incorrect, the optimal control law can be subject to serious
bias in the initial phase of the control process. A drawback of the set-based
solution is that it does not involve learning, and ignores possibly useful
information that is available in many practical problems. Moreover, it has
a problematic relation with optimality: working with a set of transition
probabilities, we can only associate a lower and upper expected reward,
i.e., an interval for the expected reward, with each control law. Almost all
authors therefore have considered only maximin or maximax solutions. They
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develop algorithms, based on dynamic programming, to nd control laws
that either maximise the minimal expected gain (pessimistic, maximin), or
that maximise the maximal expected gain (optimistic, maximax), ignoring
possibly optimal control laws in between.
One notable exception is provided by Harmanec [41], who suggests a dy-
namic programming algorithm to calculate the set of all maximal elements
with respect to a partial preference order which is based on comparing in-
tervals, i.e., interval dominance (introduced in Section 6.6 on p. 292). In that
way, not only the extreme solutions are recovered. However, Harmanec [41]
did not question in what sense his proposed dynamic programming method
leads to optimal policies. As we have already argued, we should approach
the problem from the opposite side: we rst dene a notion of optimal-
ity and investigate whether the dynamic programming argument holds or
not for this notion of optimality, instead of blindly generalising Bellman's
algorithm.
We have shown in Chapter 7 that the dynamic programming argument
holds if our notion of optimality satises two conditions: (i) the principle of
optimality, and (ii) insensitivity with respect to the omission of non-optimal
elements. Unfortunately, the principle of optimality is not satised when
using the partial ordering, namely interval dominance, suggested by Har-
manec [41]: this follows from the counterexample of Section 7.2.6 on p. 313.
Hence, Harmanec's [41] algorithm actually does not result in optimal control
laws in the sense of maximality with respect to the suggested partial order-
ing. In Chapter 7, we suggested a dierent partial order for deterministic
systems with uncertain gain, which does satisfy the principle of optimality
and the insensitivity property. However, as is also noted by Harmanec [41],
this partial order does not simply generalise to non-deterministic systems.
As we shall see in Section 8.3, the reason is that in Markov decision processes
there is so-called act-state dependence.
Our primary goal is to combine the learning-based solution with the set-
based solution in order to overcome the problems from which each of these
methods suer separately. Basically, we wish to update the set of transition
probabilities based on observations of previous transitions. A Markov de-
cision process can be considered as a collection of independent multinomial
sampling models (see Martin [56]), and we have a well-developed tool for
updating imprecise prior information about multinomial sampling models:
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the imprecise Dirichlet model, which is due to Walley [87]. Before doing this,
we rst need to generalise preference to the case of act-state dependence.
We then show that there are fairly general conditions under which the prin-
ciple of optimality and insensitivity with respect to omission of non-optimal
elements still hold.
The main result of this quest shall be that, under fairly general assump-
tions, which are satised if we invoke the imprecise Dirichlet model, we
can apply dynamic programming to nd, not only maximin or maximax,
but the set of all optimal control laws. In doing so, we make only very
weak assumptions about the transition probabilities, and we can incorporate
learning about them. Unfortunately, for the learning approach to work, the
control laws must depend on the complete state history (as with its clas-
sical counterpart; see Bertsekas [8]), and therefore, a direct implementation
of the suggested dynamic programming algorithm will only be feasible for
problems with relatively small state spaces and small control spaces.
Section 8.2 is concerned with the denition and properties of conditional
lower previsions, which we shall need extensively further on. In Section 8.3
we motivate a new partial preference order which allows for act-state de-
pendence. In Section 8.4 we precisely dene the class of dynamical systems
under study and describe how to compare control laws according to the
preference order introduced in Section 8.3. Our main result is in Section 8.5,
where we state conditions for the principle of optimality to hold. Together
with the insensitivity property, which is almost trivially satised for the sys-
tems under study, this means that we can construct a dynamic programming
algorithm. In order to demonstrate that the conditions for which the prin-
ciple of optimality holds are not overly restrictive, we show in Section 8.6
that they are satised in case of simultaneous learning and optimal control
of a Markov decision process by means of an imprecise Dirichlet model. In
Section 8.7 we present a numerical example.
8.2 Conditional Lower Previsions
8.2.1 Denition
Let us consider two random variables, say X and Y. For the sake of simplicity,
and as we do not need the more general case, we shall assume that they can
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only assume a nite number of values: X andY are nite sets. Consequently,
all random quantities involved are bounded, and hence, are gambles.
The conditional lower prevision P( f jy) of a gamble f on X conditional on
y 2 Y is dened as the supremum buying price for f , conditional on the
observation of the value y of Y; P( f jy) is the highest price s such that for any
t < s, we are willing to pay t after observing Y = y, but prior to observation of
X, if we are guaranteed to receive f (x) when observing X = x. Mathematically,
P(j) is a real-valued mapping dened on some subset of
L(X) Y = f( f ; y) : f 2 L(X); y 2 Yg:
Only to simplify the notation in the proof of Theorem 8.1 below, we shall
assume that the domain of P(j) is nite. All results extend straightforwardly
to the general case.
Fixing y, we can view P(jy) as a lower prevision on X. We shall say
that P(j) separately avoids sure loss if P(jy) avoids sure loss for each y 2 Y.
Similarly, we shall say that P(j) is separately coherent if P(jy) is coherent
for each y 2 Y. Note that Walley [86, Section 6.2, pp. 289293] has a slightly
dierent notion of separate coherence. Our denition of separate coherence
is not as general as Walley's, but it is much simpler, and it suces for the
purpose of this work.
As we have explained in Section 4.1 on p. 95 ., if P(j) separately avoids
sure loss, then for each y inY, the natural extension of P(jy) to the set L(X)
of all gambles on X exists, and is real-valued. We shall denote this natural
extension by E(jy). Note that E(j) is now a separately coherent conditional
lower prevision on all ofL(X)Y. We shall call it the separate natural extension
of P(j).
It is convenient to view the separate natural extension E(j) in a slightly
dierent way, namely, as aL(X;Y)L(Y)-mapping, which we shall denote by
E(jY):
E( f (X;Y)jY)(y) := E( f (X; y)jy); (8.1)
for any gamble f (X;Y) in L(X;Y). Here, f (X; y) denotes a gamble on X by
xing the value y of Y in f , i.e., f (X; y)(x) := f (x; y).
In case of n variables X1, . . . , Xn, each of the conditional lower previ-
sions, resp. P(jx1) dened on a subset of L(X2) for each x1 in X1, P(jx1x2)
dened on a subset ofL(X3) for each (x1; x2) inX1X2, . . . , and P(jx1 : : : xn 1)
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dened on a subset ofL(Xn) for each (x1; : : : ; xn 1) inX1  Xn 1, extends
through the method described aboveresp. to a L(X1;X2)L(X1)-mapping,
aL(X1;X2;X3)L(X1;X2)-mapping, . . . , and aL(X1; : : : ;Xn)L(X1; : : : ;Xn 1)-
mapping. Concatenating all of these mappings, we end up with a collec-
tion of L(X1; : : : ;Xn)L(X1; : : : ;Xi)-mappings (i 2 f1; : : : ;n   1g), which cor-
respond in fact to the following conditional lower previsions, each dened
on L(X1; : : : ;Xn):
E( f jX1 : : :Xn 1) := E( f jX1 : : :Xn 1) (8.2a)
E( f jX1 : : :Xn 2) := E(E( f jX1 : : :Xn 1)jX1 : : :Xn 2) (8.2b)
= E(jX1 : : :Xn 2)  E(jX1 : : :Xn 1)( f )
E( f jX1 : : :Xn 3) := E(E( f jX1 : : :Xn 2)jX1 : : :Xn 3) (8.2c)
= E(jX1 : : :Xn 3)  E(jX1 : : :Xn 2)  E(jX1 : : :Xn 1)( f )
:::
E( f jX1) := E(E( f jX1X2)jX1) (8.2d)
= E(jX1)  E(jX1X2)      E(jX1X2 : : :Xn 1)( f )
for any gamble f on (X1; : : : ;Xn). We shall call these conditional lower pre-
visions the marginal extensions of the conditional lower previsions P(j),
P(j  ), . . . , and P(j  : : : ). In the classical theory of probability Eq. (8.2)
is Bayes rule. It generalises Walley's marginal extension [86, Section 6.7,
pp. 313314] for the special case we study.
Note that, when for instance x1 is xed in Eq. (8.2d), it follows thatE(jx1)
is a coherent lower prevision on L(X2; : : : ;Xn). This simply follows from
the separate coherence of each of the mappings E(jX1), E(jX1X2), . . . , and
E(jX1X2 : : :Xn 1). So, Eq. (8.2d) denes a separately coherent conditional
lower prevision. In the same way, it follows that all of the marginal extensions
are separately coherent.
8.2.2 Marginal Extension Theorem
We now prove that Eq. (8.2) agrees with the conditional lower prevision
obtained by application of the axioms of rationality (Axiom 3.1 on p. 49) on
the original assessments P(j), P(j), . . . , and P(j: : : ), as in Theorem 4.3
on p. 96 for the unconditional case. This works simply as follows: for any g
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in dom P(jx1 : : : xi), we are marginally disposed to accept the gain gamble
h
g(Xi+1)   P(g(Xi+1)jx1 : : : xi)
i
I(X1;:::;Xi)=(x1;:::;xi):
Indeed, if the outcome of (X1; : : : ;Xi) is not equal to (x1; : : : ; xi), then this gain
gamble has zero gain, which is marginally acceptable: we're willing to accept
it if we also receive an arbitrary small amount of strictly positive utility
along with the gamble. If the outcome is (x1; : : : ; xi), then we are disposed
to pay any price strictly less than P(g(Xi+1)jx1 : : : xi) for the gamble g(Xi+1),
so g(Xi+1)   P(g(Xi+1)jx1 : : : xi) +  is acceptable for any  > 0, or equivalently,
g(Xi+1)   P(g(Xi+1)jx1 : : : xi) is marginally acceptable.
Now, the axioms of rationality imply that if a collection of gambles is
marginally acceptable, then so must be any non-negative linear combination
of them, and so must be any gamble that is point-wise larger than such a
sum. So, x for instance x1 in X1, and let f be any gamble on (X1; : : : ;Xn). If
for some choice of g;x1;:::;xi  0 and  in R, it holds that
 f (X1;X2; : : : ;Xn)    IX1=x1

X
(x2;:::;xn)
n 1X
i=1
X
g2dom P(jx1:::xi)
g;x1;:::;xi
h
g(xi+1)   P(g(Xi+1)jx1 : : : xi)
i
I(X1;X2;:::;Xi)=(x1;x2;:::;xi)
or equivalently, if
f (x1;X2; : : : ;Xn)   

n 1X
i=1
X
g2dom P(jx1X2:::Xi)
g;x1;X2;:::;Xi
h
g(Xi+1)   P(g(Xi+1)jx1X2 : : :Xi)
i
;
then the gamble  f (X1;X2; : : : ;Xn)    IX1=x1 should also be marginally ac-
ceptable, or equivalently, the lower prevision of f , conditional on x1, should
be at least . The idea of the theorem below, and of natural extension in
general, is to maximise  subject to the constraints implied by the axioms of
rationality.
Let's mention that Eq. (8.2) can also be given an interpretation as the smal-
lest coherent lower prevision that is a behavioural extension of the original
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assessments, however, the precise formulation of this result is not straightfor-
ward, and therefore we shall simply accept Eq. (8.2) as the natural extension
of the original assessments. The theorem below supports that choice. We
refer to Walley's book [86, Chapters 78] for an in depth discussion of the
conceptual diculties encountered when dealing with conditional lower pre-
visions. Note that the equation below is essentially an instance of Walley's
much more general denition of natural extension; see Walley [86, Section 8.1,
pp. 408415]. In case that the conditional lower previsions P(j  : : : ) are
independent of their conditioning random variables (i.e., if P(jx1) is inde-
pendent of the value of x1 in X1, P(jx1x2) is independent of the values of
x1 in X1 and x2 in X2, etc.), then Theorem 8.1 also proves that our marginal
extension agrees with the forward irrelevant product, see De Cooman and
Miranda [22, p. 454, Eq. (4) and Theorem 1]. De Cooman and Zaalon [25,
p. 118, Theorem A.1] proved a stronger version of Theorem 8.1 in case of two
conditioning random variables.
Theorem 8.1. Let k 2 f1; : : : ;n   1g, let f be any gamble on (X1; : : : ;Xn), and
let (x1; : : : ; xk) be any element of X1      Xk. The marginal extension of f
conditional on (x1; : : : ; xk), that is, E( f (x1; : : : ; xk;Xk+1; : : : ;Xn)jx1 : : : xk), is equal
to the maximum achieved by  subject to the constraints
f (x1; x2; : : : ; xn)    
n 1X
i=k
X
g2dom P(jx1:::xi)
g;x1;:::;xi
h
g(xi+1)   P(gjx1 : : : xi)
i
(8.3)
for all (xi+1; : : : ; xn) in Xi+1      Xn, where each g;x1;:::;xi may vary over the set of
non-negative real numbers.
Proof. It suces to prove the case k = 1: the general case then follows simply
by considering (X1; : : : ;Xk) as a single variable.
If Eq. (8.3) is satised, then, since E( f (x1;X2; : : : ;Xn)jx1) corresponds to a
coherent lower prevision when x1 is xed,
E( f (x1;X2; : : : ;Xn)jx1)   

n 1X
i=k
E
 X
g2dom P(jx1:::xi)
g;x1;X2;:::;Xi
h
g(Xi+1)   P(g(Xi)jx1X2 : : :Xi)
i x1
!
:
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The term for i = n   1 is bounded from below by zero:
E
 X
g2dom P(jx1:::xn 1)
g;x1;X2;:::;Xn 1
h
g(Xn)   P(g(Xn)jx1X2 : : :Xn 1)
i x1
!
= E(jx1)  E(jx1X2)      E(jx1X2 : : :Xn 1) X
g2dom P(jx1:::xi)
g;x1;X2;:::;Xn 1
h
g(Xn)   P(g(Xn)jx1X2 : : :Xn 1)
i !
= E(jx1)  E(jx1X2)      E(jx1X2 : : :Xn 2) X
g2dom P(jx1:::xi)
g;x1;X2;:::;Xn 1
E

g(Xn)   P(g(Xn)jx1X2 : : :Xn 1)
x1X2 : : :Xn 1
!
 0;
since we dened E(jx1X2 : : :Xn 1) exactly as the separate natural extension
of P(jx1X2 : : :Xn 1). In the same way, it follows that all other terms, for
i 2 f1; : : : ;n   2g, are non-negative as well. Hence, we nd that
E( f (x1;X2; : : : ;Xn)jx1)     0;
and therefore,E( f (x1;X2; : : : ;Xn)jx1) must be at least as large as the maximum
achieved by  under the given constraints.
To prove the converse inequality, x any  > 0. Consider again i = n   1.
By Theorem 4.3 on p. 96, for each (x2; : : : ; xn 1) in X2      Xn 1 and each g
in dom P(jx1 : : : xn 1), we may choose g;x1;x2;:::;xn 1  0 such that
E( f (x1; x2; : : : ; xn 1;Xn)jx1x2 : : : xn 1)   
  +
X
g2dom P(jx1:::xi)
g;x1;x2;:::;xn 1 P(g(Xn)jx1x2 : : : xn 1)
and at the same time
f (x1; x2; : : : ; xn 1;Xn)   +
X
g2dom P(jx1:::xn 1)
g;x1;x2;:::;xn 1 g(Xn);
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so,
X
g2dom P(jx1:::xn 1)
g;x1;x2;:::;xn 1
h
g(Xn)   P(g(Xn)jx1x2 : : : xn 1)
i
 f (x1; x2; : : : ; xn 1;Xn)   E( f (x1; x2; : : : ; xn 1;Xn)jx1x2 : : : xn 1) + 
Similarly, for i = n   2, we may choose g;x1;x2;:::;xn 2  0 such that
X
g2dom P(jx1:::xn 2)
g;x1;x2;:::;xn 2
h
g(Xn 1)   P(g(Xn 1)jx1x2 : : : xn 2)
i
 fn 1(x1; x2; : : : ; xn 2;Xn 1)   E( fn 1(x1; x2; : : : ;Xn 1)jx1x2 : : : xn 2) + ;
where we choose fn 1(x1; x2; : : : ; xn 2;Xn 1) such that it cancels with a term
in the previous expression, namely E( f (x1; x2; : : : ;Xn 1;Xn)jx1x2 : : :Xn 1). For
i = n   3, we choose g;x1;x2;:::;xn 3  0 such that
X
g2dom P(jx1:::xn 3)
g;x1;x2;:::;xn 3
h
g(Xn 2)   P(g(Xn 2)jx1x2 : : : xn 3)
i
 fn 2(x1; x2; : : : ; xn 3;Xn 2)   E( fn 2(x1; x2; : : : ;Xn 2)jx1x2 : : : xn 3) + ;
choosing fn 2(x1; x2; : : : ; xn 3;Xn 2) such that it cancels with a term in the pre-
vious expression, namely E( fn 1(x1; : : : ; xn 3;Xn 2;Xn 1)jx1 : : : xn 3Xn 2). Con-
tinuing this process until i = 1 and summing all inequalities, we recover
that
n 1X
i=1
X
g2dom P(jx1:::xi)
g;x1;:::;xi
h
g(xi+1)   P(gjx1 : : : xi)
i
 f (x1; : : : ; xn)   E( f2(x1;X2)jx1) + (n   1);
for every  > 0. Expressing f2 directly as a function of f , i.e., tracing back its
denition, we nd that
f2(x1;X2jx1)
= E(jx1)  E(jx1X2)      E(jx1X2 : : :Xn 1)( f (x1;X2; : : : ;Xn))
= E( f (x1;X2; : : : ;Xn)jx1);
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which establishes the desired inequality. Indeed, for every , the constraints
are satised by choosing g;x1;:::;xi 's as constructed above, and choosing  =
E( f (x1;X2; : : : ;Xn)jx1) (n 1). Therefore, the maximum achieved byunder
the given constraints must be at leastE( f (x1;X2; : : : ;Xn)jx1) (n 1). Since this
holds for any  > 0, the maximum is actually at least E( f (x1;X2; : : : ;Xn)jx1).

8.3 P-Maximality under Partial Act-State Depend-
ence
In this section we generalise P-maximality to the case in which there is (par-
tial) act-state dependence. This will allow us to model simultaneous learning
and optimal control. The analysis that follows may seem overly complicated
and unnecessary, but these ideas are nevertheless essential to explain under
what conditions dynamic programming fails when we simultaneously learn
and act.
Let X be a combination of two random variables  and , i.e., X = (;)
and X =  . Assume that actions a 2 A do not inuence the value of
. So, our beliefs about  can be modelled by a coherent extended lower
prevision P on some linear subspace of R(), independent of the action a we
take. For each action a 2 A and each  2, suppose that our (act-dependent)
beliefs about are modelled through a conditional extended lower prevision
Pa(j) dened on some linear subspace of R().
We assume that for all actions a and all possible values of , the random
quantity Ja(; ), as an element of R(), belongs to dom Pa, and that for all
actions a, the random quantity Pa(Jaj), as an element of R(), belongs to
dom P.
Denition 8.2. For any two actions a and b in A, we say that a is strictly
preferred to b with respect to P and P(j) if
P(Pa(Jaj)   Pb(Jbj)) > 0: (8.4)
Let's explain how Eq. (8.4) establishes a strict preference of action a over
action b. First, note that since there is act-state independence with respect to
, taking an action does not inuence the value  of , so whatever action
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we take, the value of is the same. Moreover, it does not matter whether we
observe  prior to taking an action, or after taking an action. However, we
cannot say anything about  prior to taking an action (at this point, we could
only model it using the vacuous lower prevision on ). So, it does matter
whether we observe  prior to taking an action, or after taking an action, and
the outcome of  is expected to depend on the action we take. We're now
ready for a precise formulation:
If Eq. (8.4) is satised, then we are willing to pay a strictly positive price
prior to the observation of  and  in order to engage in the two-stage
gamble that consists of taking action a and gaining Ja(; ) after observation
of =  and = , and then taking action b and losing Jb(; 0) after a second
observation of  =  and  = 0. Indeed:
 Using the behavioural interpretation of P, Eq. (8.4) says that we are
willing to pay a strictly positive price prior to observation of in order
to receive Pa(Jaj)  Pb(Jbj), if  turns out to be the value of, and this
independent of the action we take. Hence, it also holds that for some
 > 0, we are, prior to observing , willing to pay a strictly positive
price in order to receive Pa(Jaj)   and to lose Pb(Jbj)+  if  has been
observed.
 Suppose now  has been observed. Then, using the behavioural in-
terpretation of Pa(Jaj), for any  > 0 we are willing to lose Pa(Jaj)   
prior to observation of , in order to take action a and receive Ja(; )
after observation of  = .
 But, we are also willing to take action b and lose Jb(0; ) after observa-
tion of  = 0, if we receive Pb(Jbj) +  prior to observation of .
Combining all these dispositions, we conclude that prior to any observation
of  and , we are willing to pay a strictly positive price in order to take
action a and receive Ja(; ), and then to take action b and lose Jb(0; ). Let's
emphasise again that we can take the same value  of  because the action
we take has no inuence on the value of this variable.
If there is full act-state dependence, we can identify with X, and we re-
cover the ordering used by Harmanec [41] in the context of imprecise Markov
decision processes: Pa(Ja) > Pb(Jb). This corresponds to interval dominance,
i.e., weak preference without point-wise ordering; see Denition 6.25 on
p. 292.
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In case of full act-state independence, we can identifywith X, recovering
P( fa  fb) > 0; we used this strict preference relation before (again, if we ignore
point-wise dominance), see Denition 6.4 on p. 278. This order is stronger
than the interval ordering, so it leads to a smaller set of optimal actions:
this makes sense according to the principle that the stronger our beliefs, the
smaller the set of optimal actions, if we view act-state independence as an
additional piece of information.
8.4 Imprecise Statistical Decision Processes
We now introduce dynamical systems with uncertain dynamics described
by conditional lower previsions. These systems, which we term imprecise
statistical decision processes, include Markov decision processes and generalise
them to imprecise probabilities. However, we do not assume the Markov
condition to hold a priori because predictions about the dynamics of the
system must be allowed to depend on the full system history, if we are to
learn about the dynamics based on observations of the behaviour of the
system in the past.
8.4.1 States, Controls and Control Laws
Let X denote the nite set of states the system can assume, and letU denote
the nite set of controls we can apply. The variable that represents the system
state at time k is denoted by Xk, and a particular value of Xk is denoted by
xk. We assume that there is a time N beyond which we are not interested in
dynamics of the system. Consider the system at time k. We can imagine
 observing Xk = xk,
 applying the control k(xk) 2 U and observing Xk+1 = xk+1,
 applying the control k+1(xkxk+1) 2 U and observing Xk+2 = xk+2,
 etc.,
 applying the control N 1(xkxk+1 : : : xN 1) 2 U and observing XN = xN.
This control operation is characterised by a nite sequence of functions k =
(k; k+1; : : : ; N 1), where ` : X` k+1 !U. We call k a control law from time
k. We denote the set of all control laws from time k by k.
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With each control law k 2 k we can associate a gain gamble from time `
after observation of xk : : : x` 1 (with `  k; if ` = k then xk : : : x` 1 is assumed to
be an empty sequence, i.e., there is no observation, and we may also write
Jk (xk; : : : ; xN)),
Jk(xk :::x` 1)(x`; : : : ; xN) =
N 1X
q=`
gq(xq; q(xk : : : xq); xq+1) + gN(xN) (8.5)
It is interpreted as a gamble on (X`; : : : ;XN). Each transition incurs a gain:
starting at time q in state xq, applying control uq 2 U and arriving in
state xq+1 2 X, we receive an amount gq(xq;uq; xq+1) of linear utility. Ar-
riving in the nal state xN at time N, we receive an additional gain gN(xN).
Observe that Jk(xk :::x` 1) depends on k only through `(xk : : : x` 1X`), . . . ,
N 1(xk : : : x` 1X` : : :XN 1). This sequence, which corresponds to the control
law k after observation of xk : : : x` 1, is denoted by k(xk : : : x` 1).
Our goal is to nd optimal control laws, that is, control laws that maximise
their corresponding gain gamble. In order to do so, we construct a strict
partial order on gain gambles, as in Eq. (8.4). This order is derived from
conditional lower previsions that describe the uncertain dynamics of the
system.
8.4.2 A Learning Model for Uncertain Dynamics
A simple way to describe uncertain dynamics, including learning, is as fol-
lows. Suppose at time k we select k, and applying k up to time ` (`  k)
we observe xk : : : x`. We can now model our knowledge about the state at
time ` + 1 by a lower prevision on some nite subset of L(X`+1), conditional
on xk : : : x`, and depending on the control history k(xk), . . . , ` 1(xk : : : x` 1)
and the current control `(xk : : : x`). The lower previsions may depend on
the full system history, and not only on the current control and state as is
the case with Markov decision processes. This allows us to adapt our model
according to observations of the system history, and hence, to incorporate
learning the system dynamics.
As in Section 8.3, we separate those variables which are not inuenced
by the control law. Hence, we describe the dynamics by a lower prevision P on
some nite subset of L(), and conditional lower previsions Pk (jxk : : : x`)
on some nite subset of L(X`+1), for each k 2 k, each k  ` < N, each state
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sequence xk : : : x` and each value of .1 The conditional lower prevision is
allowed to depend on the control law k, but the parameters  are assumed
not to be inuenced by the control law.
At rst sight, the separation of act-state independent variables may ap-
pear to be merely a technical matter. But in fact, from Theorem 8.5 it will
follow that this separation is essential to make the principle of optimality work
when the dynamics is described by an imprecise probability model. If we do
not separate those variables, we naturally arrive at the weaker ordering used
by Harmanec [41] which does not satisfy the principle of optimality.
How can we identify act-state independent variables? Looking at the
example invoking the imprecise Dirichlet model for learning dynamics at
the end of Section 8.5, these variables naturally arise as the hyper-parameters
of the model, because they only model prior information. Thus in general,
modelling learning by an imprecise hierarchical model, the hyper-parameters
of the model, which are commonly used to represent prior information, are
a natural choice for act-state independent variables. The remaining vari-
ables, in particular the states at dierent time points, will usually be act-state
dependent.
The conditional lower previsions Pk (jxk : : : x`) combine, through sep-
arate natural extension and the marginal extension theorem, to
Ek
(jxk : : : x`) = Ek (jxk : : : x`)  Ek (jxk : : : x`X`+1)    
    Ek (jxk : : : x`X`+1 : : :XN 1) (8.6)
onL(X`+1; : : : ;XN), as in Eq. (8.2). We can now use Eq. (8.4) to compare control
laws after observation of a state sequence. Of course, after such observation
it only makes sense to compare control laws with the same control history.
Letk(xk : : : x`;uk : : : u` 1) denote the set of those elements k ofk for which
k(xk) = uk; k(xkxk+1) = uk+1; : : : ; ` 1(xk : : : x` 1) = u` 1: (8.7)
It is convenient to identify k(xk) with k.
The natural extension of the unconditional lower prevision P to the set of
all gambles on  is denoted by EP.
Denition 8.3. Letk, k 2 k(xk : : : x`;uk : : : u` 1). We say thatk is preferred
1A better but very heavy notation would be Pk(xk):::`(xk :::x`)(jxk : : : x`).
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Figure 8.1: A simple sequential decision process
to k after observation of state sequence xk : : : x` and application of control
sequence uk : : : u` 1, and we write k >xk :::x` ;uk :::u` 1 k, if
EP(Ek (Jk(xk :::x`)jxk : : : x`)   Ek (Jk(xk :::x`)jxk : : : x`)) > 0: (8.8)
Observe that, once xk : : : x` and uk : : : u` 1 are xed, the ordering depends
on k and k only through k(xk : : : x`) and k(xk : : : x`). It is easy to show that
>xk :::x` ;uk:::u` 1 is a strict partial order. Using Eq. 6.5 on p. 278, we obtain an
optimality criterion for control laws by selecting as optimal the set of those
actions which are maximal with respect to the partial order of Eq. (8.8).
Denition 8.4. A control law k 2 k is said to be optimal if it is max-
imal in k(xk) with respect to >xk for each each xk 2 X. Let k  ` <
N   1. The control law k is said to be optimal from time ` if it is max-
imal in k(xk : : : x`; k(xk) : : : ` 1(xk : : : x` 1)) with respect to the partial order
>xk :::x` ;k(xk):::` 1(xk :::x` 1) for each state sequence xk : : : x`.
Does this denition make sense? By assumption, k is nite, and the
existence of maximal control laws with respect to >xk :::x` ;k(xk):::` 1(xk :::x` 1) is
easy to prove, as is the existence of control laws which are simultaneously
maximal with respect to >xk :::x` ;k(xk):::` 1(xk :::x` 1) for all state sequences xk : : : x`.
8.5 The Principle of Optimality
Consider the sequential decision process depicted in Fig. 8.1. At each time k
we can choose between two actions, u and v. We shall make no assumption
on the connection between actions and dynamics, nevertheless, it may be
convenient for the reader to assume such a connection. Consider the control
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law 0 which applies v at time 0, and u if x1 = x and v if x1 = y at time 1:
0(x) = v;
1(xx) = u;
1(xy) = v:
The principle of optimality stipulates that if 0 belongs to the set of optimal
control laws from time 0, then the control law 0(x), which applies u if x1 = x
and v if x1 = y at time 1, should belong to the set of optimal control laws
from time 1. As a consequence, we can signicantly reduce the complexity
of calculating the set of optimal control laws. To see how this works, assume
that for instance 1, specied by 1(x) = v and 1(y) = u, is not optimal from
time 1. Using the principle of optimality, 0 and 00, specied by
0(x) = u; 00(x) = v
1(xx) = 1(x) = v; 01(xx) = 1(x) = v;
1(xy) = 1(y) = u; 01(xy) = 1(y) = u;
cannot be optimal from time 0, because otherwise 1 should have to be
optimal by the principle of optimality. Hence, when we already know the
optimal control laws from time ` + 1, we can use this information in order to
reduce the search space when looking for optimal control laws from time `.
Of course, we can do this only if reducing the search space does not change the
set of optimal elements we eventually end up with: our notion of optimality
must be insensitive to the omission of non-optimal elements. Observe that the
number of control laws grows exponentially with the length of the paths
under consideration, but by the principle of optimality and the insensitivity
property we do not need to consider most of them. In this way, we arrive at
an exponential speedup in the search for the set of all optimal control laws.
Writing this down in a formal way, we arrive at a generalisation of Bellman's
equation.
Fortunately, the insensitivity property holds in all cases where the search
space is nite and optimality is induced by a partial ordering: it suces
that every non-optimal element is dominated by an optimal element. But
this is immediate, as the set of all possible actions is nite. The principle
of optimality is more dicult to establish. The following theorem states
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sucient conditions under which the principle of optimality holds for the
imprecise statistical decision problems under study.
Theorem 8.5 (Principle of Optimality). Let k < N and k 2 k. For any
k  ` < N, it holds that if k is optimal from time ` then it is optimal from time
` + 1, whenever all of the following conditions are satised:
 The conditional lower previsions Ek (jxk : : : x`) are linear, for all k  ` < N,
all values of , and all state sequences xk : : : x`.
 EP is vacuous, that is, there is a subset T of such that EP( f ()) = inf2T f ()
for any gamble f on .
 For any x`+1 2 X it holds that
EP(Ek (IX`+1=x`+1 jxk : : : x`)) > 0: (8.9)
Proof. First, observe that for any control law k = (k; : : : ; N 1) it holds that
the marginal extension Eq. (8.6) is linear, and
Ek (Jk(xk :::x`)jxk : : : x`) = Ek (g(x`; `(xk : : : x`);X`+1)jxk : : : x`)
+ Ek

Ek (Jk(xk :::x`X`+1)jxk : : : x`X`+1)xk : : : x` (8.10)
We prove the theorem by contraposition. Assume that k = (k; : : : ; N 1) is
not optimal from time ` + 1. Then there must be a state sequence xk : : : x`+1
and a control law k = (k; : : : ; N 1) which is preferred to k after observation
of xk : : : x`+1 and application of control sequence k(xk) : : : `(xk : : : x`),
k(xk) = k(xk);
: : : ;
`(xk : : : x`) = `(xk : : : x`); (8.11)
and
inf
2T
(Ek (Jk(xk :::x`+1)jxk : : : x`+1)   Ek (Jk(xk :::x`+1)jxk : : : x`+1)) > 0; (8.12)
Since Eq. (8.11) and Eq. (8.12) only depend on k through k(xk : : : x`+1),
8.5 THE PRINCIPLE OF OPTIMALITY 349
we are free to choose the remaining components of k. For instance, choose
`+1(xk : : : x`X`+1) = `+1(xk : : : x`X`+1);
: : : ;
N 1(xk : : : x`X`+1 : : :XN 1) = N 1(xk : : : x`X`+1 : : :XN 1); (8.13)
whenever X`+1 , x`+1. But, for this choice of k, it holds that k is also pre-
ferred to k after observation of only xk : : : x` and application of the controls
k(xk) : : : `(xk : : : x` 1).
Indeed, this statement follows if we can prove that
inf
2T
(Ek (Jk(xk :::x`)jxk : : : x`)   Ek (Jk(xk :::x`)jxk : : : x`)) > 0: (8.14)
By Eq. (8.11) it holds that
Ek (jxk : : : x`) = Ek (jxk : : : x`)
since Ek (jxk : : : x`) only depends on k through k(xk : : : x`). Using this
equality when applying Eq. (8.10) on both k and k, we nd that Eq. (8.14)
is equivalent to
inf
2T
(Ek (Ek (Jk(xk :::x`X`+1)jxk : : : x`X`+1)
  Ek (Jk(xk :::x`X`+1)jxk : : : x`X`+1)jxk : : : x`)) > 0:
By Eq. (8.13), and again since Ek (Ek (Jk(xk :::x`X`+1)jxk : : : x`X`+1)) only depends
on k through k(xk : : : x`X`+1), this is equivalent to
inf

(Ek (IX`+1=x`+1 [Ek (Jk(xk :::x`+1)jxk : : : x`+1)
  Ek (Jk(xk :::x`+1)jxk : : : x`+1)]jxk : : : x`)) > 0;
where IX`+1=x`+1 is the indicator function of the singleton fx`+1g. But this strict
inequality follows from Eq. (8.9), Eq. (8.12) and the linearity of Ek (jxk : : : x`).
The proof is established. 
Roughly, Theorem 8.5 states that the principle of optimality holds if all
the imprecision is concentrated in the state-independent part of the model,
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and if this imprecise part is of the vacuous type:  is only known to belong to
some set T  . It may appear that imprecision is more or less left out of the
picture by the requirement that the conditional lower previsions should be
linear. This is not the case: whenever the imprecise model can be described
by a set of precise models
fEk (jxk : : : x`) :  2 Tg (8.15)
and these precise models are connected through a conditioning parameter  (more
precisely, a conditioning random variable ) as in Eq. (8.15), the principle
of optimality applies when using the preference order Eq. (8.8). Imprecise
probability models are often expressed in terms of sets of precise models.
The theorem tells us that we should look for an act-state independent vari-
able which parametrises this set. If this is possible, we can apply dynamic
programming.
8.6 Invoking the Imprecise Dirichlet Model
The conditions of Theorem 8.5 are satised when we use an imprecise Di-
richlet model (introduced by Walley [87]) in order to represent learning the
system dynamics. In this model the conditional linear previsions are given
by
Ek ( f jxk : : : x`) =
X
x`+12X
f (x`+1)
s`(xk :::x`)x`x`+1 + n
`(xk :::x`)
x`x`+1 (xk : : : x`; k)
s +N`(xk :::x`)x` (xk : : : x`; k)
(8.16)
for any gamble f on X`+1, and the imprecise (vacuous) unconditional lower
prevision is given by
P(g) = inf
uxy;P
y2X uxy=1
g(); (8.17)
for all gambles g on , where  > 0 is an arbitrary small strictly positive real
number (less than 1jXj ). Let's briey explain what these expressions mean,
and how we arrive at them.
We use nuxy(xk : : : x`; k) to denote the number of transitions from state x to
state y by applying control u, in the sequence xk : : : x` subject to control law
k, and Nux (xk : : : x`; k) denotes the number of transitions that start in state x
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and apply control u, in the sequence xk : : : x` under control law k:
nuxy(xk; k) = 0; (8.18)
nuxy(xk : : : x`+1; k) = nuxy(xk : : : x`; k)
+
8>>><>>>:
1; if x` = x; x`+1 = y and `(xk : : : x`) = u
0; otherwise
(8.19)
and,
Nux (xk : : : x`; k) =
X
y2X
nuxy(xk : : : x`; k): (8.20)
Equation (8.16) is the predictive lower prevision on X`+1 which arises from an
independent product of precise Dirichlet models on the transition probabil-
ities from state x` applying `(xk : : : x`) after having observed xk : : : x` subject
to control law k [56]. We assume that observation of transitions from one
state do not inuence our knowledge about transitions from another state.
This motivates the use of an independent product of Dirichlet models, each
model modelling transitions from a particular state.
The hyper-parameters of these models are s and uxy, for each x, y 2 X
and u 2 U. The hyper-parameter s > 0 determines the adaptivity of the
model (lower s means faster learning), and the hyper-parameters uxy  ,P
y2X uxy = 1, determine the prior transition probabilities from state x to state
y applying control u. Eq. (8.17) follows then from the assumption that we
know (almost) nothing about the transition probabilities a priori. Hence, we
use the vacuous lower prevision P onL(), where we use as a notation for
the collection of all hyper-parametersuxy for x, y 2 X and u 2 U. The hyper-
parameters s and , which represent prior information about the dynamics
of the system, are obviously not inuenced by the control law k: they are
act-state independent variables. The vacuous lower prevision is chosen such
that a priori the lower probability of any transition is at least . A completely
vacuous model for the hyper-parameters  is obtained by setting  = 0, but,
we must choose  > 0 to ensure that Eq. (8.9) holds.
8.7 A Numerical Example
Consider again the Markov decision process depicted in Figure 8.1. Recall
that at each time k we can choose between two actions, u and v. Transition
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probabilities are denoted as vyx (the probability from state y to state x when
taking action v), and the reward associated with this transition is denoted
by rvyx (so, for instance, g(y; v; x) = rvyx, and h(x) = h(y) = 0). Initially, all
transition probabilities are known to be at least 110 , and we precisely know
the rewards:
ruxx = ruyx = 1 rvxx = rvyx = 2
ruxy = ruyy = 1:5 rvxy = rvyy = 0:75
Intuitively, it is clear that insucient information is available in order to
construct a unique optimal feedback. However, suppose we are in state x at
time k = 0, take action v and end up in state x at time k = 1. Then it seems
reasonable to assume that when we select action v again, the probability that
we end up in x again is higher than the probability of ending up in y. In
fact, the reward associated with this transition, rvxx, is the highest possible
reward. Even if we do not know precisely the value of vxx, after observing
the transition from state x at time k to state x at k+1 under action v, we obtain,
through the imprecise Dirichlet model (hyper-parameter s = 1), a suciently
narrow probability interval for vxx in order to ensure that we will end up
with the highest possible reward by taking action v from state x at time k = 1.
This demonstrates the possible benet of learning.
Let's verify this result, and apply Bellman's dynamic programming al-
gorithm to obtain all globally optimal feedback controls.
8.7.1 Conditional Expected Gains After Observations
Assuming a Dirichlet prior with parameters s and , we have, by Eq. (8.10),
Ek (Jk(x)jx) = k(x)xx

rk(x)xx + Ek (Jk(xx)jxx)

+ k(x)xy

rk(x)xy + Ek (Jk(xy)jxy)

(8.21)
Ek (Jk(xx)jxx) =
8>>><>>>:
sk (xx)xx +1
s+1 r
k(xx)
xx +
sk (xx)xy
s+1 r
k(xx)
xy ; if k(x) = k(xx)
k(xx)xx rk(xx)xx + k(xx)xy rk(xx)xy ; otherwise.
(8.22)
Ek (Jk(xy)jxy) = k(xy)yx rk(xy)yx + k(xy)yy rk(xy)yy (8.23)
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8.7.2 Dynamic Programming
Optimal Control Laws After Observing xx
The feedback k is optimal from xx if it holds for all 0k that
sup
 110
h
Ek (Jk(xx)jxx)   Ek (J0k(xx)jxx)
i
 0: (8.24)
 k(x) = u & k(xx) = u is not optimal. Indeed:
 Consider 0k(x) = v & 
0
k(xx) = v. Then, Eq. (8.24) becomes
sup
 110
"
sk(xx)xx + 1
s + 1 r
k(xx)
xx  
s
0
k(xx)
xx + 1
s + 1 r
0k(xx)
xx
+
sk(xx)xy
s + 1 r
k(xx)
xy  
s
0
k(xx)
xy
s + 1 r
0k(xx)
xy
#
 0;
or equivalently,
sup
 110
"
suxx + 1
s + 1 r
u
xx  
svxx + 1
s + 1 r
v
xx +
suxy
s + 1 r
u
xy  
svxy
s + 1 r
v
xy
#
 0;
or equivalently,
sup
t2[ 110 ; 910 ]
t02[ 110 ; 910 ]
"
st + 1
s + 1 r
u
xx  
st0 + 1
s + 1 r
v
xx +
s(1   t)
s + 1 r
u
xy  
s(1   t0)
s + 1 r
v
xy
#
 0;
Equivalently, with s = 1,
max
(11ruxx + 9ruxy
20  
11rvxx + 9rvxy
20 ;
19ruxx + ruxy
20  
11rvxx + 9rvxy
20 ;
11ruxx + 9ruxy
20  
19rvxx + rvxy
20 ;
19ruxx + ruxy
20  
19rvxx + rvxy
20
)
 0;
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which reduces to
max
(
11  1 + 9  1:5
20  
11  2 + 9  0:75
20 ;
19  1 + 1:5
20  
11  2 + 9  0:75
20 ;
11  1 + 9  1:5
20  
19  2 + 0:75
20 ;
19  1 + 1:5
20  
19  2 + 0:75
20
)
 0;
But, this inequality is not satised. Therefore, k(x) = u & k(xx) =
u is not optimal.
 k(x) = u & k(xx) = v is not optimal. Indeed:
 Consider 0k(x) = v & 
0
k(xx) = v. Then, Eq. (8.24) becomes
sup
 110
"
k(xx)xx rk(xx)xx  
s
0
k(xx)
xx + 1
s + 1 r
0k(xx)
xx
+ k(xx)xy rk(xx)xy  
s
0
k(xx)
xy
s + 1 r
0k(xx)
xy
#
 0;
or equivalently,
sup
 110
"
vxxrvxx  
svxx + 1
s + 1 r
v
xx + 
v
xyrvxy  
svxy
s + 1 r
v
xy
#
 0;
or equivalently,
sup
t2[ 110 ; 910 ]
"
trvxx  
st + 1
s + 1 r
v
xx + (1   t)rvxy  
s(1   t)
s + 1 r
v
xy
#
 0;
Equivalently, with s = 1,
max
( rvxx + 9rvxy
10  
11rvxx + 9rvxy
20 ;
9rvxx + rvxy
10  
19rvxx + rvxy
20
)
 0;
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which reduces to
max
(
1  2 + 9  0:75
10  
11  2 + 9  0:75
20 ;
9  2 + 1  0:75
10  
19  2 + 1  0:75
20
)
 0;
But, this inequality is not satised. Therefore, k(x) = u & k(xx) =
v is not optimal.
 k(x) = v & k(xx) = v is optimal. Indeed,
 For 0k(x) = v & 
0
k(xx) = v, Eq. (8.24) is trivially satised.
 Consider 0k(xx) = u & 
0
k(x) = u. Then, with s = 1, Eq. (8.24)
becomes
max
(
  11  1 + 9  1:520 +
11  2 + 9  0:75
20 ;
 19  1 + 1:520 +
11  2 + 9  0:75
20 ;
 11  1 + 9  1:520 +
19  2 + 0:75
20 ;
 19  1 + 1:520 +
19  2 + 0:75
20
)
 0;
This inequality is satised.
 Consider 0k(x) = v & 
0
k(xx) = u. Then it is similarly checked that
Eq. (8.24) is satised.
 Consider 0k(x) = u & 
0
k(xx) = v. Again, it is similarly checked
that Eq. (8.24) is satised.
 And nally, after similar considerations, it follows that that k(x) = v &
k(xx) = u is optimal too.
Optimal Control Laws After Observing xy
In a similar way, it can be shown that
 k(x) = u & k(xy) = u is not optimal.
 k(x) = u & k(xy) = v is not optimal.
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 k(x) = v & k(xy) = u is optimal.
 k(x) = v & k(xy) = v is optimal.
Applying The Principle of Optimality
By the above results, it follows that after observation of the initial state x, the
only possibly optimal controls laws are
 k(x) = v & k(xx) = u & k(xy) = u.
 k(x) = v & k(xx) = u & k(xy) = v.
 k(x) = v & k(xx) = v & k(xy) = u.
 k(x) = v & k(xx) = v & k(xy) = v.
Indeed, these are exactly the control laws which are both optimal after ob-
servation of xx, and after observation of xy, so by the principle of optimality,
and insensitivity to omission of non-optimal elements, any control law that
is optimal after observation of x must belong to this classnote that a control
law k belongs to this class if and only if k(x) = v.
It turns out that all of these control laws are optimal after observation of
x: for any k and 0k such that k(x) = 
0
k(x) = v, it holds that
sup
 110
h
Ek (Jk(x)jxx)   Ek (J0k(x)jxx)
i
 0;
using Eq. (8.21). So, all these control laws are incomparable after observation
of only x. This simply means that we don't have enough initial information
to further discriminate between them.
8.7.3 Result
We conclude that a control law k is optimal (after observation of the initial
state x) if and only if k(x) = v. We have already argued that v is, intuitively,
a good choice as an initial control: in the given example, this is the only way
to learn about the probability vxx of a transition that has the highest reward
rvxx = 2 associated to it.
We have also demonstrated how the principle of optimality can be in-
voked to sequentially reduce the set of candidate optimal control laws. In
the example, the number of candidates was halved after only one step.
Chapter 9
Conclusion
From the introductory chapters, Chapters 36, the most important conclusion
is that coherent lower previsions are belief models (Chapters 35), which
generalise many of the existing models for uncertainty, and which naturally
lead to a theory of robust optimality (Chapter 6). They allow us in Chapters 7
8 to study dynamical systems whose uncertain gain or uncertain dynamics
cannot be described by the classical theory of probability, for instance because
insucient information is available in order to identify a probability measure.
The main conclusion of Chapter 7 is that the method of dynamic pro-
gramming can in principle be extended to deterministic systems with an
uncertain gain, where the uncertainty about the gain is modelled by a lower
prevision. We have demonstrated how the principle of optimality, together
with the insensitivity property, yields an ecient recursive algorithm in or-
der to calculate optimal paths. Basically, it reduces the global optimisation
problem which requires a search over the space of all possible paths, to a
sequence of N   k (where k is the initial time, and N is the time horizon)
local optimisation problems requiring only a search over the control space
U. In this way, the principle of optimality yields an exponential speedup in
determining optimal paths. This was nicely demonstrated by the sequence
alignment algorithm (Fig. 7.7 on p. 328).
But our general study of what conditions a generalised notion of optimal-
ity should satisfy for the Bellman approach to work is of some interest in itself
too. In particular, besides an obvious extension of the well-known principle
of optimality, another condition emerges that relates to the nature of the op-
357
358 CONCLUSION
timality operators per se: the optimality of a path should be invariant under
the omission of non-optimal paths from the set of paths under consideration.
If optimality is induced by a strict partial ordering of paths, then this second
condition is satised whenever the existence of dominating optimal paths
for non-optimal ones is guaranteed.
Another important observation is that, contrary to P-maximality andM-
maximality, the dynamic programming method cannot be used to solve
optimisation problems corresponding to P-maximinity, P-maximaxity, and
weak P-maximality: for these notions the principle of optimality does not
hold in general.
From Chapter 8, where we have investigated nite-state dynamical sys-
tems with uncertain dynamics described by conditional lower previsions, we
conclude that Bellman's dynamic programming algorithm still works if the
lower previsions describing the dynamics satisfy a very particular structural
property: all the imprecision must be concentrated in the state-independent
part of the model, and this imprecise part must be of the vacuous type. It is
quite remarkable that the separation of act-state independent beliefs from act-
state dependent beliefs is essential for the dynamic programming approach
to work.
However, due to the fact that the control laws must depend on the full
system history in order to allow learning about the system dynamics, we must
repeat the algorithm at each time step for all possible system histories, and not
simply for all possible states as in the case without learning. As a result, the
algorithm still needs an exponential time, but even so, the search space has
been exponentially reduced. This is inevitable also in the classical approach,
even when considering sucient statistics; see for instance Bertsekas [8].
On the other hand, the learning approach, using the imprecise Dirichlet
model, leads to more determinate beliefs as time increases. Hence, with
longer time horizon the incomparability of control laws will be less likely,
and the size of the set of optimal control laws will tend to stabilise. In this way,
it is less prone to the problem of huge, exponentially growing sets of optimal
elements, as is often experienced with the method proposed in Harmanec
[41], and the non-learning method discussed in Chapter 7.
Appendix A
The Extended Real Numbers
In this appendix we recall the denition and elementary properties of the
extended real calculus. For the sake of completeness, the proofs are given
too; apparently, the properties of the extended real number system on which
we rely in this work, are rather hard to nd in the literature.
A.1 Denitions
Denition A.1. The setR of extended real numbers is dened byR[f 1;+1g.
Denition A.2. The addition + on R is extended to R as follows:
 1 + ( 1) =  1; +1 + (+1) = +1;
a + ( 1) =  1 + a =  1; a + (+1) = +1 + a = +1; if a 2 R:
We call a sum of extended real numbers well dened if it cannot be reduced to
+1 + ( 1) or  1 + (+1).
As usual, a+(+1) is abbreviated to a+1, and a+( 1) is abbreviated
to a   1. We also write, for instance, fPni=1 an w.d. : a1 2 A1; : : : ; an 2
Ang as an abbreviation for the set f
Pn
i=1 an :
Pn
i=1 an well dened, and a1 2
A1; : : : ; an 2 Ang, where A1, . . . , An are subsets of R.
Denition A.3. The well dened sum of two subsets A and B of R is dened
by
A + B = fa + b w.d. : a 2 A; b 2 Bg:
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Denition A.4. The multiplication  on R is extended to R as follows:
 1   1 = +1 +1 = +1;  1  +1 = +1  1 =  1;
a   1 =  1  a =  1; a  +1 = +1 a = +1; if a > 0;
a   1 =  1  a = +1; a  +1 = +1 a =  1; if a < 0;
a   1 =  1  a = 0; a  +1 = +1 a = 0; if a = 0:
Denition A.5. The ordering  on R is extended to R by dening  1  a
and a  +1 for any a 2 R.
Denition A.6. The equivalence relation= onR is extended toR by dening
 1 =  1 and +1 = +1.
We shall write x = 1 as an abbreviation of x =  1 or x = +1,
where x denotes any extended real number.
A.2 Properties
Proposition A.7. The addition + on R is commutative and associative, the
multiplication  on R is commutative and associative.
Proof. Immediate. 
Lemma A.8. For any non-zero real number , and any extended real numbers a1,
. . . , an, it holds that
Pn
i=1 ai is well dened if and only if
Pn
i=1 ai is well dened, and
in such a case

nX
i=1
ai =
nX
i=1
ai
Proof. Immediate. 
Lemma A.9. Let a, b, c and d be sums of extended real numbers. Let A and B be
subsets of R. The following statements hold.
(i) If a+ b is well dened then a and b are well dened. Conversely, if a is not well
dened or b is not well dened then a + b is not well dened.
(ii) If a and b are well dened and a  b is not well dened, then it can only be that
a = b = 1.
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(iii) a + b   a well dened implies a 2 R, b well dened and a + b   a = b.
Conversely, a 2 R and b well dened implies a + b   a well dened and
a + b   a = b.
(iv) a  b + c whenever a and b + c are well dened is equivalent to a   b  c
whenever a   b and c are well dened. Hence, also a + b  c whenever a + b
and c are well dened is equivalent to a  c   b whenever a and c   b are
well dened.
(v) If c  d whenever c and d are well dened, then a  b + c whenever a and
b + c are well dened implies that a  b + d whenever a and b + d are well
dened.
(vi) a = b + c whenever a and b + c are well dened is equivalent to a   b = c
whenever a   b and c are well dened.
(vii) sup A = sup(A n f 1g) and inf A = inf(A n f+1g).
(viii) sup(A + B) = sup A + sup B whenever the right hand side is well dened.
Proof. (i)&(ii). Immediate from the denition of well dened.
(iii). If a+ b  a is well dened then by (i) a and b are well dened. Also, a
must be a real number since a + b   a would reduce to +1 1 otherwise. In
all three cases b = 1, or b real, the equality follows. The other implication
is proven in a similar way.
(iv). If a, b or c is not well dened then the equivalence is trivial by (i).
Therefore we can assume without loss of generality that a, b and c are well
dened.
Assume that a   b is well dened. We show that under the assumption
b + c well dened implies a  b + c, a   b  c holds.
If b + c is not well dened, then we have to consider the following cases.
(Ia) b =  c =  1. In this case, a  b = +1, and c = +1 too, so a  b  c holds.
(Ib) b =  c = +1. In this case, a  b =  1, and c =  1 too, so a  b  c holds.
If, on the other hand, b + c is well dened, then we know that a  b + c.
We have to consider the following cases.
(IIa) (b+ c)  b not well dened, b+ c = b = +1. We have that a  b+ c = +1,
which implies that also a = +1, so a  b is not well dened; we reached
a contradiction, which means that this case cannot occur.
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(IIb) (b + c)   b not well dened, b + c = b =  1. Since a   b is well dened
by assumption, a >  1, and therefore a   b = +1 and a   b  c holds.
(IIc) (b + c)   b well dened. Then b 2 R. If c =  1 then the inequality
a   b  c is obvious. If c = +1 then a  b + c = +1 and the inequality
a   b  c holds. If c 2 R and a =  1 then we have a contradiction
since a  b + c, so this case cannot occur. If c 2 R and a 2 R then the
inequality a  b  c follows from the usual real calculus. Finally, if c 2 R
and a = +1 then the inequality a   b  c is obvious.
Conversely, assume that b + c is well dened. We show that under the
assumption a   b well dened implies a   b  c, a  b + c holds.
If a   b is not well dened, then we have to consider the following cases.
(Ia) a = b = +1. In this case, b + c = +1, and a = +1 too, so a  b + c holds.
(Ib) a = b =  1. In this case, b + c =  1, and a =  1 too, so a  b + c holds.
If, on the other hand, a   b is well dened, then we know that a   b  c.
We have to consider the following cases.
(IIa) (a b)+b not well dened, a b =  b =  1. We have that 1 = a b  c,
which implies that also c =  1, so b+ c is not well dened; we reached
a contradiction, which means that this case cannot occur.
(IIb) (a   b) + b not well dened, a   b =  b = +1. Since b + c is well dened
by assumption, c < +1, and therefore b + c =  1 and a  b + c holds.
(IIc) (a   b) + b well dened. Then b 2 R. If a = +1 then the inequality
a  b + c is obvious. If a =  1 then  1 = a   b  c, so c =  1, hence
b+ c =  1, and the inequality a  b+ c holds. If a 2 R and c = +1 then
we have a contradiction since a  b  c so this cannot occur. If a 2 R and
c 2 R then the inequality a  b + c follows from the usual real calculus.
Finally, if a 2 R and c =  1 then the inequality a  b + c is obvious.
The second equivalence follows simply by replacing b by  b in the rst
equivalence and using commutativity of the addition on R.
(v). Assume c and d are well dened. If a or b is not well dened then
the equivalence is trivial by (i). Therefore we can assume without loss of
generality that a and b are well dened.
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If b =  1 or c =  1, then b =  1 or d =  1, and the statement trivially
holds. Without loss of generality, we may thus assume that b and c are strictly
larger than  1. In particular, we only need to consider cases in which b + c
is well dened.
If b = +1 or c = +1, then a = +1 (whenever b + c is well dened, which
is the case) and the statement trivially holds. If both b and c are real, again
the statement trivially holds, even though d may be  1.
(vi). If a, b or c is not well dened then the equivalence is trivial by (i).
Therefore we can assume without loss of generality that a, b and c are well
dened.
The equivalence follows from (iv). Indeed,
(b + c w.d. =) a = b + c)
() (b + c w.d. =) (a  b + c and b + c  a))
() (b + c w.d. =) a  b + c) and (b + c w.d. =) b + c  a)
() (a   b w.d. =) a   b  c) and (a   b w.d. =) c  a   b)
() (a   b w.d. =) (a   b  c and c  a   b))
() (a   b w.d. =) a   b = c)
(vii). This is follows from the fact that sup ; =  1 and inf ; = +1.
(viii). If sup A =  1 then (a) A = ;, in which case A + B = ;, or (b)
A = f 1g, in which case A + B = ; or A + B = f 1g. So the proposition
holds if sup A =  1 or sup B =  1 (by commutativity of the addition and
symmetry).
If sup A = +1 then B must contain extended real numbers strictly larger
than  1 (otherwise sup A + sup B would not be well dened). For any such
number b 2 B, b >  1, we have that sup A + b = +1, whence supfa + b; a 2
A; b 2 B; a; b >  1g = +1, and consequently, supfa + b; a 2 A; b 2 B; a +
b well denedg = sup(A + B) = +1. So the proposition holds if sup A = +1
or sup B = +1 (by commutativity of the addition and symmetry).
If sup A and sup B are real numbers, then the property follows from the
continuity of the addition. 
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